A NEW CRITIQUE 
OF 
THEORETICAL THOUGHT 


BY 

HERMAN DOOYEWEERD Dr jur. 

Professor of Philosophy of Law, Free University of Amsterdam 
Fellow of the Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences 


VOLUME IV 

INDEX OF SUBJECTS AND AUTHORS 

BY 

H. DE JONGSTE 
English Master in the 1st Christian Secondary 
School of Rotterdam 


THE PRESBYTERIAN AND REFORMED PUBLISHING COMPANY 
1969 


LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGUE CARD NUMBER A 54-7310 


Original title: 
DE WIJSBEGEERTE DER WETSIDEE 


Printed in the United States of America 


PREFACE 

Although the number of subj ects and cross-references given 
in this Index might be multiplied, this fourth volume of the 
Critique of Theoretical Thought has already assumed considerable 
proportions. The compiler alone is responsible for any errors or 
regrettable omissions and only hopes that the work may be found 
useful. 

H. DE JON. GSTE 

 A 

_AALDERS, W. J., II. 
Handboek der Ethiek, 154.
De Grond der Zedelijkheid, 154, 156, 159. 


ABBILD RELATION, II, is the representational 
relation within an objective perceptual 
image, 375.
—, III, see sub.v. Representational rela


tion, 147--150. 


ABSOLUTE, I, the Idea of the Absolute must 
be related to the supratemporal, 31. 

ABSOLUTE CONSCIOUSNESS, I, in HUSSERL; it 

is a speculative metaphysical concept, 92.

ABSOLUTISM, II, of the State, in HOBBES, 

167. 
ABSOLUTIZATION, I, the rationalistic metaphysical 
way to an Archê transcendinghuman thought absolutizes the logicalfunction, 13; transcendental logicism absolutizes 
the transcendental logical function 
of theoretical thought, 19 ; the proclamation 
of the self-sufficiency of philosophic 
thought, even "within its own field",
is an absolutization of meaning, 20; therestriction "within its own field", intendedto allow man freedom in religious, aestheticor moral fields, is, theoretically, polytheism; 
such thought fights shy of proclaiming 
the theoretical god to be the only trueone, 21; the idolatrous absolutization ofthe temporal cannot be explained fromthe temporal horizon of human existence;
the idea of the absolute must be related 
to the supra-temporal; PARMENIDES absolutized 
the modal spatial aspect, 31; thepurely intentional, modal structure of thelogical function can be made into a Gegenstand, 
but not our actual logical function; 
we never arrive at a "transcendental 
logical Subject" detachable from allmodal structures of time and "absolute", 
40; the absolutization of a special synthetically 
grasped modal aspect is the sourceof all -"isms" in the theoretical pictureof reality; the attempt will entail the reduction 
of all other aspects to mere modalities 
of the absolutized one; thus in:
materialism, biologism, psychologism,
historicism, etc.; absolutization leads toantinomy; it points to a supra theoreticalstarting point, 46; a special aspect ismade into the basic denominator of all the 
others on the immanence standpoint, 47;
KANT supposed that he could gain a startingpoint 
in theoretical reason itself, whichwould rest at the basis of every theoretical 
synthesis, and was not obtained by 

the absolutization of a special scientificview, 49; the apostate man who supposesthat his selfhood is something in itself,
loses himself in the surrender to idols, in 
the absolutizing of what is relative; thisabsolutization is a manifestation of the 
ex-sistent character of the religious centre 
of our existence, 58; in the religiousabsolutizing of the historical aspect ofour existence in the self-surrender to an 
aspect of time we transcend the aspect oftime, 59; the spirit of apostasy from thetrue God is the source of all absolutizingof what is relative even in the theoretical 
attitude of thought, 61; the absolutizationof special aspects which are relative,
evokes the correlata of the latter; thesecorrelata claim an absoluteness opposedto the deified aspects; thus arises a religious 
dialectic in the basic motives ofsuch views, 63, 64 ; the classical Humanistic 
science ideal was inclined 
to eliminate the typical structures of

(83) individuality and to dissolve empirical 
reality into a continuous functionalsystem of causal relations; this is an absolutization 
of the scientific concept offunction; the deeper penetration of scientific 
thought into its "Gegenstand" revealed 
the fundamental deficiency of theoretical 
thought in comparison with naiveexperience, 84 ; the absolutization of aesthetic 
individuality, in HEMSTERHUIS, 463;
of temporal love, in E. BRUNNER, at theexpense of justice, 320.
—, II, of theoretical thought in Immanence 
Philosophy, 8, 14 ; of certain modalaspects in speculative metaphysics, 38;
of causality, 40; in the argument of Godas prima causa, 41; of the moral aspect in

KANT, 44 ; and of complexes of functions,
45; of "absolute" space in NEWTON, 100 ;
EMIL BRUNNER absolutizes temporal love,
158; of the historical view in positivism,
200, 201 ; RICKERT and DILTHEY, 206-208; 
absol. destroys the modal meaning;
in OSWALD SPENGLER, 220, 221; the origin 
of absolutizations, 331; the absolutization 
of feeling in HUME ; KANT'S inadequate 
criticism -of HUME, and hisown absolutization of transcendental 
logical thought; HUME'S view is self-
refuting; epistemological nihilism, 332;
KANT'S epistemological criticism, 333;
absol. in the Archimedean poirit of Immanence 
Phil., 333; absol. and the cosmic 
order, 334 ; absolutiz. of mathematicsin LEIIINIZ, 338 ; DUGUIT'S droll social isan absolutization of modern industrial 
law, 396; in VOLKELT'S epistemology, 431, 


ABSTRACTION 2 


432; of theoret. thought, 433 ; KANT'S the-determined", i.e., derives from the sensis 
that synthesis makes analysis possiblesory experience of nature, 378.
is based on the absolutization of theor. 


ACT-STRUCTURE, II, acts are not aspects;

thought, 443; abs. in HUSSERL, 458; BERG


FRANZ BRENTANO and EDMUND HUSSERI,

SON'S metaphysical absolutization, 482;

conceive of an "Erlebnis" as an inten


abs. of the phenomenological attitude in

tional act of human consciousness; many

HUSSERL, 489; KANT first absolutized the 

psychologists consider feeling to be the

primary meaning-synthesis and then dis-

undifferentiated origin of the other classes

covered the problem of the inter-function


of "Erlebnisse"; but an Erlebnis is not a

al synthesis, 528; abs. of the phenome


"sensation"; then feeling can be no act,

nol. attitude, 546; of theoretical synthesis,

but is the general term for the affective

549; of the horizon of experience into an

aspect of human experience ; every real act

eternal rational order, 551; of the expe


functions in the integral modal horizon of

riential aspects, 553; of reason in Syn


human experience embracing all the mo


thesis philosophy with its theory of the

dal aspects, 112; an inner act of expe


universalia ante rem in God's mind, 559; 

rience as a concrete Erlebnis cannot be

of the theoretical-synthetical horizon, 571;

restricted to its feeling aspect, 113; ani-

of what is relative, 572; in KANT'S Prin


mal psychology; the volitional, the intel


ciples of Pure Understanding, 575.

lectual, the fantasy directions of human

--, III, of ousia (essence) in A. BRUNNER,

act-life, 114, 115; Affects, 116.

6; of the Gegenstand-relation, 64; STOKER'S

—, III, in man qualifies his temporal

substance concept lands in metaphysical

existence, 88; phantasy, 115.

absolutizations, 68; meaningless absolutizations 
of theoretical abstractions incom-ACTINO-SPHERIUM, III, may possess morepatible with the Biblical conception ofthan a hundred similar nuclei, 721.
creation, 69; Historicism starts from the 

ACTUALIZATION, III, in man's body, 78,

absolutized historical viewpoint, 82 ; So


148, 149, 150; of subject-object relations,

ROKIN minimizes the divergence between

149, 150, 192.

the different sociological schools whichare characterized by the absolutization ofAESTHETICAL ASPECT, I, its position in thea specific modal aspect, 161; the conceptseries, 3, 5; a bird's nest has objective"capitalist society" is oriented to the ab-aesthetic qualities, 43; aesthetic valuationsolutization of the economic aspect inis subjected to a norm, 152; the aestheti-
Marxism, 165; absolutizations are inevi-cal aspect is subsumed under mathematitable 
on the immanence standpoint, 169; cal thought in LEIBNIZ, 251; aestheticin Thomism the Greek absolutization of judgment in KANT, 391, 462; aestheticthe State is (169) broken through, 221;morality in SHAFTESBURY, 462.
SPANN'S error in qualifying individual-—, II, aesthetic economy, 67; retrocipaism 
as the absolutization of the individ-tions: harmony in feeling, in logicalual man to a self-contained substance, analysis, in sociality, in language, in eco239; 
transpersonalistic universalism con-nomy; juridical harmony is an anticipatinues 
to absolutize temporal society attion; aesthetical economy, exuberance;
the expense of the radical religious unityChristian aesthetics does not absolutize 
of human personality, 239, 240; ab-the artist's aesthetic subjectivity; aesthestract 
idealist morality denies to the lovetical irrationalism ; the denial of aesthetic 
between parents and children moral pu-norms is antinomous, 128; lingual analogyrity; this is the result of its absolutizationin the aesthetic aspect; objective beautyof the ethical modus, 270. of nature is based on the symbolic mean


ing substratum; animals and beautiful

ABSTRACTION, I, is unavoidable in formu


natural scenery; beauty of nature is signi


lating the concept of philosophic thought,

fied meaning to susceptible subjects, 139;

5; theoretical abstraction in the theore


aesthetic norms vary with time and place,

tical attitude of thought, 40. 

240; the importance of cultural (histori-
ABUSE OF RIGHT, II, in JOSSERAND, 396. cal) harmony, 286; mathesis universalis—, III, Josserand's theory, 463. and aesthetics in LEIBNIZ; TAINE'S con


demnation of classicism; style is an his-

ACCOMMODATION, I, in Thomism Aristote


torical analogy; great artists are shapers

lian metaphysics and the view of nature

of style, in every style works of genius

are accommodated to the doctrine of the 

are possible, 345; rigidity of the theore


church, 36, 72; rejected by Christian phi-

tical aesthetical Idea of Classicism ; DES


losophy, 119 ; that of Greek thought to the

CARTES' rules for music; art as imitation;

Christian doctrine was started by AUGUS


LE Bossu; art based on reason; BOILEAU;

TINUS, 178 ; of ARISTOTLE'S metaphysics to

„Art pokique"; law giver of Parnassus;

the Christian doctrine, 180, 181; accom


he wanted to discover the basic law of

modation was rejected by OCCAM, 183;

poetry, 346; Classicism discovered mathe


accornin. in Scholasticism, 509. 

matical, logical, economical retrocipa-
ACTION, I, according to HUME action intions in the aesthetical aspect, unity inman only arises from emotion, 307; amultiplicity; economy; ostentation; bur-
concrete action is always "empirically lesque; precocity; simplicity; frugality 


in the means of expression ; imagination 
and feeling; relative deepening of aesthetic 
meaning in Classicism; no modal 
sphere universality; beauty is identified 
with truth; the individuality of a work of 
art is reduced to aesthetic law-conformity, 
347 ; misinterpretation of mathematical and 
economical retrocipations; German Sturm 
and Drang Romanticism; the limits of art; 
adequacy of symbolic expression as a 
criterion; truth; clarity; sobriety; pregnancy 
of expression; CONDILLAC'S view of 
the connection between art and science; 
LANSON; CASSIRER; 348. 
---, III, plastic art and music, drama, poetry, 
dancing; thing structures by the side 
of inconstant individuality structures; 
books, scores, signify objectively, but do 
not actualize the aesthetic structure of a 
work of art; the art of performance; secondary 
radical types, 110; a sculpture 
is an interlacement of subject and object 
structures qualified by an objective aesthetic 
function, 111; structural analysis 
of PRAXITELES' Hermes; does it lack a biotic 
function? 112; the representational 
relation in the objective sensory aspect 
of a sculpture; Urbild and Abbild, 113; 
the mimetic and the truly aesthetic appreciation 
of a sculpture, 114; the productive 
aesthetic fantasy of the artist is founded 
in the sensory function of the imagination; 
the latter displays a productive objectifying 
function; e.g., a visual phantasm; 
a phantasm is not related to an 
existing thing; but it is the product of our 
imagination; aesthetic phantasms are 
projected as merely intentional visionary 
objects; intentional objects, 115; objectum 
intentionale; it is bound to the plastic 
horizon; the fancied object can be represented 
in a real thing, 116; Christian 
aesthetics does not recognize any humanistic 
"pure art"; the adage "art for art's 
sake", 139; harmony in family relations, 
274, 283, 284. 

AESTHETICAL ECONOMY, II, implies frugality, 
the avoidance of the superfluous, or 
of excessive ways of reaching our aim; 
the Greek aesthetic adage: medên agan, 
67; the superfluous, the "piling it on", 
"overdoing it", ought to be warded off in 
harmonic sobriety, 128. 

AESTHETICISM, I, versus moralism, 121; 
aestheticism in SCHILLER, 123; aesthetic 
morality in SHAFTESBURY, 462; aesthetic 
Idealism of SCHILLER, 462, 463, 465. 

AFFOLTER, III, Arch. f. Offentl. R., 407. 

AGAPE, II, Agape is the fulness of meaning 
of love, 160. 
—, III, eros, and original sin, in LUTHER; 
sexual pleasure is ascribed to original 
sin; agape, etc., in Protestant ethics, 314, 


315. 
AGGREGATES, III, are un-ordered; lack the 
typical total form of an inner structural 

3 ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS 

whole, 702; the aggregate theory is refuted 
by DRIESCH, 771. 


AGNATIC KINSHIP, III, this community is 
the leading and central structure of the 
"gens", 353. 


AGNATIC PATRICIAN FAMILY, III, the Roman 
concept is concerned with an undifferentiated 
societal relationship; a husband's 
jus vitae ac necis, 325. 


AGRICOLA, I, was admired by MELANCHTON, 
513 ; AGRICOLA'S dialectic as an art of 
reasoning in the Nominalist sense, was 
taken as a model for his reform by MELANCHTON, 
514. 


AGRICULTURE, II, the term "agriculture" 
indicates the cultural subject-object relation 
between human technê and the soil 
in its objective cultural potentiality, 258. 


AKKERMANN, J. B., III, 
Het ontstaan der Ambachtsgilden, 674, 


675. 
AKTIONSARTEN, II , in language, 127. 

ALBERS, O. J., III, 
Het Natuurrecht volgens de Wijsbegeerte 
der Wetsidee, 72. 
—, III, his objection to the phil. of the 
Cosmon. Idea is that the substance concept 
is rejected so that no justice is done 
to the autonomous being of the creature 
in its relation to God; cf. STOKER, 72. 

ALBERTI, LEO BATTISTA, I. 

voices the Idea of the "uomo universale" 
in his autobiography", 192. 

ALBERTUS MAGNUS, I, 

Physicorum, 26. 
—, I, he ascribed to the movement of 
things, independent of the soul, a form 
and a structure of its own, in the so-
called numerus formalis, e.g., time, 26. 
—, II, on being, 21. 


ALBERT OF SAXONY, II, On the a priori, 542. 
ALBIG, W., III. 
Modern Public Opinion, 490. 


ALBUMEN, II, the typical albumen formations 
of the different biotic species and 
the anticipatory modal types in the energy 
aspect, 425. 
—, III, each type of organism produces 
its own type of albumen, 642. 


ALBUMINOIDS, III, and the building of the
living cell substance, 642. 


D'ALEMBERT, II, 


Diderot on D'Alembert, 339. 


ALEXANDRIAN SCHOOL, I, CLEMENS and 
ORIGEN and their speculative Logos-theory, 
177. 


ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS, III, his com


mentary on AmstoTLE's Metaphysics; his

interpretation of ARISTOTLE'S view of 

works of art, 127. 


ALGAE 

ALGAE, III, all things of nature formed or
produced by animal activity, are objective
natural things; thus the silicious forms
produced by protozoa, 107 ; the silicic
acids of radiolaria, and diatoms; and calcium 
carbonate of foraminiferes; and calc 
algae, 108; blue-green algae have no cell-
nucleus, 719; the restricted number of 
undifferentiated algae figures, 772, 773. 


ALL-INCLUSIVE GROUP, III, in GURVITCH'S 
sociology, 164, 165. 


ALTHUSIUS, JOHANNES, III, 
Politica, 663. 
—, III, his theory of human symbiosis
took account of the internal structural 
principles in an anti-universalistic spirit:
"every type of social relationship has its
proper laws", 662, 663. 


ALVERDES, III, avoids the dilemma between 
mechanistic and vitalistic views, 


733. 
AMOEBAE, III, unicellular beings display arestricted number of almost undifferentiated 
figures, 772. 

ANALOGIA ENTIS, I, the Thomist metaphysical 
concept of being is not of a genericand specific character but analogical;
being is a whole in which everythingparticipates, because the concept of thewhole is here taken in a transcendental 
analogical sense; it is the pre-supposition 
of all generic and specific concepts oftotality; criticism of this concept: it doesnot direct the modal diversity of meaning 
to its unity of root, but remains dispersed 
by this diversity; it can, therefore, 
not replace the transcendental basicIdea; its claim to being an autonomousconcept of theoretical thought must berejected, 71; it is ruled by the dialecticalmotive of form and matter which was 
modified by THOMAS to adapt it to theChristian motive, and became the motive 
of nature and grace, 72; and the transcendental 
critique of theoretical thought,
71-73; analogia entis in THOMAS AQUINAS, 
181. 

ANALOGICAL CONCEPTS, II, in the different 
branches of science the use of analogicalconcepts of a fundamental character differs 
with the different modalities of the 
scientific viewpoint; Greek and Scholastic 
logic and metaphysics distinguishedthese fundamental analogical conceptsfrom generic and specific ones; theysharply distinguished real analogy fromthe mere metaphor of common speech,
55; to the analogical fundamental concept 
of "being" (analogia entis) all theothers were related; its origin in Greekthought, 56; analogical concepts lackingany relation to the cosmic time order andradical unity of meaning, cannot be thefoundation of our inquiry into the modal 

4 

structures of meaning; the relation ofanalogy in the modal structures points totheir intermodal coherence and to the 
radical unity of the human ego and theDivine Origin, 57; in the metaphysicaldoctrine of analogia entis the transcendental 
determinations and distinctions of 
"being" are themselves of an analogicalcharacter, so that the vicious circle is 
closed, 57, 58. 

ANALOGICAL UNITY, I, in Greek metaphysics, 
47. 

ANALoGY,II, in the terms for the fundamental 
concepts of different sciences; refers 
to the intermodal coherence; is to be 
distinguished from methaphor and fromanalogia entis; in Scholasticism and Greekmetaphysics, 55; the Greek motive of formand matter, 56; the origin and centralimportance of this motive in ARISTOTLEand Scholasticism; the concept of analogycannot serve in our structural analysis,
57; the vicious circle in speculative metaphysics; 
substance and accidents; ontological 
analogy and cosmic modal diversity; 
the transcendental horizon of theoretical 
thought, 58 ; analogical terms arenot metaphorical, 64; a psychologist willmaintain that, sensory space is "real" and 
assert that the term "mathematical space"
is a metaphor; but mathematical space isnot illusionary, nor a logical construction, 
65; analogical concepts, 55-72; numerical 
and spatial analogies in the analysisof the law-spheres do not prove that ourphilosophy has relapsed into the objectifying 
attitude of special science, 76. 

ANALYSIS SITUS, II, LEIBNIZ programme ofan "analysis situs" was intended to discover 
the anticipatory principle of progression 
in space; it was carried out inPONCELET'S founding of projective geometry; 
its meaning in the theory of thelaw-spheres, 104. 

ANALYTICAL CONCEPT, II, analytical andsynthetical concepts in KANT, 435; analytical 
and synthetical judgments in KANT,
438-440. 

ANALYTICAL CRITERION OF AN ASPECT, II, 
its abstract theoretical character, 4, 5, 6, 
7; and the method of antinomy; (cf. s.v.
Aspects) — 48; the material (synthetical)
criterion of an aspect, 48, 49; cf. also s.v.
Antinomy, 37 ff. 

ANANGKE, H, in PLATO, 10; being is boundto its spherical form by the Dike whichis identified by PAIIMENIDES with the"powerful Anangke", 133. 

ANANGKE. AND TYCHE, III, in DRIESCH, 

746. 
ANAXAGORAS, I, time is a divine order of 
Dike avenging the injustice of thingswhich have originated in an individualform by dissolving this latter in pure 


matter and carrying back all things totheir form-less Origin, 26; the matter motive 
had the primacy up until ANAXAGORAS, 
532. 
—, II, rejected PARMENIDES' ouranic elements; 
form became the ideal pattern forthe formgiving nous or Demiurge, 56.
—, III, before him the matter-motive was 
given primacy, 7; his idea of a teleological 
worldplan, 633 ; he distinguishesbetween homogeneous and heterogeneouswholes, 638. 

ANAXIMANDER, I, one of the Ionian thinkers; 
they were fully aware of the religious 
conflict in the form-matter motive:
the form principle is deprived of its divine 
character; the true God is form-less; 
the eternally flowing stream of life; inANAXIMANDER it is conceived of as an invisible 
"apeiron", flowing in the streamof time and avenging the injustice of thetransitory beings originated from it inan individual form, by dissolving themin their formless origin, 67; his "materialism" 
is ruled by the Greek "matter"motive, 
122; the formless, or the unlimited, 
invisible apeiron, 532.
—, III, apeiron versus existing things, 7;
in the first book, the third chapter of hisMetaphysics, ANAXIMANDER is not mentioned 
among the Ionians by ARISTOTLE, 8. 

ANAXIMENES, I, his materialism is qualified 
by the Greek matter-motive, 122. 

ANCESTOR WORSHIP, III, among the Greeksand the Romans; the generations of one,
and the same gens form an "internal"
whole; it testifies to a continuous exchange 
of love between the living and thedead among the Bataks, the Dschagganegroes, and other less civilized primitive 
races, 352, 353; the Roman gens, 353,

354. 
ANCILLE THEOLOGIAE, I, in ARISTOTLE philosophy 
is the handmaiden of theology,


178. 
ANDREAE, JOHANNES, III, the unity of a
universitas is not real but pertains to an
aggregation, 233; he thought independent
corporations very dangerous and opposed 
them by the monarchical principle,


235. 
ANDREAE, W., III, 
Staatssozialismus and StAndesstaat, 230, 


231. 
ANGLO-SAXON ATTITUDE, THE, III, with 
respect to the deeper fundamentals ofparty principles, 623. 

ANIMAL PSYCHOLOGY, III, embraces emotional 
sensations, 85, 86. 

ANIMALS, I, logical analysis is not the onlymode of distinction, for animals distinguish 
their mates, food, etc., althoughtheir manner of distinction is not of a 
logical nature, 39; an animal is a typical 

5 A-NORMATIVE SOCIOLOGY 

individuality structure with many functions, 
554.
—, II, animals have a sense of plurality,
81; subject functions in the pre-logicalspheres; object functions in the post-
logical spheres, 114; animal "intellect"
in the psychical reaction upon new factual 
situations, based on a deliberate presentiment 
of causal and teleological relations 
(not upon rational analysis), animalfeeling is not susceptible of anticipationin an axiological sense; PAVLOV'S experiments 
with dogs, 184; animals have nocultural history; they inherit instincts;
their tradition is instinctive, 202 ; their 
sensory phantasy, 425; they are extatically 
absorbed by their temporal existence,
480; they undergo, but do not experiencesensory impressions, 539.
—, III, the cells of their body; protozoa;
infusoria; protophyta; in the macroworld of naive experience there is a radical 
difference between animal behaviour 
and merely vegetative reactions tophysiological stimuli; the error of anthropomorphic 
interpretations, 85; behaviorism 
ignores the plastic dimension ofhuman experience; animal behaviour hasa psychical qualification; an animal'spsycho-motor structure requires a complete 
plasticity of the cells of its body,
86; radical types; geno-types; sub-types;
mutations; phylon, 94 ; protozoa, protophyta; 
rhizopodes; radiolaria; diatoms;
foraminiferes; algae, 107, 108; birds'nests; ant-hills; beaver dams; honeycombs, 
109; a dog resting on a chair, 136;
animal care and protection of their youngones, 267; difference between animal 
mating and human marriage, 324 ; animalplasm has an internal motive centre, thecentro soma, 720; the sensorium binds 
the lower individuality structures of theliving organism and the cell's materialcomponents, 766. 

ANIMAL FUNCTIONS, OPENED, II, the so-
called "intellect" in the psychical reaction 
to new factual situations rests on a 
deliberate presentiment of causal andteleological relations, 184. 

ANIMISM, II, according to FRAZER, magicis directed to the impersonal forces ofnature and does not strive after the propitiation 
of a deity, but aims at controlling 
and dominating the forces of nature;
magic turns out to be inefficacious andman feels helpless with respect to nature;
then arose the worship of the personifiedforces of nature and that of death; FRAZERapplies the principle of economy ofthought to explain the transition fromanimism to polytheism, and from polytheism 
to monotheism, 313. 

ANKERMANN, III, an adherent of the doctrine 
of cultural orbits, 333. 

A-NORMATIVE SOCIOLOGY, III, WEBER'S concept, 
183. 


ANT-HILLS 6 

ANT-HILLS, III, as objective thing structures, 
107, 109. 

ANTHROPOLOGY, III, its pre-requisites in 
the philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea; 
and in Existentialism, 781. 

ANTICIPATIONS, II, there is an increasing 
structural complication in the modal anticipations; 
they are only complex, 169; 
they are direct or indirect; the "irrational" 
function of number anticipates the 
spatial modus, 170; the imaginary function 
anticipates movement, 171 economy 
of thought is a complex anticipation, 175; 
justification of a theoretical judgment is 
a juridical anticipation of the logical aspect; 
a feeling of justice anticipates the 
juridical modus in the psychical sphere, 
176; animal feeling of revenge, 177; 
modal anticipations deepen the primary 
meaning of a law sphere in the 
coherence of its nucleus and retrocipations; 
e.g. subjective juridical guilt deepens 
the meaning of an illegal act, approximating 
the moral attitude of the agent; 
the concepts of causality, illegality and 
guilt belong together, 185; a concept may 
grasp a modal aspect in its restrictive 
meaning, an Idea in its expansive meaning, 
186; the Idea points in the transcendental 
or anticipatory direction, and cannot 
be closed up in time; if the Idea of a 
modal aspect is used as if it were a concept, 
the modal boundaries are eradicated, 
and the result is antinomy, 187; the 
restrictive expression of a normative modus 
is formalistic in character, e.g., Old 
English aew, 188; the Christian Idea of 
God's guidance in History assumes a normative 
meaning, but not as the execution 
of God's hidden counsel; the normative 
historical meaning of this guidance refers 
to the juridical anticipations disclosed in 
history which are brought to light in the 
sense of an historical retribution, 290; 
sexual propagation and blood relationship 
is an original type of meaning individuality 
(a nuclear type) but their 
substrata are anticipatory modal types, 
because they refer to a nuclear type lying 
outside of their own modal sphere; other 
anticipatory modal types of individuality, 
424, 425. 

ANTINOMY, I, the identification of cosmic 
diversity with logical diversity leads to 
antinomy, 19; on the immanence standpoint 
RICKERT'S view is involved in antinomy, 
22; PLATO laid bare the antinomies 
involved in PARMENIDES' absolutization of 
the spatial aspect, 31; antinomy cannot 
be resolved according to PROUDHON and 
KANT, 65; antinomy in HUME'S thought, 
300; antinomy is sanctioned in modern 
Humanistic thought, 404. 
—, II, used as a critical method; the term 
explained; it is a subjective opposition to 
law; laws as such are never antinomic; 
the cause of theoretical antinomies; anti


nomy is not an intra-modal contrariety; 
nor logical contradiction between opposites, 
37 ; the principium exclusae antinomiae; 
speculative thought is antinomic; 
the "sole causality" of God in speculative 
theology is antinomic; the argument of 
free causes, 38; there is antinomy in the 
concept of the sole causality of God, 40; 
its origin, 41; theoretical antinomies and 
the transcendental Idea of the meaning-
coherence; KANT'S conception, 42; mathematical 
and dynamic antinomies, 43; 
their origin ; sphere-sovereignty prohibits 
antinomic speculations, 44 ; a particular 
antinomy is due to the violation of 
sphere-sovereignty; the number of antinomies 
according to KANT; according to 
Christian philosophy; ZENO'S antinomies, 
45; in HUME; KANT; KELSEN ; logical contradiction 
and antinomy, 46; the origin of 
all cosmological antinomies, 47; the method 
of antinomy is one of immanent cri 
ticism, 48; this method and the discovery 
of the nuclear meaning of an aspect, 49, 
and the logification of multiplicity, 81, 82; 
antinomic theories of CANTOR and VERO 
NESE, 87; NEWTON'S "absolute space", 95; 
KANT'S view of space, 96; in the concept 
of movement as a change of place, 98; in 
the thought that matter is enclosed in 
space, 102; the antinomies of ZENO, 103; 
antinomy in the concept of a totality of 
transformations which is dense in every 
direction, 106; in DRIESCH'S neo-vitalism, 
110; in historicism, 217; formal logic as 
pure analytics is antinomic, 464 ; in KANT'S 
`attempt to isolate "pure sensibility" theoretically, 
495; in KANT'S cogito as merely 
a logical form of the unity of self-consciousness, 
500. 

ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY PARTY, THE, III, and 
ecclesiastical authority, 622. 

ANTITHESIS, I, the only radical antithesis 
is of a religious nature, 123 ; it is that 
between the apostasis of nature and its 
destiny according to creation, 522 ; this 
religious antithesis passes transversally 
through the existence of every Christian 
personality, 524. 
—, II, the radical antithesis in the subject 
side of the root of our earthly cosmos, 
32. 

-, THE RELIGIOUS, III, in the political 
struggle, 507. 

ANTONINUS, III, 

Inner Dialogues (ad se ipsum), 229. 
APEIRON, I, in ANAXIMANDER, 67 ; the endless, 
the Platonic "me on" is the highest 
principle for modern man, 194, BRUNO, 
CUSANUS, worshipped the infinite, 199. 
—, II, Greek metaphysics depreciated individuality; 
if primacy was ascribed to 
the foim motive they conceived of individuality 
as an apeiron, which in its ultimate 
indeterminateness was of no consequence 
for philosophy, 417, 418; if the 
matter motive had the primacy, indivi



duality was viewed as a guilt which must
be reconciled by the dissolution of individual 
beings, 418.
—, III, versus existing things, 7. 


APOSTASY, I, from the true God is the 
source of all absolutizations, 61; apostatethought also contributes to the fulfilmentof the Divine plan, 119. 

APPERCEPTION, II, apperception and perception, 
the former is logical, the latteris psychical; LEIBNIZ discovered thiscoherence, but interpreted it in the lineof the lex continui, 118. 

APPETITION, I, as a causa finalis, 235. 

APPETITUS SOCIALIS, I, in ARISTOTLE, THOMAS 
AQUINAS, and HUGO GROTIUS, 311. 

A PRIORI, I, a priori knowable and a posteriori 
knowable components of history,
in FICHTE, 484. 
—, II, an a priori structure can only beknown from experience, 7; it is notpermissible to develop an a priori philosophical 
theory about the coherence ofthe fundamental concepts of the different 
sciences, 72; the meaning of theword "a priori" in immanence philosophy; 
its opposite is "a posteriori"; inARISTOTLE : the universal, as the "groundof being"; it comes later in cognition; inScholasticism "a priori" also has a metaphysical 
sense, 542; in pre-Kantian rationalism 
the a priori was logical necessity;
the universally valid; in KANT : the universally 
valid transcendental forms: allsynthetical judgments of universal validity 
not founded on sensory experience;
in HUSSERL : the "universal Logos of allthinkable being", 543; HUSSERL'S "universal 
concrete ontology", 544; with SCHELERthe a priori is the whole of all ideal unitsof signification encompassing the wholerealm of essences, 545; the a priori is notopposed to "empirical" facts; SCHELER'S"pure and immediate experience" is apriori; the a posteriori depends on thesenses; the concept of "pure superhuman" 
experience is objectionable;
SCHELER'S view criticized, 546; HUSSERL'S 
"epoche"; to SCHELER the cosmos is exhausted 
in its pre-logical aspects; hethinks that ethics can do without logic;
he opposes pure logic to pure axiology,
547; the structural and the subjective apriori; the subjective a priori is eithertrue or false; it is delimited by the apriori structures of all human experience;
the latter is bound to the horizon of experience, 
viz. the a priori meaning structure 
of the cosmos as subject to the Divine 
Origin and centred in the religioussphere of the creation; the experientialhorizon is identical with our earthly cosmos, 
548; but not in the sense of transcendental 
idealism; the world is not 
created by the human transcendentaltheoretical consciousness, nor by the 

7 ARCHP. 

transcendental intersubjectivity of theegos; the fall into sin has obfuscated ourexperiential horizon; the light of Revelation 
opens it, 549; our horizon in its religious 
dimension implicitly belongs tohuman experience and constitutes its apriori element; it is made explicit intranscendental and radical self reflection, 
based on intuitive insight into the cosmictemporal order, 550; the levels of the apriori; the transcendental horizon; (thecosmic coherence), 552; the modal horizon, 
553; the temporal horizon; the synthetical 
a priori of theoretical experience,
its law side and its subject side; of subjective 
insight, 554 ; are mathematics andformal logic a priori sciences?, 555; theplastic horizon, 556-559; cosmic self-
consciousness, 562; KANT'S a priori, 568,569; that of HUSSERL, 569; HUSSERL'S anonymous 
a priori, 570; the a priori transcendental 
level of truth, 573; the subjective 
a priori synthesis, 574 ; the a prioricriterion of theoretical truth, 576. 

ARCHE, I, from the Archimedean point ofphilosophic thought we discover that theview of totality is not possible apartfrom a view of the Origin or Arch& ofboth totality and speciality of meaning,
8; all meaning is from, through, and to 
4n origin ; non-Christian philosophysought the Archê within the realm ofmeaning itself, 9; the true Origin is absolute 
and self-sufficient; in critical philosophy 
one or more of our cognitivefunctions are regarded as independentand thereby elevated to the Archê of ourknowable cosmos; thus the question aboutthe meaning of our knowledge is automatically 
precluded; this position is takenin Neo-Kantianism, where reality derivesits meaning from transcendental logicalthought, 10; philosophic thought cannotwithdraw itself from its tendency towards 
the Origin; this tendency is amanifestation of the restlessness of our 
ego; our ego comes to rest in the Archê,
which transcends all meaning, 11; beyond.
this Archê the formulating of any question 
has no longer any meaning, 12;
metaphysics, in its rationalistic currents,
deified thought comprising in itself thefullness of being as the intellectus archêtypus; 
the Archê, 13; RICKERT and hisSchool consider "transcendental" thoughtas Archimedean point and Arch& of the"theoretical cosmos", 14; all modal aspects 
converge in the transcendent centreof the fulness of meaning into the unityof direction towards the Archê, 16; in 
transcendental logicism Arch& and Archimedean 
point coincide, in rationalisticmetaphysics Archê and Archimedeanpoint remain distinct, the Arch& is theabsolutized logical aspect, or IntellectusArchêtypus; then logical thought standsas Arch& beyond which nothing meaningful 
may be further asked, and exists in 


ARCH-CONSCIOUSNESS 

and through itself, 20; in MAIMON it is 
creative mathematical thought, 407. 

ARCH-CONSCIOUSNESS, I, a term used byTROXLER to denote immediate knowledgein opposition to reflecting and discursivethought, 471. 

ARCHIMEDEAN POINT, I, is the point from 
which we are able to form the idea of 
the totality of meaning, 8; philosophicthought presupposes en Archimedeanpoint for the thinker from which todirect his view of totality over the modaldiversity of meaning; it also presupposesa position in the face of the Archê, 11;
the three requirements which the Archimedean 
point must satisfy: it must notbe divorced from our own subjective self;
nor from the concentric law of the ego'sexistence; it must transcend all modal 
diversity and be found in the totality andradical unity of the latter; since DESCARTES 
the necessity of an Archimedeanpoint has been generally recognized, atleast, if the need of critical selfreflection 
was realized; modern philosophy seeksthe Archim. point in philosophic thoughtitself, 12; the so-called transcendental 
subject of thought does not satisfy the requirements 
of an Archimedean point;
this "subject" is the subjective pole towhich the empirical world is related as"Gegenstand"; "transcendental consciousness", 
"transcendental cogito", or transc.
"unity of apperception", transc. "logicalego", is conceived of as a logical unity ofthe thinking consciousness, without multiplicity 
or diversity of moments, 16 ; thetranscendental subject of thought doesnot satisfy the requirements for the Archimedean 
point, 16, 17, 19; in transcendental 
logicism Archê and Archimedeanpoint coincide; rationalistic metaphysicsabsolutized the logical aspect in theArchê, but distinguished Arch6 from Archimedean 
point, 20; even on the immanence 
standpoint the choice of the Archim, 
point is impossible as a purelytheoretical act prejudicing nothing in areligious sense, 21; the I-ness shares inthe Archim. point in which the totalmeaning of the temporal cosmos is concentrated, 
59; the I-ness is rooted in the 
spiritual community of mankind, of the"we" which is directed to the Divine 
"Thou", 60; THEODOR LITT seeks the Arch. 
point in "pure reflection" of theoreticalthought on its own activity, 77 ; the Archimedian 
point of philosophy, 99. 

ARCHITECTURE, III, BERLAGE'S Views, 139; 
is bound art, 140. 

ARISTOTLE, I, 
Physics, 25.
Metaphysics, 72.
Categories, 203, 537.
Topica, 537.
—, I, on time and motion; motion is a 
striving of matter after form and from 


8 

potentiality to actuality; it is a flowing

plurality of earlier and later, without

unity and consequently without actual

being; the psyche can give unity to this

plurality in the subjective synthesis of

counting; time cannot exist outside the

soul, 25; he deified Form; psyche is the

form of the material body, matter is only

potentiality, 26; the philosophical theoria

of the Greeks was dominated by the same

religious basic motive, which was called

the form-matter motive since ARISTOTLE, 

36; ARISTOTLE tried to prove that the

nous poetikos (i.e. the active intellect)

must be independent of the organs of the

material body in the formation of logical

concepts; the theoretical activity is hy


postatized as an immortal ousia or sub


stance, 44 ; the form-motive has primacy,

the deity has become "pure Form", and

matter is completely deprived of any di


vine quality by becoming the metaphysi


cal principle of imperfection and "poten


tiality", 67 ; the metaphysical concept of

being in its Aristotelian sense is not at all

an autonomous concept of theoretical

thought, 71; it is ruled by the religious

dialectical form-matter motive; in Tho


mism the Aristotelian concept of deity is

accommodated to the Christian doctrine 

of creation ; ARISTOTLE was fully aware

of the religious character of his form-

matter motive, and in his Metaphysics he

speaks of the mystical moments of union

of human thought with the divine pure

Form through theological theoria, 72;

ARISTOTLE'S theistic philosophy, (121) ;

his idea of the divine nous as actus purus

(pure actuality) and pure Form, first

transcendent cause, unmoved mover and 

final end of the cosmos is the hypostati


zation of theoretical thought ruled by the

Greek form-motive; an idol, 122; his con


ception of philosophy as the handmaiden

of theology, the queen of sciences, 178;

the change in ARISTOTLE'S metaphysics

brought about in THOMAS AQUINAS syn


thesis philosophy, 180; the natural com

ponent of the Thomistic cosmonomic idea

is the Aristotelian basic Idea accommo


dated to the Augustinian Idea of the lex

aeterna; in ARISTOTLE'S view all nature is 

dominated by a dual teleological order:

every natural substance strives according

to its nature toward its own perfection

enclosed in its essential form; there is a 

hierarchichal order in which the lower 

form is the matter of a higher form, 181;

this is the content of the lex naturalis; 

the deity is the origin of the motion

which proceeds from matter toward its

goal; the deity is not the origin of matter

with its blind arbitrary anangkê; cate


gories of matter (spatiality, number) are

to be distinguished from those of form;

substance is the central category of being

and unites the form and matter of na


tural beings into a merely analogical

unity, 182; his definition of "substance" 


9 

and that of DESCARTES, 203; he refers to 
the principle of the economy of thought

in his criticism of the Platonic ideas, 272; 
ARISTOTLE'S nous praktikos, 535.
-, II, 9-12, 15, 122, 123, 135, 144, 145, 
240, 321, 449, 496, 512, 542, 558.
Metaphysics, 20, 419, 445.
Praedicam, 20,


Eth. Nic., 145.


De Anima, 434, 566. 
-, II, A metaphysical and an epistemological 
form-matter scheme was used in
ancient and medieval metaphysics; ousia
imparted delimitation to matter (hy16),
in ARISTOTLE the dynamei on (potentiality), 
9; the Platonic process of becoming
was the startingpoint for ARISTOTLE in
his last period; he rejected the eidê, conceived 
the Platonic eidos as the immanent 
essence of the material substances 
in the empirical world; their essential
form (morphê) is the teleological cause


of the development of matter, 10; theimmanent teleological principle of theirgenesis is an entelechy; the world orderis intelligible and relativizes the entelechy; 
a lower form in its turn becomesmatter for a higher kind; the actual nouscannot become matter, because it is thearchê; this concept of Being is foundedin an absolutized theoretical Gegenstandrelation; 
substances are excluded fromthe subject, object relation which is essential 
to naïve experience; the substantialforms qualify and determine the eidosi.e. the essence of things, and are notconceived in the cadre of a modal aspect, 
11 ; ARISTOTLE'S conception of thesoul as the organizing form of the body,
the body's entelechy; the substantial formis entirely directed to the supposed internal 
structure of individual things andto the teleological order between theirforms, 12; ARISTOTLE'S method of conceptformation according to a genus proximum 
and differentia specifica presupposes 
the existence of genera and speciesindependent of logical thought, 15; hisprinciple "all that moves is moved bysomething else" refers to the transitionof matter to form, of potentiality to actuality; 
its use in the Thomistic proofsof •the existence of God as unmoved 
Mover, 39; the economic anticipation inthe analytical modus was appealed to byARISTOTLE in his critique of the PlatonicIdeas, 122; on retribution, 135; the ideaof the highest good determines the ethical 
sphere, but in his metaphysics the ideaof the natural good can only be determined 
by the essential forms of naturalbeings; everything strives after its specific 
natural good, i.e., the actualizing ofits substantial form, 144; human naturefinds its specific form in the rationalsoul; human behaviour in conformityto natural reason is good and virtuous;
virtue consists in the permanent control 
of the lower sensory functions 

ARISTOTLE 

by the will according to natural reason; 
its consequence is eudaemonia,
happiness; logical virtues; their ethicalmeaning is derived from the human will;
control is cultural, not ethical, 145; Arist.
started from popular morality in hisethics, 321 (note 3) ; the substantial formof a natural being, as such, lacks individuality 
and must be combined withmatter into a simolon eras it) ; the "principium 
individuationis" is found in"matter" in its quantitative potentiality,
419 ; the Aristotelian categories are basicforms of predication about the existent;
substance or ousia, subject or hupokeimenon; 
all other categories are accidentia(sumbebekOta), 445; the ousia or substance 
was quite independent of humanthought, but thought was intrinsicallyrelated to the substances, 496; the relations 
of possibility and actuality arefounded in the metaphysical form-matterscheme (dunamei on - and --- energeia),
512; the universal is the metaphysicalground of being of individual things; thisis the essential form and the prOteronphimei as well as the hAsteron proshemas, that which comes later in cognition, 
542; he tried to approach the plastichorizon of experience with the doctrineof the substantial, essential forms ofthings; form is a dynamic principle ofdevelopment immanently operative in the"matter" of natural substances; the lowerforms are matter with respect to a poss


ible higher formation, 588.

, III, 
Metaphysics, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 87, 126.

Pol. 203, 204, 208, 211, 369.


Eth. Nicom. 204, 219.


cf. 179, 201-204. 
-, III, matter can only become actual by


assuming a form in an individual thing,
7; his view of the Ionian philosophers;
he does not mention ANAXIMANDER in this 
context; he misinterpreted the atomists
LEUCIPPUS and DEMOCRITUS ; "intelligible
matter"; he conceived of "substance" in 
two ways; the mathematical is present in
the sensible without being sensible; the
substance is the immanent point of reference 
in the process of change, 8; substance 
in a secondary sense; the pure
"essence" of a thing is its eidos, has only
an intellectual mode of being, 9; ousia
(substance) and its accidents; thing in
itself and human sensibility; qualitates
occultae; and the subject-object relation;
ARISTOTLE'S "ousia" as a "noumenon" is 
Gegenstand of the logical function; this
is a hypostatization; ousia synthetos;
ARISTOTLE mistook the Gegenstand of
theor. thought for the reality of pre-
theoretical experience, 10; the antinomy
in the substance concept; substance is
knowable from its accidentalia; it is principle 
and cause; syllable and letters; the
whole and its components, 12; his difficulty 
with the metaphysical "Gegen 



ARISTOTLE 

stand"; the cause of "matter" is the 
"form"; this is a contradiction; originaland later conceptions, 13; later he elevated 
the forms of natural composites tothe rank of ousia, which contradicted his 
view that these forms cannot have an independent 
being; the deity and purespirits; the soul, 15; his primary ousiaand NEWTON'S concept of substance, 23;
his genus concept "sensory beings", 87;
the task of a sculptor is to open the natural 
structure of his material throughthe aesthetic structure of the artistic artefact 
so that the material becomes a complete 
expression of his conception; thiscombination is an enkapsis; but ARISTOTLE'S 
form-matter schema is no use 
here; ARISTOTLE did not consider a work 
of art to be a substance; he called them 
analogies of substances; PRAXITELES'statue is only a substance insofar as itsmarble is a substance, but not as an 
aesthetically formed figure, 126; he considers 
this sculpture merely as an accidental 
form of the "substance" marble; 
the antinomy in this view, 127; metaphysical 
foundation of ARISTOTLE'S universalistic 
view of the polis as foundedin the substantial form of human nature; 
man must unfold his essential form; his 
social impulse realized in the hierarchyof communal levels; the polis; the societas 
perfecta, embraces all other communities 
and individual men as parts in awhole; the state is prior to the household 
and the village; and ought to provide individual 
man with everything pertainingto a good life; the State aims at thehighest good, 201; genetically the Stateorginates from the household; but structurally 
the State determines the nature ofthe household in the part-whole relation;
the household is a relationship embracingthose of husband and wife, parents andchildren, as parts of a domestic community 
whose primordial relationship is thatof master and slave; it is an economical 
unity and serviceable to the propagationof the human race; the household is a monarchy, 
the polis is ruled by many, 202;
the State is autarchical; a community isdetermined by its purpose; the householdis the germ of the State; the union ofman and wife is driven by instinct; although 
it involves friendschip and mutualservice, 203; the aristocratic authority ofthe husband over his wife, the monarchical 
nature of paternal authority; as amaster the husband is despotic towardsthe slaves; the householder is economist, 
producer, administrator; property is necessary 
to existence and citizenship,
204 ; his absolutist universalism : the 
polis regulates human procreation ; voluntary 
organizations are contingent;
his division of the citizens into occupational 
classes; common state-ruled meals, 
205; the unity of the polis is guaranteedby the reality of its normative eidos 

10 

(= essence) founded in an objectiveteleological world-order; the polis is nota "collective person"; there is no juridical 
organ-concept in ARISTOTLE, 206;
the relation of ruler to subject joins aplurality to a unified community; this isa general metaphysical relation; applicable 
also to plants and animals; thisordering relation is called taxis; it is a 
law concerning the distribution of political 
authority and benefits; taxis guarantees 
the identity of the State; when thecontrol in the State shifts to another social 
group, taxis is changed, and a differentstate arises, 208; taxis is the eidos of 
a polis, its essential form; this taxis is 
the constitution, insofar as it ensures the 
unity of the whole of society; the aim ofsociety is the good life of its members;
it embraces human life in its totality;
there is not any restriction to the competence 
of the State; the rule of law isthat of reason; two different kinds of 
government, 209; three different formsof government; their perversions; unpolitical 
criteria; nobility and wealth;
freedom and poverty; democracy andthe political rule of the proletariat is dueto an enkapsis; Athenian democracy during 
the Persian wars; its decline in thedays of ARISTOTLE, 210; ARISTOTLE rejectsthe principle of majority; his concept oftaxis is metaphysical and not exclusivelysociological; his theory of the relationbetween body and soul, 211; the sociological 
meaning of taxis was analogical;
his idea of the two forms of justice; commutative 
and distributive justice, 212;
justice requires the principle of equalityto be applied by giving each his due;
justitia distributiva takes account of inequality 
and requires a geometrical proportioning 
between unequal terms; justitia 
commutativa demands equality inthe exchange of values, in an arithmetical 
proportion; voluntary transactions 
of exchange, although inter-individual, 
are components of the communallife of the all-embracing polis; tokos andtokouein with respect to money; profitmaking is unworthy of a citizen, 213; 
ARISTOTLE'S commutative justice presupposes 
the autarchical all-inclusivepolis based on the economy of undifferentiated 
agrarian households, 214 ; theState is based on the rational moral essential 
form of man; it is an organic"unitas ordinis"; the will follows reasononly with the help of the laws of theState, 219; authority is based on the social 
nature of man and the lex naturalis 
as a teleology; it renders unity possible;
the authoritative structure of organizedcommunities is founded in the substantial 
form of human nature, 223 ; the Stoics 
denatured ARISTOTLE'S nous to immanent 
world logos; his eidê to logoi spermatikoi; 
the cosmic pneuma binds the cosmos 
into a unity according to the Stoics; 


ARISTOTLE'S entelechy (orexis) becamethe Stoic syndesmos (material coherence), 
224; his theory of the State ismetaphysical teleological; authority andsubordination implied in man's socialnature founded in his substantial essential 
form; the principle of inequalityamong men justified slavery; his distinction 
between to archon and to archomenon 
for all organisms, 230; universaliaonly exist in abstracto, 233 ; the relationbetween parents and children is part ofthe domestic community; the rational-
moral perfection of undeveloped humannature in their education to good citizens,
267; the Aristotelian theory of organizedcommunities and the undifferentiated 
structure of the Greek phylae and phratries; 
his conception was man's social impulse 
realizing itself in ever more inclusive 
communities culminating in the Stateas the all-inclusive social whole; ARISTO-
TLE's concept "family" is the Greek household; 
his "village community"; polis, 368;
natural communities cannot be conceived 
as parts of a sib, so that ARisT's view ofsocial life is erroneous; the polis was nott.t whole of vicinages and households, 370; 
ARISTOTLE could not overcome his idea 
of the totalitarian State, 398; his teleological 
order of essential forms in thescheme of superior and inferior, formand matter, telos (= end) and meansseems to be transparent and rational, butdoes not correspond to the really complicated 
state of affairs; it is speculative; 
and necessarily leads to a universalistconception of the cosmos, 634; he distinguishes 
homoiomeres from anhomoiomeres, 
i.e., that 'which has perfectlysimilar parts from that which has qualitatively 
different parts, 638; the Aristotelian-
Thomistic concept of substance,
710, 711; Arabian Aristotelians, 713; substance, 
718; natural primary substances,
740, 741; his view of the animate bodywas subjectivistic, ascribing the "formal"
qualities of the body to the soul as its

substantial form, 779. 

ARITHMETICAL ASPECT, II, natural cardinal 
numbers; rational, irrational, complexnumerical functions are based on the 
natural cardinal numbers; nuclear meaning 
of arithm. aspect is discrete quantityin serial order in a negative and a positive 
direction; KANT'S view, 79; mathesis 
universalis; counting is not the origin of 
number; logical, sensory multiplicitly, 80;
2 + 2 4 is not an exclusively logicalproposition ; the extension of a classconcept pre-supposes number, 82; number 
has no retrocipations but is the substratum 
to all other aspects; in Aristotelian 
Scholasticism number is an ontological 
category implying spatial extension, 
83; dimensionality is a numericalretrocipation in space; irrational anddifferential functions anticipate space 

11 ART 

and movement and logical distinction, 87;
they are not actual numbers but relations;
anticipatory numeral functions are notarbitrary products of the mind; MALAN on 
discreteness and continuity; the continuous 
number concept, 88; inserting newvalues in a series can be continued indefinitely, 
but the actual series at onemoment is not infinite; space and number; 
is there a continuous, dense, series?
89; DEDEKIND on irrational numbers; 
LEIBNIZ' continuity of the movement ofthought; section is the irrational functionof number; logification of points, andnumber is related to points, 90; NATORP 
logifies number and space, 91, 92; infinitesimal, 
deepening of natural numbers, 93;
directions of movement are numerical 
spatial analogies, 98; arithmetical time,
102; organic relation is numeral retrocipation 
in the biotic aspect, 109; numeralretrocipations in the legal validitysphere, 166, 167; mos geometricus in"natural law"; the State; juridical person,
legal order, construed out of their "mathematical 
elements", 167; spatial analogyin irrational function; the complex function 
of number, 170; anticipation ofmovement; imaginary function; NATORP ; 
GRAZMANN'S Ausdehnungslehre; HAMILTON'S 
quaternion calculus; LEIBNIZ, 171; 
logicistic arithmetic; unidimensional series; 
relative functions; complex functions; 
anticipations; Dimension iiberhaupt, 
172; group theory; the symbol i, 
173; quaternion systems in which multiplication 
has no commutative qualityrefer to movement (direction) ; HANK EL 
on the symbol i, 174; irrational and differential 
functions are limiting functionsopened by space and movement, 185;

spatial magnitude and number; irrational

numeral function, 384 ; the antinomy in a"continuum of points"; points have onlyan objective existence in the spatial subject-
object relation; a dense set of pointscancels distance, 385 . 

ARMY, III, the "morale" of an army, according 
to E. BRUNNER, 422. 

ARNIM, JOH. VAN, III, Stoicorum veterum 
fragmnenta, 225. 

ARS COMBINATORIA, I, in LEIBNIZ, 246. 

ART, II, SHAFTESBURY'S aestheticism and 
art, 276, 277; SCHILLER holds that art reconciles 
mind and sensibility, 278; CoN-
DILLAC on art and science; adequacy ofsymolic expression is a criterion of art,

348. 
—, III, the art of performance (music,
drama, etc.) ; the analysis of PRAXITELES' 
Sculpture: Hermes with the boy Dionysus, 
110; genotype, sub types and phenotypes; 
style, free art, 121; music, literature, 
122; classification of fine arts, 
123; applied (bound) art; mass production, 
bad taste, pursuit of gain;
architecture; Christian aesthetics does 

ARTIST'S TASK, THE 12 

not recognize an humanistic pure art;functional modality of the religious fulthe 
Part pour l'art slogan ; our view ofness of meaning, 7; it has a subject- andpure art, 139; a bank building as a worka law-side which are mutually irreduciof 
"art"; free art pre-supposes a differen-ble, but indissolubly correlated; and bothtiated civilization; the artistic beauty ofare determined and delimited by thefurniture, etc.; architecture is bound art, cosmic order of time; the criterion is 
140; Style of furniture; Louis XIV style, dependent on the transcendental Idea of141; our critical reserve; the colonnade the meaning totality; the basic denomiof 
the Louvre, Lemercier's chapel at thenator of the law spheres is the cosmicSorbonne, CLAUDE PERRAULT ; monumen-time order; reflected in the same manner 
tality; style Louis XIV is a façade style;in the modal structure of every aspect, 8;
the disharmony in the opening process,there is no genus proximum in a modal

142. sense possible under which the aspectscan be subsumed; the aspects themselves
ARTIST'S TASK, THE, III, according to 

are the ultimate genera of modal mean-

BERLAGE, 139. 

ing, 14 ; the modal structures of the lawARYAN RACE, THE, III, according to AL-spheres exhibit an order of increasingFRED ROSENBERG, 496. complication, but not a logically conti


nuous order, 49; law spheres are not

As IF, I, we may judge of a living or


"categories of thought"; they are arran


ganism only as if a teleological activity

ged in a cosmic succession of prior and

lay at its foundation, according to KANT,

posterior, 50; this order of succession is

395. 
not an "arrangement of the classes ofASPECTS, I, aspects are enumerated onknowledge" in a neo-Kantian sense; thepage 3; no single aspect stands by itself;earlier modal spheres are the foundation

every one refers within and beyond it-of all the later modal aspects in an irreself 
to all the others, 3; our ego is actuallyversible coherence of meaning; sub-
operative in all the functions in whichstratum spheres, 51; and super-stratumi t expresses itself within the coherencespheres; two terminal spheres, 52; whyof our temporal world; there is no singleDivine Revelation does not mention the 
aspect of our cosmos in which I do notrelation between foundation and super-
actually function, 5; the modal diversitystructure; according to this relation manis the expression of a totality of signifi-is not there before the things of inorganiccation which through the medium of time nature; viewed from the supertemporal 
is broken up into a modal diversity of creaturely root of the earthly world, the 

aspects, 16; a rough, preliminary schemainorganic and the vegetable and the ani-
of the fundamental modalities of mean-mal world have no existence apart froming; their coherence is guaranteed in aman, and man has been created as the 
cosmic order of time necessarily relatedlord of the creation; the foundational and 
to factual duration ; the indissoluble cor-the transcendental direction in the cosmic 
relation of order and duration is cosmic order of time; the second terminal spheretime, which we transcend only in theis that of faith, 53; the Biblical religiousreligious centre of our existence, 24 ; amotive gives the view of time its ultimatemodal aspect requires a transcendentaldirection to the true fulness of meaningIdea of its coherence with other aspects,intended by the cosmonomic Idea, 54;
and of the radical unity of all aspects, 85.the modal aspects should not be identi—, 
II, the criterion of a modal aspect isfied with the typical structures of in-
theoretical in character, 4; its epistemo-dividuality functioning in them; there islogical nature does not imply that thea fundamental difference between the 
aspect it refers to is epistemological, 5;modal "how" and the concrete "what"; 
this criterion is founded in the cosmic human behaviour is not an aspect, but aorder of time, but the aspect intended inconcrete activity functioning in all theit is a modus of human experience; as-aspects, 68; each of the aspects is a tempects 
are only implicitly experienced inporal modal refraction of the religiousthe naive attitude; their diversity isfulness of meaning and expresses thebased on the law of refraction of cosmic whole of the temporal meaning cohetime 
from whose continuity we abstractrence, 74 ; modal sphere sovereignty de-
the law sphere, 6; the criterion of thepends on the nucleus of the aspect sur-
latter is its general modal meaningrounded by analogical moments partlywhich integrates every specific individu-referring forward to the transcendentalality of meaning within the sphere into afunction and partly referring back to thefunctional coherence with all the other substratum-aspects; modal anticipationsmeaning individualities in this sphere;and modal retrocipations; the aspects dis-
spatial figures of all kinds of individualityplay an architectonic differentiation inare spatially correlated; a circle, a poly-their structure, 75; the aspects do notgon, a tangent, parallel and non-paralleldelimit each other; the degree of comlines, 
etc.; the modal criterion is a prioriplication of a law sphere depends on itsfunctional and guarantees sphere-sover-position in their arrangement, 76; theeignty; the general modal meaning is a nucleus gives the fundamental analogical 


 13 ATOMISTS 

concepts a definitive modal qualification,Idea is a limiting concept; the many77 ; a modal retrocipation may refer to"-isms" in immanence philosophy; trans-
the nucleus of a substratum sphere ascendental Idealism; KANT'S homo nouwell 
as to the complete coherence of themenon, 187; the opening process andnucleus and its actual analogies, 163;faith, 189; and history, 190; the indirectthere are simple, complex, directly andmethod of ascertaining the existence of aindirectly founded retrocipations; anlawsphere, 203.
example is: dimensionality and magni-

ASSER-SCHOLTEN, II,

tude in space are simple and directly

Zakenrecht, 395.

founded, 164; kinematic space is a complex 
and directly founded retrocipation;ASSIMILATION (BIOTIC), III, is supposedspatial and arithmetical analogies in theto be a crystallization process; but suchlegal aspect; the place of a juridical fact,a view does not explain the centred struc165; 
retrocipations in the legal validityture of living plasm, 721.
sphere, 166; modal anticipations can onlybe complex, 169; the complex structureASSOCIATION, II, the laws of psychical

of the so-called irrational function of association, 117; between the feelings ofnumber as a direct anticipation, and thatsight and those of touch there exists an

of the so-called complex function ofinnate association based upon the bioticnumber as an indirect anticipation, 170;coherence of the organs, 373. 
the modal nucleus and its retrocipations

ASSOCIATIONS (SOCIETAL), III, are volunta


form the primary structure of a law

ry, 189; a factory as an associatory and

sphere; e.g., juridical causality of a legal

authoritarian non-institutional organiza


fact, 181; in primitive society the causal

tion, 190; a free association is the genetic

legal fact suffices as a legal ground for a

form of a compulsory enkaptically inter-

juridical consequence; retribution has

woven organization, 191; an association is

not been deepened into the anticipatory

based on the principle of "do ut des"; a

principle of accountability for guilt, 182;

contract of association is a collective inter-

the same restrictive sense attaches to 

individual act of consensus constituting

primitive social intercourse : the foreigner

a unified will of a whole bound to a

is hostis, exlex; the law of contract is 

common purpose, 573; this purpose is

governed by the principle of do ut des

necessarily directed to the correlation of

and by a strict formalism; juridical acts

inter-communal and external inter-indivi


are tied down to a sensory symbol; the

dual relationships, prohibitions in France

closed feeling aspect in animal life, 183;

and England; enkapsis between free asso


animal proofs of "intellect" do not rest

ciations and inter-individual relations is

on rational analysis but on a presenti


reciprocal, 658; their juridical form pre


ment of causal or teleological relations;

supposes common private law; the State

an animal's feeling is not susceptible of

is bound by the opened and differen


anticipation in an axiological sense; un


tiated inter-individual societal relations,

directed physico-chemical processes are

575, 660, 670, 685; BESELER'S theory of the

in a closed state; in a living organism

formal autonomy of associations; free

they are deepened by anticipating the

associations; their contractual genetic

directing impulses of organic life; under

forms, 667.

the guidance of an anticipated lawspherean aspect is expanded and deepened in

ASSOCIATION PSYCHOLOGY, I, HARTLEY,

the opening process, 184 ; guiding or

BROWN, PRIESTLY, DARWIN, etc, 264,

directing functions are to be distingui


HumE's laws of association, 277, 278, these

shed from guided or directed functions;

laws are his explanatory principles, 302.

the anticipatory spheres of the aspect areopened through the guiding functions ofASTRONOMY, III, the planets with theirlater aspects; e.g., the approximatingsatellites, the solar system, sphericalnumerical functions point forward togroups of stars, the galaxy, etc.; little is

space and motion; thus logical feeling isknown about their mutual relations and 
a modal limiting function of feeling ap-internal nature, 651.
proximating the analytical meaningproper; the modal anticipations deepenATMAN, II, in the Indian Upanishads we

the entire primary meaning of the law-find the Ii-ness conceived of as an absosphere 
in the coherence of its nucleuslutely abstract supra temporal centre ofthe contemplative intuition of the essen


and retrocipations, 185; [cf. s.v. OPENING


PROCESS] ; Concept and Idea of the modalces transcending all that has the shape ofmeaning aspect; the concept of an aspecta thing or bears a name; it participatesis concerned with its "restrictive func-in the Brahman, the spirit of the world,

324.
tion" (i.e. closed function), the Ideaapproximates its meaning by seizing upon

ATOMISM, I, of GASSENDI is contradictory,

the anticipated modal structures in ad


255.
vance, and points in the transcendental
direction of time, 186; mistaking the IdeaATOMISTS, III, LEUCIPPUS and DEMOCRITUS; 
for the concept leads to antinomy; the they are misinterpreted by ARISTOTLE, 8. 



 

ATOMS

ATOMS, I, are "ideal forms" in DEMOCRI 
tus, 122; E. MACH does not consider them 
to be real, 213. 
—, III, in pre-Socratic phil. are elements;
DEMOCRITUS calls them "ideai", non-sensible 
but intelligible; PLATO includesatoms in the world of the "ousiai"; and 
the choora; the flowing air is the principle 
of matter, the void; the "atoms"
are called "full" of being; matter is voidof being, the me on, 8; the structure ofatoms and molecules contradicts the 
positivistic thesis that they are fictitious,
99; atoms have a veritable individualitystructure, 101; atoms are considered as 
real parts of a living cell by B. BAVINCKand TH. HAERING ; and so are molecules; 
the atoms in a living cell are enkapticallybound in a molecular union, 641; an 
atom's nuclear structure is not essentially 
changed; its existential duration isdetermined by the typical temporal orderof its individuality structure, 704 ; anatom is a "mixtum" of protons, neutronsand electrons, according to HOENEN, 708;
atoms and chemical combinations are 
not parts of the living organism, 714. 

ATOM-SPECTRUM, III, formula for its results, 
in BOHR, 706. 

ATTENTION, II, pre-theoretical attention

is rigidly bound to psychical factors; the

free direction of our attention to abstract 
modal states of affairs is typical for theoretical 
intuition; in this free direction ofattention theoretical intuition may graspcertain modal law conformities without a 
previous exhaustive analysis in the modalfield of research, 483. 

ATTRIBUTIVE COMPETENCE, III, of the common 
courts, 679. 

AUGSBURG, THE PEACE OF, III, and episcopal 
Church government, 516. 

AUGSBURG CONFESSION, III, its definition 
of the Church, 512 ; it leaves the structural 
principle of the Church institutionunexplained, 513. 

AUGUSTINIAN ROMAN THOUGHT, III, tries 
to interpret the Scholastic basic motiveas much as possible from an Augustinianstandpoint; MARLET; they hold that CALVIN 
emphasized God's transcendence toomuch, denying being to a creature; andthat CALVIN exaggerated God's immanencein his struggle against SERVET'S pantheism,
72; MARLET reduces the difference between 
Scholastic philosophy and thePhil. of the Cosmon. Idea to a theologicalproblem ; a comparison of the two respective 
basic Ideas of these philosophies,

• 

AUGUSTINUS, I, 

Confessiones, 26. 
De Civitate Dei, 178, 185.
—, I, Inquietum est cor nostrum et mundus 
in corde nostro, 11; AUGUSTINUS' sub


14 

jective psychologistic view of time, 26; thestruggle between the civitas Dei and thecivitas terrena and the historical development 
of philosophy, 119; his view oftheology in its relation to philosophy; hestarted on the path of scholastic accommodation 
of Greek thought to the doctrine 
of the Church; he interpreted Genesis 
1 : 1 in the cadre of the Greek form-
matter motive, 178; his later Christian 
conception of God's Will as Creator andhis insight into the obfuscation of humanreason by the fall became involved in theproclamation of the "primacy of thewill", 185; it came into conflict with 
realism that sought its Archimedanpoint in theoretic reason; by way ofFranciscan thought Nominalism was related 
to the Augustinian tradition, 186;
all knowledge depends on self-knowledge, 
and self-knowledge depends ourknowledge of God; his refutation ofscepticism is radically different from thatof DESCARTES; he did not declare the 
naturalis ratio autonomous and unaffected 
by the fall, 196; Deum et animamscire, volo, 196, 223; Augustinianism ofMAURICE BLONDEL, 525. 
—, II, 9, 268, 387. 
Soliloquia, 20.
De Civitate Dei, 294. 
—, II, identifies truth and being, 20; hisidea of history : Civitas Dei and Civitasterrena, 268; productive, reproductiveand synthetic imagination, 514. 
-, III, civitas Dei and civitas terrena, 
216; a State which has been separatedfrom the Body of Christ, is part of thecivitas terrena; the body politic is a divine 
institution ; he subordinates the 
State to the temporal Church; his DeCivitate Dei prepared for the medievalHoly Roman Empire; he did not sufficiently 
distinguish between the Churchas the Kingdom of Christ and the temporal 
institution, 510. 

AUL, THE, III, the Kirghiz Aul is a "jointfamily", and has an indivisible commonproperty, 351, 352. 

AUREOLI, PETRUS, I, was an Averroist Nominalist, 
188. 

AUSTIN, II, interpretation of KANT'S autonomy 
and heteronomy, 142. 

AUSTRIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMISTS, I, their 
concept "pure economics", 555. 

AUTARCHICAL SAGE, THE, III, of Stoicism, 

228. 
AUTHENTIC PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT, I, 
an existentialistic notion, 53. 

AUTHORITARIAN ORGANIZATION, III, is noninstitutional, 
[Verband], 190. 

AUTHORITIES, II, the formation of technical 
principles is only possible throughthe agency of historical authorities within 
a cultural group ; they intervene in the 


cultural community to conquer reactionary 
conservatism, 258. 


AUTHORITY, III, in an authoritarian community; 
in marriage; family, 180; of the
magistrate; of a factory manager, 181;
authority and subordination are founded
on the inequality of men; slavery; according 
to PLATO, 230; they are based on
the legal order in the theories of the
Stoics, which show a tendency towards
the social contract view, 231; authority
and subordination in the family according 
to KANT, 273 ; the authority of
parents, 274 ; authority in marriage, 325
-329; charismatic authority of a sib's
chieftain, 357; authority within the temporal 
Church institution compared with
authority in the State, 544. 


AUTOCRACY, III, KELSEN supposes that
autocracy is founded in the belief in an
absolute verity, 607. 


AUTONOMY, I, of theoretical thought in
immanence philosophy, 35-37; of natural
reason in Occamism, 67 ; of theoretical 
truth is a dogma which hands truth over
to the subjective commitment of the apostate 
personality, 150.
-, II, and heteronomy in KANT, 141; in
AUSTIN, FELIX SOMLO, 142. 
-, III, of being and value of the cosmos
with respect to God, in STOKER, and in
Roman Catholic thought, 71, 72; autonomy 
contra sphere sovereignty, 220, 221;
formal juridical autonomy of associations


other than the State, 236, 245; KANT'S idea 
of ethical autonomy contradicts the real
structural principle of moral community,
273, 274; an individualistic autonomy of
thought conflicts with communal family


thought, 288. 


AUTONOMOUS TOTALITY PHENOMENA, III, are 
vital phenomena, according to BERTAL


LANFFY, etc., 733. 


AUTOS AND Nomos, I, in KANT; and in 
irrationalism, 466. 


AVENARIUS, II, analytical economy, 123;
biological interpretation of this economy
in MACH and AVENARIUS, 175. 


AVERROISM, I, in MARSILIUS OF PADUA, 188; 
and in SIGER OF BRABANT, 260. 
-, III, of the sociology of JOHN OF JANDUN 
and MARSILIUS OF PADUA, 224. 


AVICENNA, I, tried to effect a synthesis
between Aristotelianism and the Koran,


173. 
-, II, on being, 21. 
AVUNCULAR RELATIONSHIP, III, among primitives, 
338. 

AXIOLOGICAL VIEWPOINT, III, is indispensable 
to Social Science, 336, 337. 

AXIOLOGY, II, the low degree of differentiation 
in the axiological spheres of feeling 
at a primitive stage of culture, 178; 

15 BAVINCK, H. 

in the retrocipatory direction of sensory
perception the objective analogies of the
pre-psychical functions of a thing or
event are given in a natural way in objective 
sensory space, independent of any
axiological moment in human sensory
perception, 377. 


BAAL, J. VAN, II, 
Godsdienst en samenleving in Nederlandsch 
Zuid-Nieuw-Guinea, 267, 317.
-, II, dema, personal and universal; a
fluid distinction; dema stones; cocodemas, 
317. 


BABEL, II, Tower of, 262. 

BACHOVEN, J. J., III, 
Das Mutterrecht, eine Untersuchung fiberdie Gynakratie der alten Welt nach ihrerreligiOsen and rechtlichen Natur, 331.
--, III, human sexual intercourse was at 
first promiscuous; matriarchy among theancient Lycians; the father being unknown, 
the centre of the family was themother; patriarchy came afterwards, 331. 

BACTERIA, III, have no cell nucleus, 719, 

772. 
BAER, C. E. v., III, chance is the concurrence 
of mutually independent causalseries, 747. 

BXHR, OTTO, III,
Der Rechtsstaat, 430.
-, III, his essentially civil juridical viewof the administrative judicature as a requirement 
of the modern constitutional

State, 430. 


BALBINO, GIULIANO, III, 


L'idea etica del fascismo, 415. 


BARBAROS, II, 199. 
BARTH, KARL, I, 
Kirchliche Dogmatik, 66.
--, I, there is no point of contact between
nature and grace, 66. 


9

 II, 

Kirchliche Dogmatik, 34, 300, 301, 302.
-, II, dialectical view of creation and 
sin, 34; denies the science of ethics, 148; 
his conception of Christian faith as a
new creation, 300; identifies subjective
believing with the Christian himself;
faith has no connection with the temporal 
order; the New Testament mentions 
analogies explained by BARTH as
metaphors; nature and super-nature in
his view, 301. 


BASTIAN, III, similarities in the culture 
of different peoples are not due to derivation, 
but independent developments,
332, 333. 


BAVINCK, H., II, 
The Philosophy of Revelation, 305, 307,
308, 323. 



BAVINK, BERNARD 16 

--, II, Divine Revelation also has its his pan-psychical principle of continuity,
soterio-logical sense, which has enteredand his "psychology of plants", 646; col-
into history, 305; development of reve-loids are very sensitive to changes oflatio particularis, 307; self-consciousnesselectric and temperature conditions, 719;
and revelation, 323. the acceptance of a second limit in the

internal bio-physico-chemical constella-
BAVINK, BERNARD, I, tion of a living organism can never con-
Ergebnisse und Probleme der Natur-tradict the results of modern physics andwissenschaften, 557. chemistry, 734 ; his criticism of DRIESCH,
----, I, points out that in modern phy-744 ; he is an adherent of "emergentsics the philosophical considerationsevolutionism", 762. 
advanced by MACH and AvENARIUS have

BAYARD, EMI LE, III,

given rise to a trend favourable to the

L'art de reconnaitre les styles, 142.

fundamental abandonment of the concept

BAYLE, PETER, I, had undermined the

of physical causality, 557; his "criticalrealism"; he holds natural science to be foundations of the mathematical science 

independent of philosophy; "for physicsideal; he set forth an absolute cleft be-
the molecules and light waves, the electro-tween Christian faith and natural reason 
magnetic fields and their tensors, etc.,by his nominalist doctrine of two kindsare rather of exactly the same sort ofof truth; he separated "practical reason"

from the Humanistic science ideal; the

reality as stones and trees, vegetable cellsand fixed stars"; BAVINK here overlooks Christian religion was in open conflict

with human reason; he opposed the idea

that physics has eliminated the naive

of the "Vernunftreligion" and retained

view of reality, 559; he considers "na


ture" to be "rational" into its deepesta place for the Christian religon in thefoundation; this is in keeping with his"heart", which view was blasphemy to

LEIBNIZ, 260.

"critical realism" accommodated to the 

—, II,

Augustinian doctrine of the Divine Logos;

Dictionnaire historique et critique, 353.

it does not contradict the metaphysical

—, II, he applied Cartesian doubt to his-

conception of a physical world "in itself", 
but only implies that in this phy-torical tradition; facts are not given, but

must be established; he eradicates any

sical world "in itself" is expressed the

bias of faith, education, etc.; but facts are

"Divine Reason" which is also the origin

not "history"; CASSIRER'S praise of BAYLE,

of human reason; the "objective" rationa


lity of "nature in itself" has as such no 353. 
relation to the logical subject function ofBE", THE COPULA : "To, II, its linguistic
man, but the latter has a relation to themeanings; its logical meanings (LAsK) ;
former, 560; BAVINK'S view of reality isdoes not only signify a logical relation of


false, there is no "nature in itself", 561; identity; and analytical implication, 436.
he holds that in the course of centuries 

BEAUTIFUL SOUL, THE, I, in SCHILLER'S

physics has achieved its greatest results

conception, 463, 465.

without any aid from epistemology, 561;
the truth is that modern physics rests onBEAUTY, I, is "freedom in appearance"
epistemological pre-suppositions that hadaccording to SCHILLER, 463.
to oust Aristotelian views of nature; —, II, of a landscape, 381.
BAVINK'S arguments in defence of the


BEAVER DAMS, III, as psychical objects,

philosophical neutrality of physics are

109.
not free of pre-suppositions exceeding
science and are based on an absolutiza-BEBEL, III, 
tion of the functionalistic viewpoint ofDie Frau und der Sozialismus, 457. 
natural science which leaves no room for --, III, with the disappearance of the


naive experience, 562.State also the civil legal order will vanish;
--, III, the capitalistic system of production and
Ergebnisse und Probleme der Naturwis-the economic interests of the bourgeois,
senschaften, 23, 36, 84, 100, 645, 646, 647, and also private property will be at an
699, 719, 723, 744, 758. end; LOCKE was right that the State is
—, III, on secondary qualities; his refu-for the protection of these "innate human


tation of "naive realism", 36; he states rights", especially private property, 457. 
that modern physics has abandoned any


BEHAVIOUR, II, human behaviour is not

visible model of its formulae, 37 ; his view 

an aspect, 68; is subjectivity, 113.

of the virus is connected with his so


—, III, the factual behaviour of people

called emergent evolutionism, 84 ; he

occurs within the cadre of an intricate

thinks that the rejection of the substance

network of typical structures of corre


concept in physics affects the transcen


lated communal, inter-communal, or in-

dental Idea of an individual whole; he 

ter-personal relationships, 178.

confuses reality with its physical aspect,
100; he considers an atom as a real partBEING, I, is only to be ascribed to God,


of a cell, because he depends on hiswhereas creation has only meaning, the
emergent evolutionistic standpoint, 641; dependent mode of reality or existence; 



 17 BERTALLANFFY, V. 

a true concept of being is impossible; theBERGSON, H., II, 
word being has no unity of meaning; itIntroduction a la Metaphysique, 480.
may denote "essence", e.g., in the thesis:La Pensee et le Mouvant, 481. 
"meaning is the mode of being of allLes deux sources de la morale et de la 
that has been created", 73; being andreligion, 312, 318.
validity, reality and value; is "validity"—, II, la duree is the creative qualitativeone of the categories of modality in thevital stream of time; his irrationalistic 
Kantian sense?, in Neo-Kantianism, 76. psychologistic metaphysics isolates psy—, 
II, a metaphysical concept in PLATO:chical intuition and durêe theoretically;
ousia; a dialectical unity of movementyet he feels obliged to connect intuitionand rest; transcendent, 9; ARISTOTLE: the with concepts; [cf. s.v. Concept], 481;
immanent essence of material substances, he misinterprets the cosmic continuity of10; being is not a genus proximum of thetime as psychic duration; he isolates in-
aspects, but an analogical concept, 15;tution theoretically from analysis inreason is the origin of being in Humanis-order not to fall back into the naïve attic 
thought; KANT; NICOLAI HARTMANNtitude; he starts from the metaphysicalcomprises subject and Gegenstand inprejudice that the full reality is given usvarious ontological spheres, 19; N. HART-in the actual psychic stream of time; heMANN'S being is an undefined notion.lacks critical selfreflection; his optimisticIn ARISTOTLE "being" is the noumenalbelief about the end of philosophicalground of all generic concepts; the firststrife if only his intuitive metaphysicaltranscendental determinations are, a.o., method were generally accepted, 482. 
the being true and the being good;

BERKELEY, I,

AUGUSTINUS identifies truth and being;

Alciphron, 273.

the Scholastic ens realissimus or nous, 

—, I, criticized the Humanistic metaphy


20; THOMAS AQUINAS: Duns Scotus, 21, 

sics of nature, 203; he overcame the ex-

the universal determinations of being; 

treme sensationalist nominalism of his

Nic. HARTMANN'S concept was made for

earlier writings and recognized the logi


the occasion, 21; HEIDEGGER On being,

cal conformity to laws in the relations

Sein und Zeit, 22-26; the being of all

between the Ideas, although in a nomi


that is, in the philosophy of the cosmo


nalistic fashion he only ascribes univer


nomic Idea, is meaning; sinful subjecti


sality to the signs; signs are material and

vity and meaning, 25; being and causa-

instrument of scientific knowledge and

lity in THOMAS AQUINAS, 39; analogia en-

no arbitrary names; the representative

tis in Greek metaphysics, and the form-

character of symbols has become the

matter motive; PARMENIDES identifies 

foundation of the possibility of know-

being and logical thought; being is held

ledge as representing the validity of the

together by Dike (anangke), 56. 

relations in our thought, 273 ; he criticizedBELOW, VON, III, LOCKE'S "abstract ideas", but overlookedthe fact that LOCKE'S "simplest psychical

Der deutsche Staat des Mittelalters, 440,

441. element of consciousness is no less ab-
Die Entstehung der deutschen Stadtge-stract than the concept of a "triangle inmeinde, 440. general"; from his "idealist" psycholo-
Der Ursprung der deutschen Stadtverfas-gistic standpoint he had completely re-

sung, 440. solved "nature" into sensory impressions;
Territorium und Stadt, 440. his thesis: "esse est percipi" was the—, III, his studies of the "medieval counterpart to LEIBNIZ' mathematical ide-
German State"; he points out thealism; BERKELEY discarded LOCKE'S dis-
erroneous absolutization of the econo-tinction between "primary" and "second


mical historical viewpoint in the inter-ary" qualities of matter that had beenpretation of the legal historical material;made in accordance with GALILEO'S and 
he does not realize the necessity of ap-NEWTON'S physics, 274 ; B. gave up hisplying a structural insight into the cha-earlier extreme nominalism, 283; he exracter 
of the State, 439, 440. plained the belief in the existence of an

external world by his metaphysical con-
BENEVENT, ROFFREDUS V, III, ception of God, 291.
Quaest. Sabbathinae, 235. 

BERLAGE, III, his views of the Artist's taskBERGMANN, ERNST, I, in architecture, 139. 
Fichte und Goethe, 451. 

BERLIN SCHOOL, III, founded by R. SMEND, 
BERGSON, H., I, time is the psychical dura-387. 
tion of feeling; all its moments inter-

BERNOUILLI, II,

penetrate qualitatively; psychical duree

Diderot on him, 339.

is the absolute time, 27; he took over 
NIETZSCHE'S pragmatist and biologicalBERTALLANFFY, V., III, 
conception of the theoretical picture ofHandbuch der Biologie, 721, 733.
the world created by scientific thought,Kritische Theorie der Formbildung, 771.


466. —, III, speaks of "autonomous totality 

 

BERTH, EDOUARD18 

phenomena" instead of "vital" pheno-einbarung", i.e., a unifying volitional act;
mena, 733. parties are opposed to each other; theassociation is based on the egotistical

BERTH, EDOUARD, III, French syndicalist;

principle of do ut des, 573.

l'etat est mort, 465. 
BINSWANGER, III, on the meeting between

BERTHELOT, R., II, 

I and Thou, 781.

L'Astrologie et la pensee de l'Asie, 324.

—, II, rita; the astronomical world-order; BIO-CHEMICAL CONSTELLATION, III, it starts 

derived from the Chaldeans, 324. where the molecular or quasi crystalline

structures of organic matter end; irradia-

BESELER, GEORG, II, criticism of the his


tion of nervous tissues; tendons; fibres;

torical school of jurisprudence, 277.

muscular contraction and myosin mole


—, III, a Germanist adherent of the His


cules, 726; is denied by DRIESCH, 741.

torical School of Jurisprudence, 462; histheory of the formal autonomy of privateBIOGENETIC LAW, III, formulated byassociations, 667, 670, 685. HAECKEL, 95. 

BETH, KARL, II, Bio-ImpuLsEs, III, direct bio-physico-
Religion und Magie bei den Naturviil-chemical constellations qualified by thekern, 314, 319. central subjective vital function of the—, II, a cult is never without the ethical organism, 725; these impulses use a mini-
moment, 319. mum of energy and are spontaneous, 726;

and metabolism, 731.

BEYERHAUS, (;ISBERT, III,
Studien zur Staatsanschauung Calvins mitBIOLOGISTIC, II, biologistic interpretation
besondere Beriicksichtigung seines Sou-of princ. of logical economy, 175; bioloveriinitatsbegriffs, 
504. gistic view of History of SPENGLER, 195. 


"BIBLICAL" HUMANISM, I, Of ERASMUS, etc., BIOLOGY, I, and individuality structures,
512, 513. such as a tree, a cell, etc., 554. 
—, II, and society, 344.

BIBLICAL MOTIVE, II, religious motive, 54. 

—, III, the modern biological theory andBIEL, GABRIEL, I, a more radical Nomina-its substance concept, 23; DRIEscH's entclist 
than OCCAM, 225. lechy and psychoid and WOLTERECK'S 

substantial "matrix" of "living matter"

BIERENS DE HAAN, J. A., III, 

are confusing, 23, 24; MULLER'S theory of

Die tierische Instinkte und ihr Umbau 

the specific energies of the sense organs

(lurch Erfahrung, 85. 

and LOCKE'S doctrine of the subjective

BINA MARRIAGE, III, among primitivesecondary qualities, 39; the terms "expeoples, 
338. ternal causes", "energy" in a biologicalsense; an optic nerve does not see, 40;

BINDER, JULIUS, II, 

the meaning of MULLER's theory; inade-

Philosophic des Rechts, 213, 215. 

quate stimuli are of rare occurrence; the

--. , II, systematic and historical sciences

distinction between adequate and inade


of law share the same Gegenstand, 213;

quate stimuli presupposes the existence

language, social intercourse, religion,

of objective sensory qualities, 41; MO,


etc., are historical; cultural development

LER's theory refuted by the empirical

is the dialectical-temporal development

facts supposed to confirm it; an adequate

of the absolute reason; legal science is

stimulus is required for the normal activ


related to "value" in RICKERT'S sense; but 

ity of the sense organs; the untenable

legal science is not identical with the

consequences of MULLER'S theory in ani-

science of legal history; he unintention


mal life, 42; HELMHOLTZ'S theory of differ-

ally formulates the antinomy of his view;

ences of modality and those of quality;

his Idea of justice, 214; from this Idea

sensations of musical tone, 43; the cen


he tries to infer some transcendental 

tral function in the thing structures of a

juridical categories; he is aware of the

tree is biological, 56; the central vital

difference between juridical and cultural

function is the qualifying function; it is

categories; but he historicizes law, 215.

the last subject function of a tree's tem


--, III, 

poral structure; but a tree does not only

Das Problem der Juristischen Person-

function in the pre-psychical aspects; if

lichkeit, 279, 688. 

it did, it would be a "Ding an sich";

--, his individualistic conception of legal

thinghood is not enclosed in any single

subjectivity misinterprets the organic

modal aspect, 56; a tree's object func


analogy in legal relations when he says

tions, 57 ; the result of a theoretical elimi


that legal representation destroys the

nation of the logical object function, 57,

juridical personality of the represented

58; the qualifying vital function unfolds

in favour of that of the representative,

the earlier aspects and directs them in

279. 
a typical manner, and they acquire an 
BINDING, III, and TRIEPEL denied that the internal intermodal structural coherence 
genetic form of an association has anyof which we have an implicit inarticulatecontractual character; they called it "Ver-awareness in naïve experience, 59; the 


concept of "species", 80; classificatoryand typological method in biology andpsychology and, psychiatry, 81; thedifference between animals and plants,
83-87; there is no higher "logical"
genus embracing plants, animals andman; there is not a type: "living being";
ARISTOTLE'S genus of "sensory being", 87;
geno- and variability types, radical type;
parasitical forms of symbiosis, 93 ; cf.
Type Concept; examples of genotypeswithin a radical type in animals; subtypes, 
94; the cell is the last independentviable unity of a living mass; its thing-
structure is not resolved in the biotic 
function; the reality of a cell is beyonddoubt, but not directly accessible to naiveexperience; its vital function directs thepre-vital modes; its thing-structure expresses 
itself objectively in the theoretically 
opened sensory image of perception, 
in its post psychical functions, etc.;
histological discoveries; exoplasmaticconstituents; endoplasmatic corpuscles ina cell deprived of its nucleus, 102; anthills, 
birds' nests, beaver dams, spiders'webs, etc., 107; mineral formations in the 
protoplasm of rhizopods, 108 ; organic andinorganic, 105; wood cells of a tree, 129,131; mechanistic versus vitalistic biology,

733. 
BIO-MOLECULES, III, are the smallest livingunits within a cell-structure, 722 ; their 
existence has not been proved, 757. 

BIO-PHYSICAL ASPECTS, III, of family life,
301-306. 

BIO-PHYSICO-CHEMICAL CONSTELLATIONS, 
III, have biotically directed physico chemical 
functions of material components,

725. 
BIO-POLITICS, III, negro- and kaffir-problems 
in S. Africa and the U.S.A.; tyranny,

498. 
BIO-SUB STANCE, III, is denied by DRIESCH,
732; in WOLTERECK ; he means: "livingmass"; comparable with radio active elements, 
750, 751, 752, 755, 759, 760, 

BIO-SYNTHESIS, III, WOLTERECK'S programme, 
728. 

BIOTIC ASPECT, II, its meaning-kernel islife; its phenomena are a.o. autonomousprocreation ; preservation in change, 107;
these phenomena are subjective analogies; 
the contest between mechanists andvitalists; life belongs to the fundamentalmodal horizon of human experience; itspresence cannot be decided by experiments; 
as soon as we establish the fact 
that a living being has originated, weappeal to an irreducible modal aspect ofexperience and not to phenomena 'whoseinterpretation presupposes this fundamental 
aspect, 108; life expresses itselfin an organic relation, which is a retrocipatory 
moment; this organic relation 

 

19BOA S. 

implies unity in multiplicity (number) ;
biotic space in the bio-milieu; bioticmovement, 109; botic movement is intensive 
and qualitative development foundedin the original meaning of movement;
energy exchange in the living organismhas an organizing biotic direction, 110;
sensory space refers back to biotic space,
168; biotic retrocipations in primitiveculture, 270. 
—, III, of a sculpture, 112; of the State,

494. 
BIOTIC INTERLACEMENT S, III, in a community; 
in a family: 229, 300, 301. 
BIRAN DE, MAINE, I, a French spiritualist,

525. 
BIRD, II, feeding its young ones, 374. 

BIRD'S NEST, A, I, is conceived of as a 
typical object of life, in the naive attitude, 
42; it has objective aesthetic qualities, 
43. 
—, III, as a psychical object, 107, 109. 

BISMARCK, II, as a leader of history, 243. 

BLACK, MAX, II, 
The Nature of Mathematics, 78, 79. 


BLASTOPORE, III, the invagination of thegastrula, in case of transplantation ofcells from the blastopore; the blastoporemust contain the organizing centre, according 
to SPEMANN, 752, 753. 

BLOND BEAST, THE, I, according to 
NIETZSCHE, 211. 

BLONDEL, MAURICE, I, his thought breakswith Thomism; he was influenced byFrench Spiritualism (MAINE DE BIRAN)
RAVAI S SON, LAC HELIER, BOUTROUX and 
others, and continues the Augustiniantradition, although he does not reject (ina radical sense) the autonomy of philosophical 
thought. BLONDEL is a disciple ofOLLE LAPRUNE, and starts with the immanence 
standpoint to show its deficiency by means of an irrationalistic andactivistic metaphysical interpretation ofthought and being inspired by Leibnizianthought and its irrationalist and universalist 
turn in SCHELLING'S "concrete and 
absolute thought"; later on he underwentthe influence of BERGSON'S philosophy oflife; MALEBRANCHE'S "ViSiO omnium rerum 
in Deo"; BLONDEL lacks in principlea transcendental critique of philosophicthought, 525; he attempts a dialecticalsynthesis of the Humanist and the Scholastic 
motives; there is no inner connection 
between Blondelism and the philosophy 
of the Cosmonomic Idea, 526.
—, II, he aims at a synthesis betweenAugustinianism and phenomenology, andthe irrationalistic philosophy of life, 590;
and SCHELER, 591. 

BOAS, III, 
Kultur und Rasse, 495. 



BOAS, FRANZ 

BOAS, FRANZ, III, American ethnologist ofthe critical school, 332; accepts historicalcoherences between primitive cultures;
reject the method of "complex formation", 
333; rejects the existence of "primary 
races" for political reasons, 495. 

BODIN, JEAN, I, his concept of sovereignty,

311. 
—, III, his idea of sovereignty; absolutisttheory, 395, 398; the State embraces thewhole of society and all organizationsand relationships, 452, 662. 
BODY, II, human body, 147; in KANT:
material body, the concept, and "extended", 
and "heaviness", 437. 

BODY AND SOUL, III, cf.: The Human Body;
the body is the structural whole of man'stemporal appearance; the soul is theradical unity of his transcendent spiritual 
existence, 89; the human body isqualified by the act-structure; it is not a"thing", 198 ; Body and soul in ARISTOTLE,
211; PLATO viewed the body as the vehicle 
of the soul, 778; ARISTOTLE'S subjectivistic 
view of the human body, 779. 

BODY OF CHRIST, THE, (CORPUS CHRISTI),
III, the Biblical phrase "from one blood"
does not have a universalistic sense; 
three transcendental problems of sociology, 
168 ; the central religious community 
and the Christian motive of creation,
fall and redemption, 169; sphere sovereignty, 
coherence, radical unity, meaning 
totality, 170; structure and factualreality, 171; positivization, 173 ; geneticand existential forms, 174; correlation 
between communal and inter-individual 
relations, 176; their enkapsis, 181; humansociety cannot exist as an unintegrateddiversity, 182; institutional and non-institutional 
communities, 187; differentiated 
and undifferentiated communities, 
188; Church and State; voluntary associations, 
189; naïve experience of communities, 
192; inter-individual intercourse 
is the background to the community offamily life, 194; the radical spiritual solidarity 
of mankind, 195; membership ofthe Body of Christ is independent of alltemporal communal relationships, 196;
ST. PAUL on the Body of Christ; THOMASAQUINAS synthesis with ARISTOTLE'S view;
the transcendent religious root of thehuman race, 214; the Church cannot be 
identified with the fulness of the Body of 
Christ, the Corpus Christi; and it is notthe perfect society of the whole of Christian 
life, 215; limitations put on the competence 
of the state in connection withthe Church, the family, education, thereligious centre of personality, by God'ssovereignty; the social bonds of mankindcannot be enclosed in earthly life; GELASIUS 
distinguished between the competence 
of Church and State, 216, 218, 240. 

20 

BOETHIUS, III, 
De duabus naturis et una persona
Christi, 6. 
—, III, definition of personality with the
aid of the substance concept, 6. 


BOHATEC, J., II, 
Calvin und das Recht, 161. 


-9

 III, 
Calvin und das Recht, 480; 
Die organische Idee in der GedankenweltCalvins, 510; 
Calvin's Lehre vom Staat und Kirche, 532. 

BOHMER, J. H., III, 
Jus ecclesiast. prot., 517. 
—, III, defended the territorial system of
Church government, and made room for
the settlement of doctrinal controversial 
questions, 517. 


BoHR, NIELS, III, his formula concerning
the atom spectrum results, 706; his "relation 
of incertitude" shows the limits of 
mathematical causal explanation as regards 
a living organism, 715, 726, 727. 


BOILEAU, II, 
L'Art Poetique, 346. 


BOLINGBROKE, II, 
Letters on the Study and Use of History,


350. 
BOLSHEVIST VIEWS, III, of the State; 
PASJOEKANIN, 459. 

BONHOEFFER, DIETRICH, III, his poem : Der 
Freund, 179, 180. 

BooK, III, the structure of a book, 110; a 
reading book, etc., 151-153; the openingof its lingual function by a reader's actualization, 
152. 

BOUwMAN, H., III, 
Gereformeerd Kerkrecht, 513, 514. 


BORKOVSKY, S. VON DUNIS, I, 
Spinoza, 250. 


Bossu, LE, II, 
Traite du poême epique, 346. 


BOSSUET, II, and the Christian view of 
history, 268. 

BOURGEOIS, II, bourgeois money makers,

361. 
BouTnoux, I, his anti-rationalistic Neo-
Scholasticism, 525. 


BRAHMAN, II, 324. 


BRAIN, THE, III, the brain is the physicochemical 
condition, the partial ground
of what happens in it, in DRIESCH, 742. 


BREHIER, III, 
Theorie des incorporels dans l'ancien
Stoicisme, 226. 


BRENTANO, FRANZ, I, he ascribes to feelingan intentional relation to a "Gegenstand' ;
he posits the intentional relatedness ofevery act of consciousness to a "Gegenstand", 
52. 


21 

Il, distinguishes the intentional content 
of consciousness as "meaning" fromsensory impressions, 28; Erlebnis, 112;
space perception, 367, 373. 

BRENTANO, L., III, 
Eine Geschichte der wirtschaftlichen 
Entwicklung Englands, 673. 


BROGLIE, LOUIS DE, III, 
La physique moderne et les Quanta, 706.


incongruity between quantummechanics and the conception of physicalspace in EINSTEIN'S theory of relativity, 

101. 
BROUWER, II, an intuitionist mathematician, 
78; criticized CANTOR'S "set-theory",

340. 
BROwN, I, his mechanistic association 
psychology, 264. 

BRUNNER, AUGUST, III, 
Der Stufenbau der Welt, 5, 6. 
—, III, Neo-Scholastic writer, on the concept 
"substance", 5; essence and accidental 
changes; his view of the human -I-
ness contradicts the concept of "substance", 
6. 

BRUNNER, EMIL, I, 
Das Gebot und die Ordnungen, 519, 520,
521;
Das Einmalige und die Existenzcharakter, 
519; 
Gerechtigkeit, 521.
—, I, there is a point of contact between
nature and grace, 66; he rejects the Bi


blical view of Law and replaces it by anirrationalistic ethics of love which must 
break through the temporal divine ordinances 
because they are not the true "willof God"; he fulminates against the Ideaof a Christian science, philosophy, culture, 
519; politics, etc.; this indicates anew synthesis, this time with Kantianismand Existentialism; he tries to accommodate 
Lutheran Nominalistic dualism 
of nature and grace to CALVIN'S view ofthe Law; if a Christian philosophy, etc.,
is impossible, this sphere is withdrawnfrom Christ; and then accommodations 
are unavoidable; BRUNNER absolutizes 
love at the expense of justice, misinterprets 
the central commandment of love;
his Idea of justice is Neo-Kantian, it is a"purely formal value"; he denies the fulness 
of meaning of the Cross, 520; histhought must lead to antinomies, 521.
—, II,
Das Gebot und die Ordnungen, 156;
Die Gerechtigkeit, 157;
Cf.: 143, 158, 159.

II, his dialectical theological ethics,
143; his definition of Christian ethics,156; 
the perfect cannot be just; the meaningof Divine Justice; in his work: „Die Gerechtigkeit" 
BRUNNER avoids this erroneous 
view; here he holds that love presupposes 
justice; he opposes the fulnessof religious love to the temporal ordinan-

BRUNNER, EMI I. 

ces; lie wants to build Christian ethics 
on the basis of the actions proceedingfrom religious love within the frameworkof all the temporal ordinances; this is anafter effect of the dualistic schema of 
nature and grace in LUTHER'S thought; itleads to the identification of moralityand the Christian religion; everywherein his thought there arise antinomies,
157; he absolutizes temporal love; hisconception of the Law is erroneous, 158, 

159. 
-9

 III, 
Das Gebot und die Ordnungen, 281, 302,322, 402, 403, 422, 506, 522, 530, 532, 534, 
539, 540, 541, 542, 550, 551, 552, 553. 
—, III, law and morality are contrasted;
this is a result of the absolutization of 
civil inter-individual law; BRUNNER 
knows no other positive law besidesstate-law; he calls this view the anti-
natural attitude of the Reformed view of 
life, but it is the individualistic "natural 
law" conception, 281; numerical relationsin a family point to monogamy as theorder of creation, 302 ; he calls love a 
"sandy ground" as the basis of marriage,
322; the fundamental nature of the State 
is half demonic, namely: power, 402; theState is an enigmatic formation andescapes any univocal theory; this riddlepoints back to the riddle of creation andfall within man; BRUNNER relapses into asynthesis with the immanence standpoint 
by accepting the latter's dialecticalprinciple; his false contrast between nature 
and grace in his opposition betweenlove and law; he confuses the subjectiverealization of the factor "power" withits structural meaning and denies thepossibility of a Christian State, 403;
power is called an irrational product ofhistory with its "hidden god"; BRUNNERtries to combine the Biblical motive of 
creation and fall with Humanistic irrationalism, 
404; the "morale" of an army,
422; Kirche des Glaubens and Kultgemeinde, 
509; the organized (Church) institution 
must at least document itself before 
the world as a manifestation of the 
Church..., 522 ; sects nearly always arisethrough the fault of the Church, 532 ; as arule the sect will approach the Churchinstitution more and more in the second 
or third generation, 534 ; his undefinedconcept "order" (Ordnung) is unserviceable, 
538; a confessional Church may become 
a sect through misunderstandingthe Gospel; a national Church, recognizing 
infant baptism, may influence thewhole nation, 540; the manner in which 
the Church is organized is not decisive;
only the living Word of God is decisive,
541; Christ's inheritance is divided, who 
shall investigate who has retained or acquired 
the biggest part ! this is relativismwith respect to the Church, 542; a churchwithout a living congregational diaconatemust be mortally ill; necessity of an 


liRuNo, G lc-nip:km) 

ecclesiastical function of charity, 555;
I3RUNNER only recognizes State law, opposing 
it to "natural law", 551; he onlyrejects naturalistic positivism ; his "critical" 
positivism is no improvement;
he opposes cult community and Churchof faith; the cult community and amaterial legal order; and is subservientto the "commandment of the moment" 
which cancels the legal order, 552; inmatters of faith the cult community hassome share in the divine authority, butits legal orders are derived from theState; the juridical form is alien to thecontent embraced by it; here is the dualism 
between "nature" and "grace", 553. 

I3RUNO, GIORDANO, I, is obsessed and enticed 
by the endless, 194; his pantheisticphilosophy embraced CUSANUS' doctrineof the Infinite, and of the coincidentia 
oppositorum; infinite nature is reflectedin the microcosm of the human personality; 
nature as "natura naturata" is theself-development of God (natura naturans) 
; the opposition between the "Jenseits" 
and the "Diesseits" of Christian 
dogmatics is ascribed to the standpointof sensory appearance and imagination,
an exploded anthropomorphism in COPERNICUS' 
sense; BRUNO is at pains to reconcile 
the unity of homogeneousness of infinite 
nature in all its parts to the Idea ofthe creating individuality of the monads,
199, 200; later on LEIBNIZ transformed 
I3RuNo's aesthetically tinted individualismin his conception of the monad as a 
microcosm into a mathematical one, 230; 
the tendency of activity in the personalityideal penetrated the Idea of the cosmos,

231. 
—, II, his cosmonomic idea, 593. 
BRYCE, JAMES, III, 
Modern Democracies, 606, 607.
—, III, political parties are indispensiblein a large and free country; they awakenthe public spirit of the people; createorder in the chaos of the enormous mass 
of electors; party disicipline counteractspolitical egoism and corruption, 607. 

BUBER, MARTIN, II, 
Ich and Du, 143. 
, II, Modern Christian existentialism 
has taken over BUBER'S distinction between 
"experience of the world" and the"I-thou" relation; the latter does not 
allow of rules and laws and boundaries; 
ethical relations are supposed to be extremely 
personal and existential; thisview is based on the Humanistic motive 
of nature and freedom; the I-thou meeting 
is central and religious, not specifically 
ethical, and not in the temporal order 
of human existence; BUBER has considerably 
influenced dialectical theologians, 
143. 

BUILDING, A, III, is a socio cultural object; 
a Bank building and art, 140. 

22 

BUILDING-PLAN THEORY, III, and the dualistic 
substance concept, 745. 

MINING, ERWIN, III, 
Sind die Organismen rnikrophysikalische
Systeme?, 644. 


BURCKHARDT, JACOB, I, 
Kultur der Renaissance in Italien, 192. 
rejected RANKE'S idea of World-
history, 282. 

BURLESQUE, II, the burlesque in Classicism, 
347. 

BURNING HOUSE, II, Burning house and 
meaning, 31. 

C 

CAESAR, JULIUS, II, as a historical leader,

243. 
—, III, 
De Bello Gallico, 356. 
CALEY, II, and KLEIN, on projective geometry, 
105. 

CALVIN, JOHN, a, I, 
Epitre a tous amateurs de Jesus Christ, 4;
Institutio religionis Christianae, 516, 517,
519, 523; 
Seneca's De Clementia, 516; 
De aeterna praedestinationae, 518.


b, 

Comm. in Mosis libros V, 518. 
—, I, man wanted to be something inhimself, 4; CALVIN'S judgment: "Deus legi


bus solutus est, sed non exlex" touches the 
foundations of all speculative philosophy,
93; he expounded in his Institutio theauthentic Christian conception of AUGUSTINE 
that all knowledge of the cosmosdepends on self-knowledge, 196; CALVINpassed through an early Humanisticperiod, 515; but when he reached theturning point of his life he abandonedany Nominalistic and Scholastic viewpoint 
to adopt a Biblical view; he maintained 
that the true nature of man cannot 
be opposed to grace, but was inits root corrupted by the fall into sinand is restored, "renewed", by God'sgrace in Jesus Christ, 516; he called "natural 
theology" an "audacious curiosity"
of human reason, 517; his statement: 
"Deus legibus solutus est" implies thatall creation is subject to the Law; theChristian remains subjected to the Decalogue; 
his struggle with the Anabaptistswho opposed the sermon on the Mount tocivil ordinances, 518; his view impliesthe rejection of the Aristotelian-Thomistic 
"lex naturalis" with its "substantial 
forms", 519; CALVIN must not be considered 
as a pater angelicus of Reformedphilosophical thought; he had no philosophic 
system; the development of aChristian philosophy is actually stimulated 
by the Biblical basic motive of theReformation and shows a constant 


striving after reformation; this precludes 
the canonizing of any one system; its 
basic Idea embraces the religious antithesis 
between the apostasy of nature 
and its destiny according to creation, 
522; it recognizes in "common grace" a 
counter force against the destructive 
work of sin in the cosmos; because the 
antithesis between sin and creation is 
really abrogated by the redemption in 
.Jesus Christ; common grace must not be 
dualistically opposed to particular grace; 
both are subordinated to the "honour and 
glory of God"; the root of common grace 
is Christ, 523. 
--, II, 
Institutio, 561; 
Comment. in ep. ad Col. 3" 152; 
Op. 27,560; — 27,588; — 26,502ff 161. 
cf. 243. 
—, II, all the virtues are summarized in 
love, 152; against the Anabaptists he 
maintains that justice is in the interest 
of love, 161; as a leader in a cultural 
sense, 243. 
--, III, 

C. R. 66, 635; — 504; 
Institutio religionis Chr., 520, 533, 534, 
535, 542, 548. 
—, III, the State is a "beautiful order", in 
which prevails "symmetria, proportia": 
its opposite is a "confusum et dissipatum 
chaos", 480; Christ's kingship; we do not 
have an earthly king as Christ's image, 
for Christ gives life to the church Himself, 
504 ; the Church is the Body of 
Christ, i.e. the una sancta ecclesia, 509, 
510; he connects the invisible with the visible 
church and recognizes only Christ's 
authority in the latter exercised through 
Christ's Word and Spirit; he emphasizes 
the dependence of the communal law of 
the Church on the exceptional structure 
of this instituion, 519; and claims sphere 
sovereignty for the latter, also in a juri 
dical sense; Church authority functions 
in all aspects of its temporal institution; 
because it is a real organized community; 
the disposition of the four offices and 
the congregation's share in their election 
was exclusively inferred from the New 
Testament; there was no question of 
democracy or people's sovereignty, or a 
modern system of representation, 520; 
the authority (to administer the Divine 
Word) has not been given to these men 
themselves but to the office of wich they 
are the bearers; or, to say it more clearly, 
it has been given to the Word whose 
ministry has been entrusted to them, 
533 ; CALVIN stresses ST. PAUL'S attitude 
to the Corinthian Church with all its 
sins, 534 ; the Church is the mother of 
our faith in Christ Jesus, 535; his view 
of the Church Confession, 542. 
CALVINISM, I, according to RICKERT, 149. 
—, III, according to TROELTSCH Calvinism 
is individualistic, the same view in 

23 CAROLINGIAN RENAISSANCE 

SCHMALENBACH, TROELTSCH and WEBER, 

247. 
CANONISTS, III, they were the first to conceive 
of organized communities in the 
concept of a person; a persona ficta; the 
universitas is a juridical name, not a real 
person, something incorporeal; there are 
only natural persons, 233; a universitas 
is not a societas; the hierarchical church 
institute had its unity from above, through 
Christ's representative the Pope and his 
clergy; the laity were not active members; 
the church is a persona ficta; 
canonists followed the absolutistic view 
of Roman law and did not allow any internal 
structural diversity in the universitates; 
there was only one Roman universitas 
personarum, viz. the state, a 
legal person ; other universitates required 
the State's recognition by a lex specialis; 
canonists did not recognize free corporations 
in State or Church; such freedom, 
234, evidenced anarchy, and was dangerous; 
canonist accommodation of the 
Roman legal concept universitas to the 
Church and its sub-divisions; the universitas 
became a foundation; the Church is 
a persona ficta, an individuum, a unity 
without plurality; church authorities are 
outside of the Church in a juridical sense, 
because the fictitious person lacks legal 
capacity of acting; internally the Church 
is fitted into a representational theory, 

235. 
CANON LAW, II, and the study of legal 
history, 197; justa causa doctrine; the 
principle of the freedom of contract in 
Canon Law was taken over by Germanic 
Law; and "natural" ethical law, 359. 
--, III, 233, 235. 

CANTOR, II, 

Grundlagen einer allgemeinen Mannigfaltigkeitslehre, 
87, 90, 91. 
cf. 340. 


II, transfinite numbers; actual or 
completed infinity of a series in the infinite 
and the infinitesimal orders; this 
is antinomic, 87; the convergent infinite 
series is arithmetical in his view, 91. 

CAPITALIST, III, concept of capitalist is 
oriented to the absolutized economic aspect 
in Marxism, 165. 

CARLYLE, III, 
A History of Medieval Political Theory in 
the West, 232. 


CARNAP, R., II, 

Der Raum, 78, 96. 

—, II, on formal space, 63; on topological 

space as a receptacle, 96. 

CAROLINGIANS, THE, II, answered the 
challenge of the Arabian invasion and 
the private power formations of the 
Frankish seigneurs, 253. 

CAROLINGIAN RENAISSANCE, II, Of science 


 

CAROLINGIAN STATE24 

and art was founded on the establishment 
of the Carolingian Empire, 191. 


CAROLINGIAN STATE, III, this State existed 
while the inter-individual relations had 
not yet been completely emancipated
from undifferentiated communities, and 
the medieval Church, 659. 


CARPZOVIUS, III,
Diss. de jure decid. theol. controv., 516. 


CARTESIAN DOUBT, II, applied by BAYLE to 
historical tradition, 353. 


CASSIRER, I, 


Philosophic der symbolischen Formen, 


55;
Das Erkenntnisproblem, 199, 228, 229,
240, 247, 249, 265, 282, 340, 342, 344, 345, 


349, 350;


Leibniz' System in seinen wissensch.
Grundlagen, 229, 255;


Die Philosophie der Aufkldrung, 462. 
—, I, on the basis of anthropological and


ethnological data he established that in


the mythological sphere selfknowledge


is dependent on the knowledge of deities,


55; the relation between the new Huma


nistic concept of the ego and the new


concept of nature, 199; he rejects RIEHL'S


interpretation of DAVID HUME, 282; he


thinks that KANT conceived of time and 


space as "conceptus singulares" before


he conceived them as forms of intuition, 


but CASSIRER has overlooked the termino


logy in KANT'S inaugural oration, 345. 


-9

 II,
Die Philosophie der Aufklarung, 346, 347,348, 350, 351, 354;
Substanz Begriff und Funktions Begriff,
83, 103;
Philosophie der symbolischen Formen,
316, 318, 320, 321, 323, 324, 326, 328, 330. 
—, II, rejects RUSSELL'S logification ofnumber, 83; on the change from the geometry 
of measure to that of positions,
103; mana-idea; personal and impersonal, 
natural and super-natural are mergedin it, 316; criticizes DURKHEIM'S view of 
totemism; animals and humans; their 
unity of action proves their unity of essence, 
318; totemistic communities absorb 
individuality entirely; the power ofthe primitive communal consciousness,
320; pisteutic conception of self in relation 
to the deity is mythical; the concentrated 
self is reached in myth by projecting 
new images of deity; man knows

himself only insofar as he can visualize

himself in his idols, 323; mythical con


sciousness, 324 ; myth and the theoretical

-I- of transcendental apperception, 325;

on Classicist art, 346; LEIBNIZ' treatise: 

Von der Weisheit; BOILEAU'S reduction of 

the individuality of an artefact to law-

conformity is not critized bij CASSIRER,

347; his view of CONDILLAC'S theory, 348;

on VOLTAIRE'S attempt to save human

freedom from deterministic science, 351; 

praises BAYLE excessively, 353; criticism
of VOLTAIRE, 354. 


CASTI-CONNUBII, III, the Encyclical, 319. 


CATALYSTS, III, in fermentation processes,
716; compared with lubricants, by OSTWALD, 
731. 


CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE, II, iS the pure
form of the respect for the ethical law,
in the sense of respect for the Idea of
mankind, according to the Humanistic
ideal of personality, 149.
—, III, in KANT, 749. 


CATEGORIES, II, in KANT, 13; KELSEN, 17, 
42; KANT'S cosmological Ideas; the Idea
is a "Ding an sich" to which the categories 
of the understanding are applied as
logical determinations without the aid of
any sensory experience; thus reason gets
involved in antinomies, 43; of quantity
in KANT are merely analogical concepts,
58; ARISTOTLE'S system of categories was
influenced by metaphysical and linguistic 
considerations; they are basic
forms of predication about the existent,
445; refer to sensibility in KANT, 495; in
KANT, are the foundations of the synthesis; 
KANT derives them from the table 
of logical judgments, 506 ff.; independent
of sensibility, 507; there is one synthesis
of categories and time, 508; ARISTOTLE'S
categories of possibility and actuality
were based on the form-matter scheme, 
512; "of knowledge" in critical epistemology, 
517. 


CATHREIN, VICTOR, II, Recht, Naturrecht, 
und positives Recht, 162.
—, III, 
Moralphilosophie : Die Ehe als naturrechtliche 
Institution, 313, 321.
—, III, the principal aim of marriage is
not the personal welfare of the marriage
partners but that of the human species,
the honourable maintenance and propagation 
of the human race, 313. 


CAUSALITY, I, is dialectically related to
freedom in KANT, 90; it is psychologized
by DAVID HUME, 280 ; the law of physical
causality is an innate idea in DESCARTES 
it is an eternal truth to the mathematical 
science ideal; factual verity to LEIBNIZ,
298; a habitual junction of successive
events in HUME, 299 ; WOLFF derived causality 
from the logical principle of contradiction; 
KANT opposed this view, 335; 
it is a natural-scientific category exclusively 
related to sensory experience never
to "Dinge an sich", in KANT, 381; causality 
in FICHTE'S thought, 443 ; the classical
concept of causality has been abandoned
in twentieth century physics; and resolved 
into a purely mathematical concept of 
function, 557.


—, II, the "sole causality of God"; free


causes, 38; causality in the Thomistic 



proofs of the existence of God, 39; causality 
is a modal meaning-moment; thehuman ego is the super-modal cause of hisactions, 40; a purely modal cause is atheoretical abstraction; causality cannotbe defined in the super-temporal; thespeculative concept of God as "primacausa", 41; cause and effect are analogical 
moments in the structure of the energy 
aspect, 110; causality, according to

J. S. MILL, 119; in KANT it is a transcendental-
logical category, 120; juridicalcausality, 182; historical causality, 251;
RICKERT'S views; "individual causality",
254 ; DILTHEY excludes causality as unhistorical, 
255; so does SPENGLER, 283; 
historical development and natural causality, 
283; causality is implied in theconcept "happening", 438; KANT ascribesphysical meaning to the category ofcausality, 512.
—, III, a substance is a first cause makinga thing into an individual whole, 12;
DRIESCH'S entelechy, 23, 24 ; RUSSELL'Sopposition of the causal theory of perception 
to the "common sense" view, 23;
causality in KANT is a category of relation, 
27; causality in naive experience,
34; external causes; modal aspects ofcausality, 40; there is no causal relationbetween the aspects, 62; the intermodalunity of a thing and the internal thing-
causality, 63; such causality is not sub-.
stantial, 66; there is no mutual causal 
encroachment of one modal sphere uponthe modal spheres of the others; structural 
causality pre-supposes a total viewand can only be handled as a transcendental 
idea, 159; totality causality andquantitative causality in DRIESCH, 735. 

CAVE CULTURES, II, the investigation ofcave cultures is not a genuinely historicaltheme, 265. 

CELL, I, a living cell is a typical individuality 
structure, 554.
—, II, in biology we are confronted withthe typical numerical relations betweenthe particles of a cell, the typical numberof chromosomes, 425. 
—, III, a cell of the body of an animal,
85, 86; is undoubtedly real, but notdirectly accessible to naïve experience,
102; structure of a living cell; the lastindependent viable unity of a livingmass, 102; the word "cell" denotes an 
undefined general concept and saysnothing about the individuality structureof the living unit in question; germ cellsof plants and animals; germ cell of ahuman being refers to the mystery ofthe spiritual centre of human existencetranscending all temporal structures; thegerm cell of a plant is biotically qualified;
the "psychology of plants" cannot demonstrate 
the existence of subjective modal 
feeling in plants; the biotic reactionto stimuli and their utilization should not 
be confused with genuine feeling; the 

 

25CERTAINTY 

leaves of the mimosa pudica; insectivorous 
plants like the drosera rotundifolia;
these reactions have sensory analogies infeeling; in protozoa the cell possesses"nervous-like spheres"; the backgroundto the "psychology of plants" is the Leibnizian 
principle of continuity, 645; theborderline cases between the vegetableand the animal kingdoms pre-suppose theradical typical boundaries; the germ cellimplies the architecture of the differentiated 
body as a pre-disposition, not as a"pre-formation"; it is as if every individual 
cell has been given the plan of thewhole; this integrating tendency is manifest, 
e.g., in regenerative phenomena;
DRIESCII'S experiments with the eggs ofsea-urchins (echinoidea) ; the structuralplan of the total animal realizes itself inits parts, 646; the experiments made inconnection with the transplantation andimplantation of groups of cells and withthe cultivation of free cell-cultures outside 
the living organism; they do notprove that separate cells possess an independent 
natural inner destination different 
from that of the total organism;
organic disease like sarcoma, and goiter;
the modal causal functional coherence of 
the vital phenomena within the physicochemical 
sphere is not annihilated by theinternal structural law of the individuality 
structures functioning in this aspect;
there is a harmonious coherence between 
the functional and the structural typicalview of life phenomena, 647; the real partsof a cell are its nucleus and the protoplasm, 
638; the cell is the smallest unitycapable of independent life discovered upto now, 718; development of surface ofsolved matter in a cell; enormous surface 
charges of electrity render a cell sensitive 
to changes of electric condition andtemperature, 719; most cells have an alveolar 
form of plasm, 719; hylocentric,
kinocentric, morphocentric structures; aliving cell has a centred structure; metabolism 
and its effects are directed from 
this centre; the nucleus; chromatin, 720; 
endo- and exoplasm; non-living components; 
the organic catalysts: enzymes andferments, 723; a cell cannot live in the 
molecular or crystalline matter structures, 
769; a living cell-organism is enkaptically founded in a mixture of matterwhich it binds within its own individuality 
structure, 770. 

CELL-BODY, III, is to be distinguished

from the cell-organism; organic combinations 
in plasm and nucleus are complicated 
and labile, 715; in animals is an 
enkaptic form-totality, with a psychicalleading structure, 765; its living organism. 
cannot contain lifeless parts, 766. 

CENTRAL COMMAND, I, is the command oflove, 60. 

CERTAINTY, II, feeling of certainty in 


CHAIR, A 

faith, 115; two types in VoLKELT: intuitive 
certainty originating from the logical 
necessity of thought, and the certainty 
derived from the moral law, 477. 

CHAIR, A, III, is a kind of seat; it has abiotic characteristic; the cultural needof man, 134. 

CIIALLENGE, I, the world is an infinite

active chain of challenges, according to

FICHTE, 476.

---, II, in TOYNBEE'S sense, is at the same

time an appeal to the normative task of

the real formers of history, a historical

test of their qualification as leaders in

the process of cultural development, 252,

253. 
CHAMBERLAIN, III, 
Grundlagen des Neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, 
496.
--, III, his mystic pan-Germanism and
vehement anti-semitism, 496. 


CHANCE, III, according to V. BAER, 747. 

CHARACTER, II, HEYMANS' definition;
character in its relation to the standards 
of good and evil as the veritable objectof ethical judgment, 147, 148. 

CHARDON, C., II, 

Themis, 133. 

CHARITY, III, within and outside of the

Church institution, 549, 550. 

CHEMISTRY, I, cannot operate exclusively

with a general concept of function, 554. 

CHILIASM, II, in the philosophy of his


tory, 272. 

CHITIN OF ARTICULATE ANIMALS, III, 774. 

CIIRIST, I, as the New Root of mankind is

subject to the law, 101.

—, II, embodies the religious fulness of

meaning as the meaning-ground of crea


ted existence, 25; the new root of creation, 
30; of reborn creation, 32; a Christian 
is given everything in Christ, 34 ; theKingdom of Christ, 262; in Him is theconsummation of historical power, 294;
He is the Root and Head of reborn Humanity, 
307; and the transcendent Rootof individuality, 418.
—, III, His kingship, — in CALVIN - 504;
His authority in the Church, exercisedthrough His Word and His Spirit, 519. 

CHRISTIAN, I, science, art, politics, philosophy, 
are rejected by E. BRUNNER, 519. 

CIIRISTIAN AESTHETICS, II, does not absolutize 
the artist's aesthetic subjectivity,

128. 
CHRISTIAN-HISTORICAL POLITICAL THEORY, 
II, was influenced by the conception of

God's guidance in History, 233. 

CHRISTIAN-HISTORICAL THOUGHT, III, and 
the organological view of the 19th century 
Restauration, 597.. 

26 

CHRISTIANITY, I, in the Roman Empirewas persecuted, and its attitude with regard 
to politics and culture was negative,
157 ; in the very first centuries of theChristian Church the Biblical basic motive 
was in danger of being strangled bythat of the Greeks; then the dogma of theDivine essential unity (homo-ousia) ofthe Father and the Son (soon this was toinclude the Holy Spirit) was formulatedand the dangerous influence of gnosticism 
in Christian thought was broken;
before this period a speculative logos-
theory was derived from the Jewish Hellenistic 
philosophy of PHILo; the Churchmaintained the unbreakable unity of theOld and the New Testament, thus overcoming 
the gnostic dualism that separated 
creation and redemption, 177; theReformation was quickly captured by theScholastic motive of nature and graceand did not develop an essentially Christian 
philosophy based on the basic motive 
of Holy Scripture, 188. 

CHRISTIAN IDEA OF TRUTH, II, this idea is 
directed to the fulness of meaning; truthhas a perspective character, 571. 

CHRISTIAN INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY, II, 

related the Idea of development to theKingdom of Christ in the consummationof times and was engaged in a fierce

struggle with the spirit of the Enlightenment, 
351. 

CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY, I, is aware of its

being bound to the cosmic order of time

and only points beyond and above this

boundary line to its pre-supposita; it

doe,.not elevate human reason to the

-

throne of God; its transcendental basicIdea is the cosmonomic Idea (idea legis),
93; its idea of the Arche, meaning totality, 
modal laws, subject, object, (97;)
depends on the cosmonomic Idea; typical 
laws corresponding to individualitystructures, 98; the lex as the boundarybetween the Being of God and the meaning 
of the creation, 99; the apostasy fromGod and the fall into sin; its effect on"meaning"; the logical function and sin,
100; the re-formation of the cosmonomicIdea by the central motive of the Christian 
religion; Arche, totality, diversity;
the subject side is the correlate to thecosmonomic side; the supra temporalunity of the modalities; Christ as thenew root of mankind subject to the divine 
law; the relation between the aspects 
is expressed by the term : spheresovereignty, 101; the principle of spheresovereignty is indissolubly connectedwith the transcendental ideas of the Origin 
and the totality and radical unity ofmeaning and with that of cosmic time,
104 ; cosmic time and the refraction ofmeaning into mutually coherent modalaspects, 106; everything created is subjected 
to a law, and in this sense a "sub



27 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY 

ject", 108; Christian philosophy does notChurch; his cosmonomic Idea (the lexbreak off philosophical contact withaeterna expressed in the lex naturalis) ;
Greek, Scholastic and modern Humanis-we find the neo-Platonic descending pro-
tic philosophy; it enters into the mostgression of degrees of reality accommoinner 
contact with immanence philoso-dated to the Idea of the Divine soverphy, 
but distinguishes sharply betweeneignty of the Creator; this Idea was comphilosophical 
judgments and supra-theo-bined with the Logos theory accommoretic 
prejudices; undeniable states of af-dated to the dogma of the Trinity; Gene-
fairs form the basis for a cooperation ofsis 1 : 1 was interpreted in the cadre of 
the different philosophical schools in thethe Greek form-matter motive, 178; butaccomplishment of a common task, 115;the central religious motive remainedpartial truths are not self-sufficient, 116;foremost in AUGUSTINUS' theological con-
even the Christian basic motive and the ceptions; he emphasized the absolutecontent of our transcendental basic Idea creative Sovereignty of God and rejecteddetermined by it do not give securityany original power of evil; the radicalagainst fundamental errors in our thoughtcharacter of the fall, the rejection of theon account of the effects of the fall into autonomy of theoretical thought; but insin; the Idea of the "philosophia peren-spite of his growing insight into the radinis", 
117; not any thinker can begin withcal character of the Christian religion he,
a clean slate and dissociate himself from at the least, regarded Greek philosophy asthe age-old process of philosophical re-a natural foundation for a "super-naturalflection; the historical development ofrevealed knowledge"; the central theme ofphilosophic thought is implied in thehis De Civitate Dei; he broke with theChristian transcendental basic Idea, 118; Greek Idea of time and paved the way forbut the religious starting-point and thean Idea of development; Roman Catholic-
whole direction of Christian philosophyism strove after a religious synthesis ofremain consistent and require the re-Christian faith with the Aristotelian view 
jection of any accommodation to non-of nature; THOMAS AQUINAS' posited theChristian basic motives; apostate cur-autonomy of natural reason in naturalrents of thought also contribute to theknowledge; nature is the understructurefulfilment of the Divine plan in theof super natural grace; philosophy wasstruggle between the civitas Dei and thethe ancilla theologiae, 179; philosophycivitas terrena, 119; the central basicbelonged to the sphere of natural reasonmotive of Religion, cf. sub voce Religion,where it is independent of revealed theo173-
175; this motive requires the innerlogy; the basic motive of the Christianreformation of the theoretical vision of religion was replaced by that of the Aristemporal 
reality, destroying any dualism;totelian form-matter scheme accommono 
dichotomy of pre-logical opposed todated to the Church doctrine of Creation;
post psychical aspects, between "sensorythe Roman Catholic motive of nature and 
nature" and "super-sensory freedom",grace; creation became a "natural truth"
between "natural laws" and "norms"; noin THOMAS' theologica naturalis; the"theodicy"; the conflicts because of sinGreek form-matter motive excludes the 
are not due to the cosmic order; Chris-Biblical creation motive by its thesis : "extian philosophy does not believe itself tonihilo nihil fit"; the Greek concept of thebe in possession of the monopoly ofdivine Demiurge; ARISTOTLE'S "Unmovedtheoretical truth, 176; in the AlexandrianMover" is the radical opposite of theschool Of CLEMENS and ORIGEN there living God; the principle of matter isarose a speculative Logos-theory denatu-that of metaphysical and religious imperralizing 
the Biblical motive of creation:fection and cannot find its origin in purethe Divine creating Word was conceivedForm, i.e. in God; human nature is aof as a lower, mediating being betweencomposition of a material body and athe divine unity and impure matter; thetational soul as a substantial form, 180;
Christian religion was made into a moral-the theory of the donum superadditum;
istically tinged theological and philoso-sin is the cause of the loss of the superphical 
system, a higher gnosis placednatural gift of grace, but did not lead toabove the faith of the Church; in the Or-the radical corruption of human nature;
thodox period Christian philosophy cul-THOMAS developed the metaphysicalminated in AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, 177;theory of the analogical concept of Beingbut the inner point of contact between(analogia entis), 181; under the sharpreligion and philosophy was not account-.critique of Nominalism the Christian anded for; the Christian character of philo-pagan motives, synthesized in Thomism,
sophy was the "ancilla theologiae"; awere radically disrupted; "nature" andnotion already found in ARISTOTLE'S Meta-"grace" separated; then Humanism wasphysics; philosophy had no independentable to develop the line of "autonomousrights in AUGUSTINUS' statement : "Deumnatural thought" the manner of which iset animan scire volo. Nihilne plus? Nihilbased on the motive of nature and freeomnino." 
AUGUSTINUS started on the pathdom, 187 ; the Reformation took over theof scholastic accommodation of Greek Scholastic motive of nature and grace,

thought to the doctrine of the Christian 188; Patristic and Medieval Compromises; 


CHRISTIAN POSITION, THE 28 

Scholasticism proclaimed the "autonomy anti-Christian basic motive; this is theof the "naturalis ratio" in the sphere of universal sense of KUYPER'S Idea of thenatural thought, 508; "theologia natura- religious antithesis in life and thought;
lis"; Neo-Platonism, Aristotelism, Stoi- this antithesis does not draw a line of 
cism penetrated Christian thought; the personal classification, but one of divi-
Biblical conceptions of soul, heart, spirit, sion according to fundamental principlesflesh, were replaced by abstract concepts in the world, which passes transverselyof dualistic Greek metaphysics; Christian through the existence of every Christianphilosophy began to seek the concentra- personality; this antithesis is not ation point of human existence in "rea- human invention but a great blessingson" and there arose a cleft between from God; by it He keeps His fallen,
speculative philosophy and genuine creation from perishing; the author re-
Christian faith; pseudo problems arose: jects the name "Calvinistic Philosophy"
the primacy of will or intellect in the and insists on denoting his thought as 
„essentia Der; individual immortality of "Christian Philosophy"; Thomistic philothe 
soul and the Aristotelian "principium sophy has constantly rejected this name;
individuationis", 509; psycho creation- neo-Thomists like GILSON and MARITAIN 
ism; misuse of Holy Scripture and the depart from the Thomist tradition in thisconflict with COPERNICUS; theology as respect, 524; there is a Reformed and a"regina scientiarum", and philosophy as neo-Scholastic Christian Philosophy; the"ancilla theologiae"; controversy with latter remains bound to the motive ofDESCARTES, 510; the dilemma forced on nature and grace, and breaks through thethe Reformers; Protestantism relapsed boundaries between the natural and theinto Scholasticism; LUTHER and ME- supernatural spheres in order to showLANCHTON, 511; LUTHER and ERASMUS; the insufficiency of natural philosophicaland Occamism,. Augustinian Franciscans; thought in respect to the Christian faith;
ECKHART, 512; MELANCHTON landed in from French Spiritualism arose the phi-
Scholasticism ; MELANCHTON, REUCHLIN, losophy Of MAURICE BLONDEL, 525 ; the 
AGRICOLA, ERASMUS, WILLIBALD PIRKHEI- philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea ap-
MER, 513; MELANCHTON'S school-reforms, proaches each philosophical system from514; he did not break radically with im- the standpoint of its own basic motivemanence philosophy; CALVIN'S early Hu- it opens the way to a better mutual unmanism, 
515; his Biblical thought and derstanding of the various philosophicalthe rejection of accommodations and trends by means of its transcendentalcompromises, 516; his rejection of specu- Critique so that supra-theoretical prelative 
metaphysics; and of the dualism judices shall no longer be propagated as 
of nature and grace, 517; his view of the theoretical axioms; it embraces a theoryLaw, 518; CALVIN and LUTHER; BRUNNER of the modal structures, and of those of 
versus CALVIN; his denial of a Christian individuality, 526; these theories disclose 
science, philosophy, politics, etc., 519; real states of affairs which are the same

BRUNNER'S dependence on Lutheran for every philosophical standpoint, 527;
thought; he absolutizes temporal love at Chr. phil. and science should interpenethe 
expense of justice; his Neo-Kantian trate, 566.
and modern Existential motives, 520; CHRISTIAN POSITION, THE 


 is that of a

Dialectical theology, 521; Christian phi- pilgrim; he loves creation and hates sin; 
losophic thought needs the vivifying relinquishes the "world" in the sense ofspirit of God's Word; God has maintained sin, and is given everything in Christ, 34.

the cosmic structural order, in spite of
sin, the Christian transcendental basic CHRISTIAN RELIGION, I, connects the mean-
Idea embraces the religious antithesis ing of the creation and the Being of the 


between the apostasy of nature and its Archê, 104.
destiny according to creation; it does II, should penetrate philosophy, 566. 
not seek a dialectical synthesis, 522; it CHRISTIAN REVELATION, II, 356.
recognizes Common Grace; and particu


lar grace; common grace is grace shown CHRISTIAN SCIENCE, II, the Christian Idea
to mankind as a whole, which is regene- of truth should permeate scientific 
rate in its new root Jesus Christ, but has thought, 572.
not yet been loosened from its old apos-


CHRISTIAN STATE, HI, is impossible says

tate root; the parable of the tares; the C. BRUNNER, 403; is expressed in a faith 
philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea is community; the possibility of Christianthe fruit of the Calvinistic Awakening in politics; a Christian state is not an eccle-

Holland in the 19th cent.; led by Dr. ABRA- siastical State, 502.
HAM KUYPER; it includes within its rangeall of Christian thought as such, 523; the CHROMOSOMES, II, the typical numerical 

Kingship of Christ must be taken serious- relations between the chromosomes, 425. 
ly, and the central confession of God's 

CHROMOSOME MAPS, HI, of MORGAN and

sovereignty over the whole cosmos as the his school, 755.
Creator; Christian freedom cannot imply

a freedom in thought stimulated by an CHRYSYPPUS, I, opposed the philosophers 


 

29 CHURCH, THE 

who viewed theoretical life as an end in bull Unam. Sanctam and the two swords;

itself, which he called refined hedonism, LUTHER'S view of the Church: the invisi


539. ble Church is the true Body of Christ; but 
asU such it has no temporal organization;
CHRYSIPPUS, III, valued the positive laws 

L THER held that the Church is both visiof 
the state, 228. Me and invisible; the formula of the Augs-
CHURCH, THE, III, its competency marked burg Confession; the Church in its essence

off from that of the State by GELASIUS, is invisible, as a congregation it has"visi216; 
its institution became a sacramental lbe marks", 512; LUTHER'S dualism; itshierarchy of grace with absolute author- origin; he hypostatized the faith aspect ofity over the souls, identified (gradually) the institutional organization and thuswith the "invisible" Church, the Corpus favoured the formation of sectarian con-
Christi; it became the only integrating venticles; the idea of the "congregatiofactor of Western culture; feudal inter- fideliunP; ecclesiola in ecclesia; the Conlacement 
with the State; the rise of the ciliar Movement of the XV century, 513;
ecclesiastically unified culture; a univer- the peasant revolt in Germany inducedsalist view of the Church; the Holy Ro- LUTHER to appeal to the secular govern-
man Empire pretended to embrace spi- ment to give the Church its oganization;
ritual and secular relationships; the he distinguished between the externalstruggle between pope and emperor, 217; juridical organization and the spiritualtheory of the two swords of the Corpus essence of the Church; the lord of theChristianum; a new problem posed by country as the praecipuum membrumScholasticism, 218; the Church is the ecclesiae had to supplement the spiritualperfect society in the super natural sphere order of the Church with a compulsoryof grace, 220; the infallible interpreter of secular legal order; he turned to thenatural law and of the limits of the State's Elector of Saxony with the request to incompetency, 
221; the Christian concep- stitute visitation, 514; the lord of thetion of the "invisible" Church as the cor- country also instituted consistories; theypus mysticum with Christ for its Head could impose secular public juridicaland the faithful for its members was penalties; LUTHER did not want thetransformed by the Canonists (cf. sub government to affect the pure doctrinevote), 234; 235; in the late Middle Ages and the right administration of the sacra-
the Nominalists rejected the canonic ments; the old Lutheran conception of'legal theory and viewed the Church as a Church government distinguished becongregatio 
fidelium (democracy versus tween jurisdictio ecclesiastica and juris-
hierarchy), 234; visible and invisible dictio saecularis; the Christian sovereign

Church; the una sancta ecclesia is the was the guardian of the two tables of 
Body of Christ; the terms visible and in- the decalogue in his capacity as the praevisible; 
KLTYPER'S noumenon and pheno- cipuum membrum ecclesiae; then themenon; KATTENBUSCH introduces "Kirche brothers STEPHANI tried to find a positivedes Glaubens" and "Kultgemeinde""; like juridical justification for the secularBRUNNER; this is fideism, 509; a State Church government, 515; their juridicalseparated from the Body of Christ is part construction was the episcopal system;
of the civitas terrena; the body politic as later on episcopal authority was consisuch 
is a divine institution; its subjective dered to be an illegal usurpation; theactualization does not coalesce with its arrangement of the religious peace wasstructure but is defective on account of thought to be a final restitution to thesin; AUGUSTINUS did not sufficiently dis- sovereign of his natural rights within thetinguish between the Church as the king- Church; GERHARD, CARPZOVIUS and othersdom of Christ in the hearts of men and promulgated the doctrine of the threethe temporal Church; and thus laid the estates oriented to a universalistic con-
foundation for the medieval view of the ception of the Church relationship; theHoly Roman Empire; the medieval secular government has to maintainChurch view identified visible and in- public worship, to institute the ministry,
visible Church in a universalistic way, etc. the family fathers have potestas com510; 
Scholastical compromise with the munis and their consent is required forclassical Greco-Roman view of human the government and the ministers to imsociety; 
GREGORIUS VII viewed the visible pose any iudicium on the family fathers,
Church as the hierarchy of a sacramental 516; the juridical aspect of the Church 
institution of grace transcending all the as an institutional community continued"secular" social relationships as the ab- to be viewed as external political;s thesolutized perfect Christian society; TH0- doctrine of the three estates originatedMAS based this view on the motif of from the late medieval nationalist view 
nature and grace; the dogma of papal in- of the Church; it was not sufficientlyfallibility; the seven sacraments; the clear that the internal church authoritysupra natural power of the clergy; the has an original legal competence indeecclesiastical 
juridical community was pendent of the secular government;
mode:Jed on the public juridical organi- episcopal theory therefore fell a victimzation of the State, 511; BONIFACE VIII'S to the Humanistic natural law theories of 


CHURCH, THE 

the territorial and the collegial system,

under the influence of THOMASIUS 
the territorial system ousted the episcopal 
system and was inspired by the desireto guarantee ecclesiastical tolerance topietists; all organizational authority inthe Church was merged into that of theterritorial sovereign and the ministrywere denied any influence on Churchgovernment; the establishment of thedoctrina publica had to safeguard theexternal peace in the interest of the Stateand was entrusted to secular governors

"sine concursu necessario Theologorum";
finally the collegial theory destroyed thelast remnants of the insight into thespecific structural character of theChurch institution, 517; the latter wasconceived as a mere "societas", a socialcontract between individuals having thesame religious faith; the State has sovereign 
authority over the Church; theChurch possesses the jura collegialia including 
the contractual establishment ofdogma, the regulation of liturgy, the ordaining 
of the ministry, etc. The majorityhas the power to decide upon everything,
518; ZWINGLI also started from the ecclesia 
invisibilis, characterizing it as thecommunity of the elect; only the visibleChurch has an organization; ZWINGLIopposed the sects; the visible Churchconsists of the assemblies of the local 
Churches; ecclesiastical organization andgovernment are left to the reformed lordof the country, 518 ; and are to be performed 
in accordance with the congregation 
in the name of the Church;
ZWINGLI, BULLINGER and THOMAS ERASTUSwere opposed to the Calvinistic conception 
of Church discipline; CALVIN conceived 
the temporal Church institutionas a real organized community and inferred 
this from the New Testament; thevisible Church is essentially connectedwith the invisible Church; he recognizesonly the absolute authority of Christexercized through Christ's Word andSpirit; the internal organization is indissolubly 
related to Holy Scripture andthe confession of faith; from the basic 
thought of Christocracy it follows thatthe Church has sovereignty within itsown sphere in a juridical sense, 519 ; theinternal structural principle of the institution 
expresses itself in all the aspectsof its actual existence; Church authorityis not exclusively qualified by faith, buthas its juridical, moral, economic,
aesthetic, historical, psychical aspects,
etc.; the Church institution is not exclusively 
an institution of salvation (Heilsanstalt) 
; his conception of the Churchoffices was derived from the Scriptures;
he did not advocate a theory of people'ssovereignty, nor of political democracy,
520; the Church institution has its qualifying 
function in the aspect of faith anddisplays a typical historical foundation; 

30 

this is a radical typical qualificationwhich is not intended to subsume this 
institution under a higher logical genusas a pseudo-general concept; A. KUYPER'Sremark, 521; other societal structuresonly function in faith, the Church is qualified 
by it; the Church institution is atemporal manifestation of the ecclesiainvisibilis. the una sancta ecclesia in Jesu 
Christo, 522; a non-Christian Church is acontradictio in terminis, one that is precluded 
by the internal structural principle 
which characterizes the Church asa manifestation of the supra-temporalcorpus Christi; its transcendental limiting 
character does not allow of an apostate 
isolation from its Head, Jesus Christ;
it is a manifestation of the "gratia particularis", 
523 ; particular grace has a radical-
universal character, changing thedirection in the root of life and revealingitself in temporal reality in its conservingeffect as well as in its regenerating operation 
already in the present dispensation, 
so that the disintegrating effect ofthe fall into sin is checked, 524; commonand particular grace; the Church "as anorganism" is intended by KUYPER to oppose 
the dualistic separation between,
special and common grace, 525; the temporal 
revelation of the "corpus Christi"
in its broadest sense embraces all the 
social structures of temporal human existence; 
the antithesis between the civitas 
Dei and the civitas terrena; the institutional 
Church should not be identified 
with the supra temporal Body of Christ, 
but is nevertheless the institution of 
"gratia regenerativa"; as a temporal organization 
it has been instituted by Christwithin the modal and radical typicalstructures of temporal reality given atthe creation, preserved by temporal gracefrom the disintegrating operation of sin;
it does not embrace believers and unbelivers 
alike as to its inner nature, butonly those who have been included inthe New Testament Covenant by baptismand (when adults) by their confession offaith; it is qualified as a Christian community 
of faith, 526; thus it is a particular 
institution of regenerating grace;
gratia regenerativa reveals itself also inthe institutional Church as the true root 
of temporal conserving common grace,
for in this institution the structure of the 
function of faith implanted in the humanrace at the creation is again opened tothe Divine Word revelation in Christ 
Jesus; the problem about the Church andthe sects is discussed by WEBER andTROELTSCH; TROELTSCH calls Church andsect two independent sociological types,
527 ; in "the religious basic scheme ofChristianity, with its radical tension between 
individualism and universalism a 
sect is perfectly equivalent to the Churchin a sociological sense; the Church is an"Anstalt" of saving grace; bears the treas



 31 CHURCH, THE 

ure of grace independently of the pos-the visible Church is an institutional 
sible personal unworthiness of the office-manifestation of the invisible Church;
bearers; membership starts at birth as aspiritually dead members cannot be out-
rule; the inherent miracle working powerwardly distinguished from the elect andof the Church institution; it will conquerare left to the judgment of Christ, thethe world; all temporal societal relation-King of the Church; in a sect the sameships are incorporated into the Churchstate of affairs obtains; the institutionalas a lower, previous stage of the ChristianChurch is not superior to all the othercommunity of grace; Evangelical stand-societal relationships, for the visibleards are relativized by combining themChurch is not limited to the Church in-
with Stoic and Aristotelian conceptionsstitution, 534 ; the invisible Church is theof the lex naturalis; the Church type al-supra temporal religious radical comways 
aims at an ecclesiastical culturalmunity in Christ in which all temporalunity, 528 ; the Church type is universal-societal structures are of equal value; inistic; the sect is individualistic, preferstemporal life institutional structures arean associational form of organization re-more fundamental than free associations;
lying on the personal, individual dignitysocietal relationships that are subjectivof 
its members, and their conversion; itsely withdrawn from the Corpus Christistandards are exclusively derived fromfall outside of the ecclesia visibilis and 
the Gospel; there is no compromise butremain enclosed within the Civitas terpatient 
avoidance, or open conflict, whenrena, viz. in a subjective sense; Civitas 
wordly ordinances are incompatible withterrena and civitas Dei do not form an 
Evangelical norms; all differences inaxiological hierarchy, but an irreconcilsocial 
position are meaningless in com-able antithesis; societal relationships areparison with the infinite value of the in-equal in rank only in their common root,
dividual person as a child of God;viz. the invisible Church; they are mu-
TROELTSCH'S view is oriented to the me-tually irreplaceable in their own temdieval 
Roman Catholic view of the Holyporal value, and fundamentally diversi-
Roman Empire; his idea of the "religiousfied in their structures; the Church in-
basic scheme of Christianity is depen-stitution occupies an exceptional positiondent on the "Religionssoziologie", rootedas the mother of our faith in Christ Jesus,
in the Historicistic immanence standpoint,535; the institutional Church is founded529, 530; his erroneous dilemma; hisin the historical law-sphere, its leading"ideal type" is an unscientific generaliza-function is that of faith; it is a powertion 
of the Roman Church; he wrenchesorganization, 536; which directly ex-
the Gospel from its context; and he mis-presses the transcendental limiting chainterprets 
CALVIN'S views, 531; the uni-racter of the Church, pointing as it doesversalistic conception of the institutionalto the transcendent root of the ecclesia 
Church embodies the medieval synthesisvisibilis, i.e. Christ's Kingdom in thewith the Greek "perfect society";hearts of men ; it is the power of theTROELTSCH approached the structure of"sword of the Divine Word"; thereforethe Church from a Humanistic religiousthe Church has no territorial boundaries;
point of view with its dilemma: the mo-its task is to gain spiritual dominion overtive of domination or that of personalall nations and peoples; in its non-institufreedom; 
the sect type is of an individu-tional manifestations the visible Church 
alistic nominalistic origin, and serves toalso has faith power, 537; in the Churchconstrue the temporal Church commun-institution faith power is a typical interity 
from the "converted individuals"; thenally qualifying form of organizedlatter cannot be the basis of the Church;power; its internal organization has tofor the foundation of our salvation is sole-be realized by sinful human action; itsly to be sought in Christ Jesus, 532; theoffices and the Word and the Sacraments 
institutional Church •cannot be an "asso-are holy, but the human instruments areciation"; Christ builds His Church byonly sanctified in the hidden ecclesia in-
His Word and Spirit in the line of thevisibilis in Christ; the basic rules of itsCovenant; He alone is the judge of theorganization have been ordained in God'sregeneration of its members; humanWord; communicant members invested 
judgment would interfere with Christ'swith the general office (diakonia) coopeauthority 
and invert the relation betweenrate in forming and re-forming thethe visible and the invisible Church; theChurch institution; special offices haveinstitutional administration of Word and been ordained for the administration of 
Sacraments constitutes the centre of the the Word and the Sacraments; eldershipecclesiastical corporative temporal struc-and diaconate; in this organization ofture as a congregatio fidelium; the Wordfaith power the institutional and the cor-
is the norm of faith; the congregatio isporative factors have been harmoniouslyan outcome of the Divine Covenant em-combined; the power of the institutionalbracing the believers with their children,administration of the Word and the 
533; a sect considers the visible ChurchSacraments is the centre of the ecclesias


as a group of converted individuals, mis-tical organization, 538; TILLICH and DI-

interpreting its divine structural law; BELIUS hold that the Church as a "socio



CHURCH, THE 32 

logically approachable societal relationship" 
can be explained by means ofgeneral sociological concepts, 539; theorganization of Church power is incompatible 
with political dominion and alsowith the vassalage of the secular sword;
the structural principle of the Church isconstant and based on the temporalworld-order, but as an actual formationthe Church institution could only appearafter Christ's incarnation, death and resurrection; 
the leading function qualifiesthe Church as an institutionally organizedcommunity of Christian believers in theadministration of the Word and the 
Sacraments, 539; the idea of a nationalChurch is a deformation, even a disintegrating 
power; the bond of unity in theinstitutional Church is faith, and is realized 
by unity of confession; BRUNNER'S 
preference for a national Church, 540; infant 
baptism is based on the Covenantand must not be detached from the 
Church confession as the expression ofits communal faith; baptism is not anempty cultic ceremony about 'whicheverybody is free to confess what helikes; fundamentally different confessional 
tendencies in a national Church 
are conflicting and make the internalecclesiastical unity illusory; a confessional 
Church allows for non-fundamental 
differences; Church doctrine is subject 
to the Scriptures; the Church Confession 
gives to the norm of faith for thecongregation a positive form ; this positivization 
is the work of man and must 
be tested by the Divine Word, 541; aconfession requires actual adaptation tothe historical development of the pisteutical 
insight into the Wordrevelationunder the Spirit's guidance; a confessionshould never be elevated to an infallible 
authoritative document stifling the freedom 
of believers; nor should it degenerate 
into theological dogmatics; fundamental 
differences in confession disruptthe institutional ecclesia visibilis; anappeal to "pluriformity" cannot justifyfundamental deviations from the Divine 
Word Revelation, 542; the need of ecumenical 
cooperation ; its essential requirements; 
the Church confesses the solesovereignty of Christ in this communityof faith and recognizes that such authority 
is exercised by means of the ecclesiastical 
offices; these offices are qualified 
and destined as instruments of faith 
and founded in the formative power ofthe Divine Word and Spirit in historicaldevelopment, 543 ; a Church office is service 
in the faith community; this qualification 
retains its pregnant sense in thejuridical aspect of the institution'sauthority; the authority of the State ispublic legal authority of the governmentfounded in the power of the sword; it isonly service in a moral sense and in itspisteutical aspect; its authority is coer


cive; ecclesiastical authority is service 
also in juridical respects, 544; typical 
political forms of government such as 
monarchy, democracy, etc., are incompatible 
with the structural principle of 
the Church; CALVIN did not at all favour 
the idea of any sovereignty on the partof the congregation and did not try tointroduce a representative system ; So Hm's 
summary of all kinds of misconceptions 
Of CALVIN'S view, 545; KAMPSCHULTE tries 
to prove that the Reformer started from 
the sovereignty of the congegration, but 

K. is in error; CALVIN'S use of the term 
"representative", 546; CALVIN says that 
in appointing men to an office in the 
Church Christ does not transfer His own 
right and honour to them but only uses 
them as a workman does his tools, 547; 
CALVIN observes : "Christ attributes nothing 
but a common ministry to men, and 
to each of them a particular part." 
German synods and congregational representation 
in the 19 century 'was oriented 
to modern political thought; officeswere not really services; the synod wasa "parliament"; every change in the political 
regime was bound to reflect itselfin the Church organization, 548; in amoral sense the institutional Church is a 
community of love among fellow-believers 
in Christ; this is a retrocipation; assuch it is qualified by faith expressed ina common confession; this love does not 
allow of competition by any other love, 
and interlaces all those who are of the 
"household of faith"; its realization isimperfect, especially in large towns; itexplains the character of the diaconateas the organized office of charity towards 
the poor members of the Church,
549; outside of the Church institution 
charity belongs to the general priesthoodof all believers; the diaconate is a Christion 
institution of faith, the institutionalofficial expression of Christ's divinepriestly office; it differs from civil careof the poor on the part of the State or ofprivate persons; Lutheran countriesmixed ecclesiastical with civil charity, 
contrary to LUTHER'S view; civil relief is 
qualified by public interest; privatecharity is qualified by the moral aspect,
550; SoHm holds that the legal order and 
the nature of the Church are mutually 
exclusive; this statement is rooted in the 
Lutheran antithesis between the Gospel

and the Law; the essence of the Churchis spiritual, law is secular, says SoHm;
the same in E. BRUNNER'S opposition oflove and secular ordinance; they thinkof law in terms of the coercive State Law; 

E. BRUNNER knows of no other than State 
Law, 551; SoHm's investigations of theChurch organization in the course of history 
start from his petitio principii; heidentifies the essence of the Church institution 
with the perfect Kingdom ofHeaven; E. BRUNNER distinguishes be

tween a cult community and the Church 
of faith; the former needs a material 
Church order, which is subservient to the 
"commandment of the moment"; the 
latter cancels the former, 552; the cult 
community has some share in the divine 
authority as regards matters of faith; its 
legal orders are derived from the State; 
in content Church law is ecclesiastical, 
in form it is purely secular-political; this 
view is based on Neo-Kantianism; the 
juridical form is thus considered to be 
alien to the content embraced by it; the 
dualism between "nature" and "grace", 
law and Gospel, asserts itself here, 553; 
the individuality structure of the Church 
as an organized community necessarily 
possesses an internal-juridical structural 
aspect; its law is not coercive, nor is it 
determined by its formal juridical source; 
its genetic juridical form functions as a 
nodal point of enkaptic structural interlacements 
within the juridical lawsphere; 
alien legal forms may intrude upon Church 
law: an official Church rate, e.g., 554; 
internal Church law displays its pisteutical 
qualification in regulating the inner 
constitution of the Church, the competence 
of its offices, its discipline, alteration 
of the confession, etc.; by Roman 
Catholics legal regulations of marriage 
are held to be the exclusive competence 
of the Church; this view denies the "natural" 
substructure of marriage requiring 
"secular" sanction, 555; Roman Catholic 
ecclesiastical authority presumes giving 
a binding interpretation of a "natural" 
ethical law; Church law displays the 
meaning of a retributive harmonilation 
of interests; it is a genuinely legal order 
of an ecclesiastic stamp, distinct from 
State law; Church law is an instrument 
of faith; it does not permit any coercion 
by the State; Church law is not unchangeable, 
not a ius divinum positivum; it does 
not permit any formalism, 556; it is a 
sensitive instrument for the working of 
God's Word and Spirit in the community 
of Christian believers; it is service and 
never qualifies the community, 557; other 
functions of the institutional Church: 
ecclesiastical harmony, economy, etc.; 
the subject-object relation; objective thing 
structures structurally bound art; ecclesiastical 
symbolism; the subject-object 
relation in which art functions is not 
aesthetically qualified, should not obtrude 
at the expense of the faith function; 
objects of an explicit political structure 
do not belong in a Church; the Garnisonskirche 
in Potsdam; Westminster 
Abbey in London; structural interlacements 
may give the Church an external 
variability type, 558; external variability 
types of the organization of a Church 
may result in the "pluriformity" of the 
Church, which never affects its internal 
constitution; political boundaries have 
an external sense in the structure of a 

33 CHURCH ORGANISM 

Church; the local congregation is the 
primary institutional manifestation of 
the Church of Christ; the apostles never 
mention a Church which is a more comprehensive 
body embracing a number of 
local Churches; the Church service requires 
a local centre for it to be performed 
regularly, 559; the spatial structure 
of a Church should express the universality 
of the ecclesia invisibilis; 
Churches of the same confession all over 
the world form a unity expressing itself 
in organizational bonds (synods, e.g.) ; 
the authority of a synod is that of a 
ministry, 560; the external limitation by 
the difference in language, the impossibility 
of actual communication, etc., is 
only variable in character; national 
groupings of congregations into a more 
comprehensive organization are variability 
types of the institutional structural 
principle of the Church; the Roman 
Catholic idea of this principle lacks the 
moment of dynamic growth from local 
congregational unities; the papal centralized 
hierarchical institution is held to 
embody the all-inclusive unity of all 
present and future parts of the Church; 
its static universalism originates from the 
absolutization of the institutional Church; 
the full realization of the spatial universality 
of the body of Christ expresses itself 
only in the transcendental direction 
to the eschatological future of the Kingdom 
of Heaven, 561. 

CHURCH AND STATE, III, the Church is 
merged into the State by HOBBES, 236; 
they differ radically, 411; the Scholastic 
conception of their relation, 425; the 
Humanistic natural law theories, 426; the 
task of the Church in political affairs, 
620; Church confession and political 
party, 621. 

CHURCH FATHERS, III, their synthesis of 
the Stoic-Aristotelian idea of man as a 
"rational animal"; Stoic ethics; and its 
doctrine of natural law, 217; they knew 
the theory of the organic character of 
human society, 218; and held that the 
State is based on the power of the sword 
instituted by God because of sin, 219; they 
favoured the Stoic view of the State, 230. 

CHURCH GOVERNMENT, III, the old Lutheran 
conception distinguished jurisdictio 
ecclesiastica from jurisdictio saecularis, 
515; the territorial system of Church 
government; the collegial system, 517; 
RIEKER'S view of Church government, 
520, 521, 544, 545, 546, 547. 

CHURCHILL, WINSTON, II, prime minister 
in the English Cabinet, 234. 

CHURCH-LAW, III, displays the meaning 
of a retributive harmonization of interests, 
556. 

CHURCH ORGANISM, 111, according to 


CHURCH-RATE 

KUYPER ; it is not identical with the institutional 
Church, 524. 

CHURCH-RATE, III, is an alien legal formencroaching on Church-law, 554, 

CHURCH SERVICE, III, requires a localcentre, 559. 

CICERO, III, 

De Republica, 227, 231, 232, 429;

Topica, 370. 

CIVIL AND NON-CIVIL LAW, III, and claims 
whose fundamentum petendi is found innon-civil legal relations, 680. 

CIVIL PROPERTY, III according to COMTE,

453. 
CIVIL WRONG, III, a new criterion : acts 
that are contrary to the due care pertaining 
to another's person or goods in inter-
individual social intercourse, 682. 


CIVITAS DEI, I, and Civitas terrena in 
AUGUSTINUS, 119; the Civ. Dei in LEIBNIZ 
is composed of the spiritual monads participating 
in mathematical thought together 
with the Deity, 257; in KANT it is 
the mundus intelligibilis, 350.
—, II, and civitas terrena, the central 
motive in the philosophy of history, was
replaced by that of the steady advance
of mankind towards autonomous freedom, 
268; and civitas terrena are at war 
in the religious root of our cosmos, 294;
and civitas terrena; their struggle is the
basic motive in the temporal course of


history, 363.
—, III, and the institutional Church; and 
human society; this Church is the mother
of our faith, 535. 


CIVITAS MAXIMA, III, This idea is speculative 
660. 


CLAN, III, in the clan the family bond
takes the lead, 357; and collective reponsibility, 
according to VIERKANDT, 358;
is posterior to family and Kinship, 354;
a clan is a peace organization, 361; (or
sib) as an undifferentiated societal interlacement, 
653. 


CLASSICAL SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, II, and 
the liberal idea of the State of law, 360. 


CLASSICISM, II, the rigidity of its theoretical 
aesthetical Idea, 346; it discovered 
retrocipations of the aesthetic aspect, but
identified truth and beauty; reduced the
individuality of a work of art to law
conformity; the burlesque in Classicism,


347. 
CLASSICISM IN ART, II, is condemned byTAINE, who can only find impoverishment 
in the spirit of classcism, 345. 

CLASSIFICATION, III, in biology, 81. 

CLASS-STRUGGLE, III, the class strugglereveals the illusory character of the ideaof a coMmon interest, according to F. 

34 

ENGELS, 457; labour became impersonalmarketware; the individualistic contractual 
view; unlimited competition; HOBBES' 
"homo homini lupus", 596. 

CLEANTHES, III, valued the positive lawsof the State, 228. 

CLOSED, II, and open condition of physical 
chemical processes, 184. 

CLOSED SPHERE, III, in LITT, 252-255, 

271. 
CLovis, II, and cultural integration, 244. 

CLUB, A, III, its genetic form is the nodalpoint of interstructural intertwinements,
576; is a voluntary association and touches 
man's temporal existence only superficially, 
603; its structure described, 604. 

CODRINGTON, II, 
The Melanesians, 316. 


COELENTERATES, III, in animal colonies, 

649. 
COGITO, I, in DESCARTES, had to call a halt 
to scepticism, 12; is his Archimedean 
point, 13 ; it is merely a logical unity in 
a multiplicity, 17 ; the absolute cogito ofphenomenology, 52; KANT holds that thecogito can never be a Gegenstand, 53; theCogito in LITT, 140; DESCARTES' cogito isa "res cogitans" checking scepticism,
195; in it he implicitly proclaimed thesovereignty of mathematical thought, anddeified it in his idea of God, 196; the

logical creation motive in DESCARTES'Cogito was modern ; it is explainable interms of a secularized Christian Idea of 
creation in the Humanistic personalityideal, 197, 203, 205, 222, 247, 250; KANT'S 
transcendental Cogito has no metaphysical 
meaning, it is the formal origin ofnatural phenomena and a logical function, 
358 ; a law given to nature, 359;
DESCARTES concludes from the selfconsciousness 
in the cogito to the esse, 365;
cogito as Archimedean point, 501.
—, II, KANT'S : is the form of the representation 
"I think"; "the law of the unityof apperception, 499; KANT qualified theoriginal unity of apperception in the"pure" self-consciousness, as a synthetical 
unity, which was the original apriori relatedness of a multiplicity to thecogito, 500 ; he conceives of an ultimatelogical unity above a logical multiplicityin the "cogito", 519; KANT was the firstto explain both time as such and thecogito (I think) as such transcendentally;
he brought them together in their original 
identity, says HEIDEGGER, 528.
—, HI, of DESCARTES rejected by DRIESCH,
though he retains it as his starting point,
737, 743. 

COGNATIC FAMILY, ( or kinship community),
III, leges barbarorum of Germanics, 343;
LITT'S first and second degrees; the natural 
family comprises the children under 


 age; changed relations when they becomeof age; authority is at an end; the structural 
principle of the kinship community;
different functions, 344; numerical and 
spatial aspects; organic biotic feeling;
historical aspect; social intercourse; economic 
aspect; "affective value"; juridicalaspect : duty of alimentation ; guardianship; 
inheritance; religious fulfilment ofkinship, 345; the cognate family or kinship 
community is found among the leastdeveloped primitive cultures that do notknow the sib (or clan), 354; [cf. s.v.
Kulturkreislehre]. 

COGNITION, II, in the transcendental religious 
subjective a priori of the cosmicselfconsciousness the whole of human 
cognition is directed either to the absolute 
Truth, or to the spirit of falsehood,

562. 
HERMANN COHEN, I, 
Logik der reinen Erkenntnis, 75, 235;
Ethik des reinen Wollens, 75; 
Logik des Ursprungs, 91.
—, I, "only thought can create whatshould have the value of being", 10; philosophic 
thought (Vernunft) is selfsufficient 
"thinking of being" (Ursprungsdenken) 
creating reality in a transcendental-
logical process according to the "principle 
of continuity", he breaks up the"Vernunft" into, 74 ; logical, ethical, andaesthetical reason ; his "principle of 
truth" (Grundsatz der Wahrheit) impliesa continuous coherence between logos

and ethos, although thought and volition
are to have different meanings; the principle 
of origin and that of continuity are
to bridge the meaning diversity; his
"unity of reason" remains an asylum ignorantiae; 
his continuity principle; this
is derived from the infinitesimal calculus; 
his statement: "Thinking in which
movement is inherent, transforms itself 
into will and action", 75; the transcendental 
Idea is nothing but the "self-consciousness 
of the (logical) concept"; it
no longer points to the transcendent
sphere, 91; he divides philosophy into:
Logic of pure knowledge, Ethics of pure
will, and Aesthetics of pure feeling, 530.
—, II, on legal person; state and society,
law, 167; legal theory is the mathematics
of the socio-cultural sciences, 343. 


COHERENCE, I, of all temporal aspects
finds its expression in each of them, and
also points beyond its own limits to all
the others (3) and toward a central totality, 
4; man transcends the temporal coherence, 
and at the same time he is fitted, 
with all temporal creatures, within the
coherence in a status of being universally


bound to time, 24. 
—, III, structural coherence of modal 
functions; internal and external, 59, 60. 


COHN, 
Vereinsrecht, 234. 


35 COMMUNISM! 

COINCIDENTIA OPPOSITORUM, I, in GIORDA


NO BRUNO, 200. 

COLLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS, II, in DURKHEIM'S 
sociology, 188; in primitive society, 
460. 

COLLECTIVE ENKAPTIC SYMBIOSIS, III, 
forest, heath, meadow, steppe and plantsand animals, 649. 

COLLECTIVE SOUL, II, DURKHEIM'S view, 

247. 
COLLEGIAL SYSTEM, III, of Church government, 
517. 

COLLOIDS, III, are sensitive to changes ofelectric and temperature conditions, 719, 

COLLOID SYSTEM, III, most living cells 
have the material structure of a colloid 
system ; its protoplasm may pass from asol- into a gel-condition, and vice versa,

719. 
COLLOIDAL PLASM, III, 773. 

COMMANDMENT OF THE MOMENT, III, the 
material Church order is subservient to 
the "Commandment of the moment" in 

E. BRUNNER, 552. 
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS, III, were restricted 
to movables in the Dutch Commercial 
Code; brokers in real estate were 
not considered as merchants, 692; thiswas an encroachment on the internal 
sphere of competence of Commerce andindustry; it was abolished in 1928, 693. 

COMMON GRACE, II, and fallen creation, 
33 ; owing to Christ's redemptive workCommon Grace saves the whole world 
from destruction, 35; common grace andgeneral revelation, 309. 

COMMON LAW, III, English "CommonLaw" praised by DICEY, 439, 440. BritishCommon Law, 440. 

COMMUNAL LIFE, III, in the home; is 
guided ethically and implies authority ofthe parents, 288; in the biotic aspect ofthe individual existences of the members 
of a family there are communal relationsinterweaving themembers, 299; theyfunction in an anticipatory way, 300. 

COMMUNAL SOUL, THE, III, and suchlike. 

notions, 295. 

COMMUNAL THOUGHT, III, in the home is 
adapted to the cultural sage of development 
of the children and the family'shistorical position, 290. 

COMMUNAL WHOLE, III, a summary of the

theories of a communal whole, 260 ff. 

COMMUNISM, is a secularized eschatological 
faith, 602.
—, II, the liberalism of the 19th century
evoked socialism and communism, 362. 



COMMUNIST DISTRIBUTION 

COMMUNIST DISTRIBUTION, III, according 
to needs, in PASJOEKANIS's view, 459. 

COMMUNISTIC COMMUNITY, III, is incompatible 
with the State institution, 464. 

COMMUNITY, I, the religious community; 
a common spirit; a basic motive in historically 
determined forms; the fall into 
sin, redemption, the Holy Spirit, 61. 
-II, the central spiritual comm. of 
mankind, 200; the essential community 
(SCHELER) , 589. 
-III, a cultural community is not all-
embracing, 164, 165; COMTE'S view of 
humanity as an all-embracing community, 
167 ; community in PLATO'S Phaedo, 
168; mankind is the central religious 
community, 169, 170; the term community 
defined, 177; natural unorganized 
communities, 179; institutional and noninstitutional 
communities, familistic communities; 
the State; the Church; the conjugal 
community; community according 
MAX WEBER; community implies a normative 
task, 183; institutional; and noninstitutional 
communities, 187; differentiated 
and undifferentiated communities, 
188; institutions; voluntary associations, 
189; organized communities in naive experience, 
192; organized communities in 
THOMAS AQUINAS; autonomy; not spheresovereingty, 
220; external and internal 
functions of marriage, family, and kinship, 
336; organized and natural communities, 
411; of human beings in the unity 
of their social relationships, 298. 

COMMUNITY OF LOVE, III, in a moral sense 
the Church is a community of love among 
fellow believers in Christ, qualified by 
faith expressed in a common confession, 

549. 
COMMUNITY STRUCTURES, III, cannot occur 
outside a correlative enkapsis with inter-
individual structures; Eve and Adam, 656. 

COMMUTATIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, 
according to ARISTOTLE, 242. 

COMPANIES, THE DUTCH EAST AND WEST 
INDIAN, III, exercised a genuine State 
authority, 175. 

COMPETENCE, II, in jurisprudence, is an 
analogical modal concept, 69. 

COMPETENCE OF THE STATE, III, is limited, 

216. 
COMPLEX FUNCTION OF NUMBERS, II, anticipates 
spatial dimensionality and magnitude, 
170. 

COMPLEX NUMBERS, they are also called 
multidimensional by NATORP, 172. 

COMPROMISE, III, within a political party, 
612; between different parties, 613. 

COMPULSORY ORGANISATIONS, III, enkapsis 
with the State, 190. 

36 

COMTE, AUGUSTS, I, the continuity postulate 
in his positivistic philosophy, 204; 
his positivistic sociology; law of the three 
stages ( derived from TURGOT) ; historical 
development is a necessary causal process, 
209; the first two stages were the 
theological and the metaphysical periods; 
they were abandoned to historical relativity; 
the Ideas of the third stage embody 
the classical science ideal and its 
domination motive in a positivistic form; 
they are the goal and standard of historical 
development: faith in the freeing 
power of science; positivistic historicism 
later claimed to be a new Christianity, 
210; he systematized the sciences in a 
successive continuous procession from 
the simple to the complex spheres of 
thought, in an ency clopaedical way and 
applies the method of mathematical natural 
science to every field of investigation, 
in accordance with the continuity-
postulate of the science ideal, 530. 
-II, cf. 194, 200, 269, 270; 
progressive evolution of mankind is subject 
to sociological laws, 194; rationalistic 
and naturalistic conception of society 
and culture: a social whole with 
many qualities ( economic, legal, etc.), 
200; view of history, 269; his law of the 
three stages; his optimistic view of development, 
270, 271. 
-III, 
Cours de philosophic, 455; 
Discours preliminaire, 455. 
-III, he intended to reintegrate Western 
Culture; he viewed society as an organism, 
163, 164, 167; founder of positivistsociology, 452; the State is a secondary 
product of civil society; civil property 
causes class distinctions; political authority 
belongs to the ruling classes; the 
method proper to sociology is the same 
as that of mathematical natural science 
(GALILEO and NEWTON), 453; the three 
stages in the historical development of 
human society; theology, metaphysics, 
industry; Roman society; feudal-Christian 
medieval society; industrialism, 454; 
the moral bond of a new solidarity, 455. 

CONCENTRIC LAW, I, our ego restlessly 
seeks its Origin in order to understand 
its own meaning and the meaning of our 
entire cosmos; in this tendency towards 
the Origin the fact is disclosed that our 
ego is subjected to a central law, which 
limits and determines the centre and 

root of our existence, 11; the Archimedean 
point of phil, thought must not be 
divorced from the concentric law of the 
ego's existence, 12; the concentric law of 
human experience, 162. 

CONCEPTS, I, for the formulation of the 
concept of philosophical thought it is 
necessary to abstract thinking from the 
actual entire ego that thinks; conceptual 
determination is required in thinking, 5; 
a pseudo concept cannot be analysed, 7; 


 

37 CONTINUITY-POSTULATE 

a transcendental Idea is a limiting con-to KANT'S ideas; KANT'S view of transcencept, 
24; a theoretical concept joins in dental synthesis preceding analysis; this 
logical simultaneity the analysed charac-view cancels the contrast between anateristics 
of what it defines in subjection lytical and synthetical judgments, 443; 
to the principles of identity and contra-KANT'S dualistic cosmonomic idea, 444; 
diction, expressing the analytical order "general concepts", 450; BERGSON'S "fluid 
of simultaneity in the sense of logical concepts" as the expression of "psychical 
implication and exclusion, 30; the theo-empathy" lacking the analytical epochê, 
retical concept of a modal aspect is di-481. 
rected to the modal diversity of meaning 

CONCEPT, PSEUDO-, I, a pseudo-concept

and separates the aspect from all the 

cannot be analyzed, 7; of the whole and

others, 69 the metaphysical-analogical 

its parts, 72.

concept of totality; that of being, 71; the 

CONCEPTUS SINGULARES, I, space and

metaphysical concept of the whole and 

time; intuitus singulares puri; opposed

its parts is a pseudo-concept, 72; the "lo-

to conceptus universales by KANT in his

gical formalizing" of the concept of total-

inaugural address at KOnigsberg, 345.

ity, 73 ; the question about the meaning 
of the concepts validity and being, 76; CONCILIAR MOVEMENT, III, of the 15th cengeneric 
versus total meaning; in special tury, 513. 
science generic concepts (class-, genus-

CONDILLAC, II, art and science are related

concepts, etc.) join together the indivi


to language, but have different symbols;

dual phenomena within a special modal 

simplicity is beauty; CASSIRER, 348.

aspect; generic concepts cannot level the 

CONDORCET, II, adhered to VOLTAIRE'S view

irreducible modal meanings of the va


of history, 350.

rious aspects, 77; concepts without sensory 
intuitions are empty, intuitions CONDITIO SINE QUA NON, II, J. STUART 
without concepts are blind, according to MILL's theory identified the physical and 
KANT, 363; HEGEL affirms that concepts the logical meaning of causality, 119. 
precede representations, 457. 

CONFESSION OF FAITH, III, allows for non


—, II, generic and specific in KANT, 15; 

fundamental differences; is a positivized

concept and Idea, 45; analogical concepts 

norm of faith, 541; requires actual adap


in science, 61; in logic; logical unity and 

tation to the historical development of

plurality; totality, 62; in jurisprudence; 

the insight of faith into the Word Revel-

moral bi-unity in marriage; tri-unity in 

ation, but should not degenerate into

theology; the word "space"; space as a 

theological dogmatics, 542.

mode of existence; formal logic and spa-

CONGREGATIO FIDELIUM, III, the Nominal


tial analogy, 63; space in pure, non-form


istic late Medieval view of the Church,

alized geometry; sensory space; physical 

234.
space; legal space; economic space; ex


tension, 55-71; RUSSELL'S class-concept CONSANGUINEOUS FAMILY, III, in L. H. 
an incomplete symbol, according to MA-MORGAN'S view, 339. 
LAN, 84 ; the intentional content of a con-


CONSCIOUSNESS, II, the phenomenologist

cept, 387; and actus intelligendi, 388; the 

seeks to I estrict himself to the data by

concept of the juridical aspect defined, 

directing his intuitive gaze to the inten


406; extension and content of concepts 

tional acts of consciousness. Then mean-

in KANT, 420; analytical and synthetical, 

ing is identified with the intentional re


435; attributionsurteil; concepts, logically 

lationship of the absolute pure ego to the

and ontologically, 440; " a plane triangle 

"Gegenstand" intended; it becomes iden


has three interior angles" and the prin


tical with the "reine Aktwesen" in its sub


ciple of identity, according to PFANDER; 

jective noetic and its objective noemetic

KANT'S empirical judgments are a poste


aspect, (HUSSERL) 27-29; its intentional

riori —, PFÂNDER'S distinction between 

content distinguished from sensory im


subjective concept, logical object, and 

pressions by BRENTANO, 28; historical

Gegenstand —; his formal (= inten


stream of consciousness, in FREYER, 225;

tional) object; the Gegenstand is not a 

cf. s.v. Satz des Bewusztseins.

logical object but an aspect opposed to 

CONSTANT -H-, THE, II, the typical Con-

theoretical thought; a subjective concept 

stant -h- in quantum mechanics, 425.

must intend the full logical objectification 
of the Gegenstand; incomplete subjective CONSTANT AND INCONSTANT STRUCTURES, 
concepts, 441; the objective logical traits III, PRAXITELES' Hermes is a relatively 
of the Gegenstand are not exclusively lo-constant structure; music, etc. is an ingical; 
"all bodies are heavy" expresses constant individuality structure, 110. 
universally valid law-conformity; SIG


CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, II, as a contract,

WART'S subjective interpretation, 442; 

359. 
SCHLEIERMACHER'S view; a concept is al-

CONTACT, II, language, and social contact,

ways in the state of becoming; analytical 

112, 113.

and synthetical refer to different stages 
of becoming; this explanation is contrary CONTINUITY-POSTULATE, I, COHEN derives 


 

CONTINUITY

it from the infinitesimal calculus; it has 
to bridge the meaning diversity, in Co-
HEN'S thought, 75; FICHTE'S idea of continuity; 
it broke through the boundaries
accepted by KANT with respect to the
theoretical Idea of freedom, 90 ; Neo-
Kantian view, 91; in HOBBES, 200, 216; it 
is employed as the scepter of the absolute 
sovereignty of reason, 203 ; this postulate 
in COMTE, and in NATORP, 204 ; the 
Neo-Kantians applied LEIBNIZ' continuity
principle as a transcendental logical
principle of creation to KANT'S categories, 
407 ; in MAIMON this postulate halts
before the boundary of sensory phenomena, 
411; FICHTE elevated the moral 
function to the basic denominator of all 
the aspects, 417; with him the personality 
ideal has absorbed the science ideal,
447; this principle and the concept of
function, 555. 


CONTINUITY, II, and number, 88; of thought,
in LEIBNIZ, 103, 104 ; actual continuity
cannot occur in the numeral aspect; only
in that of movement, in its original form,
105; historical, control or mastery always 
seeks new roads in such a way that
what precedes fructifies what follows
later on, thus preserving a certain measure 
of continuity, 198; the antinomy in
the construction of a "continuum of 
points", 385. 


CONTINUITY AND IDENTITY, III, of a com


munal whole, 296. 
CONTINUOUS NUMBER, II, this concept was 
introduced by WEIERSTRASZ, CANTOR,
PASCH and VERONESE, 91. 


CONTRACT THEORY, II, TROELTSCH'S interpretation 
moves in a vicious circle, 356;
cf. S.V. HOBBES, LOCKE, ROUSSEAU. 


CONTRACT THEORY OF THE STATE, III, the 
Stoics emphasize the juridical bond externally 
holding the individuals togetherin organized communities; they alsospeak of an internal social instinct, 226;
they valued positive laws in the state,
228; Roman Stoics held the external 
tonos of the functional legal order to befounded in the lex naturalis; this natural 
law implied the original freedom and

equality of all men in the "golden age ofinnocence"; the state existed for bridlinghuman dissoluteness, 230 ; the legal orderis the order sanctioned by the State; therepublican Roman jurists on the consensus 
populi as the origin of the State'sauthority, 231; the Stoical idea of the 
social instinct in man, 232; the Humanisttheory of natural law; the Humanist contract 
theory; HUGO GROTIUS ; THOMAS HOBBES; 
positive law as the general will; inMARSILIUS OF PADUA ; KANT'S volenti non 
fit iniuria; positive law is the general 
will; the contract theory was gradually 
applied both to Church and State, in 
HUGO GROTIUS, 232 ; LOCKE, WOLFF, HOBBES, 
ROUSSEAU, 237. 

38 

CONTRACTUAL LIBERTY, II, was only aprinciple that was adapted to the juridical 
interindividual relations, 361. 

COPERNICAN DEED, I, Of KANT, is the reversal 
of the relation between the knowing 
subject and empirical reality, 107,

354. 
COPERNICUS, I, introduced the heliocentric 
view of the world, 194. 

COPERNICAN REVOLUTION, II, Of KANT ; his 
Transcendental Idealism regarded theGegenstand of knowledge as the productof a universally valid subjective formative 
process, 430. 

COPYRIGHT, II, is a "personality right"
recognized by Dutch law; and objectifiesan economic interest of the party entitled, 
412, 413. 

COPY THEORY, I, ascribed to naïve experience, 
34-43, 44-47, 49-51, 53, 54. 

CORAL POLYPS, III, 774. 

CORAL ZOOPHYTES, III, in animal colonies, 

649. 
CORNELISSEN, A. J. M., I, 
The Doctrine of the State of Calvin and 
Rousseau, 517. 
—, I, "if faith requires neither a praeambula 
furnished by reason, but the reverse, 
if rational knowledge is strengthened 
by faith, then, if one is consistent, 
the act of super-natural "knowing" is only 
an act of feeling. CALVIN drew this 
conclusion and thus fell into sentimentalism"; 
this statement is based on a misunderstanding 
of the Biblical meaning ofthe word "heart", interpreted by CALVIN, 

517. 
CORPORATION, I, is supposed to be a purely 
technical juridical concept, 551. 

CORPORATIONS, III, on the possibility offorming corporations during the Romanrepublic, 234; (independent) are dangerous, 
235; Free corporations were notrecognized by the Canonists, 235. 

CORPORATIVE LAW, III, versus inter-individual 
law in GIERKE'S view, 259. 

CORPUS CHRISTI AND CHURCH, III, cannot 
be identified, 215; the Corpus Christiembraces all the social structures of human 
existence, 526. 

CORPUS CHRISTIANUM, I, this idea dominated 
the medieval ecclesiastically unified 
culture up to the times of the Renaissance, 
188. 
—, II, in the Middle Ages the Holy Roman 
Empire was considered to be thecorpus Christianum, 288; the real corpus 
Christianum is a religious organism revealing 
the individuality of its membersto the full, 418. 

CORRELATIVE ENKAPSIS, III, unites intercommunal 
and interindividual relation



ships in undifferentiated organized communities, 
655; and the first formulationof the married order in Scripture, 656;
and the intertwinement of natural communities 
with intercommunal and inter-
individual relations. 

COSMIC STRUCTURAL TEMPORAL ORDER, 
THE, II, the limit to the cosmos, makingthe aspects relative; modal laws; no antinomy 
between sphere sovereignty andcosmic coherence, 3; refractional time, 4; 
law, subject, object, and time, 8; theoretical 
thought and cosmic temporal order,
47; aspects are arranged in an order ofincreasing complication, 49; how to haveaccess to the cosmic order theoretically,
74 ; nucleus, retrocipations, anticipations,
75; terminal spheres; foundation andsuper-structure, 76; cosmic order as a lexaeterna based on divine reason in Christian 
synthesis philosophy; universaliaante rem and in re, 559. 

COSMIC TIME, I, is the indissoluble correlation 
of time order and time duration;
it is only transcended in the religiouscentre of our existence; but not in a concept, 
nor in the transcendental Idea as alimiting concept qua talis, 24 ; the classical 
Greek dilemma of time as something 
subjective mental or objective physical; 
ARISTOTLE considers time to be thenumerability of motion, 25... ANAXIMANDER'S 
view of time as a divine order of 
Dike; ALBERT THE GREAT defended the 
objective physical conception; THOMAS 
AQUINAS held the subjectivistic psychological 
position with respect to time, following 
AUGUSTINUS, 26; in Humanisticthought there are objectivistic and subjectivistic 
views; KANT calls time a transcendental 
form, of intuition of sense experience; 
he coordinates time with space,
the other form of intuition; EINSTEINconsiders time as a fourth dimension of 
physical world space; BERGSON calls timethe psychical duration of feeling; the actual 
"dui-6e" is the "absolute" time; Phenomenology 
says that "true time" is an"Erlebnisstrom"; DILTHEY and HEIDEGGER 
conceive of time irrationalistically ashistorical; in HEIDEGGER historical time 
has a dialectical existential meaning, 27;
the idea of cosmic time constitutes the 
basis of the philosophy of the Cosmonomic 
Idea; time has a cosmonomic and a 
factual side; the cosmonomic side is thetemporal order, the factual side is thefactual duration; the duration remainsconstantly subjected to the order; anexample in the aspect of organic life;
temporal order and duration are eachother's correlata and must not be dissociated; 
rationalism absolutizes the cosmonomic 
side, irrationalism the factualsubject side of time; the duration is disclosed 
in a subject-object relation; theobjective duration can never exist actual

 


39COSMIC TIME 

ly independently of the subjective duration 
in the subject-object relation; themeasurement of time depends on thelatter, 28; the modal structures and the 
typical totality structures of individualityare based on the order of cosmic time; 
and necessarily related to the factual duration 
of transitory beings, events, processes, 
acts, social relations, etc.; the 
cosmic character of time discloses itself 
in the indissoluble inter-modal coherence 
into which it fits the modal aspects; inthe empirical opening-process in whichanticipatory moments develop coheringwith later aspects, 29; 'we can form atheoretical concept of the separate aspects 
of time, but time itself in its all-
embracing cosmic meaning can never becomprehended in a concept; it can onlybe approximated in a theoretical limitingconcept in critical self-reflection as tothe necessary presupposita • of the theoretical 
attitude of thought; then we geta transcendental Idea of cosmic time-
order in the theoretical discontinuity ofthe aspects caused by logical analysis;
in the logical aspect cosmic time discloses 
a modal analytical sense; cosmictime offers no concentration point forphilosophy to start from; in time meaning 
is broken into an incalculable diversity 
having its radical unity only in thereligious centre of human existence wherewe transcend time; some seek this concentration-
point in time and suppose thereligious centre to be pre-functional butnot supra-temporal; but "eternity is setin the heart of man" so that he can direct 
himself to things eternal; even in idolatry 
the idea of the absolute is a priorirelated to the supra temporal, 31; theterm "central trans-cosmic time" is objectionable, 
32; the eschatological aspectof cosmic time in faith is a limiting aspect; 
it embraces the eschaton, i.e., thatwhich is or happens beyond the limits ofcosmic time, e.g., the days of creation,
the order in which regeneration precedesconversion, etc., 33 ; in theoretical thinking 
we approximate time only in the analytical 
setting asunder of its modal aspects, 
34; cosmic time cannot be thestarting point for the theoretical synthesis 
of the two terms in the Gegenstandrelation, 45; the transcendental Idea of 
time is the basic denominator of the various 
aspects; their diversity pre-supposes 
a temporal coherence as the expression 
of a deeper unity; if they hadnothing in common, they could not even

be distinguished from each other; theirunity is in a religious root, 79; cosmictime in its correlation of duration and 
order, and the successive refraction of 
meaning, 106. 
-, II, its lawside is order, its subject-sideis duration, 3; it overarches and permeates 
all the aspects; it splits up the fulness 


COSMOLOGICAL 


of meaning into modal diversity, 4; thelaw of refraction of cosmic time; concept 
of modal function requires abstraction 
; the cosmic temporal order isthe basic denominator of the aspects 6—
8; spatial time is simultaneity, 384; before 
and after in the spatial time function 
refers to magnitude, 384; cosmictime is the guarantee of the temporal coherence 
but not the deeper identity ofthe functions, 529; it cannot contain the 
totality of meaning but refracts it into

imeaning diversity, 532. 

COSMOLOGICAL, II, cosmological ideas, 43;
the meaning of the term "cosmological"
in Christian philosophy, 47; cosmologicaland cosmic self-consciousness are logicized 
in KANT, 498; the "categories ofknowledge" in "Critical" epistemologybelong to the cosmological analysis ofmodal aspects, 517; cosmic and cosmological 
self-consciousness, 540, 541. 

COSMOLOGY, I, rationalist cosmology wasreduced to absurdity by KANT, 367. 

COSMONOMIC IDEA, I, the origin of theterm, 93; and special science; and logicism; 
and mechanistic biology; and the"pure theory of law", 98 ; the content ofthe Cosmonomic Idea, 101; the cosmonomic 
structure of the aspects, 105.
—, II, in Neo-Kantianism, 27 ; the Christian 
Cosmonomic Idea determines the 
sense of "meaning" in relation to the Origin 
and the unity of all temporal meaning, 
30, 31. 

COUNTING, II, is not the origin of numberbut implies logical distinction, 81, 82. 

COVENANT, THE, III, Christ builds His 
Church by His Word and Spirit in theline of the Covenant, of which the Congregatio 
Fidelium is an outcome, 533. 

CREATION, II, and religion, in AALDERS, 

155. 
CREATIVE IDEAS, III, in the Divine Logos;
in AUGUSTINUS and in THOMAS AQUINAS ; 
antinomies in the view of immortality ofthe soul, 47. 

CRIMINAL LAW, II, in primitive society isbased on the principle of "Erfolgshaftung", 
182. 

CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION, III, relation between 
purpose and structure; adducedby SINZHEIMER as an argument in favourof a non-normative legal view, 577. 

CRITERIA OF TRANSCENDENTAL THEORETICAL 
TRUTH, II, principium exclusae antinomiae 
the first criterion; infringement ofsphere sovereignty entangles thought inantinomies; the second criterion is the 
datum of pre-theoretical thought, 579;
naive experience is not a copy theory;
critical epistemology and its "universala priori validity and necessity" of trans


40 

cendental truth; idealist and phenomenologist 
hypostases of theoretical synthesisare mythological, 580; the experimentalcriterion, 581; this criterion requires thedisclosure of our objective sensory experience, 
582. 

CRITICAL REALISM, I, of B. BAVINK, 559; 
is accommodated to the Augustinian doctrine 
of the Divine Logos, 560.

-III, of RIEHL, 46. 
CRITICAL SCHOOL OF ETHNOLOGISTS, III, an 
coherences between primitive cultures,

333. 
CRITIQUE OF PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT, I, 
the first way and its conclusion, pp. 6—
21; the second way of transcendental critique 
of philos. thought, 34; this way isconcerned with the theoretical attitude 
of thought as such; alle immanence philosophy 
stands and falls with the dogmaof the autonomy of theoretical thought:
traditional metaphysics, Kantian epistemology, 
modern phenomenology, NICOLAIHARTMANN'S phenomenological ontologyare involved in this autonomy dogmatism; 
it has meant something different ineach trend of thought: Greek philosophy;
Thomistic Scholasticism; modern Humanistic 
thought; this difference is dueto a difference in religious starting-point;
the Greek theoria claims autonomy overagainst popular faith, as it pretends to bethe true way to the knowledge of god;
pistis (faith) clings to sensory mythological 
representations giving only a doxa,
i.e., an uncertain opinion; cf. PARMENIDES; 
according to PLATO it is exclusivelydestined for philosophers to approachthe race of the gods, 35; Greek, Scholastic, 
and modern Humanistic basic motives; 
the autonomy of theoretical thoughtimpedes a mutual understanding betweenphilosophic schools, 36; the differentschools of philosophy seem to reason atcross-purposes because they do not penetrate 
to each other's starting-points; thispoint is masked by the dogma of theautonomy of theoretical thought; thisautonomy is not an axiom but a criticalproblem, a quaestio iuris; the necessityof a transcendental critique of the theoretical 
attitude; this critique inquires into 
the universally valid conditions oftheoretical thought insofar as they arerequired by the immanent structure ofsuch thought; transcendent criticismversus transcendental criticism, 37 ; the 
drawbacks of transcendent criticism; and 
of dogmatic theology; why transcendentcriticism is valueless in science and philosophy, 
38. 

CROUZAS, I, 
Examen du Pyrrhonisme, ancien et moderne, 
275. 
—, I, he was the "connaisseur" of Pyrrhonism; 
there is a striking agreement 


between HUME'S theories and CROUZAS' 
work on Pyrrhonism, 275. 

CRUCIFIX, III, has an objective destinationfor worship (a pistic qualification), 144. 

CRUSADES, I, in the historical process ofindividualization and differentiation, 189. 

CRUSIUS, CHR. AUG., I, followed his teacher 
RUDIGER; he opposed the geometricalmethod in metaphysics and related thematerial principles of knowledge to sensory 
experience; he combated LEIBNIZ'monadology; the grounds of being aredivided into causal and existential 
grounds, 339; physical and mathematicalgrounds, 340. 

CRYPTO RELIGIOUS ATTITUDE, II, in critical 
epistemology, 491. 

CRYSTALS, III, inorganic crystals are enkaptic 
structural totalities, 702 ; have anet-like form whose nodal points areoccupied by the atomcentra, 705. 

CRYSTAL LATTICES, HI, and atom structure, 
704 ; a heterogeneous continuum,
according to HOENEN, 709; a typicallyqualified enkaptic form totality embracing 
three different structures, 710,

711. 
CULT, II, in a primitive cult is expressedthe restrictive transcendental function of 
pistis, 318, 319; always has an ethicalmoment, 319. 

CULT COMMUNITY, III, opposed to the

Church of faith, by E. BRUNNER, 552. 

CULTURAL ASPECT, III, of family life; theparents' formative power; school and family, 
286, 287. 

CULTURAL DERIVATIONS, III, RATZEL'S Idea, 

333. 
CULTURAL ORBITS, III, FR. GRAEBNER, etc., 
333. 
CULTURAL REALMS, II, and cultural phenomena, 
203. 


CULTURE, I, as a subjective relating of
reality to values, in RICKERT, 76.
-, II, WINDELBAND, RICKERT and LASK 


denied the reality of culture and made it
into a transcendental mode of judging


"nature" by relating it to values, 201;
RICKERT, 204; in TROELTSCH'S view, 205, 
206; its origin is a metahistorical question, 
264; opened cultures, 266; and their
historical development; ROUSSEAU'S view
of culture, 270. 
-, III, similarities of culture in different 
peoples, 332, 333; cultural orbits theory;
ANKERMANN adherent, 333. 


CURATOR AND CURANDUS, III, their legal relation, 
279. 


CURIAE, III, in Roman society, 369; in ancient 
Rome, 369. 

41 DATUM 

CURTIUS, S. G., II, 
Die Bildung der Tempora und Modi im
Griechischen und Lateinischen, 127. 


CUSANUS, NICOLAUS, I, wants to rediscover 
man in the endless, in his boundless impulse 
of activity, 194; his system was a
preparation for the principles of Modern
Humanistic philosophy, 194 ; his changed
attitude toward knowledge, 203.
-, II, on the faculty of imagination, 515. 


CYCLIC TIME, II, in Greek conception of
history as the eternal return of things,


294. 
CYON, E. v., II, on eye and ear, 373. 

CYPRIANUS, III, on the election of a priestin the people's presence, 546. 

CYTOPLASM, III, arbitrary cut pieces ofcytoplasm can become complete individuals, 
721. 

D 

DALTON, III, the law of multiple proportion, 
704. 


DAMASCENUS, JOHANNES, I, 
Dialectica, 202. 
-, I, his definition of the concept "substance", 
202. 


DANCING, III, as an art, 110. 


DARMSTAEDTER, FR. III,

FR., 

Die Grenzen der des Rechtsstaates, 
408, 409, 410, 428. 
-, III, the power state is anorganization; 
the law state is an organism; theirnatural reality is related to values : a multitude 
of people are related to regulatedbehaviour and tot the power of the magistrate, 
409; cf. sub voce State; his viewis antinomous, 410. 

DARWIN, CHARLES, I, his evolution theorypervaded the historical mode of thoughtin the second half of the nineteenth century, 
465.
-, II, evolution, 260, 261; his influence 
on SPENCER'S view of history, 269.

, III, his evolutionism, 95.
-, I, Association psychology, 264. 


DARWINISM, I, in historical science, 469. 

-II, its evolutionism is a genetic life
9

and world view about culture and society, 
a metaphysics of the Humanisticscience ideal, 264; introduced into the 
conception of history, 269. 

DASEIN, I, as the ontological manner of

being in contradistinction to the ontical

way, 53.

-, II, in HEIDEGGER, 22; Or existential 

being, 23; and the transcendental imagin


ation, 524. 

DATUM, II, the datum in epistemology,
according to DRIESCH and VOLKELT, 431. 


DAYS OF CREATION 42 

DAYS OF CREATION, I, transcend cosmic for the truth of mathematical thought,
time, 33. 191; the "cogito" is a "res cogitans"
checking methodical scepticism; the

DECALOGUE, I, a Christian remains sub-

given world is broken up and then re


jected to the Decalogue, 518. 

constructued by autonomous mathemati-
DECISION OF -THE MOMENT, III, is superiorcal thought, 195; from his "cogito, ergoto any principle, according to HERMANsum" DESCARTES proceeds to God, but asHELLER, 393. absolutized mathematical thought; he

founds all knowledge in selfconscious-

DECLINE, I, in Humanistic philosophy,

ness, 196; his discovery of analytical

214. 
geometry; its propositions could be pro-
DEDEKIND, II, "section" theory of irra-ven without any other pre-suppositionstional numbers, 90, 91. than arithmethical ones; the laws of 

arithmetic originated from sovereign

DEED, I, enthousiasm and optimism of

thought; the motive of logical creation is

the "Deed" in the "Sturm and Drang",

modern Humanistic, 197; at the back of

452. 
this is the continuity postulate of theDEFINITIONS, I, nominal and real defini-mathematical science-ideal, 200; his detions, 
according to LEIBNIZ, 243 ; def. arefinition of a "substance", 202; and ARIS-
synthetical in mathematics, but analyti-TOTLE'S, 203; his "semi-idealism" camecal in metaphysics, according to KANT,into violent conflict with the mechanistic 

336. naturalism of THOMAS HOBBES; this conflict 
was the first expression of the basic
DELPHIC MAXIM, THE, I, 

antinomy in the Humanistic Cosmonomic

Gnoothi seauton, 51, 52. 

Idea, 216; he hypostatized "the thinkingDEMA, II, personal and universal; a fluid soul" and "the extended body" as "finitedistinction, 317. substances"; they are mutually irreduci


ble; a dualistic view; he rejoiced at HAR


DEMIC INDIVIDUALITY, III, the nationality

vEY's discovery of the circulation of the

of a State reveals its demic individuality,

blood as a victory over the Scholastic

according to R. KJELLEN, 484. 

`substantial forms"; in HOBBES, mathe-
DEMIURGE, I, the divine agent in Greekmatical thought is causally determinedthought, 180; in PLATO, 248.on the part of the movements of the ma--, 
II, in ANAXAGORAS, 56. terial body; there is no room for the

freedom of human personality; no stand-

DEMOCRACY, III, in Athens during the

ard of theoretical truth, or even for

Persian wars, 10 ; ARISTOTLE calls it the 

mathematical science; DESCARTES eleva


rule of the poor; — modern views, 479;

ted the ideal of personality to the rank

its axiological relatvism, in KELSEN, 610. 

of referee, but it was infected with ratio-
DEmocRrrus, I, was not a "materialist" in nalism and identified with mathematical 
the modern sense, but in that of the thought, 218; but DESCARTES coordinatedGreek form-motive: his "atoms" were the "res extensiva" and the "res cogitans";
"ideal forms" in a mathematical sense, the relation between body and soul in

122. DESCARTES; his concept "influxus physi—, 
III, his "atoms" are non-sensible, but cus"; this influx entered human con-
intelligible "ideal", 8. sciousness from the parva glandula inthe human brain; stimulating conscious-
DENOMINATOR, BASIC, I, of the aspects, 47. 

ness to sensory perceptions and affectsDEPARTMENT STORE, III, is a free associa-which disturb logical thought; heextion, 
575. tended mathematical and natural scien


tific methods to psychology; the "in-

DEPTH-PSYCHOLOGY, I, dealt a death blow 

fluxus" could not enter mathematical

to the personality-ideal, 214.

thought and the pure will directed by

—, II, and the manifestations of the ani-

such thought; his epistemology and ethics

mal structure of the human body in cer


exalted the mathematical method to the

tain Grenzsituationen, 114. 

norm of truth and morality, 219; the per-
DESCARTES, RENE, I, fect free personality should conquer theRationes more geometrico dispositae, 203;confusion wrought by sensory perception

with the aid of the pure concept formed

Principia Philosophiae, 202, 222;
Meditations Mêtaphysiques, 220, 222;"more geometrico"; the emotions can be


ruled only by the moral will according

Notae, 222. 

to clear and distinct Ideas; his partial

—, I, his "cogito" was intended as the"indeterminism"; absolute freedom ofonly fixed point in his universal metho-the will with respect to inadequate sendical 
scepticism with respect to all real-sorily obscured Ideas; he does not wantity present in experience, 12; his "the-to undermine the foundations of the 
ism", 122; his mathematical concept ofscience-ideal; the "will" is a modus' oftruth, 150; the idea of a personal God isthought, just like fantasy and sensoryaccepted as a metaphysical foundation perception; the will has no freedom in 


43 

the face of clear and distinct concepts;
theoretical error is apostasy from themathematical attitude; immorality is alsodue to this apostasy, involving us in thecausal processes of affects and passions;
the mathematical "cogito" does not err;
his dichotomy of thought and mechanistically 
determined space was to save thescience ideal, 221; his "ideae innatae" are 
inborn capacities to think them; universals 
are modes of thought, and generalnames; his metaphysics is Nominalistic;
mathematical thought is not subjected toa cosmic order; the personality ideal isresolved into the science ideal; the personality 
ideal has primacy within thescience ideal in DESCARTES; he has to 
struggle with solipsism; the idea of Godhas to be the bridge to absolute mathematical 
thought creating the res extensiva, 
222; movement is a modus of filled 
space, 223; his crass dualism, 227; the"res extensiva" as a natural substance is 
a part of absolutized space of which motion 
is the only modus, 231; his explanation 
of error and sin; the influxus physicus; 
freedom of indifference, 236; doctrine 
of innate ideas in LEIBNIZ, 237; his 
"liberum arbitrium in differentiae" was 
retained with regard to sensory representations, 
238; LOCKE'S division of human 
experience into "sensation" and"reflection" is the counterpart of DESCARTES' 
division between "extensio" and 
"cogitatio"; the material and the spiritual 
substance are independent of eachother, 263 ; mathematical thought is purely 
logical, 264 ; such thought, with itsstrict deductive coherence, is the mainstayof the ideal of science, 265; in DESCARTES 
Ideas are potentially innate, 268; he permitted 
mathematical thought to becomea static "res cogitans", 269; the ego, thepersonality, is identified with mathematical 
thought and hypostatized as a thinking 
substance, 295; he called the law ofphysical causality an "innate idea", 298;
in his work "Le Monde" the passion todominate nature found its classical expression 
in DESCARTES' proud motto:
"Give me matter, I will build a world 
from it", 332; DESCARTES conceived of 
the science-ideal in an abstract deductive 
mathematical sense, 337.
—, II

, 

Regulae ad directionem ingenii, 346;
Meditationes, 367; 
Principia philosophiae, 367.
—, II, analytic geometry, 103, 104, 337;
Cartesianism could not form an idea of 
historical development, 351; his scholasticview of subject and object, 367.
—, III, the metaphysical concept of material 
substance is the hypostatization ofthe general functional coherence betweenphysical phenomena, 27 ; DRIESCH rejectsDESCARTES' metaphysical conclusionsfrom "cogito", although this cogito remains 
his starting-point, 737, 743. 

DEVELOPMENT 

DEVELOPMENT, I, a naturalistic concept in

J. F. HERDER, 454. 
—, II, a biotic retrocipation in history,
232; historical dev, requires cultural contact, 
259; in the different spheres ofhuman society, in science and art, in thewhole of creation, 261; multimodal dev., 
262; individuality in Vico, 276; accordingto the Historical School; the idea of cultural 
development in J. F. HERDER threatens 
to stiffen into biological analogies,
277 ; intensive idea of histor. developmentin HEGEL, 279; RANKE'S idea of histor. 
dev., 281; historical development as asteady progress of mankind, in VOLTAIRE,
350; the Christian Idea of hist. dev., 363. 
DIACONATE, III, is the organized office ofcharity towards the poor members of thechurch, 549; is a requirement of a livingchurch; a church without a diaconate 
must be mortally ill, 550. 

DIALECTIC, I, religious and theoreticaldialectic, 65; AGRICOLA'S dialectic was an 
art of reasoning in the Nominalist sense,

514. 
DIALECTICAL CONNECTION, II, between general 
and particular will, in HEGEL, 399. 

DIALECTICAL LOGIC, I, FICHTE'S dial. log.
has to bridge the Kantian gulf betweenepistemology and ethics, 90. 

DIALECTICAL-PHENOMENOLOGICAL SOCIOLOGY, 
III; and the dilemma between individualism 
and universalism, 248. 

DIALECTICAL SYNTHESIS, II, of natural 
necessity and freedom according toSCHELLING, 232. 

DIALECTICAL TENSION, III, among the Moments 
of a social whole according to LITT,

249. 
DIALECTICAL THEOLOGY, I, its negative attitude 
with respect to the idea of an innerreformation of philosophical thought isthe expression of the religious dialecticborn out of the collision between the 
hidden basic motive of Humanistic 
thought and the central motive of theChristian religion, 521.
—, II, and its horror of power formation,

246. 
DIALECTICAL THOUGHT, I, was introduced 
by FICHTE, 142; in immanence philosophy, 
146; in HEGEL, 208 ff.; in FICHTE itis only concerned with the finite ego,
421, 422; it is the restless dialectical movement 
of theoretical reason dependingon sensation, 436; dial. thought in theearly Romantics, e.g., HAMANN, 466. 

DIALECTICAL UNITY, I, of natural necessityand creative freedom, in SCHELLING, 208. 
—, II, between sensibility and understanding 
is not intended by KANT, 529. 

DIALECTICAL VIEW, II, of creation and sin 
in BARTH, 34. 


 

DIATOMS 

DIATOMS, III, 107, 108. 

DIBELIUS, III, 
Das Jahrhundert der Kirche, 539. 


DICEY, III, praises the British rule of
"common law", 439, 440; [cf. s.v. Juridical 
Aspect, p. 277]. 


DICHOTOMY, I, of body and soul, its origin, 
44; in Thomism, 65.
—, II, of psycho-physical body and mind
in SCHELER, 112. 


DIDEROT, II, 
De l'interpretation de la Nature, 339.
—, II, on the rigidity of his Idea of mathematics, 
339. 


DIEMER, N., III, 
Het Scheppingsverbond met Adam, 247. 


DIEMER, J .H., III, 
Over biotypen van Anopheles Maculipennis, 
96;
Het Soortbegrip en de idee van het Structuurprincipe 
in de biologie, 96;
De totaliteitsidee in de biologie en de
psychologie, 96;
De nieuwe holistische biologie, 96. 


DIFFERENTIAL NUMBER, I, anticipates motion, 
235, 236. 
—, II, a function of number, 87. 


DIGNITY OF MAN, II, according to W. VON
HUMBOLDT, 276. 


DIKE, I, the divine order in ANAXAGORAS,
26; in ANAXIMANDER, 67, 112.
—, II, in PARMENIDES, 56 ; in HERACLITUS, 
PYTHAGORAS, PARMENIDES ; and world-
order, 132, 133. 


DILTHEY, WILHELM, I, 
Die Typen der Weltanschauung, 120.
—, I, he and HEIDEGGER conceive of time 
in an irrationalistic historical sense, 27; 
his irrationalistic hermeneutical historicism, 
53; his and SPENGLER'S historical 
relativism with respect to life and worldviews, 118; he sets up three types ofphilosophic world views : materialisticpositivism, objective idealism, and freedom 
idealism, 120; his confusing abstractschematism of philosophic systems, 122;
it interprets ancient and medieval philosophic 
trends after the pattern of themodern Humanistic motive of nature and 
freedom, 123; his view of the modern 
Humanistic "cogito" as Archimedeanpoint, 203. 

-9 

Das achtzehnte Jahrhundert and die geschichtliche 
Welt, 349; 
Ges. Werke, VII, 290/1; — 206;
cf. 112, 205, 206, 226, 256, 282, 391. 
—, II, historicism; vivo replaces cogito,
19; the consciousness of finiteness and 
relativity of every human condition and
belief, 206; he saw the impasse in which
Historicism involves theoretical thought,
207; from historical science causality is
excluded as unhistorical and explanatory, 


44 

spatial thinking; because historical
thought is interpretative understanding,
255; historical development according to
DILTHEY and TROELTSCH, 282; DILTHEY 
and the Enlightenment and the science of
history, 349; in DILTHEY empathy replaces . 
reflexive thought in socio-cultural
science, 391. 
—, III, 
Die Glaubenslehren der Reformatoren, 


521. 
—, III, he thinks that CALVIN advocates 
the sovereignty of the congregation in
matters of Church government, 521. 
DIMENSION, II, belongs to the law-side of
the spatial aspect; it is an order; it does
not imply a determinate magnitude of
lines which, as the coordinates of a point,
are constructed in different dimensions, 


86. 
DIMENSION UBERHAUPT, II, a logicisticconcept; and the modal shift of meaning,
172; it is a pseudo-concept used to eradicate 
the modal boundaries between the 
logical, the numeral and the spatial aspects; 
NATORP, 173, 459. 

DING AN SICH, I, this concept became theepistemological -x-, 263; the apriori concepts 
of the mind reveal to us the laws ofthe noumenon, the Dinge an sich, in LEIBNIZ, 
344; in KANT, 348, 349, 351, 355; 
it is excluded from experience, 348; theDing an sich is a substance, incompatiblewith the Idea of the "homo noumenon",
360, 361 ; MAIMON eliminated the Ding ansich, 404, 405; Ding an sich in REINHOLD'Sthought, 413.
—, II, in speculative metaphysics of themathematical science-ideal it is the theoretical 
idea, 44 ; in KANT, 496. 

— III, in RITTER'S view, 28; and physics, 
100. 
DIOGENES OF APOLONIA, III, he appliesANAXAGORAS' basic idea of a teleologicalworld-plan to the interpretation of particular 
natural phenomena, 633. 

DIOGENES LAERTIUS, VII—III, 433. 

DIONYSUS, I, the worship of D. is themost pregnant expression of the Greekmatter-motive, 62; Dionysian movements,

67. 
DIRECTIONS, II, of movement are retrocipations 
to space and number, 98. 

DIRECT SPIRITUAL CONTACT, III, is limited 
by TH. LITT to a "closed sphere" of the 
first degree, 253. 

DISJUNCTION, II, theoretical disjunctionof the cosmic meaning-systasis, 467. 

DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, III, its juridicalsense is denied by HOBBES ; GROTIUSascribes a moral sense to it, 212; distrib. 
just. in KANT; according to DUEZ, 445. 

DIVINE IRONY, II, there is divine irony in 


45 DIVISIONS OF PHILOSOPHY 

the many "-isms" that have arisen in the true, eternal, unchangeable entity, 532; 

history of philosophy, 333. in PARMENIDES the Form-motive is related 
to the Ouranic religion of nature;

DIVINE REVELATION, II, does not mention PROTAGORAS sceptical criticism of nathe 
modal order of the law spheres, 53; tural philosophy and metaphysical on-
has entered history, 305; development of tology involved the whole of theoretirevelatio 
particularis, 307; self-conscious- cal knowledge; he drew the most 

ness and revelation, 323. extreme conclusions from the matter-
DIVISIONS OF PHILOSOPHY, I, the classifi- motive of the older nature-philosophy;
cation and formulation of problems in theoretical truth is in a constant state ofimmanence philosophy are intrinsically flux and change; individual man in hisconnected with its transcendental basic constantly changing subjectivity is theIdea, 527; KANT treated the epistemolo- measure of all things; theoretical thoughtgical foundation and limitation of the had to give way to practical philosophyclassic ideal of science (directed to the concerned with what is useful to man,
"domination of nature") in his Kritik der especially in politics; the paideia givesreinen Vernunft; ethics was examined in form to human nature; theoretical and 
his Kritik der praktischen Vernunft; his practical philosophy were opposed tothird Kritik, viz, that of Teleological each other, 533 ; SOCRATES ascribed pri-
Judgment investigates the philosophical macy to the form-motive of the cultureproblems of biology, history and aesthe- religion; he wanted to elevate practicaltics; in connection with his Krit. d.prakt. philosophy to an epistême, a science;
Vern. KANT treats the philosophical pro- every concept of an arêtê must be conblems 
of jurisprudence (Metaphysische centrically directed to the Divine Idea ofAnfangsgriinde der Rechtslehre) and the good and the beautiful; a concept hastheology; his Krit, der teleologischen Ur- value in SOCRATES' practical philosophyteilskraft is thought of as a merely subjec- only if it informs us of the use of a thingtive between the two other "Kritiken"; (aretê) ; SOCRATES' practical phil. was inFICHTE classified philosophy as a Wissen- fact theoretical, 534; he rejected the Soschaftslehre 
with a theoretical and a prac- phistic opposition of theoria and praxis;
tical section; HEGEL distinguished logic, PLATO and ARISTOTLE sought the character-
natural philosophy, and the philosophy istic of man in his nous (theoreticalof the Spirit; DESCARTES' program of a thought) ; PLATO'S phronêsis, ARISTOTLE'Smathesis universalis; HOBBES used mathe- nous praktikos; this division was basedmatical logic and "prima philosophia" to on the Gegenstand of the logical functionarrive at an encyclopaedical system of the of thought, 535; PROTAGORAS' criterion ofsciences in a successive continuous pro- utility; in his view theoria is valueless incession from the simple to the complex itself, only in the practical aims it mayspheres of knowledge, 529; COMTE'S posi- serve, espec. in politics; the nomos is ativism, like HOBBES, maintains the natu- higher phase of development of the lawral 
scientific method in every field of less physis; PLATO and ARISTOTLE ascribed

philosophical investigation, in accordance a higher value to theoretical philosophy;
with the continuity postulate of the SEXTUS EMPIRICUS mentions three parts:
science-ideal; CHR. WOLFF divides philo- ethica, physica, and logica distinguishedsophy into metaphysics (includingna- by PLATO'S pupil XENOCRATES, 536 ; ARIStural 
theology, psychology, and physics) TOTLE'S Topica took this over: problemsand practical philosophy; JOHN LocKE about the universal are treated under logimentions 
three main divisions: physica kai; this part also includes metaphysics;
(or natural philosophy), practica (whose later on ARISTOTLE distinguished practicalprincipal part is ethics), and semiotica and theoretical philosophy and Poiêtikê;
(chiefly nominalistic logic) ; COHEN has: metaphysics became theoretical and of 
logic of pure knowledge, ethics of pure higher value than other parts; practicalwill, aesthetics of pure feeling; RICKERT phil. is directed to ethical and politicaldifferentiates between the sphere of real human activity; poetical phil. is directednature and that of ideal values; culture is to technique and art; theology is the partto synthesize these two; values are theo- of metaphysics that investigates the abretical 
or practical; theoretical philoso- solute "formal" ground of being", purephy is a transcendental critique of na- matter is the principle of becoming andtural science, practical philosophy is a change, 537; in ethics he differentiates"Weltanschauungslehre", 530; WINDEL- between the "dianoetic" and the ethicalBAND discusses theoretical problems virtues; the former are the highest, beingapart from axiological questions, 531; the directed to theoretical life; in theory thedistinction between theoretical and prac- nous poêtikos reveals itself in its puresttical philosophy existed as early as the form; pure theoria is the only way to aGreeks; their form-matter motive; Ionic real contact with the Divine "forma 
natural philosophy; ANAXAGORAS ; ANAXI- pura"; the transcendental Idea of OriginMANDER ; the Eleatics posited the opposite has two poles: pure Form versus pureprinciple, viz., that of form; metaphysical matter; THOMAS AQUINAS adopted ARIS-
ontology in which "being" is the only TOTLE's division; EPICURUS distinguished 


DIVORCE 46 

a canonic, (i.e. logical), a physical, and Reformatie en Scholastiek in de Wijsbean 
ethical section, 538; The Stoics had geerte, 36, 64, 66, 248, 479, 538, 566;
logic, physics, and ethics; in their ethics De transcendentale critiek van the theois 
revealed the primacy of practical phi- retisch denken en de Thomistische theolosophy 
; all virtues are practical and logia naturalis, 73;
moral, none is "dianoetic"; CHRYSYPPUS De Idee der Individualiteitsstructuur en 
opposed the philosophers who viewed het Thomistisch Substantiebegrip, 26, 27,


theoretical life as an end in itself, 539 ; 181; 
the basic division into a theoretical and In de Strijd om een Christelijke Staata 
practical section points to an inner kunde, 172, 188, 190, 201, 203, 216, 311,


dissension in the Archimedean point, 312;
540; it is incompatible with the Biblical De Strijd om het Souvereiniteitsbegrip in
basic motive of our philosophy; philoso- de Moderne Rechts- en Staatsleer, 312; 
phy is necessarily theoretical; the fol- De Crisis in de Humanistische Staatsleer,


lowing are fundamental and inseparably 466;
cohering themata of philosophy : trans- La Probléme de la Philosophic Chre


cendental criticism, the modal aspects, tienne, 526;
transcendental selfreflection, 541; indivi- Norm en feit. Een critische beschouwing
duality structures; philosophical anthro- naar aanleiding van het geschrift van Mr.


pology, 542; the theoretical foundation of Rozemond over Kant en de Volkenbond,
philosophy is the transcendental Critique 529;
of philosophical thought, 543; no pheno- Het Substantiebegrip in de Moderne Na


menology like HUSSERL'S or SCHELER'S; tuurphilosophie en de Theorie van het

nor a prima philosophia as in speculative Enkaptisch Structuurgeheel, 556;
metaphysics; nor a "logic of philosophy",2 Encyclopaedic van de Rechtsgeleerdheid,

as in LASK ; nor NICOLAI HARTMANN'S en


566;

tical ontology, etc.; our transcendental
Critique is not a self-sufficient basic


DOOYEWEERD, H., II,

science; philosophia specialis, 544. 

Reformatie en Scholastiek in de Wijsbe-
DIVORCE, III, the Pharisees and Christ, geerte, 10, 114, 319;

311. Het Substantiebegrip in de ThomistischeZijnsleer, 11, 420;
DIXON, R. B., III, 

De Modale Structuur van het juridisch

The Racial History of Man, 497. 

Causaliteitsverband, 39, 119; 

DNIMITSCH, V. N. III, De Transcendentale Critiek van het Theo 


La courtoisie internationale et le droit retisch Denken en de Thomistische Theo-
des gens, 486. logia Naturalis, 39;

-, III, on the "incidents Tisza of 26 May De betekenis der wetsidee voor rechts1888"; 
and "Philip Snowden", 486. wetenschap en rechtsphilosophie, 46, 213,215, 343, 422;

DNISTRYANSKI, STANISLAUS, III, 

Het substantiebegrip in de moderne na-

Zur Grundlegung des modernen Privat


tuurphilosophie en de theorie van het

rechts, 408, 409. 

enkaptisch structuurgeheel, 109; 
DOGMATISM, II, in KANT'S starting-point of Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem in hetthe Kritik der reinen Vernunft, because licht der wetsidee, 182; 
he does not realize the problems invol- Beroepsmisdaad en strafvergelding in hetved in the pre-suppositions, 432. licht der wetsidee, 186;

De Crisis in de Humanistische Staatsleer,

DoG's USE OF A CHAIR, A, III, is without 212;
the awareness of a chair's structural 


In de Strijd om een Christelijke Staat


meaning, 136, 137. 

kunde, 357, 358, 359; 

DOMESTIC JURISDICTION, III, examined by De bronnen van het Stellig Recht in het 
a civil judge, testing it to the principle of licht der wetsidee, 422;
"audi et alterem partem", and that of De analogische grondbegrippen der vakimpartiality; 
he protects the legal status wetenschappen en hun betrekking tot deof the human personality as such, 689. menselijke ervaringshorizon, 459;

Kuypers wetenschapsleer, 300.

DOMINATION MOTIVE, I, in Humanistic phi- -, HI,
losophy, 63; during the Renaissance, 198; Reformatie en Scholastiek in de Wijsbe


in LEIBNIZ, 232; in DESCARTES, 332; in the geerte, 8, 87, 200; 
Faustian passion of power in FICHTE, De idee der Individualiteitsstructuur en


448. het Thomistisch substantiebegrip, 17;
Substantiebegrip in de moderne na-
DONUM SUPERADDITUM, I, in Roman-Catho


tuurphilosophie en de theorie van het

lie doctrine, 181. 

enkaptisch Structuurgeheel, 24, 694; 
DOOYEWEERD, H., I, De Crisis in de Humanistische Staatsleer,
Het tijdsprobleem in de Wijsbegeerte der 66, 242, 246, 248, 259, 383, 386-388, 394,

Wetsidee, 25; 431, 465, 466; 


Rondom het biologisch soortbegrip, — 
(met J. LEVER), 80, 81; 
In de Strijd om een Christelijke Staatkunde, 
232, 398; 
Encyclopaedic van de Rechtsgeleerdheid, 
374, 666; 
De Vooronderstellingen van ons denken 
over recht en Samenleving in de Crisis 
van het moderne Historisme, 383; 
De Wetsbeschouwing in BRUNNER'S bock 
"Das Gebot und die Ordnungen", 403, 
404; 
Het Vraagstuk van het organisch Kiesrecht 
in een nieuw Stadium, 465; 
Norm en Feit. Een critische beschouwing 
naar aanleiding van het geschrift van Mr. 
Rozemond over Kant en de Volkenbond, 
474; 
De Structuur der Rechtsbeginselen en de 
Methode der Rechtswetenschap in het 
Licht der Wetsidee, 556; 
De Bronnen v.h. Stellig Recht i.h. licht 
der Wetsidee, 666; 
De Theorie van de Bronnen van het Stellig 
Recht i.h. licht der Wetsidee, 666; 
De Strijd om het Souvereiniteitsbegrip in 
de moderne Rechts- en Staatsleer, 667; 
Het Tijdsprobleem in de Wijsbegeerte der 
Wetsidee, 704. 

DOUGALL, MAC, VIERKANDT, etc., III, on the 
submissive instinct, 294. 

Do UT DES, II, this principle rigorously 
governs the whole of the primitive law of 
contract, even the mutual exchange of 
gifts, 183. 

DRAMA, III, an aesthetical imaginative 
totality reproduced in a series of mental 
acts and acts of performance with the 
help of its symbolical objectification in 
books, etc., 110, 111. 

DREAD, III, of nothingness, 30. 

DREVER, JAMES, II, 

Dictionary of Psychology, 112. 

DRIESCH, HANS, I, 

Metaphysik (Zwei Vortriige zur Naturphi


losophie), 546. 
--, I, philosophy of nature is a guide to 
natural science, a centre for all possible 
ways of thought about the data; from it 
there are roads to the theory of reality, 

546. 
—, II, considers phenomena of life as a 
substance; his concept entelechy, 110; he 
ignores the meaning-systasis, 431. 
--, III, 
Philosophic des Organischen, 730, 733, 
734, 736, 738, 739, 740, 742, 753, 754; 
Der Begriff der organischen Form, 736, 
737, 739, 740, 741, 771; 
Geschichte des Vitalismus, 733; 
Philosophischen Gegenwartsfragen, 737; 
Ordnungslehre, 736, 737, 738, 746, 747; 
Wirklichkeitslehre, 737, 748, 749; 


 

47 DRIESCH, HANS 

Logische Studien fiber Entwicklung, 740, 
742, 743, 744; 
Wahrscheinlichkeit und Freiheit, 747. 


, III, entelechy-psychoid, 24 ; his neovitalism, 
647; the effect of a ferment 
when it is once present, is chemical... 
This does not mean that all metabolism 
is of a chemical nature, 730; denies the 
existence of a specific material bio-substance, 
732; he identifies "vitalism" with 
the view that the biotic aspect has its 
proper laws and that a living organism 
is characterized by its individuality 
structure, 733; he identifies all modern 
mechanistic biology with a machine 
theory of life, 734 ; totality causality and 
quantitative causality; his experiments 
with eggs of sea-hedgehogs, 735, 751, 753; 
the restricted validity of his argument; 
his recourse to the "substance" concept; 
life as an invisible immaterial "organic 
form"; entelechy; psyche and psychoid, 
736; his entelechy is a second natural factor; 
his metaphysics is based on empirical 
research, it is not a philosophia prima; he 
starts from the Cartesian Cogito — and is 
influenced by KANT'S epistemology, but 
his "categories" are intentional, 737; why 
we do not have a representation of entelechy; 
his concept "substance" is first an 
ordering notion, a constant point of reference 
not implying any relation itself, the 
constant bearer of the properties, indicating 
its essence; this "substance" is not a 
"thing in itself"; his Ordnungslehre is 
nominalistic, though he accepts universalia 
in rebus; DRIESCH starts from the Cogito, 
not from the realistic concept of being, 
738; his "substance" concept impedes the 
insight into the individuality structures; 
his "entelechy" is not Aristotelian; he 
adheres to a dualism between an immaterial 
and a material substance; a material 
substance is an independent extended 
corporeal entity, 739; ARISTOTLE'S "natural 
primary substance" is a composite of 
form and matter; ARISTOTLE'S entelechy 
of a living body is never'a substance; its 
form is never an independent being; in 
DRIESCH'S entelechy are realized all the 
potences of a functional, adaptive restitutive 
character; from a phylogenetic 
standpoint there is only one entelechy, 
viz. super-personal life; his scheme of 
act-potence compared with ARISTOTLE'S, 
740; potentia is the constant substance of 
the form in DRIESCH; actus is manifest in 

matter as a non-mechanical evolution;
hence the "constant substance" is an immaterial 
"thing in itself"; in ARISTOTLE 
the potency is inherent in matter; in 
DRIESCH the immaterial constant substance 
is pure potence operating only as 
actus in matter; DR. denies the existence 
of a typical bio-chemical constellation; a 
living body is nothing but "dead matter" 
when considered from its physicochemical 
side; although a "living body" is a 
material system whose behaviour does 


DROSERA ROTUNDIFOLIA 48 

not conform to mechanical, but to vitalistic 
laws, 741; only the controlling influence 
of entelechy constitutes the difference 
between "living" and "dead"
matter; the brain, e.g., is a "physicochemical" 
system and the "psyche" operates 
by means of it; the brain's physicochemical 
condition is not the completelysufficient genetic ground, but only thepartial ground of what happens in it,
742; entelechy may originate physicalmovement (energy) ; entelechy removesenergy by "turning" material systems;
entelechy may suspend movement or setfree energy, in a teleological relation tothe needs of a living whole; entelechyimposes a building plan on the materialsystem; these are the four possibilitieswith respect to a causal operation of entelechy; 
the first possibility is incompatible 
with the law of the preservation ofenergy; in 1908 he chose the third possibility; 
but later on he preferred the"building, plan" idea; GURVITCH meantsomething similar, 743 ; HAVINK'S criticism 
of DRIESCH, 744 ; the suspensiontheory implies the production of someenergy in entelechy, hence a physicalforce; but entelechy is supposed to be animmaterial cause; the realization of a 
building plan also requires physical energy, 
745; DRIESCH'S entelechy and that ofARISTOTLE, 746; his dualism of totalityand chance, 747; DRIESCH'S philosophy ofnature is influenced by SCHELLING s free-

dom-idealism, and by KANT'S "Krit. d.
teleol. Urteilskraft". 748; he thinks that 
genuine freedom is incompatible withany general law, 749; WOLTERECK criticizes 
DRIESCH, 750; for lack of insightinto the typical individuality structuresof our experiential horizon, DRIESCHelevated "life" to an "immaterial substance" 
and called it "entelechy", 762;
DRIESCH gets entangled in the wronglyposited question as to how a psyche caninfluence a material body, 766; he refuted 
the aggregate theory, and also thepure physico-chemical theory of biotic-
ally qualified shape formation, 771. 

DROSERA ROTUNDIFOLIA, III, an insectivo


rous plant, 645. 

DROSOPHILA, III, its germ-cells, 755. 

DUALISM, I, of a material and a spiritualsubstance, in LOCKE, 263; LocKE's psychological 
dualism becomes a radicalone, for he opposes psychological experience 
to creative thought, 266. 

DUEZ, PAUL, III, 

La Responsabilite de la Puissance Publi


que endehors du Contrat, 445, 687.

—, III, on the iustitia distributiva in the 

State, 445. 

DUGUIT, LEON, II, his sociological legal 

theory, 396; he gave up the concept of

"subjective right", 399. 

—, III, 
Traite de droit constitutionel, 462; 
Le droit social, le droit individuel, et la 
transforrnat'ion. de l'Etat, 465. 
—, III, denies the human rights of the
natural law doctrine; subjective right
should be replaced by "social function";
there is only "objective law", 460; the State
is the factual relation of force between 
stronger and weaker individuals; "objective 
law" is social law; social-economic 
rules and customs of propriety compose
law, i.e. legal norms; the sovereignty of
law, 461; he later on recognizes the formative 
factor in law, distinguishing between 
normative and constructive legal
rules; his description of the development


of law since the latter half of the 19th century, 
462; his "social" law is merely the
typical industrial sphere, 463; he is an
adherent of "political pluralism", 465. 


DUMERY, HENRY, 1, 
Blonde! et la philosophie contemporaine,


526. 
DUNAMEI ON, II, or potentiality in ARISTOTLE'S 
metaphysics, 9.
—, III, the marble of a statue, 119. 


DUPUIS, II, followed VOLTAIRE'S view of 
history, 350. 


DURATION, I, is disclosed in a subject-object 
relation on which the measurement
of time depends, 28.
--, II, is the subject-side of cosmic time, 3. 


—

, III, of things, events, etc., 78, 79; thatof plant-life extends beyond the span ofthe always changing individual cells, 296;
and can only be actualized in the coherence 
of these cells, 297. 

DUREE, I, BERGSON'S conception of the
"duree", 27.
—, II, and empathy, 480, 481; in BERGSON,
it is the creative qualitative vital stream
of time, 481; pure duration in BERGSON,


482. 
DURKHEIM, E., H, 
Les formes elementaires de la vie religieuse, 
318;
cf. 247, 260. 
—, II, his speculative concept of a collective 
soul, 247; his socio-historical integration 
and differentiation is based onbiology, 260, 396, 397.
—, III, 
De la Division du Travail Social, 4*60.
—, III, segmentary and organic socialforms, 175, 178; on "Social Dynamics",
187; his broad interpretation of the word"institution", 187; he calls it the whole 
of the "social facts" originating from acollective consciousness; corporative institutions 
and durable collective manners 
of behaviour: law, morals, language, etc.;
sand collective modes of existence: stylesof building, 188; traffic, etc.; DURKHEIMand HAURIOU, 189; in primitive societiesthere is only mechanical psychical soli



clarity by the pressure of the "collectiveconscience"; "solidarity by similitude";
in differentiated societies there is solidarity 
by the division of labour; primitive 
legal order is of a penal law type;
that of a differentiated society is of thecontractual type, 460. 

DUTY, I, KANT'S Eulogy of Duty, 375. 

DUVERGER, M., III, 

Les parties politiques, 605. 

EASTERN-QUESTION ASSOCIATION, THE, III, 
of the year 1877, was not a political party, 
612. 

EBERSTADT, III, 

Der Ursprung des Zunftwesens, 674. 

ECCLESIASTICAL ASSESSMENT, III, imposedon baptismal members of the Dutch Reformed 
Church brought before a CivilCourt, 689. 

ECCLESIASTICAL AUTHORITIES, III, are juridically 
outside the church, because thelatter is a fictitious person according toCanonist theory, 235. 

ECCLESIASTICAL LEGAL ORDERS, III, are derived 
from the State, according to E.
BRUNNER; this view is due to Neo-Kantian 
influence, and based on on the dual


ism between "nature and grace", law andGospel, 553. 

ECCLESIASTICALLY UNIFIED CULTURE, THE, 
I, collapsed in the latter half of theMiddle Ages, 189. 

ECCLESIASTICALLY UNIFIED SOCIETY IN THE 
MIDDLE AGES, II, is an example of cultural 
unity, 204, 288. 

ECCLESIASTICAL PARTY, III, this term is 
objectionable, 620. 

ECHINODERMS AND VERTEBRATES, III, 774. 

ECKHART, I, had a strong influence onLUTHER, 512. 

ECOLOGY, III, its field of research, 648. 

ECONOMIC AUTARCHY, III, cannot be complete; 
FICHTE'S closed commercial State,
483; R. KJELLEN'S view, 484; KOCH'S explanation 
of the fascist programme, 484,485; Nazi-Autarchy; H. STOLL, 485. 

ECONOMIC ASPECT, II, the sparing modeof administering scarce goods, implyingan alternative choice of their destination 
with regard to the satisfaction of different 
human needs; sparing, frugal, scarce;
uneconomical ; non-economical ; requirements 
of economy; logical economy; economy 
of speech; logical and lingual economy, 
are only found in deepened theoretical 
thought and language, 66; conventional 
and ceremonial economy; tech


49 EGO 

nical economy; aesthetical and legaleconomy, 67; economy of thought inARISTOTLE; its objectivistic formula, 122;
the theory of limiting profit; its conception 
of economic value, 123; economic 
anticipation in language; economic retrocipation 
in the aesthetic sphere; juridical 
retrocipation in the aestheticsphere, 127; cultural economy; mathesisuniversalis and economic theory; "pure"
economics; theory of prices; price movement 
theory; market equilibrium, 344;
mechanistic views; EucKFTsi's analysis,
of the antinomy in economic theory,
345; humanistic natural law and individualism 
united with economic individualism; 
mercantilism and State-absolutism, 
the law-State; LOCKE'S formation 
of the classical liberal idea of the state of 
law; the classical school of economics of 
"laissez faire"; medieval guild corporations 
shattered, 360; economic individualism; 
physocrats; opening of the inter-
individual economic relations at the expense 
of the communal relationships; supply 
and demand; freedom of exchange andcontractual liberty; a free market; utilitarian 
morality; disharmony in the ope-
ning-process; absolutization of the homoeconomicus; rationalizing and technicizing 
of economic life meant misery forthe labourers; "Christian" bourgeois money 
makers, 361; the excess of culturalpower formation caused by science; absence 
of cultural economy, 362; tyrannyof the science ideal; Restoration and 
reaction ; Romantic revolution ; liberalism; 
socialism; communism, 362. 

ECONOMY PRINCIPLE, II, according to HENNIPMAN, 
123; the principe of economy isoften abused to justify the introductionof theoretical fictions masking antinomies, 
124. 

ECONOMY OF THOUGHT, I, in ARISTOTLE'S 
criticism of the Platonic Ideas; in DAVIDHUME, 272. 

ECUMENICAL CO-OPERATION, III, is needed;
its requirements, 543. 

EDUCATION, III, in ARISTOTLE'S theories, 
267; in the family sphere is irreplaceable, 
274 ; and discipline, 275. 

EGO, I, our ego expresses itself as a totality 
in the coherence of all its functionswithin the modal aspects of cosmic reality; 
the ego or selfhood transcends thiscoherence; the ego as a totality operatesin the conceptual determination of philosophical 
thought, but also in all my temporal 
functions; it is I who am the central 
point of reference and the deeperunity above all modal diversity; the egotranscends the philosophical concept;
it is the concentration point of all itscosmic functions, a subjective totalitylying at the basis of all the functions, 5;
the supposed reduction of the selfhood to 


EGOLOGY 50 

an immanent, subjective pole of thought; in the existential conception of the ego, 
in this attempt the thinker imagines that due to the basic motive of nature and 
he is able to set the logical function of freedom; but the "authentic", the "funthought 
apart as a self-sufficient activity, damental" I-ness is then dispersed in time 
6; but such a reduction of the thinking and recedes from our view for ever; a 

ego to the would-be "transcendental lo-purely temporal ex-sistere may never be 
gical subject", executed in the process of identified with the ex-sistent character of 
thought, can be performed only by the the religious centre of human nature, 58; 
selfhood, which cannot itself turn into the ego is rooted in the spiritual comthe 
result of the abstraction formed by munity of mankind, in the "We" directed 
thought, 7; the restlessness of the ego is to the Divine "Thou", 60; the concrete and 
transmitted from the selfhood to all the thinking ego, in THEODOR LITT, 82; 
temporal functions in which the ego is HEIDEGGER reproaches KANT for conceiactually 
operative; the ego must partici-ving the Ego as a Subject in an ontologipate 
in the meaning totality if genuine cal sense, thus considering the being of 
thinking in terms of totality is to be pos-the ego as the reality of the "res cogisible; 
the ego seeks its origin in order to tans", 111; the absolute and the thinking 
understand its own meaning and thereby ego in FICHTE, 142; the ego is mathethe 
cosmos; the ego is subjected to a cen-matical centre of thought in DESCARtral 
law, which derives its full meaning TES ; in HUME it is a merely collective 
from the Origin of all things and limits concept of the series of ideas ordered 
and determines the centre and root of constantly in accordance with the laws 
our existence; the Archê transcends all of association, 295; the ego is an illusion 
meaning and our ego comes to rest in it, and must be explained in terms of the 
11; the ego is the inner concentration laws of association, in HUME, 296; in 
point of all the aspects, and does not coa-KANT the ego becomes an ego only if it 
lesce with the mutual coherence of the obeys itself, 373 ; FicHTE's absolute ego is 
aspects, but is transcendent over it; the the hypostatization of the concept "ego" 
modal diversity is the expression of a as the totality of reason, according to 
totality of signification ; the meaning I.AsK, 416; the "Ego-Drama" is the formal 
totality is the transcendent centre where expression of the art of the German 
the aspects converge into the unity of "Sturm und Drang", 453. 
direction towards the Origin, the Archè —, III, THEODOR LITT's view : the ego is a 
of all meaning; the transcendental logical monad interweaving past and present 
ego is the subjective pole of thought to experiences, 250. 
which the empirical world is related as 

EGOLOGY, I, HUSSERL'S egology, 91, 213.

Gegenstand, i.e., in immanence philosophy, 

—, II, in HUSSERL, 560.

16; the conception of the "transcendental 
cogito" conceals a pitfall in its neglect of EHRLIcH, W, II,
the problem of the relation between the Kant und Husserl, 487.
ego and the logical function, 17; the ori-—, II, proved that the phenomenologicalginal choice of a position is an act of the "intuition of the essence" cannot adefull 
self which transcends the modal di-quately grasp the "essence" of "immeversity; 
it is a religious act for it con-diate experience", 487.
tains a choice of position in the concentration 
point of our existence in the face EIDE, I, in PLATO, 31, 100; as eternal 
of the Origin of meaning, 20; the self-forms, 248. 
hood, or ego, as the religious root of —, II, in PLATO, 10. 
existence is the hidden performer on the 

EIDETIC LOGIC, I, in HUSSERL, 213.

instrument of philosophic thought, 21; 

—, II, in HUSSERL, 558.

the central sphere of human existence; 
the religious sphere; pre-functional; the EIDETIC JURIDICAL LOGIC, II, in line with 
concentration point of the root of our HUSSERL'S "refine" Mannigfaltigkeitslehre,
existence, 31; this central sphere is one developed in F. SCHREIER'S "pure theory
of dynamic occurrence out of which the of law", 342. 
conflict between the civitas Dei and the 


EIDETIC NUMBERS, II, in PLATO; he taught

civitas terrena takes its issue; but occurrence 
is not identical with the historical 

the transcendent being of the form world 
and included in it the numbers them-

aspect of cosmic time, 32; the ego and 
religion, 57; religion is the ex-sistent selves, 9. 
condition in which the ego is bound to 

147,mos, II, as immanent essence in ARIS-

its true or pretended origin; religion is 

TOTLE, 10; or supertemporal essence,

self-surrender; the idolatrous elevation 

HUSSERL, 454; logical eidos in the

of the ego to an "ideal selfhood" opposed 

Wesensschau, 544.

to our "empirical" I-ness as the objectivation 
of our self in the past and sub-EINSTEIN, I, time is a fourth dimension 
jected to causality; if this "ideal self-of the physical 'world space, 27, 85; 
hood" is related to the present and the KANT'S followers opposed EINSTEIN'S 
future, a dialectical time problem results theory of relativity on the ground of 


 51 ENKAPSIS 

KANT's view that three-dimensional space,EMILE, I, ROUSSEAU'S Emile opposes senas 
an intuitional form, is a transcenden-sory nature to the feeling of freedom, 316.
tal condition of geometry, 547.

EMOTIONS, II, feeling expresses itself in

—, II, 

movements of feeling, called emotions,

Uber die spezielle und die allgemeine Re


lativitatstheorie, 101. 

117. 
EMPATHY, I, as a method in HERDER to

EISLER, I, 

understand history, 454; and individual-

WOrterbuch der Philos. Begriffe, 150. 

ity, 455.
THE ELDERS OF THE CHURCH, III, THOMP-— II, the inner life of experience canSON asserts that the Presbyterian churchonly exist in a social exchange of expeorder 
considers them to be the represen-riences; hence the psychological methodtatives of the Church, 521; but they areof empathy, 113 (note), 114; (in BERGSON)
Christ's instruments of faith for the exer-is an immediate subjective psychic penecise 
of His authority in the Church, 543. tration into the duree, 480, 481. 

ELEATICS, THE, I, developed a metaphy-EMPIRICAL JUDGMENTS, II, are synthetical,
sical ontology in which the all-inclusiveaccording to KANT; this view criticized,
form of being was qualified as the only438. 
true, eternal, and unchangeable entity;


ENCOUTER, III, provides genuine inner

they were oriented to the ouranic reli


knowledge; experience affords "objecti


gion of nature, 532

, 532. 

fying outer knowledge", according toELECTION, IIY, in Christ, the Head of re-MARTIN BUBER'S Existentialist view, andborn humanity, 247. that of others, 782, 783. 

ELECTRO-MAGNETIC FIELDS, I, the realityENCYCLOPEDISTS, I, were condemned byof these fields, in "critical realism", 559. ROUSSEAU, 317. 

ELECTRO MAGNETIC THEORY, III, Of MAX-ENERGIDE, III, is a potential unit of nu-
WELL was in conflict With RUTHERFORD'S cleus and protoplasm sphere, accordingatom model, 706. to SACHS, 722. 

ELECTRONS, III, the determination of their ENGELS, F., III, 
positions and their velocity, 715.Ludwig Feuerbach, 457;
—, III, protons, neutrons, electrons, deu-Herrn Eugen Diihrings Umwiilzung derterons, mesons, have mass and charge,Wissenschaft, 457.100; the typical chemical reactions—, III, in the class struggle it appearsoccurring in chemical combinations arethat the idea of a common interest is ilrelated 
only to the electrons in the peri-lusory; then the State is necessarily anphery of the atom ; in the heavier ele-ideological whole; it only serves the inments 
the change is restricted to theterests of the ruling class; the State willoutermost shell of electrons; the inside (lie out, 457.
shell and nucleus retain their inner struc-

ENGLISH EMPIRICISM, II, starts from the

ture unaltered, 699; electrons emit ele


dogmatic supposition that the datum in

mentary waves, 705. 

experience is of a purely functional sen-

ELEMENTS, III, the structure of chemical sory character; the same thing is foundelements, 100. in KANT, 431. 

ELITE, III, influences all the individuals ENKAPSIS AND THE RELATION WHOLE-
by means of institutional ideas, accordingPARTS, III, enkapsis is the inter-structuralto HAURIOU, 189. coherence between different interwoven 
types of individual totalities,92; different

EMANCIPATION, III, of individual man, 

kinds of interlacement: natural and un


581. 
natural interlacements; both may occurEMBRYO, III, embryology and evolution-side by side in the structure of a wholeism; the "biogenetic law" of HAECKEL,(e.g. parasitical forms of symbiosis), 93;
95; an embryo's development, 753. the enkapsis in the structure of a marble

sculpture, 111; the Abbild-relation in such

EMELEUS-ANDERSON, III, 

a sculpture, 113; the physical structure is

Ergebnisse und Probleme der modernen

opened in it and directed in an anticipa


anorganischen Chemie, 699, 700. 

tory way to the aesthetic expression, 123,
EMERGENT EVOLUTIONISM, III, Of C. LLOYD 125; an enkapsis of structural principles,
MORGAN ; of B. BAVINK ; his view of the 126-128, 131, 132; enkapsis and spherevirus, 84 ; WOLTERECK'S theory, 729; dif-sovereignty in the inter-structural coheferent levels of reality arise according torence of interlaced societal individualitythe rule of structural constants in WOL-structures, 170; animal types of symbiosisTERECK'S theory; WHITEHEAD is an adhe-differ from normatively qualified societalrent of emergent evolutionism, 762; WOL-human relationships which require hu-
TERECK'S evolutionism is irrationalistic, man formation, 172; civil and ecclesias


763. tical marriage, etc., 174; enkapsis of corn

 

ENKAPSIS

munal and inter-individual relationships,
181; enkapsis in compulsory organizations 
(with the State), 190; voluntary andindirectly compulsory organizations maybe interwoven with each other in the genetic 
form of a free association, 191, 192; 
THEODOR LITT'S view of the ego 'who interweaves 
past & present experiences,
250; LITT'S idea of the social interwoven-
ness of the ego in the community of theclosed sphere, 251; intertwinements ofindividuality structures cannot be positeda priori, but must be discovered in continuous 
confrontation with empirical social 
reality, 264 ; undifferentiated organized 
communities are interlacementsof social structures, 347 ; interlaced in an 
intra-communal sense, like the sib, 349, 
350; the Kirghizian Aul, 350-351; ancestor 
worship, 352; sibs, 354-362; Mannerbunde 
(secret men's societies) are politically 
guided; Vehmgerichte, 363-366;
the medieval guilds, primitive vicinages(villae, domaines), seignories, 367; theGreek household, 368; phylae; phratries;
polis; Roman curiae, 369; quirites, 370;
primitive primary norms are interweavings 
of various structural norms, 374,375; the enkaptic interlacement betweenChurch and State as seen in an Established 
Church; the State may enact ecclesiastical 
norms, 376; no single individuality 
structure can be realized but in inter-
structural intertwinements with other individuality 
structures; the idea of a "Universe", 
627-632; the structural type of alinden tree is incapable of complete isolation 
and cannot be conceived in itself 
as an independent substance; its metabolism 
appeals to the cosmic coherencebetween the tree and its environment 
("Umwelt") ; outside of the latter the metabolic 
functions are impossible, 632; thecomplicated structural interlacements revealed 
in the natural scientific view of 
the tree are multiplied when the objective 
normative functions are considered, 
including the tree also in thestructures of human society; the universal 
inter-structural cosmic coherence 
is reflected in the pheno-typical individuality-
structure of this thing; accordingto its transcendental limiting function thetree is an object of faith integrating itinto the cosmic interwoven coherence, 
which only makes its structure possibleand a real datum centring in the religious 
root of human existence; the interwoven 
coherence of the individualitystructures and the teleological order ofthe Aristotelian "essential forms"; (seeANAXAGORAS ; DIOGENES of Apolonia; SOCRATES; 
XENOPHON; PLATO; ARISTOTLE; the 
Demiurge), 633; the interstructural interweaving 
in the cosmic order does notdisplay a uniform schematism; the different 
types are so varied that they defyany speculative construction; THEODORHAERING borrowed the term "enkapsis" 

52 

or incapsulation from HEIDENHAIN todenote the relation between the separateorgans of a living body and its totalorganism; kidneys, lungs, etc. are notmere "parts" of the body but relatively 
independent individuals, 634; thebody, however, displays an independentinternal unity working in all the individual 
component parts; an example is theenkapsis of histo-systems arranged oneon top of the other in a muscle, a rathershoved into one another; HAERING uses 
the terms enkapsis, Funktionseinheitand Ganzes mit Gliedern promiscuouslyand applies these terms a.o. to thepsyche as "ichhafte Funktionseinheit";
etc.; his conception is oriented to aconstructive trichotomistic schema of 
physis, psyche, and spirit, 635; HAERING'Sown term, viz. "unity of individuality" isbetter suited to what he intends to express; 
in a genuine enkapsis the interwoven 
individuality structures are notrelated to the whole as its parts; the relative 
autonomy of the organs within the 
total organism does not mean that theyhave a natural leading function of theirown, 636; an animal organ does not havethe natural destination to live apart fromthe total organism; the inner nature ofan "autonomous" organ is determined byits natural destination as a part of thewhole; in its artificial isolation an organmay continue to propagate itself in itsprocess of growth; this proves its relativeautonomy, not its sovereignty within itsown sphere, 637 ; the relation between anindividual totality and its parts is determined 
by the internal structural principleof the whole; there are different types ofthis relation : internal homogeneity, andinternal heterogeneity of the parts (cf.
ANAXAGORAS, ARISTOTLE) ; all bioticallyand psychically qualified natural beingsare non-homogeneous in structure; so arethe objective works of art realized in athing structure; the marble of the "Hermes 
of Praxiteles" is not a part of thework of art, though it functions in itthrough an interstructural interlacement;
the physico-chemically qualified molecules 
are no parts of the living organismof a cell; because they lack the subjectivevital function of the cell; the real partsof the cell are the nucleus and the protoplasm 
with their numerous organic-structural 
component parts, 638; the parts ofa non-homogeneous thing are qualifiedby the structure of the whole; such partscan only be identified by an inquiry intothe internal individuality structure of thewhole; the physico-chemical functions ofa cell are bound to the molecules of the 
different kinds of its constitutive matter 
but these functions are no living parts ofa cell; in an enkaptic interlacement onestructure is bound in another and exceeds 
the boundaries of its internal structural 
principle in this enkapsis, which is 


 53 ENKAPSIS 

regulated by the law of the enclosingthe environment exhibits and objectivething-structure; the internal sphere-biotic and objective psychic qualifyingsoirereignty of the bound individualityfunction; pheno-types of individuality;
structure is left intact, 639; enkaptic in-these interlacements bear the character 
terlacements display different types ofof mutual interdependence in a difordering; 
between the marble and theferent respect; symbiosis remains inter-
sculpture there is an irreversible found-woven with the correlative •enkapsisational relation in their enkaptic inter-between living being and Umwelt; symlacement; 
the marble of the "Hermes" isbiosis of an independently existing indithe 
foundation of the artistic object invidual outside of the collective unit within 
the relation of material and form; thewhich it functions as a part of the whole,
technical form is the foundation of the 648; animal colonies of coelenterates,
artefact as an aesthetically qualifiedcoral zoophytes, and synphonophora; thething; the qualifying function is found inmedusas of the jellyfish; there is enkapthe 
objectified depiction of the aesthetictic symbiosis also in the volvox and theconception of the god's figure which isspongiae; parasitic symbiosis betweennot at all identical with the technical animals and plants; symbiotic enkapsisform; in this enkapsis the structure ofbetween structures of a different radical 
the marble is opened and deepened turn-type; gall-wasps and oaks; virus anding it into an aesthetically expressiveplants or animals; a collective type ofmaterial of the object of art; the internalenkaptic symbiosis between forest, heath,
nature of the marble has not been des-meadow, steppe, etc., and plants andtroyed but rendered subservient, 640; theanimals; a pine forest; a heath, 649; namarble 
assumes a variability type and,tural collective centres or nodal points ofconversely, it gives the artefact a varia-enkaptic symbiosis (landscape and faunability type; in a cell's nucleus and plasmand flora) are not to be confused withwith their organic subordinate parts thestructural wholes proper; they are ruledatoms are enkaptically bound in a mole-by a law of biotic balance; enkaptic subcular 
union but retain their own inner ject-object relations between animals andnature and internal sphere sovereignty, plants and their objective formations:
641; only in the physico-chemical macro-talc-shell of molluscs; the shell can beprocesses the bound structure is openeddetached and then its object function isby that of the cell-organism ; assimilatoryin-actualized, 650; planets with their sa-
and dissimilatory processes display antellites; solar system; spherical groups ofanticipatory direction ; the resulting che-stars, galaxy, etc.; astronomy; the univermical 
combinations are for the most partsal interwoven coherence of thing-strucextremely 
complicated and in theirtures and the nodal points of these en-
phenotype they are determined by thekaptic interlacements, 651; enkaptic in-
structure of the organism ; each type ofterlacements of natural things in humanorganism produces its own type of al-societal structures; a mixed farming bubumen; 
the enzymes or ferments andsiness; fields, pastures, cattle, buildingstheir rapid operations, 642 ; modern bio-function in this societal structure as well 
logy holds that "life" reveals itself in aas all the usable objects belonging tosolidary activity permeating "the livingfarming; the live stock in their own in-
mass" to its minutest biotically qualifiedternal structure are not economically qua-
particles; but in the molecular structuresified; they are bound to the pasture (asof matter the living structural whole ofa vegetative collectivity) in a symbioticthe organism is enkaptically founded;interlacement, and form a correlative en-
modern scientists say that the cell is notkapsis with their Umwelt; they can bethe real bearer of life, but much rather enkaptically interwoven with an industhe 
living mass; but this assertion is un-trial relationship, 652; Primitive societalwarranted; the hypothetical "protome-interlacements like the extended family,
ries" ; they are often called "bio-molecules".the patriarchal or matriarchal sib or clan,
Life will be extinguished when ruthlesslyare undifferentiated, 653; marriage bondexposed to the light; BOHR, called thisand cognate kinship cut across the sibfact "complementarity"; it found expres-relations and are bound in a foundational 
sion in HEISENBERG'S "relations of incer-enkapsis within the sib; types of enkapsistitude", 643; JORDAN'S theory; he biolo-between communal and inter-communal 
gizes the internal atomic structures ofor inter-individual relationships, 654 ; thematter; his theory premises that atomiclatter are united in a correlative enkapsisand molecular structures of matter, en-in undifferentiated organized communikaptically 
bound in a living organism,ties; the fancied figure of a family livingare biotically qualified; but the enkapticin temporary isolation in an uninhabitedphysico-chemical function of the atomsisland; the story of ROBINSON CRUSOE; theand molecules in a living cell is deter-supposed genetic character of the relationmined by the structure of this livingbetween natural communities and the 
whole, 644; enkaptic symbiosis and cor-other relationships of human society,
relative enkapsis; the field of research655; the latter cannot have developedof ecology; environment or Umwelt; from natural communities genetically; 


ENKAPS1S 54 

there is genetic coherence between a real tiated inter-individual societal relations 
marriage bond and the family relation-in its inter-individual course; between 
ship as far as their genetic form is con-different States there is a correlative 
cerned; but the first pair of human beings type of enkapsis; the State's structure 
(lid not develop from marriage; only the has always been realized in a plutranscendent 
root community of man-rality of States; the idea of a Civitas 
kind forms the ultimate basis of temporal maxima is speculative; —, KELSEN de-
human society; the transcendental Idea rives the validity of the international 
of the origin refers to the basis of all so-public legal order from the constitutional 
cietal structures laid at the creation and law of the separate States, or vice versa, 
transcending theoretic thought; com-660; this view is internally contradictory; 
munity structures cannot occur outside a the sovereignty of the State's legal order 
correlative enkapsis with inter-individual is not the ultimate origin of the validity 
structures; Eve was led to Adam as a of international inter-communal law; 
woman in her full temporal existence (in this view would deny international law as 
principle comprising all societal struc-an inter-communal legal order; the retures 
at the same time) ; the first form-verse hypothesis is the denial of the inner 
ulation of the married order in Scripture, communal character of constitutional 
656, indicates a correlative enkapsis of State-law. There are various types of en-
marriage and family with the inter-indi-kapsis of societal relations; e.g.; correlavidual 
societal relations outside of the tive and foundational types: fashion in 
family; the positive forms of exogamy sporting clothes; international trade is 
are of an historical foundation; the in-one-sidedly founded in traffic; free martertwinement 
of natural communities ket and competition form a correlative 
with their intercommunal and inter-in-enkapsis; the territorial enkapsis of the 
dividual relations display the type of cor-other differentiated social structures in 
relativity; the enkaptic foundational re-the State, 661; members of the same 
lation between the opened structures of Church or family may belong to differinter-
individual relations and those of ent nationalities; so do international or-
free associations; contractual genetic ganizations; BODIN'S concept of soverforms 
of free associations and the consti-eignty; ALTHUSIUS' theory of human symtutive 
role of ends and means of an asso-biosis; his Politica, 662; his anti-univerciation, 
657 ; prohibition of trade-unions salistic view of the interstructural re-
and enterpreneurial associations in libe-lations between the different types of 
ralism; the French Code penal; in Eng-social relationships; he formulates the 
land the Combination Act; opened in-principle of internal sphere sovereignty; 
dividual relationships may occur with-difference between the territorial and 
out the formation of free associations but the personal type of interlacement, 663. 
not the reverse; their interweaving is Nodal points of enkaptic interlacement; 
found in an irreversible foundational re-they are the positive forms given to them 
lation; this enkapsis implies a transcen-which have a typical historical found-
dental correlativity not to be confounded ation; genetic and existential forms; gewith 
a correlative type of enkapsis; the netic forms and the sources of law; marenkapsis 
of free associations with inter-riage, organized communities, contracindividual 
relations displays reciprocity tual inter-communal and inter-individual 
between these two; natural institutional relationships presuppose positive genetic 
communities and differentiated organized forms establishing or constituting these 
communities are interwoven in an irre-relations; these genetic forms are declaversible 
foundational relation, 658; in rations of will, as such they are omnitheir 
genetic forms the State and the functional, 664; there are constituent and 
Church institution do not show any ge-constituted genetic forms; agreements for 
netic relation with natural institutional cooperation are formal sources of law in-
communities; the opening of the non-tra partes, civil law and integrating nonpolitical 
inter-communal and inter-indi-civil social law (general conditions, cusvidual 
relations pre-supposes the rise of tomary stipulations, etc.). These genetical 
institutional communities of a differen-forms are centres of enkaptic structural 
tiated organized character; there may interlacements within the juridical law-
exist a real State or Church, whereas the sphere; examples; in the juridical geneinter-
individual relations have not yet tic forms of positive law different mate-
emancipated from their binding to un-rial spheres of competence are inter-
differentiated communities, e.g., the Ca-woven with each other, 665; the theory 
rolingian State and the medieval Church; of the sources of law; positivistic, nathe 
opened interindividual relationships tural law, naturalistic-sociological, his-
and the nonpolitical relationships stand toricistic, all ignore the fundamental pro-
in a one-sided foundational relation with blem of the individuality structures with-
Church or State, 659; the juridical form in the jural order; the "naive" legalistic 
of a free association / pre-supposes com-theory elevates one of the genetic forms 
mon private law; the State in its turn of law to the highest source of validity; 
is bound by the opened and differen-but in these genetic forms there lurks a 


problem, viz. that of structural enkapsis; 
the political dogma of the will of the 
legislator as the sole source of validity 
(Kompetenz-Kornpetenz) is taken for 
granted; other theories recognize autonomous 
law formation in a contractual 
way and in non-political communities; 
yet they lack insight into their enkaptic 
interlacements, 666 ; modern sociologists 
eliminate the competence problem because 
it implies a normative viewpoint; 
GURVITCH turns the problem into a historical 
one; BESELER and GIERKE ; their 
theory of the juridical autonomy of associations; 
they keep clinging to the constituted 
juridical genetic forms of autonomous 
social law (articles of association, 
domestic bylaws) ; in a differentiated 
human society the genetic forms 
cannot guarantee the internal independence 
of law-formation in non-political 
associations; the genetic forms are bound 
to the typical structure of the legal sphere 
of the organs; a Church community cannot 
promulgate a State Act; etc., 667; but 
the genetic form of ecclesiastical rules 
may contain provisions of a civil juridical 
nature; a private contract of sale may 
contain economically qualified legal rules, 
general civil-juridical clauses, and social 
integrating law; a particular genetical 
form (juridical) cannot be the original 
source of validity of all positive law; indirect 
and implicit. direct and explicit 
genetic forms; custom and customary 
law; longaevus usus, 668; juridical genetic 
forms interlace original and derivative 
spheres of competence; one and the 
same genetic form positivizing juridical 
principles may be an original source of 
law in one sphere of competence, and a 
derived source in another sphere; articles 
of association are an original source 
of law within the society concerned, a 
derived source with regard to civil law; 
the original spheres of competence bind 
and limit each other, 669; a question of 
internal communal law may have its 
counterpart in a civil juridical question; 
this civil juridical question can only relate 
to the external formal-juridical aspect 
of an internal communal legal point 
of difference; all law displaying the typical 
individuality structure of some 
community or inter-individual or intercommunal 
relationship falls within the 
original material juridical sphere of competence 
of such an orbit and is only 
formally connected with the spheres of 
competence of other societal orbits; the 
legal history of the medieval Germanic 
unions; the Historical school opposed 
the absolutization of Roman jus civile et 
gentium on the part of the Romanistic 
wing led by PUCHTA, etc., 670; GIERKE'S 
theory was universalistic-metaphysical 
and gave no insight into the real individuality 
structures of society; medieval 
juridical • life had very intricate 

 

55 EN KAPS I S 

structural interlacements, both in territorial 
and in personal enkapsis; e.g. the 
ordinances of a mark alternating with 
regulations concerning weddings, fune 
rals, poor relief, the Church, etc.; medieval 
craft guilds; trade unions; coercive 
legal organizations (guild ban), a part of 
the political organization of a town on 
a military basis, an ecclesiastical group; 
the guild fraternity (including families) ; 
communal spirit (like the old sib), 672; 
GIERKE'S definition of a medieval guild; 
he ignores the differentiation of the 
guilds at the time of their greatest power; 
the oldest are Frankish and Anglo Saxon, 
and have an undifferentiated structure; 
the oldest, espec. the sworn peace guilds 
formed an artificial sib; also in the late 
medieval fraternities the sib-idea survived; 
SOMMER'S and SIEBER'S conception, 
673; later differentiation in the genuine 
craft-guilds : economically qualified industrial 
organizations, interwoven with 
fraternities; primitive neighbourhoods 
may have been the basis of the craft 
guilds; then this would be an example of 
territorial enkapsis; the natural family 
relationships of the guild brethren were 
interwoven with the fraternitas in a personal 
enkapsis, 674; the vocational organization 
of the craft guild was not identical 
with the organization of the public 
office; in various towns there were crafts 
that were not al all connected with the 
magisterium, and the guilds embracing 
these crafts had not obtained the guild 
ban either; if craft and office were connected, 
this could only be in an enkapsis; 
OVERVOORDE and JOOSTING'S edition of the 
sources of law relating to the guilds at 
Utrecht up to 1528, 675; the guild fraternity 
was interwoven with the craft, with 
an internal ecclesiastical group structure, 
a political structure; the guild ban is 
only concerned with the positive existential 
form of the craft organization in a 
particular variability type; but this element 
cannot be based on the internal 
structure of the industrial organization; 
the guild society is an autonomous organization 
and also a part of the town cornmunity; 
both in an enkaptic interlacement; 
GIERKE'S error; he seeks the internal 
bond in the guild as a juridical community, 
676; he clings to the real or supposed 
genetic forms of guild law. The 
guild regulations show a great structural 
variety of provisions, which do not form 
a unity as to their material sphere of 
competence; they only hang together in 
having the same genetic juridical form; 
there is a fundamental difference between 
the political and the industrial members; 
between fellow craftsmen and mere members 
of the protective guild relationship, 
677 ; the guild could possess original 
spheres of competence only as the free 
organization of a craft, and as an undifferentiated 
fraternity without a political 


 

ENKAPSIS 56 

structure; the Dutch Judicial Organiza-or a Church community cannot clarifytion Act, art. 167 of the Constitution; thethe judicial view in cases of civil wronglimits to the competence of the State'son the part of the public administration;
common courts, 678; provisions concern-the decision of 1919 and the material 
ing the "attributive competence of thecriterion of unlawfulness formulated bycommon courts; the nature of the dis-the Dutch Supreme Court cannot be exputes 
to be submitted to the civil judica-plained by the contractual theory; theture; the fundamentum petendi, accord-civil judge makes a halt before the intering 
to THORBECKE, deciding what actions,nal sphere of communal law, 686; juris-
for debt belong to the cognizance of thediction has to form law in concreto; itcivil judge; but this article is invariablyrefuses to judge the internal structure ofinterpreted in conformity to art. 2 J.O.unlawful governmental actions by meansAct, and only the object of an action isof a material civil law standard; the indecisive; 
"the right to be protected isternal communal relationships have theirdecisive", 679; judicial decisions showcivil legal counterpart. GIERKE criticized,
the difference between civil and non-687. If the internal rights of membershipcivil law to be fundamental; the civilin an organized community are qualifiedjudge is competent to take cognizance ofby their inherence in membership quaclaims whose fundamentum petendi istalis, and a member is merely a part offound in non-civil legal relations; he hasthe whole, he cannot bring an actionto refrain from judging of material ques-against the whole, just like an outsider;
tions of law concerned with the internal GIERKE'S separation between communalstructure of the public administrationlaw and inter-individual civil law and 
and with that of non-civil communal and his lack of insight into their enkapticcontractual law; English judicaturestructural interlacements render this 
adopts the same attitude, 680; so does thestate of affairs inexplicable; but everySupreme Court of Germany; but makes aninternal communal law and civil inter-
exception with respect to Zwanggenossen-individual law are related in an enkapsis,
schaften; in the latter the private mem-688; a civil judge applies the formal testber's social status is at stake; then there isof the articles of association and the do-
an enkaptic structural interlacement withmestic regulation of a society to the acthe 
State, 681; a new criterion of civiltions performed by the organs withinwrong was introduced by the Supremetheir original sphere of competence, inCourt of the Netherlands; illegal acts areorder to maintain legal security; he exaalso 
those that are "contrary to the due caremines a domestic jurisdiction and puts itpertaining to another's person or goods"to the test' of the principles of audi etin inter-individual social intercourse; thisalterem partem and of impartiality; heappeals to unwritten legal norms lackingalso applies common civil law principlesthe genetic form of statute law; a civilto the so-called inalienable human rights;
judge employs a formal concept of un-the juridical regulations of an organizedlawfulness if the decision of the material community are necessarily interwovenlegal question should lead to an en-with civil legal relations to protect thecroachment upon the internal legal spherelegal status of the human personality asdetermined by the inner structure of thesuch; an ecclesiastical assessment imsocietal 
relationship concerned; exam-posed upon baptismal members of theples of disputes about Church matters,Dutch Reformed Church brought before682; the positivistic contractual theory isa civil court and the juridical sphere so-
influenced by the Humanistic doctrine ofvereignty of the Church, 689; the theonatural 
law and its contractual construc-retical view of the Dutch Supreme Courttion of all communities irrespective ofagreed with the doctrine of THORBECKE; 
their inner nature, 683; this constructionDE SAVORNIN LOHMAN opposed this viewis helpless when a civil court has to de-by absolutizing the juridical internalcide material juridical questions not con-sphere of the Church; but here is a casecerning the internal structure of a pri-of enkaptic structural interlacement bevate 
organized community; the decisiontween civil law and internal ecclesiastical 
of the Amsterdam Court given on thelaw; baptism establishes a juridical bond22nd June 1880 is an instructive example,of an internal ecclesiastical nature; the684; the South African case in whichobligation to pay a Church tax imposedprofessor Du PLESSIS was deposed andon baptismal members 690 can neverthe judge was induced to a material ap-be of an internal ecclesiastical juridicalpreciation of questions of belief and con-character as it has no relation to the 
fession; this was an excess of legal po-typical structural principle of the instiwer. 
Within its own sphere an organizedtutional Church; it is contrary to thiscommunity cannot be compelled to acceptprinciple; the Church is not a coercivea civil judge's decision, 685; a civil jud-power organization ; partiality or abusege's final decision has to be accepted un-of power may arise when the authoritiesconditionally in a civil juridical senseof an organized community or a familyonly; the positivistic construction of theexercise their authority contrary to its"formal autonomy of a free association" inner nature and destination so that the 


civil juridical interests of its membersare injured, 691; then there should be anappeal to the civil judge possible. Theagreements with a transportation company 
may violate the deepened civil-
juridical principles de facto; then thecivil juridical counterpart of the non-
civil law-formation must not be lost sightof; the enkaptic inter-structural interlacements 
between civil law and non-
civil law form a delicate tissue; the original 
spheres of competence cannot beisolated from one another hermetically;
sphere-sovereignty only functions in thecosmic meaning coherence; the legislator's 
competence is limited as regards theenkapsis between non-civil inter-individual 
commercial or industrial law and 
the civil legal order; the Dutch Code ofCommerce in its earlier form restricted 
commercial transactions to movables; 
brokers in real estates were not merchants, 
692; this was encroachment on thepart of the civil legislator upon the internal 
sphere of competence of commerceand industry; it was abolished in the Limited 
Liability Company Act of 1928; andthe Acts of May1922 and July1934,-693. 

ENKAPTIC WHOLE - AND - SUBSTANCE 
CONCEPT, III, naïve experience knows individual 
wholes; the idea of the enkapticstructural whole is opposed to the a priorisubstance concept of metaphysics, 694;
preliminary definition of an enkapticstructural whole; its interwoven structures 
are not parts of the whole; the leading 
structure has the qualifying role; butthis highest structure does not coalescewith the enkaptic total structure; the enkaptic 
structural whole is not identicalwith a primitive undifferentiated individuality 
structure, e.g., a primitive organized 
community, 695; in a genuine enkaptic 
structural whole the differentinterwoven structures maintain their 
sphere-sovereignty and belong to thetotality so long as they are united in themutual enkaptic bond; the incapsulatedstructure has its own internal operationalsphere and an external enkaptic sphereordered by the higher structure's operational 
sphere; the relation of enkapsisshould not be confused with the whole-
part relation, 696; the enkaptic structuralwhole and the different types of enkapticinterlacement; the irreversible foundational 
relation does not always functionin an enkaptic structural totality: in adifferentiated human society there is no"highest component structure"; in physico-
chemically qualified things and matter, 
and in the vegetable and animal kingdoms 
there is always found an enkaptictotality cohering with the irreversiblefoundational relations in their interlacements; 
it is also found in man's temporalindividual existence, 697; enkaptic symbiosis 
displaying a real collective struc

 


57ENKAPTIC WHOLE 

ture; in the type of correlative enkapsisthe figure of an enkaptic whole is lacking(e.g., plants and their "Umwelt"), 698;
the apparent paradox in the basic thesisof chemistry. An atom's nucleus determines 
the place of an element in the periodical 
system as well as its physicochemically 
qualified geno-type; typicalchemical reactions in chemical combinations 
are only related to the electrons inthe periphery of the atom ; probably onlythe outermost shell of electrons in the 
heavier elements; the inside shell and thenucleus retain their inner structure unaltered; 
in the chemical combination"water" we are confronted with an irreversible 
enkaptic foundational relation;
H2O is the minimum form-totality, 699 ; theH-atoms and the 0-atom remain hydrogenand oxygen; their nuclei remain unaltered 
as to their structural principle;
they are not ruled by the structural principle 
of the matter "water"; they functionin enkaptic binding within the new individuality 
structure; but without their internal 
connection with the nuclei the electrons 
could not display chemical functions; 
the theory of valency; three typesof binding; the combination is always concerned 
with the electrons of the outermost 
atomic sphere, whereas the nucleus,
(and in the heavier elements the insideshell of electrons) remains unaltered; theH-atoms and the 0-atom cannot be called 
parts of water; they only function enkaptically 
in the combination the atomsare embraced by the molecule as the mi. 
nimal form-totality, viz. a typically ordered physico-spatial figure or configuration 
(701) as the foundation of the qualifying 
physico-chemical function of thewhole (i.e. water). Enkaptic natural totalities 
of the macro world, a mountain, a 
poly-cellular plant or animal, etc., cannotexist without a typical foundational spatial 
form; unordered aggregates lack thetypical total form of an inner structuralwhole; inorganic crystals are enkapticstructural totalities; mountains displaying 
typical totality figures; shell-lime,
lithographic slate, chalk; an enkaptictotal structure must possess a typical embracing 
form-totality doing justice to theenkaptic interlacement, 702, and to thewhole-part relation ; the form is the nodalpoint of enkaptic interlacements; a merecorrelative enkapsis is not an enkapticstructural whole; but a water-molecule is;
it is a physico-chemically qualified formtotality with a typical spatial ordering ofatoms according to their valency; the formula 
H20; the atomic nuclei are immuneto the combination; an atom is not essentially 
changed; only in its periphery,
703; the existential duration of an individual 
whole is determined by the typical 
temporal order of its individualitystructure; experimental proofs of the

conclusion that atoms do not change es



 

ENKAPTIC WHOLE 

sentially; H-rays; radio activity; stoechiometrical 
laws; crystal-lattices; theI,aue diagram, 704 ; crystals have a net-
like structural form whose nodal pointsare occupied by the centra of atoms; theintensity of the rays reflected by thecrystal lattice also depends on the innerstructural forms of the atoms; separateatoms of a crystal lattice may operateas independent sources of radiation;
the classical atomistic conception ofa molecule as a mechanical aggregatedoes not explain the fact of the ab-
sorption-spectrum, 705 ; a chemical combination 
is a new totality; the mechanistic 
view of classical science culminated 
in the atom model projected by RUTHERFORD 
: an atom is a kind of solar system;
quantum physics exploded this conception; 
BOHR tried to accommodate RUTHERFORD'S 
pattern to MAX PLANCK'S quantum,
theory; MAXWELL'S electro magnetic theory 
conflicted with RUTHERFORD'S model;
BOHR'S improvement entailed new anomalies, 
706; HOENEN'S neo-Thomistic 
theory concerning the ontological structure 
of atoms and molecules and crystals;
the continued actual existence of atoms 
in molecules must lead to the atomistic 
conception of molecules as aggregates,
according to HOENEN; he offers only onealternative, viz., the neo-Thomistic conception 
of a mixtum (or composite) as a newsubstance in which the elements are not 
present actually but only virtually or potentially 
; the "mixtum" is then a substance,
a new totality, consisting of one "primary 
matter" and one "substantial form"
giving the matter unity of being; there isa gradation of potencies according to thisview; the unity of an extended substancedoes not exclude a diversity of properties 
in its different parts; there are "heterogeneous 
continua"; this theory is applied 
to atom and molecule; HOENEN'Scriticism of the classical atomistic conception 
is convincing, 708 ; but the immunityof the atom-nuclei in a combination is not 
due to some virtual preservation of heterogeneous 
properties, for the nuclearstructure of an atom is not an accidental 
property; the nuclear structure determinesthe particular type of element; giving theatom its indispensible "unity of being";
in Thomism this structure should be 
called its substantial form; it cannot be 
destroyed in the combination of atoms;
HOENEN'S theory has landed in an impasse; 
the immunity of the existentialduration or a radio active element as to 
its bound condition in a molecule is concerned 
with the element's actuality as aninternal structural whole; HOENEN'S theory 
of a crystal lattice as a heterogeneouscontinuum; he does not mention the"atomic formfactor" 's influence on the 
intensity of the reflected Röntgen rays,
709; nor does he mention KossEL's experiments; 
the neo-Scholastic concept of a 

58 

heterogeneous continuum is incompatiblewith the foundations of modern wave-
mechanics; DE BROGLIE'S pronouncement;
the unacceptable dilemma in the Aristotelian-
Thomistic concept of substance;
temporal reality is in principle built upin enkaptical structural interlacementswhich leave no room for absolute metaphysical 
points of reference; the substance 
concept precludes the insight intothe relation of enkapsis; the molecule, orthe crystal lattice, is a typically qualifiedenkaptic form-totality bearing the genuine 
chemical combination; there arethree different structures enkaptically interlaced, 
710; a molecule or crystal as anenkaptic form totality can embrace theinterlaced structures of its bound atoms 
leaving the atomstructures' sphere sovereignty 
intact; the Thomistic substanceconcept is bound to the form-matter motive; 
HOENEN posits a wrong dilemma,
711; it is impermissible to argue fromneo-Thomism that an enkaptic structuralwhole cannot satisfy the ontological requirement 
of a "unity of being", for sucha structure requires the binding of pluralstructural wholes in an embracing totalitypreserving the inner proper nature ofeach of these wholes; HOENEN cannotsolve the structural problem concerningthe dissolution of a combination; howcan the atoms regain their substantialform in the process of dissolution afterlosing it in the chemical combination?,
712; there is no genetic affinity of naturebetween the mixtum and its elements;
"the preservation of the properties of theelements is to be explained by a materialcause as ratio sufficient; new propertiesof the mixtum are explained from theefficient cause," says HOENEN; this reasoning 
should hold in the reverse direction 
as well, but a "material cause" is no"ratio sufficiens" and HOENEN fails to 
point out its efficient and "formal cause".
The conception of material composites inpre-Thomistic medieval Scholasticism;
the Arabian Aristotelians and the older 
Christian Scholastics, 713 ; their viewwas contradictory; atoms and chemicalcombinations are not parts of the livingorganism; the structural enkapsis embraces 
both the matter structures and the 
living organism of a cell, 714 ; cell-organism 
must be distinguished from the realcell-body; the small number of elementsin a cell: H., 0., C., N. and usually nineothers; the higher organic combinationsin plasm and nucleus are complicated andlabile; BOHR'S biological relation of incertitude, 
715, shows the limits of mathematical 
causal explanation of the chemical 
constellation in a living organism; theindividuality structure of such a livingorganism posits these limits; only for extremely 
complicated organic combinations 
there are no fixed structural formulas 
as yet (e.g., globulin, nuclein, albu



men, etc.) ; chemistry has succeeded inthe synthesis of a great number of organic 
combinations; the role of catalysts infermentation processes; "living organism"
(716) is a typically biotically qualified 
individuality structure functioningwithin an enkaptic whole; a living bodydoes not coalesce with its "living organism"; 
HOENEN'S view, 717; neo-Thomismreasons a priori from the Aristoteliansubstance concept rendering empiricalresearch superfluous; the cell with itsnucleus and plasm sphere is the smallestunity capable of independent life discovered 
up to now; there exist non-cellulartissues; the extra cellular bifurcation ofthe genuine cellular plasm in protozoa(exoplasm) ; exoplasm has autonomousdivision, increasement, capability for stimulation, 
etc.; but they lack viability,
718; bacteria, blue-green algae have nocell--nucleus; their more diffuse centralcell-sphere plays the part of a nucleus;
most living cells have the material substructure 
of a colloid system; the enormous 
development of surface of solvedmatter in the cell's colloid mixture; theirenormous surface charges of electricityrender them sensitive to changes of electric 
condition and temperature; beingcolloid, protoplasm may pass from a sol-
into a gel-condition and vice versa; mostcells have an alveolar form of plasm, 719;
the hylocentric, kinocentric and morpho-
centric structure of a living cell; the living 
cell has a centred structure; metabolism, 
and its organizing, determinatingand regulating effects are directed froma central sphere in the cell-body; therole of the nucleus; that of chromatin;
in animal plasm there is an internal motive 
centre, viz. centro-soma; the cell'scentred structure and the production oftypical somatic part-forms; differencebetween a living cell and physico-chemically 
qualified micro-wholes, like molecules 
and crystals; its physico chemical aspect 
expresses the cell's individualitystructure qualified by the biotic function,
720; an artifical model of a polypeptidmolecule is not centred; KOLZOFF'S materialistic 
conception of the "molecularcomponents of living albumen substance";
assimilatory processes are supposed to becrystallization processes; but this theorycannot explain the typical centred structure 
of living plasm; in protozoa everynucleus is the potential centre of a newcell-body; finally the polynuclear protozoa 
split up into as many new individualsas there are nuclei; cell-division in metazoa; 
polynuclear protozoa may retaintheir plurality of nuclei : an actino-sphaerium 
has over a hundred of them; arbitrary 
cut pieces of cytoplasm can become 
complete individuals, 721; SACH'Sdesignation of "energide"; infusioriahave dissimilar nuclei; a nucleus bearsthe heredity factors and is the vital cen


59 ENKAPTIC WHOLE 

tre; genital cells in poly-cellular beingshave an unlimited capability of propagation; 
protozoa nuclei bear heredity factors 
and are vital centres; infusioria havetwo different nuclei : for propagation andfor vital processes; generative and soma-
tical nucleus; the smallest living unitswithin the cell-structure: bio-molecules; 
Miscellen; vitules; protomeries; but theyhave not been proved to maintain lifeapart from a living cell, 722; endo- andexoplasms; the cell-organism is the realnormal minimal centre of life; non-livingcomponents of the cell-body and theirenkaptic binding in the living organism;
enzymes or ferments are not living components 
of a cell; but are organic catalysts; 
BUCHNER'S experiments of 1896;
fermentation is an intricate process; enzymes 
are complicated protein combinations; 
"organizers" are inductive, nonliving 
material components influencingliving cells, 723; vacuoles, nucleoles, andother para plasmatic material particles;
typical mineral formations of protozoaand protophytes; Si(10 formations of radiolaria; 
they are typical form-totalities,
enkaptically interwoven in a cell, butnot parts of the living organism; the term"bio-molecules", 724 ; a molecule or quasicrystal of an organic chemical combination 
lacks the centred structure of livingunits, it is physico-chemically qualified;
in bio-physico-chemical constellationsthere are biotically directed physicochemical 
functions of material components; 
such constellations are opened bythe subjective vital function; such constellations 
are directed by bio-impulsesqualified by the central subjective vitalfunction of the organism as a whole, 725;
they have a physico chemical aspect;
these impulses use a minimum of energyand possess a spontaneous character;
BOHR'S relation of incertitude is structurally 
localized and determined as an enkaptic 
relation ; the bio-chemical constellation 
starts exactly at the point wherethe molecular or quasi crystalline structures 
of organic matter end; the livingorganism avails itself of variability typesof these structures; irradiation of nervous 
tissues; tendons are built up of genuine 
crystals with large molecules andordered after the pattern of fibres; muscular 
contraction and myosin-molecules,
726; the problem of so-called" "livingprotein" is wrongly posited; protein combinations 
found in a living body are intricate, 
labile material combinations physically 
determined in structure; BOHR'Sbio-chemical relation of incertitude can 
only pertain to the enkaptic functions ofthese molecules in the living organism;
a possible bio-synthesis, 727 ; the searchfor a "proteid molecule"; WOLTERECK'Ssummary of the modern programme ofbio-synthesis; but he holds that thecombination of continual active change 


 

ENKAPTIC WHOLE 

with the maintenance of the total systemis a completely new biotic phenomenon 
that cannot be produced artificially, 
728; WOLTERECK adds that an artificial 
combination will never "experience"; 
the most simple living beingshave a kind of a-psychical experience(Innen-Erregungen) says WOLTERECK;
this a postulate of his "emergent evolutionism"; 
a cell's centred structure guarantees 
the preservation of its identityand has its necessary counter-part in thevariability of all material combinationsin their enkaptic functions within theliving organism; the limits to physicochemical 
penetration into the bio-chemical 
constellation, 729; metabolism happens 
with the aid of ferments; bio-chemistry 
is not identical with organic chemistry; 
the process of mineral formationin radiolaria and other protozoa, 730; typical 
field reactions and the catalytic processes 
in assimilation and dissimilation 
are started and directed by bio-impulses,
which impulses are accessible to physicsand chemistry only in their physicochemical 
aspect, not in their qualifyingbiotic modality, 731; the question abouta specific "vital matter"; the materialistic 
view of KOLTZOFF denies its existence,
because it would lead to a vitalistic standpoint; 
but DRIESCH denies the existenceof a specific material bio-substance; heassumes that matter can only be "living"
so long as some "entelechy" controls aphysico-chemical constellation; "bio-substance" 
in a recent conception; WOLTERECK 
defends the "hick-substance" concept; 
he criticizes DRIESCH'S "entelechy",
732; vitalism should not be identifiedwith the view of the biotic aspect havingits proper laws and of the characterization 
of a living organism by its totalstructure of individuality; vitalism absolutizes 
the biotic aspect; the "Stufentheorie"; 
or "emergent evolutionism";
"mnemism" (HERING and SEMON) : GURVITCH, 
UNGERER, BERTALLANFFY, ALVERDES 
evade the problem; the mechanistic viewis inspired by the classical science-idealand starts from an a priori absolutizationof the physico-chemical energy aspect,
denying the irreducible nature of the biotic 
modus, 733 ; this view is involved inantinomies; it handles a deterministic 
concept of causality; its first limit is themicro-structure of atoms; the acceptanceof a second limit in the internal biophysico-
chemical constellation of a livingorganism cannot contradict the results ofmodern physics and chemistry; it is inconflict with the a priori mechanisticstartingpoint of classical natural science;
modal aspects do not have a rigid structure; 
the physico-chemical constellationis not closed; neo-vitalism holds to the 
mechanistic view of the physico-chemi


cal constellation in a living organism but

wants to withdraw "life" from the rule 

60 

of its causality; DRIESCH'S experimentalproofs of self-regulation, regeneration,
and heredity; Older vitalism proclaimedthe a priori thesis: [734] "chemistry willnever succeed in composing organic matter"; 
this conception could also be meantin a mechanistic sense; difference between 
neo- and old-vitalism; DRIESCH'Sproofs of entelechy; his "Ganzheitskausalitdt" 
is contrasted with "Einzelkausali 
tat"; experiments with eggs of sea-hedgehogs, 
735; regenerative processes in full-
grown organisms; quantitative causalityversus totality causality; the restrictedforce of DRIESCH'S argument; his lack ofinsight into the modal structures; his recourse 
to the substance concept; "life"
lacks genesis, because it is an invisibleimmaterial "organic form" in a pseudoAristotelian sense; i.e., an entelechy;
—psyche and psychoid-736; the propersubstance of organic form is entelc„;hy,
the form, the eidos; that which is formedin a visible way is only the transitoryproduct of its operation in matter;
DRIESCH'S entelechy is a second naturalfactor; he wants to base his metaphysicson empirical research; he rejects an apriori and primordial basic science (philosophia 
prima) ; his startingpoint is theCartesian cogito — he is influenced byKANT'S epistemology, notwithstandingthe intentional character he ascribes to 
his ordering concepts or "categories",
737; DRIESCH'S Ordnungslehre is nominalistic, 
738; his dualism of a material 
and an immaterial substance, 739; phylogenetically 
speaking there is only oneentelechy, viz. "super-personal life", 740;
his scheme: "potence-act" compared withthat of ARISTOTLE; he denies the existenceof a typical bio-chemical constellation,
741; entelechy constitutes the differencebetween "living" and "dead matter"; thisis exemplified in the human brain; sufficient 
and partial genetic grounds ofevents in an organism, 742; four possibilities 
of entelechy influencing matter,
743; GURVITCH speaks of a vital form(morphe) regulating, but not determiningthe physico-chemical system ; BERNARD 
BAVINK'S criticism of DRIESCH'S second 
and third hypotheses; DRIESCH should 
have shown how entelechy can alter the 
direction of a physico-chemical processthat is already completely determined byits initional condition and the classical 

laws of nature, 744 ; the suspension theorysupposes the production of some energyon the part of entelechy; a force thatdoes not do any work is nevertheless aphysical force; whereas entelechy is supposed 
to be an immaterial cause; thebuilding plan theory; the realization ofsuch a plan can never occur in a purelyimmaterial way, but requires physicochemical 
energy not belonging to thephysico-chemical constellation of thebuilding materials; so long as "life" is 


 

61

viewed as "an immaterial substance" 
working upon a "material substance", thepossibility of such operation will remaina problem; the dualistic substance concept 
involves theoretical thought in insoluble 
problems, 745; Aristotelian entelechy 
is in different ways in a better position 
than neo vitalism; DRIESCH could notadopt this conception because he startedfrom the basic motive of nature and freedom 
in a Humanistic sense; his use of 
the scheme of matter and form, act andpotence, anangke and tuchê, 746; hisdualism of "totality" and "chance" (BAER'sdefinition of "chance"), — but his idea oftuchê is: what is not related to a totality;
in "matter" chance rules without restriction, 
747; DRIESCH and KANT on freedom; 
freedom is a question of belief; DRIESCH'Sphilosophy of nature remains within theframe of determinism; his totality concept 
remains a category pertaining tonatural phenomena; it is influenced bySCHELLING'S freedom-idealism; SCHELLING'S 
and DRIESCH'S idea of totality wasderived from KANT'S Kritik der teleologischen 
Urteilskraft, 748; DRIESCH deniesthe genuine freedom character of KANT'Spractical Idea of liberty; DRIESCH holdsgenuine metaphysical freedom to be incompatible 
with any general law imposing 
itself on human action; genuinefreedom is only compatible with a consistent 
pantheism in the sense of a "becoming 
deity" lacking any determinationby a constant divine nature, 749; WOLTERECK'S 
bio-substance concept; this substance 
is connected with "immaterial and 
conditional structural constants" as potencies 
which pass away with their material 
bearer; physico chemical bio phenomena 
are the temporal spatial outside ofa living organism, their genuine essenceis their immaterial inside; a vital processis the "inner experience" of a livingbeing; an artificial bio-synthesis is impossible; 
causal physico-chemical analysis 
of bio-phenomena has reached a limit,
750; by "bio-substance" he means "livingmass";this mass is a complex of molecules 
different from inanimate matter or 
dead plasm; owing to a "primary biochemical 
moment" this bio-substance is 
autonomously capable for stimulation, andhas genetic continuity; it is comparablewith radio-active elements and aromatic 
combinations; in a living cell some components 
produce other kinds of matterwithout passing away themselves; othersare produced without being able to produce; 
enzymes are intermediate; only theproducing "Chief substance" is "livingsubstance' , 
; a bio-system has units effecting 
assimilation and dissimilation; theorganizing regulators, i.e. the inductivematerial units (genes, hormones, enzymes); 
the "matrix" (germ-plasm, idioplasm, 
reserve-plasm), 751; the "matrix"
produces itself and, if need be, the in-

ENKAPTIC WHOLE 

ductive material components; the catalytic 
operation of enzymes in metabolism;
the specificity of protein combinations;
the significance of hormones; "developmental 
mechanics" has pointed out theexistence of "organizers" and their influence 
on the embryo; SPEMANN'S experiments 
with the transplantation of cellsfrom the blastophore, i.e. the invagination 
of the gastrula; inner-, outer-, mesoblastoderm, 
752; during its developmentthe living cell of an embryo has moregenetic potencies than that which is realized; 
neighbouring cells exercise a determining 
influence on the direction ofthe development; the two part-cells ofthe egg of a sea-hedgehog and the direction 
of their development; H. MANGOLD'S 
experiment; "chimera formations"; SPEMANN'S 
hypothesis : the blastopore mustcontain the organizing centre, 753; mechanists 
called these "organizers" material 
substances; neo-vitalists viewed themas effects of the immaterial entelechy;
DRIESCH mentioned the building plantheory and assumed sub-entelechies; experiments 
have shown them to be inductive 
material factors; HOLTFRETER'S experiments; 
the discovery of the genes inthe chromosomes; the bearers of thehereditary dispositions, 754 ; MORGAN'Sgenetical analysis; chromosome maps;
chromatin; WOLTERECK'S hypothesis, 755;
the genes have their seat in the nuclearloops of the germ-cells; we do not knowwhere the matrix has its seat; presumable 
location of the matrix, 756; WoL-
TERECK later on speaks of the existenceof the "matrix" as an experimentally established 
fact; a cell's material components 
are non-living combinations; genesare not pure living units; the existenceof bio-molecules causing assimilatory anddissimilatory processes has not beenproved; by "matrix" WOLTERECK meansgerm-plasm, idio-plasm or hereditarymaterial; AUGUST WEISMANN'S theory ofgerm-cells, 757 ; recent discoveries havealmost invalidated this theory; DRIESCH'Scriticism of WEISMANN'S view, 758; 
the question about material combinations 
is a philosophical problem ofstructure; the influence of the metaphysical 
substance concept on WoL-
TERECK'S theory of "matrix"; he holds 
that the bio-substance may display the intricate 
structure of a polypeptid molecule; 
there are living and non-living cellcomponents; his theory is influenced bythe metaphysical substance concept; hishypothetical "bio-substance" seems todisplay the intricate structure of a polypeptid 
molecule, although he has assertedthat such a model can never account for 
the typical centred structure of a livingcell; the theory of a molecular "livingmatter" eliminates the typical totalitystructure of a living organism, 759; theclassical concept of matter; its transfor



ENKAPTIC WHOLE 


mation into the concept of function ; inchemistry "matter" only means a systemof equilibrium between protons, neutrons 
and electrons; neither in modernnatural scientific thought, nor in Greekand Scholastic metaphysics can it makesense to speak of a specific material biosubstance 
in contrast to an in-organicsubstance of "dead matter"; WOLTERECK'Sstandpoint is far from clear, 760; hisconcept "bio-substance" implies an innercontradiction ; Roux's criticism of a"matter" which assimilates itself; WoL-
TERECK is involved in antinomies, 761;
his "Ontologie des Lebendigen", containing 
a dynamical "Stufentheorie"; this isa genetic monism accepting irreduciblelevels of becoming; life is a new level ofreality, and at the same time an "emergence" 
of physico-chemical constellations; 
emergent evolutionism; differentchemical elements are explained byWOLTERECK from increased possibilitiesof a material basic substance; psychicallife as an "emergence" of biotic, and"mind" as an "emergence" of psychicallife; the rise of different autonomous"levels of reality" is ruled by "structuralconstants" called "autonomous powers",
"determinants", "imagoids" or "ideas",
762; the constancy of these "determinants" 
is in conflict with the continuityand unity of the process of becoming inan antinomic way; WOLTERECK acknowledges 
this antinomous character of histheory and observes that determinants ofbecoming and those of value are mutuallyincompatible, like validity and the genesis 
of validity; this antinomy is due toan overstraining of the modal aspect ofbiotic development; W.'s evolutionism isirrationalistic; he views structural lawsas products of the creative freedom of a"Welt-Subjekt" in the process of development; 
here the Humanistic motive of nature 
and freedom is the ultimate, religious 
power of his theoretic thought;
"freedom" is called the "completion ofnature", 763; W. asserts that the "spiritual-
psychic phenomena, the productiveactivities and their results belong just asmuch to life as, e.g., the shell formationor movement of protozoa"; a temple, abook, a sonata, or a strategic plan arebio-phenomena, 764 ; the cell-body is abiotically qualified enkaptic form-totalityembracing three different kinds of individuality 
structures : the physico-chemical 
material combinations (themselvesenkaptic structural wholes), the cell'sliving organism, in which these buildingmaterials are enkaptically bound, andfinally the cell-body as a biotically qualified 
enkaptic whole; in animal cells thestructure of the living organism is thefoundation of the psychically qualifiedsensorium structure; the enkaptic structural 
whole is, therefore, also psychicallyqualified, 765; the bio-chemical constella


62 

tion in a cell is built up by means of thosephysico-chemical functions of the materialcomponents that are enkaptically boundin the living cell-organism; these functions 
fall outside of the internal structure 
of the material components; they aresubject to the continual direction of theleading biotic function of the organismwhose internal physico-chemical functions 
they are, and they are not functionsof the material molecules; the organismcan only realize itself in the enkapticwhole of which (in vegetable cells) it isthe qualifying component; in animal cellsthe sensorium binds the lower individuality 
structures; there is a bio-chemicalas well, as a physico-chemical constellation; 
a psychical qualified reaction inprotozoa also displays a physico-chemicaland biotic aspect; THEODOR HAERINGdistinguishes "material body", "psyche"
and "mind" (or "spirit") ; the living organism 
of a cell-body can as such notcontain lifeless parts, but this organism isnot identical with the cell-body of whichit is a part-structure, 766; this total cell-
body is an enkaptic form-totality alsocontaining lifeless material combinations 
bound by its living organism; inan animal cell the organism is enkaptically 
bound by the sensorium; this theory 
of enkapsis harmonizes two series ofexperiential data which in the substanceview seemed to contradict each other; 
the contest between mechanistic and 
vitalistic views cannot be settled on the 
basis of the substance concept; the Aristotelian-
Thomistic substance concept isunable to resist the mechanistic view; sois neo-Scholasticism with its theory ofthe virtual preservation of properties ofthe material components in a livingwhole, 767; the internal molecular andcrystalline structures of the materialcomponents are not as such part structures 
of the living whole; our theory of aplurality of structures interwoven withinan enkaptic structural whole does notcontradict this structural unity, 768; theliving body is not an aggregate; a cellcannot live in the molecular or (quasi-)
crystalline matter structures, though thelatter are actually present in the livingcell, because its organism can no morelive without than within them and the 
material sub-structure functions within 
its form-totality, 769; a living cell-organism 
is enkaptically founded in a veryparticular mixture of matter and bindsthe latter within its own individualitystructure; its nodal point is the alveolar-
colloidal and centred form of the plasmmaintained in the continual processes ofdissolution and building up of the matterstructures; in this form the material components 
disclose their particular variability 
types that function in the bio-chemical 
constellation; the cell-body as awhole gives the plasmatic matter its par



titular form qualified by the subjectivebiotic (or in animals by the psychical)
function; the form is plastic, enablingthe body to adaptations; the total form isan expression of the total system (e.g. ofthe cell) ; also the cilia, fibres, vacuoles,
etc., are produced by the total substratumof the system ; the living "cell-body" isthe bearer and producer of all its part-
forms and of the specific total figure ofthe radiolarium, infusorium, bacterium",
770; DRIESCH and others have refuted theaggregate theory; the visible figure ofpoly-cellular plants, animals, the humanbody, obeys the specific form-laws of atotality; WEISMANN'S theory was refuted;
also the separate cell-form is an elementary 
total form expressing a typical structural 
whole, 771 ; WOLTERECK'S investigations 
into the "biotic elementary forms"
such as bacteria, algae, amoebae; no particular 
forms have developed in them besides 
membrane and nucleus; flagellatedcells; sperm-cells; monads; peridinidiae;
all these part-forms are produced by theliving cell as a whole and are a differentiated 
morphological expression of itsstructural totality; tissue cells; epithelialcells, muscle cells, gland cells, etc.; thetotal cell form with all its particular articulations 
of inner and outer architecture 
is a function of the total cell-body, 772;
the typical totality character of the formproducts of protozoa and protophytes;
silico lattices and flagellates; they differfrom the physico-chemically determinedcrystal forms of the mineral silicon dioxyde 
although they remain typical Si02 
figures; their production starts with alterations 
of the colloidal plasm whichzonally passes from the sol- into the gel-
condition; the fixed formations arisingin the plasm of calc-algae and foraminifera; 
plasmatic, allo-plasmatic and xenoplasmatic forms, 773; they are typicallyqualified by a biotic (or post-biotic) object 
function; they arise from solidifiedplasm (having passed into the gel-condition; 
silico skeletons, and calc-shells of 
sponges, coral polyps, echino derms, vertebrates; 
cellulose coverings of uni- orpoly-cellular plants, the chitin of articulate 
animals, and horny formations(scales, hairs, feathers, etc.) ; rhizopoda;
foraminifera and their coverings; lobsters 
cover their hind parts with seaweed,
sponges, or snailhouses; insect larvaebuild tubes and "houses" from shell 
pieces, etc.; especially with protozoa thexeno- and allo-plasmatic forms may besimilar: the different nature of the materials 
is not essential to the form production 
of the living bodies; the essentialthing is the formative principle that selects 
the material and works them into 
moulded products; the xeno- and alto-
plasmatic forms are qualified by an object-
function, 774 ; of biotic or post bioticmodality; they can only function enkap

 


63ENKAPTIC WHOLE 

tically in the living organism; but thissubject-object relation does not detractfrom the enkaptic form-totality, 775; thefoundational form-totality of a livingbody is always an objective sensory-spatial 
figure; its non-living form productobeys form laws of the cell body as awhole and not the laws of crystallizationof the materials used; the non living formproduct is taken up in the body's objective 
sensory form totality; the form of aliving cell body as a whole, and that ofits organic parts is a morphological expression 
of an enkaptic structural wholeof a higher than physico-chemical qualification; 
the material components are noparts of this totality, but they are realized 
in the morphological interlacementsof the structures concerned; there is nosuitable single morphological criterion todistinguish the different "structurallayers" of a living body; this body is amorphological whole qualified by thehighest structure enkaptically bound byit, 776; vegetable or animal bodies aretherefore real thing-structures, accessibleto naive experience which immediatelygrasps the morphological whole; .the formtotality does not coalesce with the formfunctions of the interlaced structures; the 
sensory total form of the body overlapsthe interlaced structures, giving the bodyits material sensory figure, which is stilllacking in the dynamic biotic space; it isthe objective sensory image of the materialized 
living organism; in an animalit objectively expresses the higher structure 
of the sensorium; in the human,
body, in an anticipatory direction, it expresses 
the act-structure of the enkapticwhole, 776; the enkaptic totality constitutes 
itself by means of inter-structuralinterlacernents without being reducible tothe latter; the whole is thus accessible tonaive experience which grasps the continuous 
whole only, and is implicitlyaware of the qualifying role of tin higheststructure as to the sensory form-totality;
the enkapsis with the "Umwelt"; thebodily form is produced by the livingbeing itself and is not mechanicallyimpressed on the latter by its vitalmilieu; the number of organ forms farsurpasses that of the life conditions;
WOLTERECK'S three groups of morphological 
types: suspensoid, motoroid, andbasoid types, 777; 'the organic forms arenever a mechanical result of adaptationto the milieu, but always co-determinedby the structural genotypes; in the samemilieu are developed a thousandfoldabundance of forms of the motoroid type,
e.g., the freely swimming peridinidiae;
the diatoms, radiolaria; the form-totalityis a nodal point of enkaptic interlacements, 
both as to its internal constitutionand as to its outer milieu, and remainsthe morphological expression of an internal 
structural whole; each of its struc



ENLIGHTENMENT 64 

tural strata has its proper internal struc-— individualization and faith; anticipatural 
criterion; the body intertwines themtions rationalized individualistically, 357.
in its typically qualified form-totality;—, III, in the Humanistic doctrine of 
PLATO viewed the body as a vehiclenatural law; in CHR. WOLFF, 282. 

(ochêrna) of the soul, an objectivistic

ENS REALISSIMUM, II, in Scholaticism is

conception, 778; ARISTOTLE ascribed all

God, 20.

the "formal" qualities of the body to thesoul as its substantial form (a subjecti-ENSTATIC ATTITUDE, II, and the antitheti


vistic view) ; Augustinianism preferredcal attitude of thought, 468, 470; and in-
the Platonic conception; the objectivetuition, 474. 
sensory form of the body is the foun-ENSTATIC ERLEBEN, II, in pre-theoretical

dational function of its structure as an intuition, 474.
enkaptic whole; it is related to a possible

ENTELECHY, I, organic life as an entele


subjective sensory perception ; PLATO re


chy, 556 ,(note).

lated this form to the "immaterial sub


—, II, in ARISTOTLE, 11 ; in DRIESCH'S view

stance" (the soul) so that the material

of "organic life", 110.

substance can only be a vehicle or organ

—, III, in DRIESCH, 23, 24 ; in ARISTOTLE,

of the soul; this is a hypostatization of

634, 739, 746, 751; DRIESCH'S entelechy

the objective morphological aspect of the

concept is criticized by WOLTERECK, 732;

body; M. HAURIOU on the relation between

DRIESCH'S supposed proofs of the exi


body and soul; Modern Existentialism re


stence of entelechies, 735; his recourse to

turns to the subjective view (SARTRE,

the substance concept, 736; he rejects a

MERLEAU PONTY), but emancipates it from

prima philosophia, 737; but he finally

the Greek metaphysical substance con-

ascribes a metaphysical sense to his en


cept; PONTY'S "experienced corporality"

telechy idea as a "substance", 738; he

belongs to the supposed "pre-objective

holds to the Cartesian substance concept

experiential field", 779 ; human corporal-

although rejecting DESCARTES' metaphysi


ity is then considered as a "blind adhe


cal interpretation; his view is dualistic,

rence" to the "pre-objective" world, 780. 

viz., the dualism of body as matter, andthe immaterial entelechy, 739; the differ-

ENLIGHTENMENT, I, the primacy of the

ence between this view and that of ARIS-

Humanistic science ideal of the intellec-

TOTLE; from a phylogenetic viewpoint

tualistic "Aufklarung" (Enlightenment)

there is only one entelechy, viz., the

had to yield to the personality ideal in

super-personal life of which all indivi-

KANT'S "primacy of the practical reason",

dual entelechies are ramifications, 74;

137; at the time of the Enlightenment and

but in the end DRIESCH takes his entelechy

of the natural scientific positivism of the

concept in a metaphysical sense, 741; he

19th century, Humanistic philosophy in-

assumes four possibilities as to a causal

vades its own life and world view in a 

method of operation of entelechy, 742; at

popular form and imprinted upon it its

first he only rejected the first, later on

quasi-scientific mask, 170; Humanism be-

the third possibility, 743; BERNARD BAVINK

gan to influence the masses during the

criticized the second and the third possi-

Enlightenment, 171; to the Enlightenment

bility, 744 ; criticism of the fourth, 745.

the term "natural" meant "conceived in 
terms of natural laws", 453 ; the German ENTSCHLOSSENHEIT, II, in HEIDEGGER : the 
"Sturm and Drang" was never able toselfhood is exclusively free in its run-
liberate itself completely from the deter-ning forward [in hermeneutical reflectministic 
rationalism of the Enlightenment,ion] to death; it is the authentic self onlybut its conception of individuality noin its fundamental isolation by the silentlonger had the atomistic individualisticdreadful resolve (Entschlossenheit) tocharacter of the Enlightenment, 454; Inaccept the fate of its existence, 24.
HERDER'S phil. of history the science-ideal

ENVIRONMENT, III, the naturalist environ


of the Enlightenment is still clearly evi


ment theory has entangled RATZEL'S view

dent, 455. 

of the spread of culture, 333.

—, II, its idea of progress, 263 ; its idea
of development. NEWTON and LOCKE do-ENZYMES, III, and their rapid operations,


642, are protein combinations, 723; differ

minated its science ideal, DILTHEY, 349; 
POPE'S praise of NEWTON, 350; the En-from hormones, 731. 
lightenment opposed the Christian-EPICTETUS, III,


Augustinian conception of history, 351;Diss., II, 20, 6 —. 232.


rejected miracles and Divine providence;


EPICUREAN MOTIVES, I, in Renaissance

applied psychology to history, 352;

thought, 198.

BAYLE'S method of historical criticism is 

overpraised by CASSIRER, 353; naturalEPICUREANISM, III, is nominalistic indivilaw; 
individual ideas of natural law, faith dualistic; developed the theory of the so-

in the science and the personality-ideal;cial contract; they were atomists and heldinnate human rights; LOCKE; ROUSSEAU'Sa mechanistic view of the cosmos; denied 
rights of man and citizen; Western cul-the appetitus socialis; a community ofture becomes rationalistic-individualistic, men arises out of a voluntary association 


of individuals; the State is due to a contract 
made against common dangers, 232. 

EPICURUS, I, divided philosophy into acanonic (logical), a physical, and an ethical 
section, 538. 

EPISCOPAL SYSTEM, III, of church government; 
REINGKINK ; J. F. STAHL, 516. 

EPISTEMOLOGY, I, the epistemologicalproblem about the limits of our knowledge 
presupposes some insight into themeaning of knowledge as necessarily related 
to the ego; the genetic tendency ofphilosophic thought makes its appearance 
at the heart of all epistemologicalquestions: a priori conditions of humanknowing, the possibility of universallyvalid knowledge of our cosmos; its non-
a-priori moments; the distinction between 
the critical and the genetic methodis terminologically confusing, 9; in so-
called critical philosophy the knowablecosmos derives all its meaning from thesupposedly self-sufficient a-priori structure 
of the cognitive functions; the question 
as to the meaning of our knowledgeis thereby precluded; questions concerning 
the foundation of philosophy are notasked : philosophic thought has come torest in the pretended origin of meaning;
Neo-Kantians suppose they can understand 
the whole of cosmic reality inthe transcendental logical meaning, 10;
KANT'S epistemology is dogmatic, 35;
dogmatic epistemol. identified the sub


-

jectobject relation with the Gegenstandrelation, 
43; KANT calls reality a category
of modality, 76; his epistem. is dogmatic,
118; that of HOBBES is mechanistic, 221;
LOCKE'S is psychological, 262; substance,
Ding an sich, became the epistemological
x, 263; HUME reduces abstract concepts
to sensory impressions, 272-277; KANT
opposes sensibility to logical understanding, 
360; MAIMON adopted LEIBNIZ' doctrine 
of the "petites perceptions", 404;
FICHTE'S Wissenschaftslehre and epistemology, 
423; his conception of the productive 
imagination, 427-428-429-430; this
imagination is a pre-logical function of
the ego as a link between understanding


and sensibility, 431. 
—, II, is not an isolated problem, 4, 5;


epistem. of cultural sciences, 209; in Sat-
MEL, epistem. of history, 211; immanence
standpoint; its fundamental error; the
prejudice of selfsufficient theoretical
thought since the Eleatics; phenomenon
and noumenon; substance; knowledge derived 
from sensory perception; or from
logical thought and perception; or logical
thought alone; the substance is cognizable
or not; the "thing in itself"; positivistic
Nominalism; intuition as inner certainty
of feeling — or as a superior rational organ; 
up till KANT and HUME the Gegenstand 
was considered to transcend the 
phenomenon; KANT'S Copernican revolu

 


65EPISTEMOLOGY 

tion : the Gegenstand as a given chaos ofsensory impressions; KANT'S view of 
theoretical synthesis, 430; KANT excludesintuition from logical thought; English"empirism"; KANT'S datum in experienceis of a purely functional sensory character; 
the objective synthesis provides everyempirical thing in the world that isbeyond the un-arranged sensory impressions; 
the chief problem is the abstraction 
of the sensory material from themeaning systasis; DRIESCH and VOLKELTon the "datum", 431; abstraction is theoretical 
disjunction and opposition; theepistemological capital sin; critique ofknowledge; its cosmological petitio principii; 
KANT was led by a truly transcendental 
motive; his dogmatism, 432; ancient, 
scholastic, and pre-Kantian epistemology 
were based on the theory ofbeing; in phenomenology the need of ontology 
is felt again; its description of theacts of cognition ; but theoretical synthesis 
has not become a problem to it;
absolutizations the source of uncritical 
dogmatism; how can the analytical function 
be opposed to the non-logical functions? 
the Gegenstand as a resistant, 433;
how is synthesis possible? analytical orlogical synthesis and intermodal theoretical 
synthesis; also in naïve experience;
the objective systasis of logical characteristics 
in the logical object; ARISTOTLEdid not see this difference, 434; 
KANT'S analytical and synthetical judgments, 
435; KANT makes a logicalproblem dependent on the linguisticstructure of a judgment; the copula"is", 436; the concept "body"; and "extended"; 
a concept is not purely and exclusively 
. analytical; "heaviness", 437;
empirical judgments are also analytical;
the concept of causality is implied in thatof "happening"; it is not synthetical apriori; KANT'S note on his own distinctions, 
438; RIEHL'S paraphrase; PANDER'S 
elaboration; formal and materialobject, 439; the concept "triangle is supposed 
not to imply "three angles"; thematerial object of the concept does havethree angles; PANDER'S exegesis, 441;
that Of SIGWART and SCHLEIERMACHER,
442; KANT says that synthesis precedesanalysis, 443; his dualism; SIGWART confuses 
the linguistic and the logical structure 
of a judgment, 444 ; ARISTOTLE'S categories 
and KANT'S distinction, 445-448;
and the subject-object relation; the truthof judgments of experience; S P, is nota purely logical judgment, 449; HUSSERLon analytical and synthetical judgments,
450; on the concepts of the whole and itsparts; symbolic logic, 451; WHITEHEADand RUSSELL'S logistic, 452; HUSSERL'Scomplete formalization, 453; KANT on"the whole and its parts"; HUSSERL'S "regions", 
454; logical space and movementand subject and object functions, 455;
HUSSERL on "the whole and its parts"; 


EPISTEMOLOGY 

formalization implies synthesis; H.'s modal 
shiftings; RUSSELL, 456; RUSSELL'S"purely" analytical deduction and the"whole and its parts"; HUSSERL'S "extensive 
whole"; his other "totalities", 457;
"unifying connective forms"; relations offoundation; formalization is the abstraction 
in a concept from all meaning individuality 
in the law-sphere concerned;
the concept triangle, 458; its limits; thelimits of formalization ; false formalismsin HUSSERL; also in KANT, 459; analyticaland synthetical judgments; only logicalrelations are formalized; linguistic formula 
and analytical relation do not havean absolute objective character; theoretical-
logical subject-object relation andgnoseological Gegenstand relation, 460;
the signification of: S = S; logical identity 
and diversity; PLATO'S Parmenidesshows that the relation of identity mustnot be absolutized, 461; pre-theoreticjudgments are systatic; there is no Gegenstand 
relation in them; the possibilityof logic as a science, 462; KANT'S view ofthe Gegenstand; that of HUSSERL; a definition 
of Gegenstand, 467; the enstaticand the antithetical attitudes of thought;
there is not antithesis in the psychicalaspect; analysis in naïve experience hasno Gegenstand; definition of naïve experience: 
a concrete experience of thingsand their relations in the fulness of individual 
temporal reality; the enstatic subject-
object relation; the theoretical Gegenstand 
relation; meaning-synthesis andtime; the "epoche", 468; in theoreticalGegenstand relation the continuity of timeis abstracted; various GegenstAnde; limitsto abstraction; the "epoche" is unavoidable, 
469; the dynamics of sphere-universality 
urges the analytical function on tothe deepened meaning of analysis; antithetical 
thought distinguished from en-
static analysis; the naïve concept; and thetemporal systasis; naïve distinctions areoriented to practical life, and verifiable inthe sensory sphere, 470 (and III, 779) ; theanticipatory sphere in the pre-logicalGegenstand is opened; its pre-dispositionto the systematic tendency of theoreticalthought; the logical object side is deepened; 
logical systasis becomes distasis;
the modal concept of function, 471; thisdistasis is made manifest, not created; itis a possibility, not a datum ; intermodalsynthesis is a subjective cognitive act presupposing 
the transcendent super-temporal 
I-ness, 472; cosmic intuition and our 
continuous contact with all the functions,
our selfhood becomes cosmologically conscious 
of itself in the temporal coherenceand diversity of all its modal functions;
actual analysis exceeds the limits of theanalytical law-sphere, 473 ; self-reflectionon the modalities as being our own ; en-
static Erleben, 474 ; synthetical thought isbased on intuitive insight; VOLKELT'S theory, 
475, 476; KANT'S view, 477; "pure sen


66 

sation" is an abstraction; theoretical intuition 
of time and inter-modal synthesis,
478; cosmic and cosmological self-consciousness, 
479; animals are ex-staticallyabsorbed by their temporal existence;
man enters into the coherence of cosmic 
time enstatically; analysis and intuition;
SCHELLING'S view; BERGSON'S psychologistic 
theory of intuition, 480; he has to revert 
to concepts connected with intuition,
481; BERGSON on "pure duration", 482;
theoretic intuition cannot operate apartfrom the analytical function; intuition andinstinct, men of genius, 483; WEIERSTRASZ'discovery and intuition; RIEMANN'S, 484;
limits set to concept formation and definition; 
the phenomenological attitude,
485; its internal antinomy, 486; its character 
dangerous to Christian thought,
487; a great variety of phenomenologicalschools of thought, 488; its lack of realtranscendental selfreflection, 489 ; the dogmatic 
character of the crypto religious attitude 
in "critical" epistemology, 491; thepostulate of self sufficiency is a religiousa priori forced on us as a "pure" theory;
KANT'S critical method is a failure as to 
the central problem of epistemology, 492;
HEIDEGGER on KANT'S Kritik der reinen 
Vernunft; his view does not concern thesecond edition, 493; KANT'S synthesisand the unity of self-consciousness; his"datum"; HUME, 494 ; KANT'S "pure sensibility"; 
he was influenced by the metaphysical 
concept of substance, 495; his 
categories refer a priori to the objectsof sensory intuition, 496; he does not 
distinguish between logical and inter-
modal synthesis; his concept of thepower of the imagination, 497; he logicizes 
the cosmic and cosmological self-
consciousness, 498; identifies the transcendental 
unity of self-consciousness withthe "cogito", 499, 500; his critique isfunctionalistic, 501; the I-ness has becomea formal concept, 502, 503; his transcendental 
logic, 503; he calls the categoriesconceptus dati a priori, 504 ; they are ofa logical character, 505; the logos becomes 
Archimedian point, also in Neo-
Kantianism; substance in KANT, 506; categories 
and sensibility, 507 ; KANT'S epistemology 
lacks cosmological foundation;
unity, plurality, totality, 508; reality, negation, 
limitation; KANT'S conception of time,
509; the categories of quality, 510; of relation; 
and ARISTOTLE'S logic, 511 ; KANT'Sconcept of causality is physical; his categories 
of modality and ARISTOTLE; LEIBNIL 
; the intellectus archetypus, 512; KANTon the transcendental imagination, 513,514; HUME; KANT'S transcendental logic;
the "inner sense", 515; he stuck to the dogma 
of the autonomy of theoretical thought,
516; he avoids the problem of the possibility 
of synthesis; his "transcendentalschema", 517, 518, 519; HEIDEGGER'S view 
of KA,NT'S productive imagination,KANT'sthree sources, 520; the change in the se



cond edition of the Kritik d. r. Vern., 
521 ; HEIDEGGER distinguishes epistemol.
and ontology, 522; KANT'S noumenon and 
phenomenon, 523 ; homo noumenon ; HEIDEGGER'S 
interpretation of KANT, 524; 
KANT never meant a dialectical unity between 
sensibility and understanding, 529;
he does not identify transcendental self-
consciousness and time, 530; but the I ofthe intuition and the logical I, 530 (note),
531; the link between two stems of knowledge, 
532; two ways of deduction,533; heargues in two directions, 534 ; the transcendental 
unity of selfconsciousness is notsensible, 535; his conception of experience, 
536; the "Satz des Bewusztseins",
537; his ethics and his epistemology forma whole, 538; the real datum of experience; 
in KANT, positivism, phenomenology; 
there is nothing given without thepsychical function, but a great deal morehas been given, 539; experiential data arenot merely functional but of a cosmicsystatic character, 540; (cf. sub voce„AP.mom") ; there is an apriori complexin the cosmological sense of the structural 
horizon of human experience; thishorizon has the character of a law; themerely subjective apriori complex in theepistemological sense is the subjectiveapriori, insight into the structural horizon, 
548; the sense in which the experiential 
horizon is identical with the horizon 
of our earthly cosmos; the obfuscation 
of our experiential horizon by sin,
549; categories of modality, 550; necessity 
and possibility, 551; the transcendentdimension of the cosmological horizon isformed by the religious root of humanexistence; the transcendental dimensioncosmic time, 552; the modal horizon, 557;
the perspective structure of the horizonof human experience; the religious ortranscendent horizon is that of the selfhood 
and encompasses the cosmic temporal 
horizon; the latter encompassesand determines the modal horizon; thetemporal horizon also encompasses anddetermines the plastic horizon of thestructures of individuality in which themodal horizon is implied; the religiousfoundation of all knowledge, 560; objection 
raised to spiritualism in epistemology; 
the transcendent light of eternitymust force its way through time into theperspective horizon of experience; ourexperience is not limited to time, 561; inthe transcendent religious • subjective apriori of the cosmic self-consciousnesshuman cognition must be directed to theabsolute truth; "the stumbling-block ofthe cross of Christ" as the corner-stone 
of epistemology and the cross of scandal,
562; the law-conformity of the structureof our experiential horizon is originallya law of freedom, 563; standing in theTruth; reason and faith, 564; the perspective 
structure of truth, 565 ff.; [cf.
sub voce TRUTH] ; the individuality of 

67 ERASMUS, DESIDERIUS 

human experience in SCHELER'S phenomology, 
583; his theory of the individuality 
of absolute truth as truth of personalvalidity; his "pure actual -I-" is a residueof the methodical destruction of the 
world, but no true individuality; hissolipsistic self-reflection; he adopts 
LEIBNIZ' view of the ego and alter egos;
the monadic ego is broken through bythe universally valid innate ideas in DESCARTES 
and in HUSSERL, 584; SCHELER, 
585; individual cognition and human society; 
societal structure of human knowledge, 
594 ; human theoretical insight objectified 
in records of a symbolical structure; 
according to SCHELER the "Wesensschau" 
gives us the "essence" in a non-
symbolical way; individual insight ofgenius and the theoretical opening-
process; leading personalities in thescientific world, 595; criticism of theconcept of a "formal transcendental consciousness"; 
our a priori knowledge remains 
subjective and fallible, 596; criterion 
of the truth of the cosmonomic idea; 
modern phenomenology ascribes infallibility 
to the intuition of the essence, 597;

the task of epistemology, 598.
—, III, critical Ep. considered the transcendental-
logical category of substance asthe origin of the experience of things;
RITTER says that we create a "thing",

which he identifies with a "substance",
28; RIEHL'S critical realism; Satz des Bewusztseins 
or Satz der PhAnotnenalitat;

his Kantianisms, 46. 

EPITHELIAL CELLS, III, display part-formswithin the frame of their specific total

form, 772. 

EPOCHE, I, in HUSSERL'S "Intuition of the 
Essence"; the theoretical epoch& enables
the "disinterested observer" to give an
adequate essential description of the en


tire act-life of man, 213. 
—, II, in HUSSERL'S philosophy, is the replacing 
of the naïve attitude by the theoretical-
phenomenological one without losng 
any content of the intentional act of
consciousness, 28, 29; the inquiry into
the states of affairs implied in fundamental 
analogical concepts and the epochê of
philosophical prejudices; this epoch& is
the reverse of HUSSERL'S notion of epochê,
73, 74, 75; the epoche from the cosmic
meaning-coherence, 469; the contiuity of
this coherence is cancelled theoretically
by BERGSON, 482; HUSSERL'S self-constitu


tion of the ego; his theory of the phenomenological 
reduction (epoche) and 


eidetical intuition, 549. 


EQUALITY, I, of men, in HumE, 312. 
—, II, is a mathematical retrocipation in


the juridical sphere, 135. 
EQUALITY AND INEQUALITY, III, in ARISTO


TLE, 213. 


ERAsmus, DESIDERIUS, I, as a Biblical Humanist 
interpreted the Scriptures moral



 

ERDMANN, K. 0.

istically; this showed the secularizingtendency in the development of late Medieval 
thought, 190; LUTHER opposedERASMUS' Biblical Humanism which tried 
to effect a new synthesis between theChristian faith and the spirit of Greco-
Roman antiquity, 512; MELANCHTON enjoyed 
his friendship, 513; and underwenthis influence, 514 ; ERASMUS broke with 
MELANCHTON, 515. 

ERDMANN, K. 0., II, 

Die Bedeutung des Wortes, 226. 

ERINYES, II, the daughters of ANANGKE, inHeraclitus, 132, 133. 

ERLEBEN, II, in HOFFMANN'S thought is amode of pure experience, 29; or hineinleben, 
474, is an entering into realitylacking theoretical insight into the modalaspects, 475.
--, III, in RICKERT, 50, 51. 

ERLEBNIS, II, is intentional; FELIX 
KRUEGER'S definition of Erlebnis; impliesfeeling; FRANZ BRENTANO; EDMUND Hus-
SERL'S definition, 112; Erlebnisse are subjective, 
multi-modal, and not the Gegenstand 
of psychology; Erlebnisse and external 
behaviour; lingual expression andsocial contact; behaviourism, 113; Erleben 
or Hineinleben in systatic thought,

474. 
ERLEBNISSTROM, I, as true time, in phenomenology, 
27. 

EROS, II, the cultural Eros, an element in 
formative power, 291. 

EROS AND AGAPE, II, Eros described in 
PLATO'S Symposion, is an aesthetical lovedrive to the beautiful; Agape is religiouslove; they form no contrast, 153. 

(INNEN-) ERREGUNGEN, III, of the simplestliving beings, in WOLTERECK, 729. 

ESCHATOLOGY, I, the eschatological aspectof cosmic time; eschaton is what is or 
happens beyond the cosmic temporallimits, 33. 

ESCHATOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE, II, in cultural 
development, 337. 

ESSENTIA DEI, I, is pure form, rejected inOCCAM, who conceived of God's power inthe Greek way, of the unpredictableanangke, 187. 

ESTABLISHED CHURCH, III, an interlacement 
with the State, 376. 

ESTATES, THE THREE, III, secular government 
in Church matters, according to theLutheran views, 516; they originated fromthe late medieval nationalist view of the 
Church, 517. 

ETERNAL RETURN OF THINGS, II, the eternal 
return of things in cyclic time, inGreek thought, 294. 

ETERNAL TRUTHS, I, in LEIBNIZ, 224 ; they 

68 

are eternal possibilities in God's creativemathematical thought, 225, 242. 

ETERNITY, I, is set in the heart of man, 31. 

ETHICS, I, of SOCRATES, 123; in heteronomous 
ethics the concept of the highestgood becomes the "unconditioned totality 
of the object of pure practial reason",
in KANT, 382. 
-, II, NIC, HARTMANN'S ethics is a material 
value philosophy, 51 ; BRUNNER'S dialectical 
ethics, 143; ARISTOTLE'S ethics is 
determined by the Idea of the highestgood, 144; his idea of virtue, as the permanent 
control of the will over the sensory 
functions according to the rules ofthe practical reason, 145; BARTH deniesthe science of ethics, in AALDERS and E. 
BRUNNER, 148; a definition of Christian 
Ethics, 156; modern economic ethics; 
medieval economic ethics, 241; in PLATO; 
popular morality in ancient Greece [note]
321; in HEGEL the body politic is the incorporation 
of true morality, into whichthe antithesis with subjective right isdissolved; justice is identical with theIdea of ethical power, 396. 

ETHNOLOGICAL TIME, III, and historical 
time, 334, 335. 

ETHNOLOGY, II, evolutionistic ethnology;
MORGAN; TYLER; FRAZER, 265, 267, 270. 

EUCKEN, II, pointed out the antinomiesin the pseudo-natural scientific concep


tion of economics, 345. 

EULER, II, DIDEROT on him, 339. 

EUSEBIUS, II, his Christian conception ofhistory, 268. 
EVIL, II, and good, in NIETSCHE, 148; the

radical evil (KANT), 150. 
EVOLUTIONISM, I, in the 19th century, 210;

and CHARLES DARWIN, 465. 

EVOLUTION, II, is an analogical concept;
progressive evolution of mankind, inCOMTE, 194; in DARWIN, 260, 261. 
-, II, found adherents especially in prehistory 
and ethnology; but even in ethnology 
evolutionism has been refuted;
the evolutionism of SPENSER; that of 
JAMES FRAZER; in WELLS' History of theWorld, 270. 

EVOLUTIONISM, DARWINISTIC, III, B. BAVINK'S; 
LLOYD MORGAN'S, 84 ; CHARLES

DARWIN; HAECKEL, 95. 

EXCESS OF LEGAL POWER, I, in HOBBES' 
view of the State as a perfect instrumentof domination (Leviathan) , 217 ; in ROUSSEAU'S 
conception of the "general will" asexpressed in legislation, 320.
-, II, retributive justice reacts againstevery "ultra vires"; it binds every legalpower to its limits, 134 ; the principle oftalion in primitive tribal laws, 136; excessive 
striving after power dashes itself 


to pieces against the power of the otherdifferentiated cultural spheres, 290; disregard 
of the normative principles of lawcan in, the end only create social chaos,
336; LOCKE'S conception of absolute innate 
human rights is incompatible withthe relative nature of right as such, 357

(395) ; in the idea of the Roman CatholicChurch as the guardian and interpreterof the "lex naturalis" there is question ofan excess of legal power, 359; also in theancient Roman figure of the "patria potestas", 
411. 
—, III, PLATO'S and ARISTOTLE'S conceptions 
of the polis embracing allhuman societal relationships, regulatingeven human procreation ; in ARISTOTLEeven common meals for all citizens;
PLATO denied to the governors any private 
household and property, 205, 206;
ARISTOTLE knew of no limits to the competence 
of the legilator, nor did PLATO,
209 ; in THOMAS AQUINAS the Church hasto judge of any excess of legal power onthe part of the State, thereby exceedingthe ecclesiastical competence, 221, 311;
the general juridical concept of competence 
includes a mutual balance and delimitation 
in juridical harmony of conflicting 
interests and excludes any excessof legal power, 283; excess of legal poweron the part of a despotic government un


dermines the fundamentals of authorityitself, 442; ROUSSEAU'S "general will" didnot imply any material legal criterion of 
the competence of the legislator, 443;
Pope BONIFACE VIII's Bull "Unam Sane-
tam" and the excess of legal power onthe part of the Church, 511, 512; LUTHERinvoked the secular government to organize 
the temporal church, and thus occasioned 
excess of legal power on the partof the State, 514 ; compare the episcopal,
the territorial and the collegial systemsof Church government, 515-518; a civil

judge will avoid any excess of legal power 
in civil law-suits when a juridicaldecision of an internal nature taken bya competent organ in. a community has tobe considered; he then employs a formalconcept of unlawfulness, 682, 683; amaterial excess of legal power on thepart of the State cannot violate the internal 
sphere-sovereignty of an organizedcommunity so long as the latter puts up aunited resistance in defence of its original 
sphere of competence, 685. 

EXCOMMUNICATION, I, as a means to check

the polar tensions in the dialectical motive 
of nature and grace, 183. 

EXISTENTIALISM, I, has broken with theCartesian (rationalistic) Cogito, and replaced 
it by existential thought conceived 
of in an immanent subjectivistichistorical sense, 13 ; modern existentialism 
is unable to dissociate its theoretical 
attitude of thought from the "Gegenstandrelation", 
52; existentialism, the Human

 


69EX-SISTENT 

istic kind, can grasp the free historicalex-sistere only in its theoretical antithesisto the "given reality of nature" (for HEIDEGGER 
"Dasein" as the "ontological"
manner of being against the "givenworld" as the "ontical"; for SARTRE "leneant" as against "l'etre") ; HEIDEGGER'Sphenomenologism is irrationalistic, inDILTHEY'S hermeneutical historicist way;
existentialistic thought assumes an antithetical 
attitude, notwithstanding the factthat it wishes to create a great distancebetween existential thinking as authentically 
philosophical and all scientificthought which is directed to a "Gegenstand"• 
in existentialism "Gegenstand" is

"das Vorhandene", i.e., the given object,
53 ; in so far as it considers time to be anexistential of the "authentic ego" it remains 
entangled in the diversity of meaning 
of the terms "ego" and "selfhood" (note3) ; the "empirical selfhood" as an objectivation 
of the self in the past and subjectto causality; the "ideal selfhood" relatedto the "present" and the "future" freedom,
58; even in the religious absolutizing ofthe historical aspect of our existence wetranscend time, 59; opposes existentialthinking to theoretical, 129 (note) ; HEIDEGGER'S 
existentialism, 214.
—, III, and the Divine Revelation inJesus Christ, according to S. KIERKE


'

GAARD, 782. 


EXISTENTIAL ISOLATION, III, and the impersonal 
attitude; the dread of nothing


ness, 30. 
EXISTENTIALS, III, care, dread, concern;


HEIDEGGER, 781. 
EXLEX, II, in primitive societies a foreig


ner is hostis, ex-lex, 183. 


Exo- AND ENDO-PLASM, III, endo- and exoplasmatic 
constituents, in a living cell;
endoplasmatic corpuscules in a cell,
102 ; exo-plasm has autonomous division,
increasement, capability of stimulation,


but it lacks viability, 718, 719. 


EXOGAMY, III, a law of the clan (.= sib),


355. 
EXPERIENCE, II, is rooted in self-consciousness, 
560; cf. S.V. NAIVE EXPERIENCE. 

EXPERIMENTAL METHOD, I, is one of isolation 
and abstraction, 561. 

EX-SISTERE, I, a temporal ex-sistere cannot 
be identified with the ex-sistent cha


racter of the selfhood, 58.

—, II, If HEIDEGGER had had real insightinto cosmic time, he would not havesought the selfhood's transcendence inthe inner-experience of the ex-sistere, inthe historical time-aspect with its antici


patory future, 531. 

EX-SISTENT, I, modern Humanistic existentialism 
can grasp existence as the freehistorical ex-sistere only in its theoretical 
antithesis to the given reality of na



 

EXTATIC 

ture ( HEIDEGGER : Dasein as the "ontological" 
manner of being against the "given
world" as the "ontical"; SARTRE : "le 
nêant" against "l'etre", 53; religion is the
ex-sistent condition of the ego; a purely
temporal ex-sistere may never be identified 
with the ex-sistent character of the 
religious centre of human nature, 58 ; the
autonomous ex-sistere of the ego lost in
the surrender to idols must be broken 
down by the Divine ex-trahere from the
state of apostasy if man is to regain his
true ex-sistent position, 59. 


EXTATIC, II, extatic absorption in sub
human creatures by their temporal existence, 
480. 


EXTENSION ( SPATIAL) , II, not identical
with "body", 436, 437. 


EXTENSIVE IDEA OF HISTORY, II, HERDER'S 
Idea of History, 280. 


EVIL, I, radical evil, in KANT, 175; evil 
has not any original power, according to
AUGUSTINUS, 179; the metaphysical evil
in LEIBNIZ is the limited, 194; this metaph. 
evil is necessary if there is at all
to be a cosmos, according to LEIBNIZ, 257;
he distinguishes three kinds of evil, 258,
259, 260. 


FACE, II, Human face shows logical
thought in a concrete act of thinking, 377. 


FACTS, I, LOCKE distinguished empirical
facts from the necessary relations between 
concepts, 269.
—, II, BAYLE discovered that historical 
facts are not given to scientific enquiry,
but that science has to analyse them, 353.
—, III, can only be conceived in their
structural meaning, 330. 


FACTS AND NORMS, II, this Kantian distinction 
is advanced by LEENDERTZ
against the normative conception of God's
guidance in history, 233. 


FACULTY PSYCHOLOGY, II, modern psychology 
conceived feeling as one of the
chief classes of Erlebnisse and co-ordinated 
it with volition and knowing as the
two other classes. This misconception is
due to the faculty psychology of the 18th
century since ROUSSEAU, especially to
TETENS and KANT, 111. 


FAIRCHILD, H. P., III, 
Dictionary of Sociology, 177. 


FAITH, I, the modal meaning of faith is
related to divine revelation; it is an 
eschatological aspect of cosmic time; and
groups the eschaton and that which is
or happens beyond the limits of cosmic
time; e.g. the days of creation; the order
in which regeneration precedes conversion, 
etc.; this aspect should not be iden


70 

tified with the historical modus, 33; faith 
is bound to Holy Scripture and theChurch Tradition; the Bible becomes a 
law book, in OCCAM, 184; the faith in the 
validity of mathematics is a product ofthe imagination and of psychical association, 
according to HUME, 289; JACOBI opposes 
emotional faith to the understanding, 
458, 459; faith and reason, inLUTHER, 513. 
—, II, ecclesiastical power, 69; faithpower, 71; primitive popular faith andlegal life, 183; historical development offaith, 291 ; of Humanism ; WEBER'S ReligionsSoziologie; substrata of faith, 292; andMarxism; WEBER'S Die Protestantische 
Ethik and der Geist des Kapitalismus,
293; faith and the meaning of history;
civitas Dei and civitas terrena; Christ 
the consommation of historical power,
294; fear of natural powers is the content 
of primitive faith; deification ofnatural powers, 297; faith is not identicalwith religion; we must distinguish thesubjective function, the root, the principium, 
content and direction; KUYPER'Sview of pistis, 298; the heart and faith;
direction of faith; KUYPER'S provisionaldefinition, his material circumscription;
faith and intuitive evidence, 299; KUYPER 
discusses sub-functional anticipations offaith; faith and imago Dei; CommonGrace; its direction after the fall into sin; 
THOMAS AQUINAS' actus intellectus givenby supernatural grace; TROELTSCH andOTTO psychologize faith ; BARTH'S VieW 
of Christian faith as a new creation; regeneration 
and faith; faith is not a newcreation, 300 ; BARTH'S Scholastic dualism, 
301; natural man's impotence to havefaith in Christ; sin is not a counter powerbut derives its power from creation; faithand the heart; Christ's work in the heart, 
302; the dynamics of faith; faith andscience; church and state; the identification 
of religion and faith leads to

the view that religion is a special department 
of life; VOLKELT'S view of faith as 
cognitive intuition, 303 ; HUSSERL'S 
Glaube is noetic sensory perception, doxa,
not certainty; this refers to a faith anticipation 
in sensory experience; the nuclear 
meaning of faith is transcendentalcertainty related to divine revelation;
there is no concept of faith possible, 304;
its lawside is the faith aspect of Revelation; 
revelation is expressed in all creation; 
faith and culture cohere; progressive 
revelation; its historical aspect; dynamics; 
development, 305; faith in aclosed and in a deepened state; general 
revelation and particular revelation(in the Scriptures) , 306 ; the Word revelation 
is universally intended; with ABRAHAM 
came revelatio particularis; Israel;
revelation to a community, not to individuals; 
Christ as Root and Head of reborn 
humanity; no theologia naturalis, 307;
revelation in nature disclosed by the 


Word; idolatry; the Roman appeal toPAUL'S Epistle to the Romans 1 : 19-23;
natural revelation apart from the Wordturns into a law of sin, 308; CommonGrace and general revelation ; Commongrace and Special Grace; the closed aspect 
of faith is the extreme limit of apostasy, 
309; apostate faith has -reversedits direction away from God in the absolutization 
of created things; primitivefaiths look like diseased mental states;
restrictive faith is the running to wasteof faith; Christian faith is deepened byits openness to the Word after the regeneration 
of the heart, 310; regenerationreverses the direction of faith; semenreligionis; paganism; elements of truthin apostate faith and philosophy, falsifiedon the immanence standpoint, 311; magic; 
FRAZER'S opinion, 312; worship ofnature and of death; animism; polytheism; 
montheism, 313; magic and idolatryare interrelated; BETH'S and VIERKANDT'Sdiscoveries of a pre-magical culturalstage, 314 ; the restrictive revelationalprinciple is not the original phase; thebiotic sensory substrata of a closed society 
are deified; EDUARD VON HARTMANNon faith in nature, 315; the restrictiverevelational principle turns into a curse;
personality becomes diffuse; mana; personal 
and impersonal, natural and supernatural 
are merged; taboo, 316; henotheism; MAX MULLER; split personality atinitiation; totemism, 317; BERGSON, DURKHEIM'S 
views; CASSIRER'S criticism; moral 
analogies in faith in primitive cults,
318, 319; the opening process; Greekaesthetic humanizing of polytheism; HESIOD'S 
theogony; the gods of measure, order, 
and harmony; HOMER; personal cultural 
gods; CASSIRER'S view, 320; he identifies 
faith and religion; natural and cultural 
religions; art and science; nationalconsciousness, gods; Olympians; the expansion 
of the normative lawspheres;
Orphism; deified nous undermines polytheism; 
self-reflection, 321; transcendental 
selfconsciousness; faith anticipates therevelation of the deity in the selfhood;
man becomes aware of his freedom to 
devise idols, 322; the principle of divinerevelation in the order of creation; mantranscends his own self in the central relation 
to his Origin; positive and negativeopening of faith; CASSIRER'S view, 323; 
the self is identified with some normative 
function; Egypt; the juridical and themoral function; immortality; OSIRIS thejudge; Iranian belief; Veda, rita; the Upanishads, 
Annan, Brahman, 324 ; mythicalconsciousness; mythos and logos; mythosatheos; myth and magic; and fiction, 325;
iltman of the Upanishads is not a primitivemagical form of faith; KANT'S idea of thetranscendental logical subject is a Humanistic 
article of the faith in reason, hence 
a myth; a logical unity without multiplicity! 
not every faith is mythical; myth 

71 FASCISM 

is fictitious; though not like a tale or alegend; its time aspect; myth falisfiesRevelation; misinterprets truth; the pis-
tic interpretation of the Deus absconditusexperience, 326; PLATO'S nous was amyth; DESCARTES' and LEIBNIZ' intellectus 
archetypus; the self was identified withmathematical thought; the image of theirmathematical god; KANT'S homo noumenon 
is the image of his moralistic god;
HUME and KANT had a mythical idea ofthe temporal coherence; the profane andthe sacred; Brahman-atman; faith versusmaya : noumenon-phenomenon ; PLATO'Sme on and apeiron; LEIBNIZ' peras as themetaphysical evil; the myth of deterministic 
nature and creative human freedom,
327; naturalistic thought and transcendental 
thought are mythical ; not in a restrictive 
structure of faith but of deepened 
pistis; mana faith separates theprofane from the sacred, 328; the mysterious 
is magical; LEVY-BRUHL thinksthat primitive thought is pre-logical; heinfluenced CASSIRER, 329; mythicalthought is pistological and so is the faithin reason, 330; the dualism of faith andscientific thought, 334 ; the faith inscience and the personality-ideal, 357;
the faith in "reason" determines KANT'S 
doctrine of Ideas, 492; in Nominalism,

564. 
—, III, of totemistic clans arose from 
economic causes, according to W. KOPPERS, 
360. 
FALL INTO SIN, II, has obfuscated our experiential 
horizon, 549. 

FAMILY, THE HUMAN, III, its six stagesof development, according to L. H. MORGAN, 
331; extended family as a societalinterlacement, 653; the internal psychicalinterlacements between the members of a 
family : authority and respect, 294 ; interlacement 
with national feeling, feelingsof social standing, etc., 295; in the bioticaspect of the temporal existence of themembers of a family there are structuralcommunal interweavings, 299 ; they function 
in an anticipatory way under theguidance of the moral family bond, 300;
the same holds for the members' physicochemical 
and spatial relations, their originin the female ovarian cell and the male 
sperm; the care of their bio-physicalexistence is guided by love; the spatialcentre of the home, 301; a harem is onlyenkaptically interwoven with the marriage 
bond, an unnatural enkapsis, 305;
in primitive societies in India the pirraura 
relations are abnormal sexual relations 
interwoven in an external enkapsis

with marriage, 341. 

FARMING BUSINESS, A MIXED, III, is an enkaptic 
interlacement, 652. 
FASCISM, III, its conception of the cos


mos; it is a mental attitude in reaction to

the superficial materialism of the nine



 

FASHION 

teenth century, according to MUSSOLINI,
414 ; the Fascist State is a will to power;
the myth; Fascism was State-minded, 415;
its economic autarchy concept, 484. 


FASHION, III, and the leading houses, 591;
is an integrating factor in inter-individual 
social relations, 592; fashion in 
sporting-clothes, etc., 661. 


FATE, II, in SPENGLER, replaces the concept 
of causality, 283. 


FECHNER, G. TH., III on the macrocosm; 
the somatic-spiritual individual Super-
being; his pantheism, 630, 631.
-, III, 
Zend-Avesta oder fiber die Dinge des
Himmels and des Jenseits, 631. 


III, our bodies belong to the larger, orhigher, individual body of the earth, justas our spirits belong to the larger andhigher spirit of the earth; the spirit ofthe earth is not the sum total of the earthly 
individual spirits, but their unifiedhigher, conscious coherence embracingthem all; our individuality, independenceand freedom are only relative; the earthand all other stars are individual animate 
beings, 631. 

FEELING, I, F. BRENTANO ascribes an intentional 
relation to feeling as a Gegenstand, 
52; according to FICHTE naïveman's emotional belief grasps reality,

458. 
-, II, is the nuclear moment in the psychical 
lawsphere, 111; is universal, and
implied in every Erlebnis as a quality of
the totality of our inner experience, 111,
112; is characterized by its polarity; sensations 
are elementary subjective feeling
phenomena referring to objective sensory
qualities of things or events. Indifference
is also a feeling attitude, 116, 117; feeling
in animals has a closed structure, 184 ; is 
absolutized in HUME, 332; of bloodrelationship, 
424. 


FEELING OF JUSTICE, II, the feeling aspect
must first be deepened in its anticipatory
spheres, before there can be any differentiation 
in the feeling of justice, 177. 


FERMENT, III, its effect is chemical, 730. 


FEUDALISM, II, the rise of feudalism in 
the Frankish kingdom, 252. 


FICHTE, J. J., I, 
Wissenschaftslehre, 78, 90, 417-425, 428
-432, 437, 440-448, 455, 479; 
Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre, 
301; 
Die Bestimmung des Menschen, 449, 450;
Grundrisz des Eigentiimlichen der W. L.
in Riicksicht auf das theoretische VermOgen, 
433;
Transzendentale Logik, 449;
Die Tatsachen des Bewusstseyns, 449,461;
Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, 
401, 414, 415, 416, 434-437; 


72 

Veber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre, 
415; 
Appellation an das Publikum gegen dieAnklage des Atheismus, 438;
Ueber die Wiirde des Menschen, 447; 
Aus einem Privatschreiben, 438; 
Grundlage des Naturrechts, 436;
Ueber den Grund unseres Glaubens an 
eine glittliche Weltregierung, 438;
Riickerinnrungen, Antworten, Fragen,
455, 456, 458; 
Werke II, 458, 461, 473, 474; 
Werke IV, 459, 461, 475, 487, 488, 489, 
490, 491, 492; 
Werke VII, 459, 477, 478, 480, 481, 482,483, 484, 485, 486, 494; 
Grundziige des gegenwArtigen Zeitalters,
459; 
Sonnenklarer Bericht an das grOssere Publikum 
caber das eigentliche Wesen derneuesten Philosophie, 455, 460;
Reden an die deutsche Nation, 479, 494; 
Letter to Schelling, 477;
Werke V, 492. 
-, I, the "thinking ego" has a reflexive-
logical sense in the "Wissenschaftslehre",
78; LITT identifies "pure" reflexivethought and being (like FICHTE and HEGEL), 
79;"practical freedom" is the hypothesis 
of his epistemology in the first edition 
of his "Wissenschaftslehre"; he introduced 
a dialectical logic in order tobridge the Kantian gulf between epistemology 
and ethics; the postulate of continuity 
implied in the freedom motive 
broke through the boundaries accepted

by KANT with respect to the theoretical 
use of the transcendental Idea of freedom, 
90; he is the father of the dialectical 
way of thinking; he spoke of the tensionbetween "absolute ego" and "thinkingego", 142; he refused to hypostatize theoretical 
thought, in his Kantian period; tohim the root of the selfhood was in the 
"practical", not in "theoretical" reason,
143; the concept of substance is antinomous; 
so is that of the "Ding an sich",
301 (note) ; the development of the conception 
of the Idea displays a dialecticaltension, 329; the Idea of autonomous 
freedom is elevated to the all-inclusive 
root and origin of the cosmos, 358; heeliminated the natural "Ding an sich" andproclaimed the ethical ideal of personality 
to be the deepest root of the cosmos,
362; F. accepted the domination of thepersonality ideal over nature at the expense 
of the science ideal, 390; in hisfirst "Wissenschaftslehre" the dialectical 
development of transcendental freedomidealism (413) took its start from thetranscendental reflection upon the Idea 
of freedom as the hypothesis of thescience Ideal; he abandoned the concept"Naturding an sich"; all functions ofconsciousness are referred to their absolute, 
transcendent root, viz., the self-
consciousness as absolutely free ego; thisego creates itself by means of a free prac



tical act (Tathandlung) ; it is the dynamic 
totality of activity; from it originatesthe entire cosmos; even necessity is aproduct of the activity of the absolute -I-,
414; his highest principle is: the egoposits itself; the ego is the origin of theanalytical principles and elevated aboveall logical determination; but the firstprinciple of the doctrine of science proclaims 
the absolute sovereignty of "practical 
reason" in the sense of the Humanist 
ideal of moral freedom, 415; the absolute 
ego's first "Tathandlung" is thinking 
of itself; the laws of this reflectionare tacitly pre-supposed as known andestablished; this absolute ego must bequalified as a mere hypostatizing of theuniversal concept "ego" as the totality ofreason; it is the absolute free activity ofthe moral function hypostatized in thepersonality ideal, 416; the Humanisticcontinuity postulate required mathematical 
thought to produce a cosmos of itsown according to the mathematicalscience ideal, and similarly the samecontinuity postulate drove the Humanisticpersonality ideal to exceed the modalboundaries of the aspects and to elevatethe moral function to their basic denominator; 
natural necessity became a product 
of the hypostatized moral freedom;
"theoretical" reason, practical reason,
and faculty of judgment are no longermutually isolated, but are related to theroot of selfconsciousness viewed byFICHTE as freely creative moral activity;
the ego is the absolute subject; every,
category is derived from it; everythingto which it may be applied has its reality 
transferred from the ego to itself, 417;
the logical principle of identity is merelythe form of the conclusion from "beingposited" to "being", abstracted from theproposition "I am" by the elimination ofthe content implied in the ego; A is A isan A created and activated in the ego;
the ego is not static but infinite activity,
therefore identity is not an immobile logical 
form but an infinite task in thedetermination of the cosmos; the modeof activity of the human mind, disclosedin the logical form of the jugdment ofidentity, is the category of reality; thiscategory is reduced by FICHTE to the absolute 
ego as actual origin of all reality;
its relation to sense experience is notbased on the "natural thing in itself", buton the absolute ego; the logical judgmentof contradiction is also referred to the 
first principle of the doctrine of science.
418; the principles of identity and contradiction 
are found among the "facts ofempirical consciousness"; logic cannotjustify them ultimately; in the judgment:
non-A is not A we can .ask: has indeed 
non-A been posited, and under what condition 
of the form of the mere act has it 
then been posited? logical antithesis isan absolute act of the ego; it is possible 

73 FICHTE, J. J. 

only on the condition of the unity ofconsciousness in its thesis and antithesis;
originally nothing is posited but the ego;
all opposition must be made with reference 
to this ego; but the antithesis of theego is the non-ego; "to the ego a non-egois opposed", from this material judgmentFICHTE derives the principle of contradiction 
; further abstraction leads toKANT'S second category, viz., that of negation; 
like all other categories it is adialectical point of transition to the ego'sconsciousness of itself as infinite free 
activity; in the second principle ofthe doctrine of science there is an overt 
antinomy; the non-ego (i.e. nature) is tobe posited only in the ego as absolutetotality, 419; but as antithesis it cancelsthe ego; "thus the second principle isopposed to itself and cancels itself"; butthe third principle requires the synthesisof ego and non-ego: "The ego posits thenon-ego in the ego by limitation of itself; 
further abstraction leads to the category 
of determination; in FICHTE'Sthought dialectical thought usurps thetask of the cosmic order; thus the boundaries 
of the modal spheres are relativized; 
the absolutized moral aspect is conceived 
as an unlimited totality from whichby division the limited, finite functionsmust originate, 420; FICHTE'S basic denominator 
is formulated in his statement: 
"Our world is the material of our duty,.
rendered sensible; this is the authentically 
real in things, the true basic matter 
of all appearance"; the moral function is. 
thus torn out of the cosmic temporal coherence 
and becomes a meaningless formand no totality of meaning; FICHTE'S"Wissenschaftslehre" raises "ethics to the 
position of metaphysics" (KRONER) ; speculative 
dialect demands that the thesis of 
the "absolute ego" should not fall outsidethe dialectical system; F.'s absolute ego ofthe thesis is separated by him from thelimited ego of the antithesis, 421; F.'sdialectical system in the "Wissenschaftslehre" 
is only concerned with the finiteego; the absolute synthesis remains aninfinite task; here the Idea of the absolute 
ego as ethical task makes its entry;
the predicate of freedom can hold forman insofar as he is an absolute Subjectwho has nothing in common with thenatural being and is not even opposed toit; freedom and natural necessity shouldbe united in the Idea of the ego as undetermined 
by anything outside of itself;
this Idea is contradictory, but nevertheless 
set up as our highest practicalgoal; the final antinomy in the dialecticalsystem cannot be reconciled logically,
only ethically, 422 ; F.'s Wissenschaftslehre 
attempts to clear up the problem ofthe epistemological synthesis by relatingthe latter to the root of the self-consciousness, 
423 ; the root of self-consciousness isthe "homo noumenon"; the synthesis is 


FICHTE, J. J. 74 

then rooted in antinomy; the antitheticala "pre-logical" function of the ego as arelation in theoretical thought becomes alink between understanding and sensibilogical 
contradiction in a dialecticallity, a link that exceeded the theoreticalsense; he derives KANT'S categories ofantithesis; only our cosmic self-conquantity 
and quality by abstraction fromsciousness can grasp the deeper unity ofthe absolute ego; later on he does theall the aspects of reality; but a "functionsame thing to the categories "substance",of feeling" (FicHTE's idea) cannot accom"
inherence"„ "causality", "interaction"plish an interfunctional synthesis, 431;
starting from the synthesis between rea-FICHTE holds that an explanation of thesonable freedom and sensory nature,occurrences in our mind is impossible424 ; he tries to derive the science ideal without absolute opposites; these occur-
from the personality ideal by the way ofrences rest on the productive power ofthe continuity implied in the freedomimagination which can only exist if ab-
motive; "everything reproduces itself andsolute opposites appear as fully unsuitedthere is no hiatus possible; from anyto the power of apprehension, 432; FICHTEsingle term one is driven to all the rest",supposes he has cancelled dogmatic ideal425; 
FICHTE searches for the radical unityism and dogmatic realism in a higherof philosophical reflection in a selfhoodcritical idealism; in his "Grundrisz" ofbeyond the theoretical diversity of syn-1795 he follows the reverse method in 
theses; he shows insight into the conti-comparison with his earlier work; henuous coherenice of the cosmos; but hisstarts from the "fact" of consciousness;
insight is misdirected by his Humanisticthe ego sets itself in opposition to itself;
cosmonomic Idea; the limits that reason in producing itself it also produces thesets to itself rest on free self-limitations non-ego by imagination, creates sensoryof reason itself; ultimately the absoluteimpressions, as parts of the ego itselfsynthesis should be effected by the hy-and finds itself in them; so it transcendspostatized ethical thought of "practicalthe sensory function and makes the senreason"; 
there is one function whichsory perceptions its own; this activityachieves this absolute synthesis creatingcannot cease before the selfhood has be-
form and content alike, 426; to FICHTE come conscious of the ego having pro-
it is "the power of productive imagina-duced the non-ego in itself; in the longtion" proclaimed the free creating originrun sensation changes into the object ofof sensory matter; it is theoretical andintuition and experience, and the latterpractical; determining theoretical thoughtinto the transcendentally conceived "Geposits 
rigid conceptual boundaries and genstand" of epistemology, until finally 
cannot bring about the highest synthesis; "theoretical reason" becomes conscious 
it remains confined in the final antinomy of itself as creating the "Gegenstand";
between the free infinite ego and the fi-empirical reality is phenomenality ofnite ego limited by the non-ego; they cannature constituted in a synthesis of senbe 
synthesized only in the concept ofsory and logical functions, but withoutmere determinability, not in that of deter-a "natural thing in itself"; the non-egomination, 427; the boundaries betweengives the ego the impulse necessary forthe finite ego and the finite non-ego inmental representation, 434 ; the guidingthe infinite ego are relativized to attainthesis of the "doctrine of science" was: 
to the final theoretical synthesis, which"the ego posits itself as determined byis grasped as "determinability"; the egothe non-ego"; it also implies the guidingposits itself as finite and as infinite atthesis of the practical "doctrine ofthe same time; this change of the ego inscience": "the ego posits itself as deter-
and with itself is the faculty of imagina-mining the non-ego"„ 435; in this "praction, 
428; it is thetic, antithetic and syn-tical part" an account is given of the rethetic 
activity; making consciousnessduction of the theoretical to the practicalpossible through reflection; it is a freereason; the restless dialectical movementact not determined by any grounds; itof the theoretical reason depends on senoperates 
prior to all reflection as pre-sation, the first limit the ego sets to it-
conscious activity; it hovers betweenself; the first impulse for the develop-
determination and non-determination; itsment of the entire dialectical series, i.e.,
product is called into existence duringsensory impression, makes "theoreticaland by means of this hovering; by "pre-reason" possible and is not to be derivedconscious" FICHTE apparently meansfrom it; in its innermost nature the ego"pre-theoretical productive imagination",is "practical", the root of personality and429; the productive imagination has "nonature is in the moral function; the egofixed standpoint" and keeps the meanoperates causally upon the non-ego, thebetween definiteness and indefiniteness,antinomy between the ego as absolutefinitude and infinitude; thus the oppo-being and its dependence and limitationsites "ego and non-ego" are united; theas intelligence should be overcome; the"productive imagination" is a "Factum",non-ego must remain opposed to the egoa synthesis, and a function of feeling; aif the I-ness is not to become an emptycomparison with KANT'S transcendentalform, 436; the free infinite ego ought"productive imagination", 430; F. sought continually to set limits to itself as "in



 

75

telligence" by an objective non-ego, in
order to provide its infinite striving activity 
with a resistance to be overcome
giving content to this striving; without
striving there is no object; therefore the
practical reason is the basis of the theoretical; 
("KANT's categorical imperative"); 
the root of selfconsciousness is
the hypostatized moral function, 437; the
finite, moral, practical ego can have no
other goal for its infinite striving than
to become absolute; the tension between
form and matter, consciousness and
being, freedom and nature, personality-
and science-ideal, should be eliminated 
in the absolute Ego (the Divinity). KRONER
says: "even the absolute Ego needs the
"impulse" if it is to be an ego", 438; the
theoretical ego is necessarily coherent
with the practical ; it must reflect on its
being limited; practical and theoretical
ego are the same, striving being their
common root, 439; he supposes that he
has destroyed fatalism by referring to the
absolute freedom of reflection and abstraction 
and to the possibility of man's
focusing attention to something according 
to moral duty, 440; the sensory ego
is driven forward by itself to become a
self-knowing intelligence, and the ego
dominated by sensual impulses becomes
the ego determining itself as "pure ethical" 
will; in the ego there is an original
striving to "fill out infinity"; a Trieb (i.e.
impulse) is a self-producing striving; the
impulse to reflection (Reflexionstrieb) is
also an "impulse toward the object"; feeling 
is the expression of a suffering, a
passivity, an inability; it is united most
intimately with activity: I feel — I am
the feeling subject — and this activity is
reflection — a limitation — I feel, I am
passive, 441; this limitation supposes an
impulse to go beyond it; that which
wills, needs, embraces nothing more,. is
— naturally with respect to itself — unlimited, 
and thus satisfied and not satisfied; 
the course of FICHTE'S deductions,
442; a longing drives the ego in itself
beyond itself and discloses an outer-
world in the ego; causality is fulfilment
of desire; compulsion arises through the
limitation of longing by the non-ego, its
object is something real; the object of
the longing has no reality (the ego in itself 
has no causality, which would cancel
it as "pure activity") but ought to have
it in consequence of the longing which
seeks reality; both objects stand in anti-
nomic relation to each other (nature and
freedom) ; the reality felt determines
(limits) the ego which as such determines
itself (in the reflection about the feeling) ;
its longing becomes the impulse to determine 
itself, and this reality, 443; in the
longing arises the Empfindungstrieb, the
drive toward knowledge, striving to regain 
for the ego the natural object created


by it, not yet experienced by the ego as 

FICHTE, J. J. 

its own; it strives to represent the objectin the I-ness; the limit is felt as felt, i.e.,
as created in the ego by the ego; by anew reflection the sensory feelingchanges into an intuition; intuition sees,
but is empty; feeling is related to reality,
but is blind; the feeling ego must keeppace with the intuition which views whatis felt as something contingent in the object, 
444; the impulse toward a change offeelings is the disclosure of the longing;
the changed feeling must be intuited aschanged if the ego is to be able to reflectabout the impulse to change its feelings;
approbation ; its opposite is displeasure,
445 ; the synthesis in the approbation maynot be performed by the spectator, i.e.,
theoretically, but the ego itself must perform 
it; intuition and impulse alike mustbe understood as determined and self-
determining; the drive towards change,
that towards mutual determination of the 
ego through itself, that towards absoluteunity and perfection in the ego; the absolute 
drive; the categorical imperativeis merely formal without any object, 446;
"Thou shalt" is an eternal task never to be 
fully accomplished; in FICHTE'S identityphilosophy the personality ideal has absorbed 
the science-ideal along the line ofthe continuity postulate of freedom, butat the cost of sanctioning the antinomy;
his hymn on the dignity of man, 447; theFaustian passion for power turned intothe power ideal of the personality, 448;
in the science-ideal "nature" is hypostatized 
in its mathematical and mechanical 
functions for the sake of the continuitypostulate; in FICHTE "nature" only hasmeaning as material for the performanceof our duty; he could not project a natural 
philosophy, 449; in KANT'S dualisticworld-picture the antinomy between thescience- and the personality ideal impliedthe recognition of both factors; FICHTEconverted this antinomy into a contradiction 
within the personality ideal itselfbetween free activity (spontaneity) andbondage to the resistance of the "lower"
nature, or between "Idea" and sense; toFICHTE the world is the posited contradiction, 
and dialetic is the method to 
know it, 450; in his second period, since1797, there are no new viewpoints withrespect to the dialectical development ofHumanistic thought; but under the influence 
of JACOBI'S philosophy of feelingFICHTE'S third period showed a newtrend, an irrationalistic conception of theHumanistic personality ideal, 451; hisconnections with the"Sturm und Drang";
his titanic activity motive and strong voluntarism 
is congenial with this "Storm

and Stress" glorifying the "activity of thegenius"; Sturm und Drang artistically expressed 
in its ego-drama; activity andselfhood are the two poles in this worldouf thought; GOETHE'S Faust; SCHILLER'S"Rauber": "the law did not yet form a 


FICHTE, J. J. 76 

single great man, but freedom hatcheshis form-matter schema, except in hiscolossuses and extremities"; HAMANN'S Aesthetics; the freedom motive began its"Sokratische Dekwiirdigkeiten", 452;contest against the old rationalist science-
FICHTE separates theoretical knowledgeideal under the inspiration of problemsfrom real life; real life is feeling, desireof the philosophy of culture, 470; FICH-
and action; speculation is only a meansTE'S "metaphysics of the spirit"; he for-
to form life, 455; his answer to the chargemulates the question of the individual ego,
of atheism ; "our philosophy makes life,472; and that of the metaphysical found-
the system of feelings and appetitions, theations in being for the spiritual life; thehighest, and allows to knowledge every-consciousness of the other ego is essenwhere 
only the looking on", 456; F.'stial in one's own self-consciousness; the 
view of the relation of the dialectical other ego is the Thou; the plurality ofconcept and the reality of life, and thatspiritual beings outside myself have anof HEGEL, who posits that the concept isaltogether other mode of being with res,
first and the contents of our representa-pect to me than the material externaltions are not; in FICHTE KANT'S irrational "world" of "nature"; the reality of the"sensory matter of experience" is theworld of spirits arises from the moral"true reality"; it is accessible to imme-foundation of the ego itself; the duty todiate feeling, not yet logically synthesizedrecognize every free individual as an in-
and deeply irrational; "all theoreticaldependent moral "end in himself"; a me-
knowledge is only image... you seek aftertaphysical "synthesis of the real world ofall something real residing outside thespirits" is needed; this synthesis is thatmere image"..., 457; this "something"of the Absolute Being with infinite free-
can only be embraced by belief, not bydom; the individual ego is one of thescience; like JACOBI FICHTE considers be-many concentration points of the "Ablief 
to be the diametrical opposite of cog-solute Spirit"; the ego has the form ofnitive thought, 458; the true reality isexistence ("Dasein") from the Absolutediscovered only by belief rooted in theBeing, but definite, concrete, individualimmediate feeling of the drive to absolute,being from the interaction with the spiriindependent 
discovery of true reality totual world; all finite selves owe their 
vital feeling alone in his third period;being to a transpersonal life of reason,
however, he concludes with the eulogy473; the bond of union among the spiritsof the "Wissenschaftslehre"; it will free is their communion as individual egos, asthe whole of mankind from blind chance appearances of the infinite Origin; theyand destroy fate, 459; he now recognizes originate from a metaphysical actus in-
both the value of "empirical individual-dividuationis in which time itself acity", 
and feeling as an immediate sourcequires individual points of concentraof 
knowledge of reality; such individual-tion; the Spirit's Being is transpersonality has an inner value as being rooted inbeing of freedom; the moral order is thethe individuality of the moral ego itself,transpersonal bond of union for all finite460; KANT'S categorical imperative nowspirits, 474 ; the Absolute Being, becausehas to read : "Act in conformity with youractually infinite Divinity, is eternallyindividual destination and your indivi-transcendent to reflection and knowledge,
dual situation; in the individuality of thethe inner real ground of the possibilityempirical world is disclosed the materialof rational freedom, and as such, the ab-
of our individual duty; in each act ofsolutely irrational; all life is only imageperceiving and knowing is concealed aor schema of God; "nature"is the reason"
practical" kernel of feeling; the princi-able ethical appearance of God, who onlypium individuationis is sought in feelingreveals himself in this appearance inas the concentration point of knowledge;ethical activity; God is thus the absolutethe transcendental critical line of hypostasis of the creative, subjectivethought never vanishes from FICHTE'S ethical stream of life, which is the trans-
Wissenschaftslehre, the irrationalist phi-personal bond and totality of the indilosophy 
of feeling never gained a com-vidual free subjects, 475; his moral basicplete victory in it; FICHTE tries to in-denominator has changed into a histordividualize 
the contents of his activistic ical one; historical existence is the final 
and moralistic personality ideal in themode of being of finite existence; thecadre of its universally valid form, 461;world is an infinite chain of "challenges"
the change in his valuation of individual-of "freedom-evoking and spirit-cultivatingity brought FICHTE to a speculative meta-inter-action of self-acting life-centres inphysics that was completely differentcreative freedom producing ever newfrom his earlier identity philosophy;faces from nothing"; the theme of his-
there was a general and growing oppo-tory is that of striving upwards to freesition 
to Kantian criticism ; "Criticism" dom, 476; the higher ethos of spiritualhad vested all value in the universallylife is in the creative historical process;
valid forms of reason and depreciatedthrough the concentration points of thethe individual, as the transcendental ir-great leading personalities the absoluterational; KANT had raised the problem ofmetaphysical Idea is realized in the Ideasindividuality only within the frame of of art, state, science, religion ; history is 


 

77

essentially made by great personalities,
477 ; natural individuality must be annihilated 
by the individual spirit in thehistorical process, 478; individuality canonly be understood from the individualcommunities, in which alone it has temporal 
existence; a nation is a historicaltotality; he denies both the reality ofabstract general concepts (universalia)
like the Nominalists, and the possibilityof deriving subjectivity from a law; hisabsolute transcendental Idea is not a universal 
but a totality; he rejects any hypostatization 
of general concepts in thesense of Platonic ideas; his system is notmonistic Eleaticism, for being in thelatter sense is static, in FICHTE it has anessential relation to the historical process; 
it is the divine origin of all activityand cultural individuality; he has brokenthrough the Critical form-matter schema,
479; but his conception of the Idea as ametaphysical totality of all individualityeasily leads to a priori construction inthe philosophy of history; he requires aphilosopher to be able "to describe a-
priori the whole of time and all possibleperiods of it"; thus his idea of a historical 
world-plan, which is construed a-
priori and defined in a teleological sense:
"the aim of the earthly", 480; life of mankind 
is "the arrangement of all its relations 
within it with liberty according toreason; this World-plan is the Idea ofthe unity of the whole of human earthlylife", his five chief periods of world-
history whose subject is the "humanrace"; he offers no point of contact forthe science of history; the latter ishanded over to the annalist; philosophyshould also make a logical analysis of thegeneral conditions of "empirical existence" 
as the material of historical construction; 
his "logic of the historicalmode of enquiry" emphasizes the irrational 
character of historical experience;
FICHTE'S "transcendental-logical" delimitation 
of the historical field of investigation, 
481; the philosopher has to guarantee 
to the historian his basis and foundation; 
physics is the science of constantand recurrent features of existence; the 
science of history investigates the contents 
of the flowing time-series; thephilosopher of history has to comprehendthe facts in their incomprehensibility,
clarifying their "contingency",therefore,
to differentiate between speculation andexperience; he opposes any attempt todeduce historical facts from the infinite 
understanding of the Absolute Being,482;
neither the historian nor the philosophercan say anything about the origin of theworld or of mankind, for there is noorigin at all, 483; the relationships between 
the components of historical development 
to be known a-priori and thoseto be known a-posteriori; his Idea of aNormalvolk, which was dispersed over 

FICHTE, J. J. 

the seats of rudeness and barbarism, andhad been in a perfect "Vernunftkultur"
through its mere existence, without anyscience or art; the a-priori component ofhistory is the world-plan leading manthrough five periods of world-history;
history in its proper form is the a-posteriori 
component, 484; he distinguishestrue historical time from empty time; heanticipates modern phil. of life in hisconception of historical time; but at thisstage (485) his historical logic exhibits afundamental hiatus; true science of history 
is restricted to the collection ofmere facts with the exclusive criterion of 
the external sequence of years and centuries 
without any regard to their content; 
in the Staatslehre he discovers thelogic of historical truth; he attempts thesynthesis of nature and freedom in thehistorical field, 486; the intermediateconcept is: free force; "dead nature" isgOverned by mathematical-mechanicallaws; "living actual freedom" is ruled bythe autonomous moral law; the problemis: what rules "free force", the realm offreedom products, i.e., that of visible,
cultural freedom ; then history is lawless,
487; but freedom disclosed in historypossesses a hidden law-conformity, viz.,
the providence of the moral Deity; thislaw conformity is not knowable from rational 
concepts; it is a hidden telos, 488;
in this way the law is made a simple reflection 
of individual free subjectivitydisclosed in the "irrational process", 488;
it is the precipitation of the irrationalistpersonality ideal, and the negation ofveritable historical norms; in it the 
nomos is merely the reflection of theautos; the individual person's membership 
of a particular community is a constitutive 
historical factor owing to thehistorical tradition and the "common 
spirit" that all the members share; thisleads to a universalist conception of society, 
viewing the latter as a "whole" inrelation to its "parts"; FICHTE irrationalizes 
the Divine world-plan; this is nowsought in the individuality of the historical 
matter, 489; what he posited as absolutely 
factual (and therefore incomprehensible), 
might be posited by an Understanding; 
history thus becomes the principium 
individuationis, as the synthesisof value and temporal reality; the gradual 
conquest of faith by the understanding 
is a merely formal one; it is only thequalitatively individual moral naturewhich, as given freedom, produces thematerial of history, since it becomes anindividual paradigm for the producingby freedom; the concept of a moral procreation 
or nature of man has replacedProvidence (as a Miracle) ; Providence isthe "transcendental-logical condition"
for the possibility of historical experience, 
490; the miraculous is further

transferred from the individual to corn



FICTION THEORY 78 

munities viewed as "individual total-to the term "organism", replaced it by 
ities"; we must conceive the appearance "organization", 406 ; defended State eduof 
freedom as a totality absolutely closed cation like PLATO, 442. 
in time, and therefore we must assume 

FICTION THEORY (of the unity of a COM-

some society possessing by its mere exi


munity), III, devised by the Canonists,

stence the morality to which it leads 

(sub vote Canonists), 233-234; taken

subsequent societies; this is FICHTE'S 

over by the Humanists in their doctrine

conception of a original "highly gifted 

of natural law (cf. s.v. natural law), 235;

people" (das geniale Volk) ; historical 

the fiction theory denied the real unity

development is the non-recurrent indivi


of an organization and conceived of it as

dual and "lawless" realization of value; 

a mere juridical construction, 236.

it is of higher value than what recurs 
periodically according to uniform laws FIDEISM, III, in EMIL BRUNNER'S view of 
of nature; the historical is the totality of the Church, 509. 
what is new and creative individual, 491; 


FISHER, E., III, the complicated model of

nature is static being; the infinite con-

a polypeptid molecule projected by or-

tent of "freedom", the moral task, re


ganic chemistry, 720.

mains incomprehensible, the image of God, 
to be experienced only in the revelations FISHER, LUDWIG, II, 
of history; revelation is the synthesis of Die Grundlagen der Philosophic and der 
irrationality and originality; religious Mathematik, 385. 
life in the historical empirical form of 


FLAGELLATES, III, 772, 773.

Jesus is the immediate individual revelation 
of the Idea of God in the appear-FLOURENS, II, on the connection between 
ance; FICHTE brings all normative sub-eye and ear, 373. 
ject functions under a historical basic 

FLUID CONCEPT, 1I, in BERGSON; he con-

denominator; yet he denies all knowable 

nects intuition with concepts in an in-

historical determination of facts, because 

ternally contradictory way; he deprives

de-termination can only issue from a law 

the intuitively founded concept of every

regulating and limiting the subject func


analytical delimitation and considers it

tions in their infinite individual diver-

as the fluid expression of "psychical em


sity, 492; his discovery of the national 

pathy", 481.

community of a people as an individual 

historical totality; under the influence of FORAMINIFERA, III, 107, 108, 773, 774. 

Romanticism he broke radically with the

FORCE, III, in naive experience; and ener


atomistic cosmopolitan view of the En


gy, in STOKER'S philosophy ; in LEIBNIZ'

ligtenment, 493; he opposes the national


monadology; and the "essence" of things;

ity to the State; the latter is to him a 

and SCHELER'S thought, 70.

mere conceptual abstraction ; the former 

is "true historical reality", which has an 

FORM, II, is a dynamic principle of de


"earthly eternity", far above the State, 

velopment in ARISTOTLE, 558.

494 ; he absolutizes nationality to the 

— III, is the nodal point of enkaptic in-
true historical revelation of the eternal 

terlacement, 703.

spiritual community of humanity; 
FICHTE and the Historical School; in re-FORMATIVE CONTROL, II, is the original 
cent times this view of the relation be-meaning nucleus, qualifying the histortween 
nation and State has been elabo-ical sphere, 203. 
rated in detail in the irrationalistic "plu-

FORMERS OF HISTORY, II, give cultural form

ralistic" sociology Of GEORGES GURVITCH, 

to the social existence of persons (Per


495; he classified philosophy into a "Doc


sonkultur), 198.

trine of Science" with a theoretical and a 
practical section, 529. FORM-MATTER MOTIVE, I, in Greek thought,
—, II, 27; on juridical numerical analogies esp. in ARISTOTLE'S view of time and moin 
validity, 167; FICHTE and SCHELLING tion, 25; the Greek philosophical theoria 
influenced the Historical School; and was dominated by the form-matter motive.
Neo-Kantians, 201, 232, 248; his idea of a this term derives from ARISTOTLE, 36; from 
highly gifted original people as bearers the purely intentional anti-thetic strucof 
the original civilization, 264 ; his theo-ture of the theoretical attitude of thoughtry of absolute innate human rights, 395, it is inferred that the logical function is421, 505. really separated from all pre-logical as—, 
III, in his actualism the marriage pects of the body; this conclusion was 
bond depends on the actual subjective directed by the dualistic form-matter mocontinuance 
of love between the part-tive; THOMAS AQUINAS held that the enners; 
a modern irrationalistic conception, tire rational soul must be an immortal 
307; his actualistic view of sexual love; and purely spiritual substance because 
he derived the essence of marriage from he considered it to be characterized by 
the bare moral notion of love, ignoring the theoretical activity of thought, 44; 
the civil juridical aspect and the internal the form-matter motive dominated the 
juridical side of marriage, 318; objected classical Greek world of culture and 


thought, 61; it originated from the encounter 
of pre-Homeric religion of life(a nature-religion) with the cultural religion 
of the Olympic gods; the formerdeified the eternally flowing Stream oflife which was unable to fix itself in anysingle individual form; periodicallyemerging transitory beings are subjectedto the horrible fate of death, anangke orheimarmen6 tychê; this matter motivewas expressed, a.o., in the worship ofDIONYSUS imported from Thrace; theOlympian religion was that of form; essentially 
a deification of the cultural aspect 
of Greek society; the form-mattermotive was independent of the mythological 
forms it received in the old nature 
religions and the new Olympian culture-
religion, 62; pure form in SOCRATES,
PLATO, ARISTOTLE, is the Deity, 67; AUGUSTINUS 
introduced the form-matter motive 
into the interpretation of Genesis 1 : 1,178; this motive in LEIBNIZ, 190; this 
motive is applied by KANT to the moralprinciples; his categorical imperative isa logicistic judgment, 374 ; MAIMON attempts 
to overcome the antinomy of theCritical form-matter schema, 405. 

—, II, in metaphysics and epistemology; 
PLATO; ARISTOTLE; PYTHAGOREANS;
medieval philosophy; Augustinian Scholasticism 
; — hyle, me on ; dynamei on;
ousia delimits hylê PLATO'S eideticnumbers; and geometric figures astranscendent being; the choorismos; thephenomenal world; the antinomy inthis conception; dialectical logic; the"ideal matter of Augustinian Scholasticism; 
goneness and plurality in PLATO;
Socratian kalokagathon ; rational soul;
PLATO'S anangke; evil; ARISTOTLE'S eidosas immanent essence, 10; ARISTOTLE'S 
hylê, morphê, entelechy; the universaland the individual; the soul is the 
form of the body; the world order isintelligible; the actual nous is the Arch&
of all delimitation of meaning, 11; matteris the principium individuationis; formis a constructive a priori conditon of sen


sory experience in KANT; KANT'S epistemological 
use of the form-matter scheme;
he calls time and space intuitional forms,
and posits the transcendental consciousness, 
12; the form-matter scheme is 
at the back of the distinction between 
reality and meaning, 31;, form and matterin PARMENIDES, ANAXAGORAS, SOCRATES; 
PLATO'S synthesis of Eleatic and Heraclitean 
principles; being and not-being, 56;
PLATO'S Philebus, genesis eis ousian; theIdea of the good and the beautiful; unityand verity; peras and apeiron, 57; theform-matter schema applied to law bySTAMMLER, 209 ; by SIMMEL, 210 ; ARISTOTLE'S 
use of the form-matter schema with 
respect to individuality, 419. 

FORM-MATTER MOTIVE, III, in ARISTOTLE, 7;
intelligible matter, 8; form is the cause 
' 

79 FRAZER, JAMES 

of matter; the form of a natural composite 
is an ousia; deity; spirits; soul, 15;
form and matter of a work of art, 127. 

FORMAL AUTONOMY OF A FREE ASSOCIATION, 
III, is a positivistic construction and cannot 
clarify cases of civil wrong on thepart of the public administration, 686. 

FORMALISM, II, in juridical theory, 422. 

FORMALISTIC SCHOOL OF SOCIOLOGY, III, 
founded by SIMMEL, 242. 

FORMALIZATION, II, of the concept triangle,
i.e., all meaning individuality in the spatial 
aspect is abstracted from such a concept, 
458; triangle is a generic concept,
geometrical, 459; formalizing cannot exceed 
the boundaries of the logical modus; 
false formalisms (e.g. dimension ingeneral) ; KANT'S transcendental logicalcategories and forms of sensory intuition,
459; the limits of formalization, 495. 

FORMAL LOGIC, II, cannot be purely analytical; 
it is a formalized logic, examining 
the analytical aspect; it eliminatesanalytical individuality and all total individuality 
structures, 464. 

FORMS OF THOUGHT, II, empirical realityis the synthetically arranged sensorilyperceptible in the Kantian conception;
everything not belonging to "empiricalreality" is called a construction, a form.
of thought, 537. 

FOSTER CHILDREN, III, and motherly love,

292. 
FOUILLAE, ALFRED, III, "idees forces" are 
operative ideas in a psychological sense;
he rejects a collective consciousness distinct 
from that of the individuals, 189, 


FOUNDATIONAL ENKAPSIS, III, of opened
structures of inter-individual relations 
and those of free associations, 657. 


FOY, W., III, an adherent of the Kulturkreislehre, 
333. 


FRAENKEL, A., II, 


Einleitung in die Mengenlehre, 88. 


FRANCE, III, 
Der Organismus, 641.
—, III, he gives an instructive picture of
the infinitely complex organic articulation 
of a "simple" cell, 641. 


FRANCISCANS, I, their Augustinianism influenced 
LUTHER, 512. 


FRAZER, JAMES, II, 
The Magic Art, 312;
The Worship of Nature, 313.
—, II, an evolutionistic ethnologist, 270;
considered magic as not to belong to religion; 
his definition of religion, 312; he
holds magic to be a preliminary to religion, 
313.


III, 
Totemism and Exogamy, 339.
—, III, his evolutionist hypothesis of 


FREEDOM 

"group-marriage", 339; explained levirateas a weakening of polyandry, 340. 

FREEDOM, III, the metaphysical questionof freedom in KANT'S Kritik der praktischen 
Vernunft, 748. 

FREEDOM TO DEATH, I, in Existentialism, 

214. 
FRIENDSHIP, III, is not a natural community; 
DIETRICH BONHOEFFER'S poem"Der Freund", 179. 

FREUD, S., II, 
Die Zukunft einer Illusion, 313. 
—, II, his view of faith, which he identifies 
with religion : a universally humancompulsive neurosis originating from theinfantile Oedipus-complex; the father isfeared and admired and as such the primitive 
image of god; all religion is illusion, 
312, 313. 

FREYER, II, on the historical stream of 
consciousness, 225. 

FROBENIUS, LEO, III, 
Ursprung der Afrikanischen Kultur, 333,


336. 
—, III, applied RATZEL'S idea of cultural
derivation to entire cultures and used the 
historical method, 333. 
FUETER, E., III, 
Geschichte der neueren Historiographie,


335. 
FRUIN, ROBERT, II, history is the science
of becoming, 193. 

FUNCTION, II, the mathematical theory offunction of RIEMANN; in arithmetic, inWEIERSTRASZ, 484. 

FUNCTIONAL INDIVIDUALITY, II, modality isindividualized by the structures of individuality, 
414; subjective and objectivejuridical facts; lawful deeds and delicts;
law making volitional declarations, 415;
sources of law; the individuality of a juridical 
casus; the individualizing of themodal sphere in its gradations towardscomplete subjective individuality, 416;
modal individualization cannot be inferred 
from the modal meaning-structures; 
the rationalistic Scholastic principium 
individuationis is internally contradictory; 
form as a universal yields individuality 
through matter; if matter isuniversal, form constitutes individualitybut loses its ideality, 417; individualityin Greek metaphysics, an apeiron as aguilt; in Christian thought there is notension between the universal and the 
individual, (law-side and subject-side),
but correlation; in Christ is the transcendent 
root of individuality; Corpus Christianum 
is a religious organism; ST. PAUL ;
the fulness of individuality is refractedin the modal aspects; the cosmic coherence 
of meaning, 418; Nominalism andRealism; the modal all-sidedness of individuality; 
the Greek form-matter 

80 

scheme; the Humanistic nature and freedom 
scheme; they show dialectical tension 
between the universal and the individual; 
ARISTOTLE'S substantial form 
with matter, a synolon; principium individuationis; 
THOMAS AQUINAS materia 
signata vel individualis and the immortalsoul, 419; if an aspect becomes a formof thought, it cannot be individualized;
REMBRANDT'S Nightwatch; intercourse inmarriage and in a club; in the form matter 
scheme there can be no question ofindividuality, 423; a modal aspect individualizes 
itself within its own structure 
but is not exhausted thereby; completeindividuality is a-typical; nuclear or original 
types; sexual propagation; its retrocipations 
are unoriginal types, onlyconstituted in functional anticipation ofthe sexual biotic types (which are anticipatory 
modal types) ;• juridical types ofindividuality; psychical feelings of blood-
relationship are biotically founded, 424;
numeral, spatial, physical anticipatorymodal types of individuality; the typical 
constant h in quantum mechanics; theLOSCHMIDT number -n-; numeral relations 
between the particles of a cell (chromosomes, 
e.g.), are anticipatory types; typical 
albumen formations; mathematicaltypes are anticipatory only; sensoryphantasy, also in animals; not typicallyfounded in the biotic sphere; phantasmsof sensory imagination are intentionalobjects; entirely apart from the sensory 
objectivity of real things, 425; in theopened structure of this type all subjective 
types of aesthetical projects arefounded; these projects are realized inobjective works of art; the objective typeof a picture differs from that of a painting 
or a sculpture; that of juridical typesof movables and immovables; of servi 
lutes praediorum rusticorum or urbanorum, 
etc., 426; individuality belongs tothe apeiron in KANT'S philosophy, 450;
the plastic horizon comprises structuralindividualities, our insight is subjectiveand fallible, 583; individual knowledgeand society, HUSSERL, SCHELER, SPENGLER :
SCHELER'S "essential community", 584—
594; the insight of genius, 595. 

FUNDAMENTUM PETENDI, III, according toTHORBECKE, / 679. 

FURNITURE, III, tables, 137 ; chairs, etc., 
style Louis XIV; — 141; preference forantique furniture, in certain social circles, 
146. 

FUSTEL DE COULANGES, III, 
Histoire des institutions politiques del'ancienne France, 335; 
La cite antique, 352.
—, III, restricted the historian's task to 
written records, 335; his description ofthe 'eternal' whole of generations of thesame `gens', an undifferentiated organized 
community, with the cult of ancestor 


81 GEGENSTAND 

worship, 352; [cf. s.v. Undiff, Org.we must proiqeed from the theoreticalComm.]. antithesis to the theoretical synthesis be


tween the logical and the non-logical as


pects, if a logical concept of the non


logical "Gegenstand" is to be possible,

44 ; the antithetical attitude offers no

bridge between the logical aspect and itsGAIUS, III,non-logical "Gegenstand", 45; the start-
Institutiones, 193. ing-point of all special synthetic acts of

thought must be sought by looking away

GALILEO GALILEI, I, laid the foundations of

from the "Gegenstande" of our knowledge

modern mathematical natural science, to-

and exercising self-reflection, 51; in the

gether with NEWTON, 193, 201; the law

phenomenological attitude the "absolute

of motion had been formulated by Nico


cogito" (i.e. absolute transcendental con-

LAUS OF ORESMA before GALILEO, 202; the 

sciousness) is opposed to the "world" as

differential number anticipates the mean-

its intentional "Gegenstand"; SCHELER

ing of motion in its original exact pre-

considers the "Gegenstand-relation" as

physical sense, as it is viewed by GALI-

the most formal category of the logical

LEO, 236.

aspect of mind; in this relation the hu


—, II, his kinematics, 99, 100; he was a

man mind can oppose itself not only to

leader of history, 243.

"the world" but even make the physio


—, III, on "substance", 19. 

logical and psychical aspects of humanGALL-WASPS, III, and oak, 649. existence into a "Gegenstand", 52; modern 
Humanistic existentialism grasps

GANZHEITSKAUSALITAT, III, in DRIESCH, 

existence only in its theoretical antithe


735. sis to the "given reality of nature"; it
GASSENDI, I, his atomism was intrinsi- creates a great distance between existential 
thinking as authentically philoso


cally contradictory, 255. 

phical and all scientific thought as "ge-
GAUSSIAN COORDINATES, II, are physicalgenstdndlich", "Gegenstand" in existent-
anticipations in geometry, 101. ialism means "given object" (das Vor


handene), 53; a generic concept cannot

GEFUHL IST ALLES, I, in GOETHE'S Faust, 

bridge the modal diversity in the theore


453. 
tical "Gegenstand-relation", 77; if LITT'SGEGENSTAND, I, in the phil. of the Cos-"pure thinking ego and its Gegenstand" 
monomic Idea, is what is opposed to the(the concrete ego) were one and thelogical function in the theoretical atti-same, the Gegenstand-relation would be

tude of thought; in current philosophyeliminated, 81; LITT confuses Gegenstandthe "Gegenstand" is usually called "ob-and object, 86; the Gegenstand is identiject" 
(6), in theoretical thought the "Ge-fied with "temporal reality" in imma


genstand" is formed by the non-logicalnence phil., 87; the Gegenstand relationaspects distinguished from the logical as-in LITT, 143; in KANT the G. is a chaotic 
pect and synthesized with the latter, 18;mass of sense impressions received in

in theoretical thought we oppose the an-the a-priori forms of intuition (space andalytical function of our real act oftime), 352. 

thoiight to the non-logical aspects of our—, II, is absolutized into a "substance", 11 ; 
temporal experience; the latter becomeKantian categories and the Gegenstand,
"Gegenstand", i.e., the opposite to our15; in NICOIAI HARTMANN, 19; transcenanalytical 
function; this antithetic struc-dental Idea and the concept Gegenstand inture of the theoretical attitude can pre-KANT, 44; an in MErNONG, 33; absolutizedsent itself only in the temporal totalG., 220; the historical Gegenstand and in-
structure of the act of thinking; this an-dividualization, 274, 275 ; in realistic Schotithetic 
structure is only intentional, notlasticism, 388; G. and intentional objectontical, 38, 39; the modal structure of theidentified in Nominalism, 389 ; up till KANTanalytical aspect itself is given as athe G. was considered to transcend the 
whole, and not in analyzed moments; in-phenomenon; KANT's view, 430; KA'NT'Sthe theoretical attitude we can analyzeconception of the "datum",431; the G. as athe logical aspect, for the latter expressesresistant to the logical function, 433; G. andin its modal structure the temporal orderobject, 434 ; Phenomenologists conceive ofinto which the different aspects arethe Gegenstand as a datum in the intentiofitted; 
the theoretic act is not identicalnal relation of the act of consciousness, aswith the aspect; in its theoretical ab-the intended correlate to the latter; thestraction the modal structure of the lo-"world" as intended G., 466; constitutedgical aspect has only an intentional exist-by the "transcendental consciousness"
ence in our act of thought and can be(HUSSERL) ; it is the subjective reality ofmade into the Gegenstand of our actuala substance which is independent oflogical function, 40; dogmatic epistemo-human experience in pre-Kantian metalogy 
identified the subject-object re-physics; in KANT it is the universallylation with the Gegenstand-relation, 43; valid and objective of experience; there 


 

GEIST

is no G. of knowledge, neither of the
knowing subject or the "transcendental
consciousness", or the ego, or the "cogito"; 
the Origin of the Gegenstand is to
be sought in the theoretical disjunction
of the cosmic meaning-systasis in which
our selfhood is not found; the Gegenstand
must be in the diversity of the modal aspects 
owing to a theoretical setting apart,
467; the enstatic and the antithetical 
attitude of thought, 468; the "epoche" and
the continuity of time; varieties of "Gegenstande", 
469; we think "Gegenstdnde"
a-priori in KANT, 504; the Gegenstand in
HUSSERL, 544. 
—, III, metaphysical view of the Gegenstand 
relation as corresponding to reality, 
10; ARISTOTLE'S "ousia" as a Gegenstand, 
13; difference between the Gegenstand-
relation and the subject-object relation, 
22; a thing is not a Gegenstand,
27, 28; naïve attitude is not antithetical 
like the Gegenstand relation, 31; this relation 
has nothing to do with naïve exp.,
33 ; this relation makes modal sphere-
sovereignty seem to contradict the internal 
unity of a thing, 63; the absolutization 
of the Gegenst.-rel. gave rise to the
pseudo problem of body and soul, 64. 


GEIST, I, in MAX SCHELER, 52; its individual 
disclosure, in SCHELLING, 471. 


GEISTESWISSENSCHAFTEN, II, On the dialectical 
standpoint of philosophy the
method of investigation should be "geisteswissenschaftlich" 
if philosophy is to


attain to transcendental self-reflection, 
76; Geisteswissenschaften should be detached 
from spatial objectifying thought,
according to Neo-Kantianism, 390. 


GELASIUS, III, delimited the competence
of the state from that of the church, 216. 


GELPCKE, ERNST, I, 
Fichte und die Gedankenwelt des Sturm 
und Drang, 451, 452, 453.
—, I, his characterization of the new Humanistic 
postulate of freedom and its
aversion to all universal rational norms, 


453. 
GEMEINSCHAFT (i.e. community), III,
TONNIES' distinction, 177, 178; and 
SCHELLING, 184, 185, 186; SIMMEL, VON 
WIESE and WEBER resolve the social Gemeinschaft 
into a formal system of relations 
and interactions, an individualistic 
view; LITT holds that the ego is interwoven 
in the Gemeinschaft of the 
closed sphere, 251; its expressive symbolical 
forms are rendered transpersonal,
252; closed spheres of the second degreeand social mediation in a subjective andin an objective symbolical way; this mediation 
creates unity and continuity inthe social whole; the true communal relationship 
is the closed sphere, a spiritual 
reality, 253 ; and phenomenologicalAnalysis, 254; LITT's view is a new type 

82 

of social universalism; authoritative societal 
organizations have the relation of
authority and subordination implied in
them ; LITT'S Gemeinschaft lacks norms, 
and therefore authority, 255; this is due
to his phenomenological prejudice; his
argument is that normative and anti-
normative are mutually exclusive; the
error in this argument; LITT's "spiritual
reality" concept, 256; he seeks the root
of temporal reality, of the selfhood, in
time; "closed spheres" and social mediation 
are not structural principles guaranteeing 
the inner unity e.g. of a political
community; the spheres overlap; his
quantitative criterion of the scope of the
"closed spheres" of the second degree,
257; there is one final all-embracing
"closed sphere", says LITT, 258; it is constituted 
in terms of inter-communal cultural 
relations between component
groups, 259; SMEND applies LITT'S theory
of Gemeinschaft to the state, 259; LITT 
excludes the organizations from his community 
concept, 260; medieval society
completely realized the "Gemeinschaft",
271; TONNIES' category of "Gemeinschaft", 
571, 574. 


GENERAL CONCEPTS, II, are equivocal and
unqualified, 77. 


GENERIC CONCEPTS, I, in special science, 
cannot bridge the modal diversity, 77,
193, 194. 
—, II, e.g. triangle, 459. 


GENES, II, are organizing regulators, 751;
the bearers of hereditory dispositions,
754; genes and chromosomes, 755. 


GENESIS, III, or becoming, is an analogical
concept requiring modal qualification in
scientific thought, 193; active and passive


genesis (in HUSSERL) , 558. 

GENESIS EIS OUSIAN, II, in PLATO, 10, 57. 

GENETIC TENDENCY, I, of philosophy towards 
the Arche; and the Critical Method, 
according to Neo-Kantians, 9. 

GENETIC COHERENCE, III, between marriage 
and family; but the first pair ofhuman beings did not develop from marriage, 
656. 

GENETIC AND EXISTENTIAL FORMS, III, and 
pheno-types of organized communities,
174; genetic forms of compulsory organizations, 
191; the Genetic Juridical Formof the church institution; it functions as 
the nodal point of enkaptic structural interlacements 
in the juridical law-sphere,
554 ; the genetic forms of Church andState do not show any genetic relationwith natural institutional communities; 
the opening of non-political inter-communal 
and inter-individual relations presupposes 
the rise of organized institutional 
communities, 659; genetic andexistential forms of enkaptic interlace



ments, 663, 664 ; genetic forms may beconstituent or constitued, 665-668. 

GENITAL CELLS, III, in poly-cellular beingscan propagate endlessly, 722. 

GENIUS, I, KANT'S doctrine of creative 
genius recognizes subjective individuality, 
387; in HAMANN'S thought, and inthat of the Sturm and Drang generally,
452; Geniale Volk (highly gifted people)
in num, 491. 
—, II, historical genius, 246; the bearersof the original civilization were a nationof geniuses, according to FICHTE, 264;
their theoretical intuition can grasp certain 
modal law conformities syntheticallyin the free direction of its attention without 
previous exhaustive analysis, 483;
individual genius; its insight; and theprocess of disclosure, 595. 

GENO- AN VARIABILITY TYPES, III, and radical 
types, 93. 

GENTES, III, the Roman gentes were patrilineal 
sibs, 353. 

GENUS PROXIMUM, II, in ARISTOTLE, 14; 
and the differentia specifica, 15, 132. 

GENY, FRANCOIS, II, rejects fictions in ju


ridical science, but not in juridical technique, 
125. 

GEOLOGICAL HISTORY, II, the natural genesis 
of geological formations, 196. 

GEOLOGY, II, in often called "natural history", 
when it refers to the natural genesis 
of geological formations and of species 
of plants and animals, 196. 

GEOMETRICO, MORE, II, the Humanistic 
doctrine of natural law started with the 
postulate of dealing with the jural spheremore geometrico, 342. 

GEOMETRIC FIGURES, II, are transcendent,
in PLATO, 9. 

GEOMETRY, I, discovered by DESCARTES,
and considered as the model of anyscientific method, 197; it was invented 
by NICOLAUS OF ORESME, i.e., analyticalgeometry, 202; the geometrical conception 
of the root of reality, 250; SPINOZA'S"eternal and unchangeable geometricaltruths", 250, 251; HUME on "pure geometry"; 
comparison 'with RIEHL'S view,
285; KANT thought a non-Euclidean geometry 
possible in his pre-critical period,
547 (note).
—, II, non Euclidean geometries; thearithmeticizing of geometry; BROUWER,
MAX BLACK; CARNAP; RUSSELL, 78; of 
measure and of position, 103; PONCELET'Sprojective geometry approximates themeaning of motion, 104. 

GEO POLITICS, III, is RATZEL'S name for 
political geography, 500. 

GERBER, III, an adherent of the formalistic 
positivistic constitutional legal theory, 

83 GIERKE, OTTO 

399; juridical formalism leading to adualistic internally contradictory constitutional 
theory (right versus might),

400. 
GERM-CELLS, III, of human beings; theyrefer to the mystery of the spiritualcentre of human existence transcendingall temporal structures, 645; germ-plasm,
or idio-plasm, in PLATE, 732; continuity
of germ-plasm, according to WEISMANN,
739, 757. 
GESAMTERLEBNIS, III, in a social whole, 


according to LITT, 253. 


GESINNUNGSETHIK, I, of KANT; he absolutizes 
the moral aspect, 49.
—, II, KANT'S Gesinnungsethik was meant
to replace the central religious commandment 
of Love; Categorial Imperative is
the "pure form" of the ethical law, 149. 


GESTURES, II, deictic, mimic gestures, 126. 

GEWORFENHEIT, II, in HEIDEGGER, 22. 

GIBBON, EDW., II, followed VOLTAIRE, 350. 

GIERKE, OTTO, II, 
Genossenschaftsrecht, 394, 395; 
Deutsches Privatrecht, 413; 
cf. 344. 
—, II, on the Roman conceptions of ares, 393; the construction of "rights torights", 394, 395; he holds that the realobject of a right can only be the specificobject-sphere of the res affected by thisright, 408; personality rights and copyright, 
412, 413. 
—, III, 
Deutsches Genossenschaftsrecht, 205, 206, 
233, 234, 235, 673, 676, 677, 678, 685, 688;
Joh. Althusius, 232; 
Die Grundbegriffe des Staatsrechts, 394,399, 400, 406; 
Deutsches Privatrecht, 662, 670, 687, 688. 
--, III, holds that the corpora ex distantibus 
(of Stoic philosophy) are limitedto human communities and animal herds, 
only developed and held together by thepsychical social impulse, 226; on thecanonist view of organized communitiesas personae fictae, 233; types of societalwholes are viewed as persons with a"spiritual" organic articulation with aseparate soul (the will of the corporation)
and their body is the organization; thisis metaphysics; the internal law of the"Verbande" had formal juridical autonomy, 
245; G. was aware of the difference 
between communal and interin


-

dividual, and inter-communal relations; 
he distinguished "Individualrecht" from"Sozialrecht", 247; the differentia specifica 
of the State institution, 394 ; State 
and law are two different and independent 
aspects of communal life, 399;• Stateand law are interdependent although entirely 
different aspects of communal life;
the State is the historical form of the 
political organization of a national community, 
400 ; organized communities are 


 

GILSON 84 

"spiritual personal organisms", 406; dis-Drang in the utterance: "Gefiihl ist alles",
tinguishes between "Obrigkeitsstaat" and453. 
"Volksstaat", 435; he is an adherent of the-, II, his humanistic cosmonomic idea, 
Germanist wing of the Historical School593. 
of Jurisprudence, 462; his view of the


GOGARTEN, F., II, dialectical theologian;

craft guilds, 676; and of the internal unity

wrote ethical works, 143.

of the Craft guilds, 677; the guilds possessed 
an independent public law of theirGOITER, III, an organic disease, 647.
own, 678 ; he splits up legal human sub-

GOLDEN AGE, II, of mankind, in PLATO; in

jectivity into that of an individual and

PROTAGORAS, 263.

that of a member of a communal whole, 

-, III, the legend of the golden age in

689. 
PLATO; golden age of innocence, in StoicGILSON, I, a Neo-Thomist; he speaks oftheory, 229. 
"Christian Philosophy", 524. GOLDENWEISER, III, an adherent of BOAS, 

333.
GLAND CELLS, III, 772. 
GoLTz, II, eye and ear, 373.

GNEIST, RUDOLPH, III, 
Der Rechtsstaat, 430.GOOD AND EVIL, II, in NIC. HARTMANN, 148. 
-, III, his civil juridical view of the


GOOD LIFE, THE, III, in ARISTOTLE'S view

State, 430. 

of the polis, 203. 
GNOSTICISM, I, a danger to early Chris-

GOOD SAMARITAN, THE, III, JESUS' Parable,

tianity; it separated creation and re


583.
demption, 177. 
GOPPERT, III, 'Ober einheitliche, zusam-

GOD, I, in KANT God is the postulate of

mengesetzte, und Gesammtsachen nach

practical Reason, 67; ROUSSEAU'S belief 

rOmischem Recht, 226.

about a personal God, 191; God is absolutized 
mathematical thought in DES-GORLAND, II, 
CARTES, 196; He is "universal harmony" Prologik, 51.
in LEIBNIZ, 234 ; in KANT He is the prac--, II, on the order of classes of know-


tical original Being, 350; in FICHTE He is ledge, 51.
the moral order, 459. 


GOTTSCHICK, III,

-, II, is the idea of the good and the

Zeitschr. f. Kirchengeschichte, Bd. VIII,

beautiful in PLATO, 10; the actual nous in 

pp. 590 ff., 518.

ARISTOTLE, 11; ens realissimus in Scholasticism, 
20; God is the pure actual form 

GRACE, III, Christ is the King of Common

in ARISTOTLE; the Arche, 26; the so-

Grace; the State has a general soterio


vereign Creator and Lawgiver of reality

logical vocation, 506; gratia particularis

in the Christian religion, 30; meaning is

changes the root of life and has a con-

religious dependence on God, 31; God as

serving effect and a regenerating opera-

the unmoved mover in Thomism, 39; God

tion, 524; common and particular grace,

is only the Cause of everything in the

525 ; regenerative grace is the root of

sense of the transcendental Idea of 

temporal conserving grace, 527.

origin, 40; God as prima causa, 41;
God's act of creation is revealed in the GRACE, THE SPHERE OF, III, is the church,
Scriptures; this revelation appeals to our-the perfect society in Roman Catholic
selves in the religious root of our exist-belief; the infallible interpreter of "naence, 
52; God's guidance in history, 233,tural law", 220, 221. 
290; intellectus archetypus in KANT, 501; 


GRAEBNER, F., III,

the Idea of God in SCHELER'S thought, 

Methode der Ethnologie, 145, 332, 334,

589, 590, 592. 

335.
--, III, His transcendence and immanence

-, III, We can only experience the ob-

according to MARLET, 72. 

jective reality of things connected withGOD'S GUIDANCE IN HISTORY, I, according the sacred character of the communityto VON STAHL, 488, 489. . to which they belong if we sympathize

with such a community; this fact is im-

GOEBEL, K. v., III, 

portant for the ethnological ascertain-

Organographie der Planzen, 777. 

ment of the objective destination of pri


mitive utensils, 144, 145; he is an adhe-

GOETHE, W., I, quotation from "Faust"

adapted to ANAXIMANDER'S philosophy, 67;rent of the theory of the cultural orbits,
333; "mixed and contact cultures" are of

the activistic ideal of personality per-

a secondary character, 334.

meates all the, expressions of the Sturmund Drang period and concentrates it-

GRAMMAR, II, pure (HUSSERL) , 224 ; pure

self, as it were, in GOETHE'S Faust with 

signification, 224, 225.

its typical utterance: "Im Anfang war die
Tat", 452; Faust formulates the irrationalGRAND, G. GUY, III, 
philosophy of feeling of the Sturm und La democratie de l'aprês-guerre, 479. 



85 GUIDANCE 

GRASZMANN, II, GROSSE, ERNST, III, 
Ausdehnungslehre, 171. Die Formen der Familie und die Formen 
der Wirtschaft, 359.

GRATIA COMMUNIS, I, God maintains the 

—, III, criticized the evolutionist theory

fallen cosmos in His common grace by

of the rise of theJlatural family, 331; the

His creating Word; the redeemed crea


influence of economic factors on the

tion shall finally (175) be freed from its

formation of patriarchal joint families

participation in the sinful root of human

and sib relationships, 359.

nature, and shall shine forth in higher
perfection, 176; Christian philosophy re-GROTIUS, HUGO, I, he externally follows
cognizes in common grace a counter forcethe Aristotelian Thomistic doctrine of the 


against the destructive work of sin inappetitus socialis, but in his theory
the cosmos; this grace is not to be dual-authority and obedience have no natural
istically opposed to particular grace;foundation; they must be described
CALVIN subordinated "gratia communis""more geometrico" out of the simplest
to "gratia particularis" and to "the hon-elements, i.e. the free and autonomous
our and glory of God"; Common grace isindividuals; the construction of the so-
meaningless without Christ as the rootcial contract, 311; he conceived of the
and head of regenerated mankind; it issocial contract in a formal sense like 


grace shown to mankind as a whole,HOBBES and PUFENDORFF, 319.
which is regenerate in its new root JesusII,
Christ, but has not been loosened from De jure belli ac pacis, 359;
its old apostate root, 523. De jure praedae, 407;


Mare liberum, 407;

GREECE, ANCIENT, III, Attic and Dorian 

cf. 167, 395.

phylae; phulobasileis; patrician sibs;

—, II, the doctrine of natural law, 167;

phraties (obai) ; gene; SOLoN's reforms;

my own rights are all that others are

KLEISTHENES' reform; the Pisistratidae; 

forced to respect on account of the legal

phraties become cult-communities, 369. 

order, 395; he denied England's and Por-
GREEN, I, tugal's claims to the property of the openIntroduction (to the Ist part of HUME'Ssea, 407. 
works), 282, 288, 305.—, III, 
—, I, rejects RIEHL'S interpretation ofDe Jure Belli ac Pacis, 212;
DAVID HUME, 282; GREEN thinks that HUME Inl. H. Rechtsgel., 316.
saw the impossibility of reducing arith-—, III, his natural law doctrine used the 
metic to sensory relations, 288; LOCKE'SStoic idea of mankind as an all-inclusive 
theory of the freedom of the will againtemporal community for his foundationevokes an intrinsic antinomy with hisof international law, 169; he denied thatscience-ideal, 305. "distributive justice" has a juridical

sense; he ascribed a moral sense to it; he

GREGORIUS VII, III, viewed the church as 

summarizes natural law in four main

the hierarchy of a sacramental institution

principles pertaining to inter-individual

of grace transcending all the secular re-

relationships, 212; his theory of the con


lationships as the absolute, perfect so


tractual state and the Stoic "social in


ciety, 511. 

stinct", 232; marriage is a contractualGREGORIUS OF RIMINI, I, was more Nomi-relationship giving rise to mutual iura innalistic than OCCAM, 225. re, viz., the right of using each other's

body, 316.

GRENZ SITUATION, II, the animal structure 
of the human body can ,freely manifestGROUP, II, theory of number, 173.
itself in limiting situations, 114. 


GROUP MARRIAGE, III, according to FRAZER,
GROEN VAN PRINSTERER, GUILLAUME, II, his 340. 
adage: it is written and it has happened,

GROUPS, III, particular and all-inclusive

192. 
groups according to GURVITCH, 164 ; the--, III, term "group", 176. 
Ongeloof en Revolutie, 478.

GROUP-TRADITION, II, at a primitive stage

III, Dutch Christian historian ; opposed

of culture civilization seems to be immer


v. HALLER'S patrimonial conception as
sed in a lethargic group-tradition, 245;

the "Christian Germanic State-Idea" to 

guarded by the historical authorities in

the classical republican idea defended by

primitive societies, 259.

the a-priori natural law doctrine; he
abandoned this reactionary view for thatGRUNBAUM, III,
of F. J. VON STAHL, 478. Herrschen und Lieben, 71. 


GRONOVIUS, III, GUARDIAN AND WARD, III, their legal rela-


Ad Grotiam de jure Belli ac Pacis, 316. tion, 279. 


GROSCHE, R., GUIDANCE, II, God's guidance in history,
Der hl. Thomas von Aquin, 12. in the thought of v. STAHL, 249. 



 

GUILDS 

GUILDS, III, are fraternities, primitive 
associations, generally embrace the children 
under age of the guild brothers; this 
is an institutional trait; they may include 
different trade unions, cult communities, 
political organizations, etc., but the principle 
of the kinship community has the 
lead; medieval towns and rural viciniages 
were organized as guilds; guilds also 
exist in primitive peoples; villae, domaines, 
indicated as "familiae" also included 
an agricultural business; feudal vassalage 
and Germanic trustis were connected 
with the domestic community of the seigneur, 
367; they might be under the lead 
of a political structure 'with military 
power, but did not constitute a real state, 
368; BINDER'S definition; the oldest are 
Frankish and Anglo-Saxon, 673; later 
forms, 674; and the sources of law, 675; 
the guild ban is only concerned with the 
positive existential form of the craft organization, 
676. 

GUILD SOCIALISM, III, according to HAROLD 
LASKI, 387. 

GUILT, I, the concept of guilt in Greek 
and Humanistic philosophy has a dialectical 
character, and consists in a depreciation 
of an abstract complex of functions 
of the created cosmos in opposition to 
another, and deified, complex; KANT'S 
"radical evil" is opposed to the Bible, 

175. 
—, II, good faith, good morals, etc. are 
limiting functions of the juridical aspect,
185. 
GUNN, J. ALEXANDER, I, 

The Problem of Time, 32. 

GUNTHER, III, 
Rassenkunde des deutschen Volkes, 496. 


GURVITCH, GEORGES, I, 

Sociology of Law, 495. 
—, I, elaborated FICHTE'S view of the 
relation between a nation and a State, 

495. 
—, III, 
Sociology of Law, 164, 667. 
—, III, all-inclusive and particular societies, 
164, 165; competence in partic. 
groups, 667; he avoids the dilemma between 
mechanistic and vitalistic biology, 
733. 
HAECKEL, III, his "biogenetic basic law", 

95. 
HAELSCHNER, II, cancelled the power of 
enjoyment contained in the concept of 
subjective right, 403. 

HAERING, THEODOR, III, 

Philosophie der Naturwissenschaft, 37; 
Ueber Individualitat in Natur und Geisteswelt, 
635. 

86 

—, III, modern physics omits secondary 
as well as primary qualities of matter, 
37; HAERING'S use of the term "Enkapsis"; 
kidneys, lungs, etc. have relatively independent 
individuality, 634 ; yet the 
total organism displays internal unity 
working in all its individual parts; e.g. a 
muscle; HAERING applies this idea in a 
general way in biology, physics, in the 
"purely psychical realm" of the psyche; 
his conception is oriented to a constructive 
trichotomistic schema of physis, 
psyche, and spirit, 635; a single organ 
may be kept alive outside of the whole 
organism; then it is not the same organ, 
636; he considers atom and molecule as 
real parts of a cell, 641; the fact that a 
psychically qualified reaction in protozoa 
also displays a physico-chemical and 
biotic aspect has been misinterpreted by 
TH. HAERING, 766. 

HAHN, EDUARD, III, an adherent of the 
Kulturkreislehre, 333. 

HALDANE, II, a holistic biologist, 341. 

--, III, his modern holism, 647. 

HALLER, V., III, 
Restauration der Staatswissenschaft, 477. 
—, III, his patrimonal theory of the State; 
monarchy was the normal and oldest 
form of government, based on large scale 
land ownership, 477. 


HALLUCINATION, II, lacks the sense of 
identity on the part of the psychical subject, 
375. 


HAMANN, I, 

Sokratische Denkwiirdigkeiten, 452. 
—, I, What replaces in HOMER the ignorance 
of the rules of art that ARISTOTLE 
invented, and what in SHAKESPEARE the 
igorance or violation of these critical 
laws? Genius, is the unanimous answer, 
452; true reality is in the irrational depths 
of subjective individuality and can be 
grasped only by feeling; HAMANN'S 
thought is dominated by the irrational 
philosophy of feeling, 453. 

HAMEL, WALTER, III, 

Volkseinheit and Nationalitdtenstaat, 414, 
415; 
Das Wesen dCs Staatsgebietes, 415. 
—, III, the background of the German 
racial theory was irrationalistic historistic, 
414; German national socialism was 
folk-minded; Italian fascism was State 
minded; HAMEL considers people and

State dialectically connected, 415; cornmimity 
of territory is the adversary of 
community of blood, 416. 

HAMILTON, I, arithmetic is the science of 
pur time or order in progression, 32.
I

—, I, his so-called quaternion calculus, 

171. 
HANKEL, II, 

Die Elemente der projektivischen Geometric, 
105; 


87 HEGEL 

Theorie der complexen Zahlensysteme,HAURIOU, MAURICE, III, follows DURKHEIM ; 
170, 174. is a Roman-Catholic sociologist; founder—, calls magnitude independent of anyof the institutional school of law; rejectsnumber concept, 170; his view of theDURKHEIM'S "collective consciousness"; 
symbol -i-, 174. the metaphysical Ideas (Neo-Platonic)
function as structural principles in so-

HAREM, III, is an enkaptic interlacement

ciety; their influence is explained by

with the marriage bond, an unnatural en-

psychologically conceived idêes d'oeuvre

kapsis, 305. 

directing the elite of the "entrepreneurs";
HARMONIA PRAESTABILITA, I, in LEIBNIZ, these Ideas are "institutions" or "institu


259. tional Ideas"; their influence through theoperative Ideas d'oevres expands from
HARMONY, II, in feeling; in logical ana-

the elite to the whole of all the individu


lysis; in sociality; in language; in econo


als embraced by a corporation, 189; he

my; in matters juridical, 128; logical har


was first influenced by COMTE ; then by

mony, 176; cultural harmony, 286, 289. 

the philosophy of life; then conceived theHARMONY AND THE STATE, III, the State is State in a semi-Platonic way, 384; he dis-
a beautiful order in which symmetry andtinguishes between subjective purposeproportion prevail, according to J. CAL-and structural principle, but calls theVIN, 480. latter an "idêe d'oeuvre", the embodiment 

of an "institutional idea"; this neo-Plato-

HARTLEY, I, his mechanistic psychology,

nic speculation cannot explain a criminal

264. 
organization of professional criminals; heHARTMANN, EDUARD VON, II, assumes the existence of "bad" ideas, 578; 
Das religibse Bewusztsein der Mensch-bad ideas cannot account for normative 
heit, 315, 317. principles of behaviour in such a cri


minal organization; evil cannot build,

HARTMANN, NICOLA', I, remained involved 

only deform a community; bad ideas are

in a theoretical dogmatism, 35; his cri


incompatible with neo-Platonism, 579.

tical ontology is unacceptable, 544. 
—, II, 

HAVESTADT, G., III,

Grundziige einer Metaphysik der Er-

Der Staat and die nationale Gesamt


kenntnis, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 110, 111, 148;

ordnung, 431.

Ethik, 148. 
—, II, his ontological "spheres of being",HEFELE, III, 


19; his concept of "being"; and of the Conciliengeschichte, 512.


subject, 21, 22; his "Schichtentheorie"


HEGEL, I,

(theory of the spheres of being) cameafter the publication of DOOYEWEERD'SWerke VI, 457. 
"Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee" (Philosophy—, I, tried to think together the anti-

of the Cosmonomic Idea) ; HARTMANN'Sthetic motives of nature and freedom, 64, 
ontological categories; his dichotomy of65; his dialectical logification of history asmaterial versus ideal being is Humanis-the dialectical unfolding of the Absolutetic; his ethics is a material value philo-Idea in the objective Spirit, 208, 209; it issophy, 51; he holds that "matter" is trans-impossible to conceive historical develop-
formed by "life", a lower "layer" into ament in the a priori dialectical thoughthigher one, 111; his view on good andforms of the Hegelian system, which re-
evil, 148; he is an adherent of the pheno-duced man's "creative freedom" to the 
menological school, but with a cosmono-role of a puppet of the World-Reason,
mic Idea of his own, 488.209; the Idea is "present", consequently—, III, his "Schichtentheorie" influenced "essentially now", 328; his absolute Ideal-
WOLTERECK'S ontological view, 762. ism, 329; HEGEL elaborated speculative

dialectic consistently, 421; it is wrong toHARTREE, III, on the elementary wavessuppose that the things which form the

emitted by the electrons of the samecontents of our representations wereatom, 705. 

first, and our subjectivity which throughthe earlier mentioned operation of ab-

HAYEK, II, 

straction and synthesis of the common

The facts of the Social Sciences, 230. 

characteristics of the objects, produces

—, II, his question about the battle of

their concepts, would come only after-

Waterloo as an historical event, 230. 

wards. The concept is rather the true

HEART, I, the human heart is the concen-first", 457; he divides philosophy into
tration, the radix of temporal existence,logic, natural philosophy, and the philo65; 
according to PETER BAYLE, religionsophy of the Spirit, 529.
has a place in the heart and is in open—, II,
conflict with human reason; he opposedDie Vernunft in der Geschichte, 280, 281,


the "Vernunftreligion", 260; ROUSSEAU284, 289;
holds that the principles of true virtueGrundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts,
are inscribed in everybody's heart, 314.396, 397.
—, II, the heart and faith, 299. —, II, his absolute Idealism, 19; history 



HEGEL, KARI, 

as the unfolding of the Objective Mind,
195; his intensive idea of development,
279; he conceived of the freedom motive 
in a trans-personalistic sense; List derVernunft; the world history motive asserts 
itself in the view of every individual 
mind, 280; the truth in his intensive 
idea of historical development, 281; heabsolutizes the cultural denominators of 
Western civilization, 282; demanded 
"Geisteswissenschaften" to detach themselves 
the spatial objectifying way ofthought, 390; subjective right as an individual 
volitional power; justice is anchored 
in the idea of freedom; as the 
idea of ethical power; in the state it isuniversal competence; antithesis to morality; 
there is no element of interest inHEGEL'S idea of subjective right, 396; hedefended the classical theory of civil law;
unfree nature is an object, 397; generaland particular will are dialectically connected, 
399; the infinite logical subject,

589. 
—, III, 
Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts,
318; 
Philosophie der Geschichte, 456;
Rechtsphilosophie, 491;
Encyclopadie der phil. Wissenschaften,
584, 585. 
—, III, his view of the state as a person;
the highest realization of the objectivespirit; the reality of the ethical idea; thepresent divine will; this absolute statebreaks through (244) family and civilsociety; its will is the real "communal"
will, proving its objectivity, its universalvalidity and absoluteness, 245; juridicalmoral essential nature of marriage; subjective 
feelings should give way to anideal restriction, 318; he emphasized thenormative determination of married love, 
but his view remained dialectical-functionalistic, 
319; his idealistic universalistic 
idea of the absolutist power State,
399; he rejects the idea of an essentialpurpose of the State because the State isan absolute end in itself; it is the highestrevelation of the "objective Spirit", thetotality of morality, in which freedom attains 
to its highest rights, 433; his dialectical 
view of the relation between 
"civil society" and the State; the latteralone can integrate all private interestsinto the communal interest of the societal 
whole as "ethical substance", the 
highest revelation of the "objective Spirit", 
456; public opinion contains theeternal essential principles of justice, thetrue contents and result of the entire constitution, 
legislation and general condition 
in the form of common sense, 491; 
his dialectical idea of the "biirgerlicheGesellschaft"; the "strategem of reason",
583; the Vernunftstaat and the substantial 
moral freedom of everybody as apart of the whole; the State as the organized 
administration of justice and police, 
88 

584; the three main structures in civil 
society: the economic, the legal, and the
public administrative structure; civil society 
is subservient to the ideal State as
the "totality of substantial morality"; its
structure is a complex of economic purposes 
regulated by civil juridical and administrative 
legal rules; family and civil
society are dialectically elevated to a
higher unity in the absolute State; increasing 
differentiation entails an increasing 
division of labour; social classes; the
logical triad of social class-distinctions,
585; Korporationen (i.e. voluntary associations) 
are of fundamental importance
to manual labourers and manufacturers 
who might fail to see general concerns;
an organized group has comparative universality 
of interest; society and the family, 
are mere parts within a whole; a
corporation is the guarantee of "vocational 
class honour"; a single unorganized 
person has no "social station"; a
corporation tries to reconcile individual
interests with the demand of universality
in the form of civil law, 586; criticism of 
HEGEL'S view, 587. 


HEGEL, KARL, III, 
Stadte und Gilden der Germanischen VOlker 
im Mittelalter, 673, 674. 


HEIDEGGER, MARTIN, I, 
Sein und Zeit, 111.
—, I, his definition : "das Sein des Seienden" 
and DOOYEWEERD'S : „Meaning is themode of being of all that is created",
(note), 4; time is historical and has adialectical existential meaning, 27; thebeing of the ego is understood as the reality 
of the res cogitans (thinking substance), 
111; he accepts the static conception 
of reality with respect to the"given world of things" and rejects thisconception as to "free personality" or"free human existence"; he moves in the 
paths of immanence philosophy; his Archimedean 
point is in "existentialthought", thus making the "transcendental 
ego" sovereign, 112.
—, II, 
Sein und Zeit, 22, 23, 24, 524; 
Holzwege der Philosophie, 22;
Was ist Metaphysik?, 25;
Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik,
520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 527, 528, 529, 
530, 531. 
—, II, his notion of "being"; he opposesthe old metaphysical equation of "being"
and non-differentiated unity; „das Vorhandene"; 
Dasein; Geworfenheit; Verworfenheit, 
22; das Nichts; Angst; "ontical 
being" has no selfhood; historical existential 
being; Dasein or existentialheing, 23; Zeit; Sorge; running forwardto death; Entschlossenheit; HEIDEGGER 
and OSWALD SPENGLER'S "Der Untergangdes Abendlandes", 24 ; HEIDEGGER'S interpretation 
of KANT'S Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 
492; KANT'S Krit d. r. V. is not 


89 HELLER, HERMANN 

concerned with epistemology, accordingproper do to protoplasm, 642; his con-
to HEIDEGGER; but it relates to ontology,cept "protomeries", 722, 755.
at least in its first edition, 493; HEIDEG


H. HEIMSOETH, I, 
GER holds that KANT did not deduct the 

Metaphysik der Neuzeit, 473, 476.

categories from the table of judgments, 505 
(note) ; and acknowledges that the opera-HEINECCIUS, III, 
tion of the productive imagination onEl. jur. civ. tit. Inst. de Nuptiis, 316.
sensibility is ascribed by KANT to logical 


HEINICHEN, 0., III,

thought, 515; KANT'S chapter on the sche-

Driesch' Philosophy, 738, 746.

matism is the central part of the wholework, 520; the synthesis is called imagi-HEISENBERG, III, his concept "relations of 

nation, but it is the understanding, 521;incertitude", 643; in the determination of 
the unity of sensibility and thought can-position and velocity of an electron, 715;
not be understood or even made a prob-the micro structure of atoms sets a limit 
lem; HEIDEGGER distinguishes sharplyto a causal explanation; it has been for-
between epistemology and ontology (Seinmulated in HEISENBERG'S relations of in-
des Seienden), 522; his maxim for inter-certitude, 734. 
preting a philosophical system; its re-HELIOCENTRIC PICTURE, I, of the world:
lative truth; the guiding idea should be 

introduced by COPERNICUS, 194.

that of the system under investigation;

HEIDEGGER views KANT from the irration-HELMHOLTZ, III, on qualitative and modaldifferences between sensations, 43; the

alistic historicistic idea of existentialism; 

"quality" of sensations is not affected by

this is an arbitrary policy; he admits

MULLER'S law, 44.

that he has recourse to violence; he identifies 
KANT'S "transcendental imagina-HEMPEL, CARL G., (and P. OPPENHEIM) , III,


tion" with Dasein; the synthesis is onto-Der Typusbegriff im Lichte der neuen
logical; human life is at the mercy ofLogik, 81.
"das Vorhandene" but rises above it 


HEMSTERHUIS, I, the philosophy of feel-

through understanding das Vorhandene;

ing discloses its absolutization of aesthetic

for this purpose Dasein designs an a

individuality in HEMSTERHUIS and the

priori image of what is; the problem of

German Sturm und Drang, 463.

synthesis is : how can a finite being know
the "being" of what is "beforehand"?,HENNIPMAN, P., II,
524; HEIDEGGER'S transcendence of the Economisch Motief en Economisch Prin


selfhood is only that of Dasein above dascipe, 123.
Vorhandene; its essence is time as pure—, II, denies the economic worthlessness


intuition ; transcendental imagination isof the analytical principle of economy,
the formative medium of the two stems of 123. 
knowledge, viz., intuition and thought,


HENOTHEISM, II, in primitive nature


525; HEIDEGGER does not recognize the

belief according to MAX MULLER ; the frag


cosmic coherence, and seeks the selfhood 

mentary personification of the divine

in the temporal historical Dasein, 526;

lacks concentration of personality, but

the phenomenon is object, "Gegenstand",

does not cancel the belief in the deeper

das Vorhandene in nature, the "me on";

unity of mana, 317.

the synthesis of the transcendental imagination 
gives it ontical being; the possi-HEPP, V., II,
bility of ontological synthesis remainsHet Testimonium Spiritus Sancti, 300.
unexplained; KANT still held the selfhoodto be supra-temporal; reality is only ac-HERACLITUS, I, tried to bridge the reli


gious antithesis in the starting-point by

cessible in the theoretical abstraction of 

means of a theoretical logical dialectic,

the "Gegenstandliche", 527; KANT on in


64; the Ionian philosophers and HERA-

tuition, imagination, logical thought, as 

CLITUS could never ask for an "Unmoved

a threefold unity of time; HEIDEGGER

Mover" as prime cause of empirical mo


holds time to be the cogito; pure recep


vement, because they deified the matter

tivity; self-affection, 528. 

principle of the eternally flowing stream

—, III, 

of life, 72.

Existence and Being, 30. 

—, II,

—, III, his existentialism used by AUGUST

B. Fragm. 94, 134;
BRUNNER, 5; seeks an immediate approach

cf. 132.

to the innermost sphere of man's tem


—, II, his "Dike, 132; it reacts against

poral existence; the Existentials (care,

every ultra vires, 133, 134.

dread, concern), 781, 
HERBST, III, mechanistic biologist, 733.

HEIDENHAIN, M. III, 

HERING, E., III, "mnemism", 733.

Plasma und Zelle, 642, 643, 722. 
—, III the so-called albuminoids bear the HELLER, HERMANN, III,
same relation to the building-materials of Der Begriff des Gesetzes in der Rechts


the living basic substance as the albumens verfassung, 383; 



 

HERMES OF PRAXITELES 

Die Souveriinitdt, 387, 393, 395;


Allgemeine Staatslehre, 388, 389, 390, 391,
392, 393, 394, 407, 408, 410, 411, 477, 481, 
491, 492, 497.
—, III, on the political degeneration of
the idea of the law-State, 383; the State
is always in a process of becominer as a


°

"plebiscite de tous les jours", 387; brokewith SMEND, relinquished some basicthoughts of LITT'S sociology; recognizedthe State as a subjective "Aktzentrum";
broke with the anti-axiological conception 
of sociology; he wants to bridge theNeo-Kantian dualism of Sein and Sollen;
he says that the State is a structural, nota historical notion, 388; the unity of theState maintains itself in all changes; hetries to explain State, Church and Industrial 
life from the cross-section of the 
stream of history, 389; this view is historicistic; 
the State is an historical structure, 
a function within the totality of theconcrete historical-social constellation; 
the functions and structure of the State 
are changeable, 390; insofar as this structure 
has a certain duration politicaltheory has been given its "Gegenstand",
but its configuration is open, 391; hisnormative idea of the State is moderatelyhistoricistic; his moral-juridical principles 
which he considers to be the onlyjustification of the State are not suprahistorical, 392; the decision of the moment 
is superior to any principle; herejects the idea of a supra historical "ordre 
naturel"; he distinguishes betweenthe State and other organized communities 
according to the method of ARISTOTLE'S 
genus proximum and differentiaspecifica; genus proximum is here: organization; 
differ. spec. is sovereigncommand over a territory, 393; theState is "the formal source of the validityof all legal rules", 394 ; other organizedcommunities lack the competence tomake their internal legal order independent 
of the agreement of the State; Stateand law present a historical problem;
law has developed from an undifferentiated 
convention ; he agrees with BoDIN'stheory of absolute sovereignty; juridicalnorms are indissolubly bound up withhuman volition ; the will of the State is asubjective psychical act; this leads to anantinomic concept of law; this conceptis a pseudo concept of function, 396; hisidea of organization, 407 ; unity of actionand organs, 408; his "dialectical structural 
idea" is functionalistic and handles 
a "general concept" apart from the internal 
individuality structures of organized 
communities, 410; his dialectical 
viewpoint is incapable of discovering theradical difference between, e.g., Churchand State, 411; the State can only affecteconomic life from the outside; State andeconomy are self-contained, equivalentsocial functions, each with relative autonomy, 
481; on "public opinion", 491; on 

90 

the demo-liberal ideology with respect topublic opinion, 492; criticism of modernracial theories, 495. 

HERMES OF PRAXITELES, III, its sensoryimage is an intentional visionary objectbound to• the plastic horizon of experience, 
116; the function of its marble,
638; between marble and sculpture thereis an irreversible foundational relation,

640. 
HERDER, J. F., I, 
Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der
Menschheit, 469.


—, I, his irrational philosophy of feeling,
453; his philosophy of history was neverable to liberate itself from deterministic 
rationalism; his naturalistic concept ofdevelopment was derived from LEIBNIZ;
he tries to understand the voice of history 
by way of empathy, by feeling himself 
into the spirit of historical individualities; 
he unhesitantingly accepts thepolarity, the inner antinomy betweenthis irrationalistic view and the deterministic 
conception of development takenover from LEIBNIZ, 454; necessity of nature 
and creative freedom of the irreducible 
individuality come together inhistory; yet historical development remains 
subject to natural laws; the lexcontinui is conceived of as in increasingly 
complicated and more highly ordered 
series from inorganic matter toorganic life and human history; his cultural 
optimism; it is refined by the new"humanity" ideal of the Sturm andDrang; the impulse toward sympatheticunderstanding of cultural individualityprotects HERDER from VOLTAIRE'S rationalistic 
construction of world history, 455. 

-II, 

Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte,

272, 276, 277;
cf. 593. 
—, II, man's perfectibility & LEIBNIZ' ideaof development; HERDER'S irrationalisticpersonality ideal; his insight into individual 
totalities, 272; his idea of culturaldevelopment as the idea of humanity;
and SHAFTESBURY'S aestheticism; the dig


nity of man; VON HUMBOLDT, HERDER'Sstandard of national perfection, 276; tension 
between national individuality andhumanity; organological notions, 277 ; hisextensive idea of history, 280; his humanistic 
cosmonomic idea, 593. 

HERRENMENSCH, III, KALLIKLES' idea of 
the political ruler is a prelude to NIET


SCHE'S Herrenmensch, 398. 
HETERONOMY, III, KANT opposes hetero


nomy in an ethical sense to morality,
273; heteronomy and autonomy in DARM


STAEDTER, 408. 

HERTWIG, O., III,
Allgemeine Biologie, 758. 
HESIOD, II, his mythology, 320, 321. 



HETEROGENESIS, II, of historical aims, 244. 

HETEROLOGICAL, I, versus heterologicalmonological 
thought, in RICKERT, 22, 23. 


HETERONOMY, II, versus autonomy, in
KANT, 141. 


HEYMANS, G., I, 
Einfiihrung in die Metaphysik, 103.
—, I, his psycho-monism with its elaboration 
on all realms of meaning, 103.
—, II, 
Einfiihrung in die Ethik, 147.
—, II, his definition of "character", 147. 


HIERARCHY, III, in the church derives 
from above through the Pope and the
clergy, 234. 


HILBERT, II, HUSSERL deduces mathematics 
in a purely mathematical way, and
shows affinity with HILBERT'S conception
of mathematics, 452. 


HILDEBRAND, DIETRICH VON, III, 
Die Ehe, 319. 
—, III, Love is the primary meaning of
marriage according to the creation; its
primary purpose is to produce new human 
beings; this latter function is entirely 
subordinate to the primary meaning; 
the conjugal relation is an I-thourelation, 
319; this statement is due to 
irrationalistic influences; HILDEBRAND 
hypostatizes the masculine and the feminine 
principle in creation to a metaphysical 
difference of essence; the feminine
principle is concentrated in the Virgin


Mary; BUBER'S influence; the conjugal I-
Thou relation is a central contact in human 
existence; thus the marriage bond
is absolutized; his view of a community's
"rank"; he distinguishes between marriage 
as a natural union and as a sacrament 
of grace, 320; he emphasizes the
tendency to be indissoluble as long as
life lasts is implied in the conjugal love
union; then only is marriage possible, if
there is conjugal fidelity, 321. 


HILDEBRANDT, KURT, I, 
Leibniz und das Reich der Gnade, 308. 
—, III, 
Geschichte und System der Rechts- und
Staatsphilosophie, 205, 206. 


HIRZEL, III, 
'Ayeaq,o; vOyos , Abh. der philolog. hist.
Klasse der Kgl. Sachs. Ges. der Wissensch. 
xx., 231. 


HISPANUS, PETRUS, I, 
Summulac, the 7th Treatise, entitled : "de 
terminorum proprietatibus", expanded to
Parva Logicalia, 184 (note).
—, I, universalia are only "sings" standing 
for a plurality of individual things
in the human mind, but do not possess
reality in or before these things; "stand
for", "supponent", hence the name "suppositional 
logic"; they are based on
arbitrary convention like the "voces", or 


91 HISTORICAL ASPECT 

they are "conceptus" or "intentiones animae" 
formed by the understanding, 184. 

HISTOLOGY, III, histological discoveries,

102. 
HISTORICAL ASPECT, I, the historical aspectis absolutized in historicism; 0. SPENGLER, 
103, 118 ; the historicist view of 
reality, 207 ; historical development isconsidered as a necessary causal processin COMTE ; HEGEL'S view of histor. development, 
209; this development is the nonrecurrent 
individual and lawless realization 
of value in FICHTE, 491; historicism 
began to turn away from evolutionism under 
the influence of WEBER and RICKERT, 
212; in FICHTE freedom in history possesses 
a hidden law-conformity, the Providence 
of the moral deity; his five periods 
of history, 484, 488; historical timeis distinguished from empty time; historical 
existence is the final mode of 
being of finite existence and the basicdenominator, in FICHTE'S third period,
476, 485; his concept of historical truth,

486. 
—, II, historical aspect and technical economy; 
primitive technique, 67; commandor power is a modus, not a thing, 68; cultural 
authority, 69; naïve and theoreticalconceptions of history; GROEN'S adage,
192; history as a Gegenstand; historicaltime; genesis; evolution, 193 in chemistry, 
geology, biology, psychology, language, 
jurisprudence, etc.; positivism;
COMTE ; Neo-Kantianism; empirical realityrelated to values; individuality; naturalscience is blind to values; HEGEL'S idea of 
history, 194; the dialectical course; Os-
WALD SPENGLER'S biologistic view; the existentialistic 
conception; the humanisticidea; the meaning-nucleus of the culturalaspect; the term "culture", 195; the termhistory; geology, palaeontology and history, 
196; history of language, societalforms, economy, art, legal affairs, morality, 
faith; Roman and Canon law; masteryor control transcends what is given in nature, 
197; free project of form-giving; historical 
continuity; a spider's web ; beavers;
termites; Personskultur; Sachkultur; societal 
formation; things cultural; formersof history; positive cultural principles;
legal power, over persons essential to thejura in re, 198; culture and civilization;
barbaros, 199; the I-ness participates inthe central spiritual community of mankind; 
the "Historical School of jurisprudence" 
and the word "culture"; Volksgeist; 
positivistic absolutization of history; 
culture and nature, 200; Neo-Kantianindividualizing way of relating nature tovalue in culture on the influence of 
FICHTE and KANT, 201; tradition; K. KUYPERS' 
view, 202 ; culture is formative control; 
the indirect method of establishingthe existence of a modal law-sphere; typical 
individuality structures; the material 
extent of the historical field; cultural 


HISTORICAL ASPECT 

realms; . cultural phenomena, 203; modernsociety is not a "social whole"; primitivesociety; medieval ecclesiastically unifiedsociety; current views : RICKERT ; MUNCH ;
their humanistic origin, 204; culture conceived 
as the collective concept of all thenormative law-spheres; the philosophyof life uprooted the. faith in the supertemporal 
ideas; historism; TROELTSCH ;
LEIBNIZ' monads, 205; ethics and communal 
life derive their standards from 
historical development; values clingingto historical processes; there is no criterion 
to distinguish culture from othermeaning modes, 208; STAMMLER wants toconquer historical materialism; RICKERT'S"transcendental-logical" historical formof knowledge is useless; the antinomy inthe epistemology of cultural sciences,
209; BINDER historicizes law, 215; thecultural is never right or wrong socially,
juridically, morally, or in faith; it is nota supra modal concentrationpoint of experience, 
216; historicism with its generalizing 
undefined concept of culture is antinomic, 
217; science and history, 218;
SPENGLER'S historism, 218---220; this isself-refuting, 221; logical retrocipationsin culture, the Romantic term: naturalhistory, 229; the concept of developmentis multivocal; natural events may changehistory, but only in the subject-object relation 
; cultural development is not a natural 
process; requires a subject's analytical 
sense of meaning; logical retrocipation 
of identity and diversity in history; 
the battle of Waterloo; HAYEK'S question,
230; historical imputation of actions tosubjects of formative power is impliedin the cultural nucleus; historical contradiction; 
and continuity, 231; vital anddead historical development: a biotic retrocipation; 
HERDER'S view; VON SAVIGNY :
historical development, is continuous;
state and society are considered as a natural 
growth; FICHTE; SCHELLING; a hidden 
law of Providence; dialectical synthesis 
of freedom and natural elements, 232;
FR. VON STAHL on God's guidance; theconservative mind of the Restoration; itsquietism; Christian-Historical theory opposed 
to the French Revolution ; objectionsraised by A. C. LEENDERTS ; he contrasts 
facts to norms, 233; every fact has a normative 
qualification; norms cannot bederived from subjectivity, 234 ; a nationalmind is not a norm, nor Providence, nor 
destiny; historical norms 235; historicalreaction is anti-normative; progress andreaction ; signorial rights in the Netherlands 
in 1814 and 1815; formula of thedevelopment of political powerformation,
236; reaction is a retrocipation; post-
logical laws are regulative principles requiring 
positivization; variable formations 
accommodated to cultural development; 
genuine norms offer a rule of conduct 
to human judgment; logical normsare principia, 237; temporal normative 

92 

freedom; free scope in the pre-logicalmodi; free formative control; positivization 
is historically founded; appeal tothe human will; humanism speaks ofeternal principia separated from positivenorms, 238; natural law; positivisticlegal theory; the anticipatory spheres ofthe pre-logical spheres require human intermediary 
for their opening, 239; absolute 
and empirical norms; this distinction 
is untenable; WINDELBAND ; logical,
aesthetical, ethical norms are called supra 
temporal; F, SomLo; norms varywith time and place; antique andmodern drama, 240; also ethical norms;
modern economic ethics; medieval prohibition 
of interest; theoretic thoughtmust be ruled by the theoretical formations 
of principles of logic; juridical 
positivization of norms of juridicalcompetence; might is not right, 241; lawformation and history; tradition andprogress; reaction; continuity; conservatism; 
the cultural task, 242; shapers ofhistory; the struggle for power; theformative will and analysis in historicalactivity; leaders: CAESAR, GALILEI, etc.,
243; the psychical function of the will;
and cultural formation; CLovis and cultural 
integration ; heterogenesis of aimsin history; leaders in an historical groupfunction, 244; the objective spirit in history; 
the supra individual group tradition; 
the question about the individualand the group; primitive culture andgroup tradition; the historical genius, 
245; normative historical mission; powerover men, is not brute natural force, norsocial psychical influence; leader andmasses; dialectical theology has a horrorof power formation; the Divine culturalcommandment in Genesis; all power isin the hands of Christ, 246; churchfounded in His power over men; the riskof power is a proof of its normativemeaning; positivistic view; the speculative 
concept of the collective soul; Emil,
DURKHEIM; normative mission of formative 
control, 247; principles of culturaldevelopment; consummation in Christ;
power inherent in the imago Dei, absolutization 
is idolatry and apostasy; thepowers of darkness; the Romantic quietist 
conception of God's guidance in history, 
248; SCHELLING and the HistoricalSchool of jurisprudence; FR. VON STAHL;
irrationalistic organological view of history; 
an unconscious formative process;
this conception contradicts man's Divine 
mission to lay the foundation of the Kingdom 
of Christ, 249; biotic retrocipationin historical development; organologicalview; living and dead elements in tradition; 
a closed historical law-sphere lacksa regulative principle of development,
250; historical causality; imputation; historical 
meaning of natural events in thesubject-object relation only; historicalcausal nexus and physical psychical an



 93 HISTORICAL ASPECT 

tecedents, 251; J. HUIZINGA ; G. SIMMEL ; 267; TROELTSCH'S synthesis of Westernarbitrary selection of facts; the rise of culture; Universal or World history; thethe feudal system; Frankish vassalage; breach with the Christian conception ofTOYNBEE'S challenge theory; political po- history in the Enlightenment; EUSEBIUS ;
wer integration of the Frankish kingdom, AUGUSTINUS ; BOSSUET ; VOLTAIRE'S formula252; 
challenge and mission; historical tion of the humanistic idea of culture afidcause is factual, not normative the Caro- NEWTON'S natural-science principles, 268;
lingians, 253; RICKERT'S individual cau- VOLTAIRE collected materials; his idea ofsality; causal equation, not historical; in- of World history; belief in the perfectidividual 
causes occur in all the super bility of man by science; ST. SIMON;
strata of the kinematical aspect; indivi- COMTE; and positivism; DARWIN'S in-
duality is an apeiron except for its lead- fluence; SPENCER'S idea of development,
ing function; historical individuality is 269; COMTE'S three stages, 270; ROUSSEAU'Sdetermined by history, not vice versa; pessimism and his later optimism; SPEN-
individual totality opened in the antici- CER; KANT'S conception, 271; league ofpatory direction; history and natural nations as final aim of history in KANT;
causality, 254; DILTHEY and causality; civil legal relation between nations; chi-
development rests in movement; biotic liasm of the philosophy of history; thepotentiality; vital and dead tradition; irrationalized personality-ideal; HERDER'Shistorical cause; its basis is movement, "Ideen"; perfectibility of man; LEIBNIZ'
255; spatial retrocipation; numerical developmental idea; the period of Stormanalogy; power and quantity viewed his- and Stress; HERDER'S insight into the untorically, 
256; cultural area; historical folding of individual historical totalitiesmagnitude; subject-object relation; the in historical development, 272; individucall 
to win control over nature; technical ality in primitive societies; in disclosed'industry, 257; tools, agriculture; techne communties; shapers of history, 273; theis not purely objective; technical norms; rise of nationalities; National Socialism;
communal; progress and reaction; tech- the national character; this view is reacnical 
authorities, 258; deepend technical tionary; Old Germanic "trustis"; theprincipia; inventions; primitive closed norms of individualization, 274 ; indivisocieties 
without a leading function; the dual talent in a cultural community; theleading function of the church; authori- historical Gegenstand; historical methodties in primitive societies are often dei- of concept formation; RICKERT'S discofied 
guardians of the group tradition; very, and his error, 275; apart from thecultural contact necessary for develop- anticipatory meaning-coherence indiviment, 
259; war; conquest; Christian mis- duality is an apeiron; HERDER'S idea of 
sionaries; cultural integration and diffe-humanity; SHAFTESBURY; VON HUMBOLDT;
rentiation; Western intrusion into under- national cultural communities in HERDER,
developed cultures, 260; DURKHEIM; H. 276; his view is naturalistic organolo-
SPENCER; DARWIN, 260; development in gical; the universally human is not ascience and art, 261; multi modal devel- standard of historical development; the 
opment; te tower of Babel; unity of Historical School of jurisprudence; their

h 

mankind; control over the earth; sin; op- crux of legal history; VON JHERING andtimism and pessimism; the Kingdom of BESELER'S criticism, 277; SCHELLING'S ro-
Christ, 262; the original stage of man- mantic idealism and KANT'S transcenkind; 
PROTAGORAS ; PLATO'S golden age, dentalism; nature is the spirit coming in-
the Prometheus myth; according to PRO- to existence; history as two develop-
TAGORAS, the "natural state" had religion, mental series of the absolute (as indiffelanguage, 
• limited technique; no justice rence) ; synthesis of nature and freedom;
nor morality; general conviction and ge- free action rooted in hidden necessity;
neral will; natural law; civilization; the Providence or fate; SCHELLING'S aesthe-
Humanistic mathematical natural science tical culture and KANT and SCHILLER'S 
ideal and the Idea of Progress; the En- doctrine; KANT'S moralism; VON SAVIGNYlightenment, 263; an axiological standard; and PUCHTA took it over, 278; the Histothe 
transcendental idea of historical de- rical School; nationalistic conservatism. 
velopment; Darwinism; FICHTE'S original and irrationalism; pedantry of their epiculture 
of a highly gifted people; the gones; HEGEL'S dialectical idea of histoorigin 
of culture is a meta-historical ques- rical development; the objective mind,
tion; pre-history, 264; primitive and 279; the selfdeveloping humanistic free-
deepened culture; ethnology; sociology; dom motive asserts itself in every indi


historical science; cave cultures, 265; vidual mind; List der Vernunft; 
closed primitive cultures are rigidly duality is a precipitation of the objective

bound to biotic organic development; mind, 280; every individual moment con-
rise, maturity, decline; opened cultures: tains the whole course of world historyEgypt, Babylon, Persia, etc.; fecundated in nuce; RANKE'S idea of development;
Germanic and Arabian cultures, 266; his- history starts when there are written dotorical 
idea; "Kultursynthese"; Christian cuments; criticism of HEGEL'S idea ofGermanic cultural development and Greek development; his intensive conceptionand Roman culture; Egyptian factors, contains an important truth, 281; Dn.



 

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 

THEY and TROELTSCH; their autonomous 
idea of culture; their historism ; SPENGLER'S 
concept of history in which evolution 
shows merely biotic retrocipations;
he parallels cultural totalities withoutany coherence; SPENGLER'S view of time;
he eliminates causality; his fatalism, 283;
the internal unrest of meaning; symbolical 
anticipation; HEGEL and RANKE; narrative 
and deeds are simultaneous according 
to HEGEL, 284; mnemosyne is idle inprimitive culture; but disclosed historyis signified meaning; cultural symbolism;
historical signification is not identicalwith lingual; cultural international inter••
course and historical development; primitive 
cultures are isolated and secluded,
285; cultural factors should not expandtheir power to excess; economic anticipation; 
shapers of history cannot disturbthis economy without dislocating andruining the entire cultural complex ; cultural 
harmony, 286; between powerformations there should also be harmony;
expansion between the cultural boundariesof the respective cultural spheres : State,
Church, family, industry, etc.; no totalitarianism, 
287; medieval ecclesiasticallyunified culture was a necessity; churchand "secular" culture; disadvantages ofecclesiastical supremacy, 288; the motiveof nature and grace; of form and matter;
biblical motive; juridical anticipation;
HEGEL'S Weltgericht; but historical justice 
is not juridical; sin in history; thecourse of history is often marked by 
blood and tears, 289; God maintains his 
world order; this is historical jurisdiction; 
God's hidden counsel can never become 
the normative standard for the 
judgment of the course of history; God'sguidance refers to the juridical anticipations; 
historical retribution, 290; moralanticipations; cultural Eros; culturaleconomy and harmony; anticipation offaith; shapers of history are guided byfaith in their task, 291; domination ofnature and the faith of humanism; WE-
BER's sociology of religion is a retrocipation, 
292; error of Marxism with respectto faith, 293 ; civitas Dei et civitas terrena; 
AUGUSTINUS; the Greek idea of theeternal return of things in cyclic time;
the possibility of culture lies in the victory 
of the Kingdom of God over thepowers of Darkness, 294 ; Adam's fall andChrist's incarnation are turning points;
periods in history, 295; objections raisedto the view that cultural development isthe meaning of history; primitive mandoes not realize his transcendence over 
nature; his diffuse personality awareness, 
296; his faith rests on the fear ofthe powers of nature, 297 ; the stress inthe humanistic science ideal shifted to 
the science of history during the Enlightenment; 
its secular idea of developmentopposed the Christian Augustinian view,
349; progress of mankind; VoLTAIRe; uni


94 

form reason passes through a historicalprocess to get rid of prejudice and tradition 
; MONTESQUIEU'S political idea ofdevelopment; the Enlightenment and 
VOLTAIRE'S history of culture; the ultimateaim of history is to attain to reason'sself-consciousness; the unalterable empirical 
causes and psychological analysis, 
350; the ideal of the Enlightenment; 
BOSSUET'S error; he exceeded the boundaries 
between theology and historicalscience; knowledge of faith guides us butis not a stop-gap; VOLTAIRE tried to reconcile 
freedom with deterministic,
science, 351; NEWTON had taught experimental 
method and empirical science,
and history was now subjected to thesame rules in the application of psychology 
to history; the pragmatic method;
causal explanation and miracles and Providence; 
a small number of basic principles 
in history; craftiness of priests,
etc.; the victory of critical understanding, 
352; BAYLE'S historical criticism,
353; DILTHEY'S method; empathy, 391. 

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT, II, according to 
KANT, 270, 271. 

HISTORICAL ECONOMY, II, the different 
cultural factors ought to be prevented,
from expanding their power in an excessive 
way, 286. 

HISTORICAL SCHOOL OF JURISPRUDENCE, II, 

PUCHTA and VON SAVIGNY, 138, 234, 249;
its idea of development, 277; nationalistic

conservatism, and irrationalism, 279. 

HISTORICAL SCHOOL, III, and TONNIES' Idea 
of Gemeinschaft, 186; the State is onlythe historical form of the political national 
community; the transpersonalisticconception of organized communities iselaborated pluralistically; they recognize

the autonomy of non-political and oflower political associations; the generalwill is their substance; the concept "spiritual 
organism" is derived from SCHELLING; 
GIERKE'S theory, 245; the State isthe historical form of political organization 
of a national community, 400. 

HISTORICISM, II, OSWALD SPENGLER'S bio


logistic view, 195; positivistic absolutization 
of history, 200; TROELTSCH and DILTHEY'S 
struggle with historicism; historicism 
in BINDER'S conception of law, 215;
historicism is antinomous, 217 ; SPENGLER, 
218-220; is self-refuting, 221 ; DILTHEY,
TROELTSCH, etc., SPENGLER, 283 ; historicism 
tries to explain everything historically, 
354; TROELTSCH'S historicistic bias 
leads to mythological mystifications, 355;
his interpretation of the contract theory
moves in a vicious circle; individualistic


ideals of natural law of the Enlightenment, 
356. 
--, III, starts from the absolutized historical 
viewpoint, 82. 



HISTORICAL IDENTITY, II, of the battle of 
Waterloo, 230. 

HISTORICAL SPACE, II, cannot be perceived,
and must be signified, 65. 

HISTORY, II, science of becoming, according 
to FRUIN, 193 ; as a stream of life, 195. 

HOBBES, THOMAS, I,
Leviathan, 150;
De Corpore, 197.


—, I, his materialistic metaphysics, 122;
he was a Nominalist and considered truth 
and falsehood to be attributes of language, 
not of facts and things; the exacttruth consists in the immanent agreementof concepts with each other on the basisof conventional definitions, 150; he describes 
(in the terms of the story of creation 
in Genesis) the methodological demolition 
of all given reality by humanreason in order to reconstruct the cosmos 
out of the simplest elements ofthought; the logical activity creates; themotive of logical creation is entirely modern 
and Humanistic, 197; behind it liesthe postulate of continuity of the mathematical 
science-ideal, 200; he did not recognize 
any limits to the continuity postulate 
founded in his monistic metaphysical 
ontology; the post-biotic functions,
216, were brought under the basic denominator 
of "moving body"; an idealisticmaterialism; "moving body" was not conceived 
in a physical sense only; it was ametaphysical-mathematical denominator; 
"body" is everything that can be analysed 
mathematically; the State is an artificial 
body construed Nominalistically bymeans of a social contract out of the simplest 
"elements", i.e. the individuals andtheir emotions of fear; the State is Leviathan; 
here the domination motive ofscience has absorbed freedom; the human 
soul is mechanistically conceived;
his view of human nature is pessimistic;
still he retained his enthusiastic faith in 
the personality ideal; his Faustian consciousness 
found an optimistic expressionin Leviathan, where the light of reasonis said to destroy the kingdom of darkness; 
his mechanistic epistemology andethics undermined the normative foundations 
of truth and ethics, the scienceideal as well as the personality ideal fella prey to logical self-dissolution; hisepistemology was sensationalistic, reduced 
to movement, in terms of causality; this theory served to satisfy the continuity 
postulate of the science ideal;
GALILEO'S mechanics became the basic 
denominator of the aspects, 221; movement 
is a subjective "phantasma rei existentis; 
time is a "phantasma motus";
mathematically determined movement isthe basic denominator, 223; LEIBNIZ avoided 
HOBBES'S crass materialism, 227 ; theoptimism of the Enlightenment and ofHOBBES with regard to the science ideal 

95 HOENEN, P., Si. 

was in overt contradiction to his "pessimist 
scientific" view of human nature,
253 ; he sought to free himself of theCartesian dualism, 264 ; the picture ofLeviathan on ROUSSEAU'S "Contrat Social" 
had its head cut off, 316; HOBBES' idea of 
the state of nature as a "helium omnium 
contra omnes"; his optimism and pessimism 
compared with ROUSSEAU'S, 317;
LOCKE opposed the absolutist doctrine ofHOBBES (318) who conceived of the Socialcontact in a formal sense, 319; his encyclopaedical 
systematizing of the sciencesin a successive continuous process fromsimple to complex spheres of knowledge,

529. 
—, II, 
Leviathan, 360.
—, II, his absolutism of the State, 167;
his view of justice, 360; theory of subjective 
right: my own right is all that has
not been forbidden me, 395; his theory
of natural law considered the power of
enjoyment of a subjective right as thenatural freedom to enjoy anything notforbidden by positive law, 403.
—, III, his sociological individualism;
the state as a fictitious person; the socialcontract, 183; denies the juridical senseof distributive justice, 212 ; his Stoicaltheory of the state contract, 232; Humanistic 
natural law led to state absolutism 
according to the mathematical scienceideal; the state embraces all other societal 
relationships; social contract; theindividuals relinquished their original 
freedom; there is not a single organization 
independent of the state; the Churchis merged into the state; the state is Le


viathan, 236; his view of the State, 442. 

HOEGEN, A. W., III,
Over den zin van het huwelijk, 312, 313,
319, 329.


—, III, the essence of marriage is de


termined by its purpose, 312; and the new
tendency in Roman Catholic circles in
the views of marriage, 319. 


HOENEN, P., S.J., I, 


Philosophie der organische natuur, 26.


--, I, shares AUGUSTINUS' conception of 
movement with ALBERT THE GREAT, 26. 
—, III, 
Philosophie der Anorganische Natuur,
706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 725.
—, III, his neo-Thomistic conception of
molecules, atoms and crystal lattices; a
mixtum is a new substance in which the 


elements are no longer present actually
but merely potentially; their properties
that are preserved have become accidents
of the new substance; this substance can
only have one single substantial form;
the preserved properties are due to the
affinity of the nature of the elements with
that of the mixtum ; the mixtum is a new
totality consisting of one "primary matter" 
and one "substantial form"; the substantial 
form gives unity of being to the 



HOFFMANN, PAUL 96 

"matter"; there are gradations of poten-HoMo ECONOMICUS, II, an abstract indivitiality 
in "matter"; the "matter" first hasdualistic idea resulting from the faith ina disposition to the elements and viathe sovereignty of mathematical and nathese 
to the "mixtum", 707; its substan-tural scientific thought which rationaltial 
unity does not mean that the newized the formative process, 361.
substance is always a homogeneous

HoMo NOUMENON, I, in KANT, 109 ; he

whole, it may have a diversity of proper-

considers the homo noumenon as self-

ties; there is a possibility of a "heteroge


sufficient; which renders any moral auto


neous continuum"; the atom is a mixtum 

nomy of man meaningless, 375; homo

of protons, neutrons and electrons; it is a

noumenon in FICHTE, 424.

natural minimum, not further divisible; 

—, II, this idea is the root of reality ac


after splitting it up there arise "element


cording to KANT, 44 ; KANT'S practical

ary substances" of a different physical

ethical metaphysics maintains the self-

nature; if molecule or crystal lattice con-

hood as the super-temporal, super-sen


sist of atoms of a different chemical kind 

sory noumenon, 527.

they are "specific heterogeneous totalities"; 
i.e. the specific heterogeneous pro-HoMo UNIVERSALE, I, Of LEO BATTISTE ALperties 
of the atoms are preserved to aBERTI, 192.
certain degree in the combination; as a
result of the affinity in "nature" betweenHONEYCOMBS, III, as psychical objects,
combination and atom, 708; criticism of 109. 
this view, 708; 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 


HONIGHEIM, PAUL, I,

716, 717; his a priori method of reason-

Zur Soziologie der mittelalterlichen Scho


ing, 725. 

lastik, 188. 
HOFFMANN, PAUL, II, 

HONIGSWALD, RICHARD, I,

Metaphysik oder verstehende Sinnwis-

Vom Problem der Idea, 329.

senschaft, 29, 30; 

—, I, his summary of the development of

Das Verstehen von Sinn und seine Allge


the conception of the "Idea" as the em


meingiiltigkeit, 29.

bodiment of the Humanistic personality


—, II, Verstehen und Schauen (under


ideal, 328, 329.

standing and intuiting), 29; logology;
meaning as such, 30; he is a phenomeno-HOPMAN, III,
logist, 488. Weltalkunde, 651. 


HOLDER, III, HORIZON OF EXPERIENCE, II, the structural 

Natiirliche und Juristische Personen, 279.and the subjective horizon of human expe--, 
HI, his individualistic conception ofrience; and our earthly cosmos, 547, 548;

legal subjectivity misinterprets the par-there is not an earthly world in itself;
tial two-unity of representative and re-HUSSERL'S view rejected; the fall into sinpresented, 278. and the horizon of experience, 549; implicit 
and explicit experience; why it is

Housm, I, is functionalistic, 564, 565.

called a priori; KANT'S categories; neces


—, II, MEYER and HALDANE are represent


sity and possibility in contrast with ac


atives of Holism and have tried to project 
a biological mathematics, 341.tuality, 550; the metaphysical absolute

horizon of human experience; possibility

—, III, is a totality view of a living or-

and necessity belong to creaturely mean


ganism reducing its physico-chemicalaspect to a modality of its central bio-ing, not to the Divine Being, 551; thepsychical sphere, 77; HALDANE'S holism,transcendent dimension of the experien


647. tial horizon; and our selfhood; and the 
religious attitude; the word religious can
HOLL, KARL, III, 

be meant in two senses; the transcenden-

Ges. Aufsdtze, 514. 

tal dimensions of the experiential hori


—, III, his investigations in the domain

zon: cosmic time; the functional struc


of Church history, 513, 514. 

ture, 552; the a priori modal structures;
they determine the possibility of our ex-

HOLTFRETER, III, his experiments in pro


perience; in the theoretical and in the

ducing the induction of an embryo in

pre-theoretical attitude; structural stabi


the indifferent abdominal tissue of the 

lity of the modal aspects, 553 ; the horizon

host-animal by means of dead cellular

of theoretical knowledge is formed by the

material from the blastopore, 754. 

structure of intermodal synthesis; the sub-
HOLTKER, G. III, jective insight into the theoretical horizonMAnnerbiinde, 364, 365. is a subjective a priori, and fallible, 554;

examples of physics, juridical facts;

HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE, THE, II, the Church 

mathematics and formal logic are a priori

and the Christianized idea of the Holy

as far as their modal aspect is concerned;

Roman Empire integrated medieval so-

their subjective a priori is not intended

ciety into a community embracing all

in the sense of creative logic, 555; the

Christianity, 288. 

structural horizon of individuality; inHOMER, II, his mythology, 321. concrete things and events; in relations 


among men; structural types of law areunchangeable; the plastic horizon, 557;
ancient and medieval views, 558; individuality 
structures manifest themselvesonly in the analysis of variable things,
events, and relationships; the plastic horizon 
is a priori because it determinesexperience and makes it possible; the apriori horizon of exp. is the Divine order 
of the "earthly creation" itself; thisorder was present in God's plan beforethe foundation of the world, 559; theperspective structure of the horizon ofexperience; its religious root; the transcendent 
horizon encompasses the cosmictemporal one, which encompasses themodal one and the plastic horizon, 560;
CALVIN'S view of self-knowledge; exp. islimited by, but not to, temporal reality,
561; the apostatic selfhood abused its religious 
freedom, 563 ; and fell away intothe temporal horizon; it tried to hypostatize 
an abstract part of the temporalhorizon, 564 ; the process of theoretical

cognition is experience according toKANT, 568; the temporal horizon, 594. 

HORIZON, III, of human experience; theplastic and the theoretic horizon have

their historical aspect, 31. 

HORMONES, III, and enzymes, 731; are inductive 
material units, 751. 

HORNBORSTEL, VON, II, the space of perception, 
373. 

HOSE AND MC. DOUGALL, III, 

The Pagan Tribes of Borneo, 356. 
HOSTIS, II, a foreigner is hostis, exlex, in

unopened primitive society, 183. 
HOUSEHOLD, III, as the germ of the State,

in THOMAS AQUINAS, 202, 203, 218. 

HOWITT, S., II, 
The native tribes of South-East Australia,


317. 
—, III, 
The native tribes of South-East Australia,


362. 
----, III, primary norms promulgated atinitiation among the Kurnai in South EastAustralia, listening to their parents,
sharing their goods with fellow tribesmen, 
etc., 362. 


HUBERT ET MAUSZ, II, 
Esquisse d'une thêorie generale de la


magie, 317. 


HUIZINGA, J., II, he holds that a historian
is compelled to select an arbitrary series


of facts, 252. 


HUMAN ACTION, II, originates from the
religious root, cannot be enclosed in certain 
aspects of reality, 40; if it is enclosed, 
theoretically, in its physical aspect, 
there arises antinomy, 46; the act-
structure; Erlebnisse and action, 112; can
acts be studied? language and social con


97 HUMANISTIC 'THOUGHT 

tact give' access to another, personality;
behaviourism, 112, 113; empathy; the act=
structure is founded in a psychical lowerstructure; animal structure is a sub-conscious 
under layer; Grenzsituationen;
depth psychology; acts are related 'to the

human ego, 114. 

HUMAN BODY, THE, III, there is no radicaltype, 87-89; is the individual whole ofman's temporal existence; it shows avery complicated interlacement of different 
typical structures (87) combined in aform-totality qualified by the act-structure; 
this act structure is founded in animal, 
vegetative and material structures,
functions in all modalities, lacks a typical 
qualifying structure; is the immediateexpression of the I-ness, which transcends 
the cosmic temporal order; man'serect gait, his spiritual countenance, hishand formed for working after a freeproject; human acts have a threefold direction 
: cognition, imagination, volition;
the human body is the field of free expression 
for the human spirit, i.e., forthe religious centre of human existence,
88; the human body is man in the structural 
whole of his temporal appearance;
the human soul is man himself in the radical 
unity of his spiritual existencetranscending all temporal structures; racial 
differences, 89; the human body isnot qualified aesthetically, 113; the bodyas "experienced corporality" belongs to asupposed "pre-objective" experientialfield, according to MERLEAU-PONTY, 779;
it is a blind adherence to the "pre-object


ive world", 780. 

HUMAN BRAIN, THE, III, exemplifies thedifference between living and dead matter, 
according to DRIESCH, 742. 

HUMANISTIC THOUGHT, I, (cf. Modern Humanistic 
Philosophy, I), its ground motive 
of nature and freedom; its conception 
of time is orientated rationalisticallytoward mechanical motion in the sense 
of classical physics; or it is irrationalistically 
considered in a vitalistic, psychological, 
or historical way; objectivisticand subjectivistic views, 27; As long asNominalistic Scholasticism subjected itself 
to the dogma of the Church it restedin a dualism between faith and natural 
knowledge; its secularization was introduced 
by JOHN OF JANDUN and MARSILIUSOF PADUA, 188; the collapse of the ecclesiastically 
unified culture of the MiddleAges; the discovery of the pure Greekand Roman sources of culture, resentment 
against Medieval barbarian linguistic 
forms of Scholasticism, and against thesynthesis between Christianity and theancient life and world view, 189; BiblicalHumanism andthe Reformation; theBible was moralistically interpreted byERASMUS, etc., 190; the religious basicmotive of Humanism is that of nature 


HUMANITY 98 

and freedom; this motive is founded on mated with life; VALLA deified nature asthe secularized Biblical motive of crea-the expansion sphere of the personalitytion, and Christian freedom and assimi-ideal, 198; since COPERNICUS' astronolated 
the Greek motive of form and mat-mical revolution modern man discovered 
ter and the Roman Catholic motive of in nature a macrocosm that had its renature 
and grace; its inner dialectic isflected image in man's own personalitydue to the ambiguous freedom-motive;as microcosm; BRUNO'S and CUSANUS'which is the driving force of the modernworship of the infinite; and of the coin-
religion of human personality; the lattercidentia oppositorum; their rejection ofwants to dominate nature by means ofthe opposition between "Jenseits" andscience to which it ultimately surrenders,"Diesseits"; the religious freedom motive190; the radical unity of the human per-is still in accordance with the nature mosonality 
gets lost; any faith in the "super-tive; BRUNO'S only difficulty intimatesnatural" is rejected; its religion concen-the future tension between these two motrates 
on man and his needs; it rejectedtives, 199; the decisive turn came withany "heteronomous" Divine Revelation ; athe introduction of the functional con-
personal God is used as the foundationcept of mechanic causality,200; Humanistfor mathematical truth in DESCARTES ; as thought had built a new metaphysics, andthe requirement of religious feeling inin its cadre the dialectical tension between 
ROUSSEAU, as a postulate of the "practicalnature and freedom became manifest; un-
Reason" in KANT; the Renaissance secu-der the science ideal HOBBES' epistemololarized 
the Christian Idea of regenera-gical empiricism was extremely rationaltion, 
i.e., in the Italian "Renascimento",istic, since it conceived of the process of

with its thirst for temporal life and itsknowledge in terms of the laws of mecha-
Faustian desire to control the world;nical movement; since LOCKE, empiricism

OCCAM'S depreciation of "natural reason"

gave the science-ideal a psychological

was replaced by religious confidence in

turn, seeking the common denominator of

reason's liberating power, 191; the Hu-

the modal aspects within the functional

manistic life and world view was origin-

apparatus of human knowledge, 262; espeally 
aristocratic; the "uomo universale"cially in feeling and sensation alone; sub-

Of LEO BATTISTA ALBERTI'S autobiography;

stance, "Ding an sich" became the episte-

LEONARDO DA VINCI; Faustian desire for 

mological x, the unknown and unknow


the progress of culture; the Greek "phy


able background of the "empirical world"

sis" view was dominated by the motive

given only in psychical impressions and

of form and matter; modern autonomous

perceptions, 263.

man considers "immeasurable nature" 

—, II, in the crisis, 18 ; has given up re


(192) as a macrocosmic reflection of the
flecting on the supra-temporal root of ex-

autonomous freedom of human personal


perience owing to the pressure of positi


ity; or as such a reflection of the Faus


vism and historism; the historical con


tian domination-motive; this leads to a

sciousness; its irrational existential atti


deterministic theoretical view of reality;

tude; the decay of religious self-reflection,

GALILEO and NEWTON; this scientific me


19, 20; the Humanistic cosmonomic Idea,

thod was proclaimed the universal model

26; assumes a logical continuous order of

for thought; this creates a structureless

the sciences, 49; the science ideal and

view of reality as a continuous causal

its creation motive in PASCH, VERONESE,

series, which is a threat to free human

CANTOR, etc. on "continuous numbers",

personality, 193; early Humanism turned

91; tends to logicize number and space;

away from the "formalistic hairsplitting"

the subject-side of number is merged into

of scholastic conceptual distinctions;

its law-side, 92; natural law concept, 167;

COPERNICUS' heliocentric world picture,

the a priori is taken in an epistemological

194; for modern man the Platonic me on,

sense; in recent times in a phenomeno


the endless, the apeiron, is the highest

logical sense, 543.

principle : CUSANUS, BRUNO; LEIBNIZ Con


—, III, NEWTON'S "material units" and

sidered the limited as "metaphysical

the concept of substance are based on

evil", 194 ; Nominalistic subjectivism and

the classical Humanistic science-ideal,

individualism were considered as pheno


23; this ideal is deterministic; was in


mena of decadence and a mortal danger

tended to destroy the world of naïve ex-

to the Greek polis, in ancient Greek cul


perience and reconstrue reality by means

ture, 195; Humanism borrowed heavily

of mathematical mechanical thought, 26.

from the Stoic ideal of the self-sufficient 
Sage, from Epicurean ethics (VALLA),HUMANITY, I, HERDER'S ideal, 455.


etc.; but it had an inner predisposition—, II, modern Idea of humanity in

to a deterministic view of the world; the

RANKE, 281.

mathematical ideal of knowledge became—III, COMTE'S idea of humanity as anthe transcendental ideal of cosmic order;all-embracing community, 167.
but originally nature was not conceivedas a mechanical system, but as filled withHUMAN NATURE, I, iS a composition of a

beauty, force and life; DA VINCI consi-material body and a• rational soul, indered nature as a teleological whole ani-Thomism, 180. 


99 HUME, DAVID 

HUMAN SOCIETY, III, its ultimate basis is tasm possesses a concept of order ex-
the transcendent root community of man-cluding arbitrariness; the law of this or-
kind, 656. der is that of necessary connection or 

association; Ideas are simple or com-

HUMBOLDT, W. VON, II, 

plex; the complex Ideas are partly based

Werke I, 276;

on sensorily perceived relations between

cf. 222. 

impressions; impressions are either

H, the general dignity of man, 276. 

simple or complex; all associations obeyHUME, DAVID, I,the law of resemblance, spatial and tem-
Treatise upon Human nature, 272, 274,poral coherence (contiguity), the law of276, 277, 278, 280, 281, 282, 284, 285, 286,cause and effect, 277; they are purely287, 290, 291, 292, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298,mechanical laws and concern only the. 
299, 300, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308,so-called "natural relations between the 
309, 310, 313; Ideas; their products are the complexEnquiry concerning human understand-Ideas of relations, substances and modi,
ing, 276, 281, 288, 300;i.e., the ordinary objects of our thoughts

Dialogues concerning natural religion,and judgments; the imagination produces275; associations on the basis of sensory re-
Dissertation on the Passions, 302; lations and exceed that which is given;
The Original Contract, 312;they may go astray; there are "natural"
An Enquiry concerning the Principles ofand "philosophical" relations; the latterMorals, 312. compare Ideas or impressions not con---, 
I, He criticized the Humanistic meta-nected by association; there are sixphysics of nature, 203 ; desired to reduceclasses of philosophical relations (278)
all phenomena to the smallest possiblein this classification; the basic mathemanumber 
of simple principles (economytical principles have become psychologiof 
thought) ; and in this way to achievecal ones, and so have the laws of logic,
a Copernican revolution in the field ofphilosophical relations are either variathe 
phenomena of human nature; all ab-ble or invariable; the latter are thestract concepts must be reduced to in-ground of certain knowledge; certain,
dividual sensory "impressions" as thebecause unchangeable and directly per-
simplest elements, 272; this shows a strongceivable together with their terms with-
vein of Nominalism in HUME'S psycholo-out reasoning; reasoning always consistsgicism; his "empiricism" and that ofin a succession of Ideas; they fall underLEIBNIZ; moderate and radical nominal-the province of intuition rather than unism; 
his reduction of universal "repre-der that of demonstration ; the same thingsentations" into "impressions" is the is true for the variable relations of idenexact 
psychological counterpart of (e.g.tity, time, and place, 279; natural rela-
LEIBNIz') the resolution of "complex con-tions rest on a veritable association in 
cepts" into the simplest conceptual Cle-the sequence of Ideas; on the ground ofments by mathematicism, 273; Hum'sthe causal relation those of time, place,
"data" do not belong to the real data ofand identity can exceed the directlyour experience; LocKE's "simple psychi-given sensory datum and play a part incal element of consciousness" is as ab-the associational process of thought;
stract as the concept "triangle in ge-HUME'S criticism of mathematics; contraneral"; 
he eradicated the boundariesdictory interpretations of HumE's critibetween 
LOCKE'S "sensation" and "re-que of mathematics : RIEHL, WINDELBAND,
flexion"; all reality was "sensation"; 274;280; he doubted the claims of mathemahe 
was strongly influenced by the tics to exact knowledge; mathematicsmethod of SEXTUS EMPIRICUS ; but he did belongs to the knowledge of relations,
not want to end in Pyrrhonistic sceptic-not of facts; in his Enquiry he says:
ism, 275; HUME'S scepticism was only athough there were never a circle or amethod in the interest of the psycholo-triangle in nature, the truths demonstragical 
ideal of science; he repudiated theted by EUCLID, would for ever retaindualistic division between "sensation" their certainty and evidence, 281; hisand reflexion; reflexion became an imageTreatise contains very contradictoryof "sensation"; truth has its criterion instatements; the method to solve thisthe demonstration of the "original im-riddle; HUME'S contrast between "matpressions" 
from which an Idea is derived;ters of fact" and "relations of Ideas" is 
his notion of "impressions"; he does notnot Lockian; HUME'S "reflection" is anconceive them in their subjective actual-"image" of sensation"; many complexity, but according to their objective con-Ideas are not due to corresponding "imtent 
as the elements of phenomena; ideas,pressions", many "complex impressions"
or thought and reasoning are derivedare never reflected exactly in "Ideas",
from sensory "impressions"; they are282; "I can imagine a city like the "Newcopies of impressions and less sensorilyJerusalem", although I have never seenintense; his explanation of "false Ideas",such a city; I have seen Paris but I can276; 
the difference between the Ideas of not form such an Idea of it that is adememory 
and those of fantasy; the phan-quate to reality; all judgments that are 


HUME, DAVID 

not pure copies of the original impressions 
must relinquish their claim to certainty 
and exactitude; if mathematicsgoes beyond the sensory limits it has noclaim to universally valid truth; all universal 
ideas are merely particular onesunder a universal name evoking other individual 
ideas in the imagination resembling 
the first, 283; everything in natureis individual; this inclines to radical sensationalism; 
the conception of space isthe copy of sensory impressions of "co-
loured points"; HUME'S basic denominator 
is "visual and tactual meaning"; coloured 
points are minima sensibilia, theirsensory relation is reflected in the concept 
of space as a mere copy of them;
these points must possess a sensory extension 
which is no longer divisible, 285;
a mathematical point without any extension 
must be an absurdity to HUME, evenin the "order of thought"; the concept ofmathematical equality; of straight lines;
curves; planes, etc.; they are useful fictions; 
the first principles (of maths) arefounded on the imagination and the senses; 
the conclusion, therefore, can nevergo beyond, much less contradict thesefaculties, 285; HUME'S concept of time;
this "Idea" is formed out of the sequenceof changing sensory "impressions" and"Ideas"; five notes played on a flute giveus the impression and the concept oftime; all false concepts in mathematicsarise through the natural associations ofresemblance, contiguity and causality,
286; arithmetical unity is the copy of asingle "impression"; number as unity inthe quantitative relations is a fiction; areal unity must be indivisible and incapable 
of being resolved into any lesserunity; a sum of units can only begrounded on a sensory relation betweenindividual impressions, 287; the "co-
loured points of space", the minima sensibilia; 
he reduces original numericalmeaning to "sensory impression"; butsensory multiplicity pre-supposes theoriginal modus of number; in HUME arithmetical 
laws are psychical laws; if thiswere true, arithmetic would have to relinquish 
any claim to being an exactscience; HUME shrank back from such a 
conclusion; his "Enquiry concerning human 
understanding" relapses into theLockian position, 288 ; mathematicalexactitude and independence of sensoryimpressions only has a pragmatic validity; 
faith in mathematics is to be explained 
from imagination and the lawsof psychological association ; these lawsare to arrest radical Pyrrhonist scepticism; 
psychological thought is HUME'SArchimedean point; his criticism of thesubstance concept and his interpretationof naive experience, 289; he insisted thatnaive experience is not a theory of reality, 
but must be explained in terms of anatural impulse of human feeling; noth


ing is given in experience but the multiplicity 
of sensory impressions, 290; HUMErejected LOCKE'S distinction beween primary 
and secondary qualities; his positivistic 
psychologism had no recourse toa metaphysical theology to explain ourbelief in an external world; "Ding ansich" is a product of imagination; "natural 
associations", resting on the temporal 
succession of Ideas lead fantasybeyond what has been given and metaphysics 
to its false substance concept;
common sense (i.e. naive experience) or"the vulgar view" derives its belief in theexternal world from sensory impressionsand true philosophy has to indicate theseimpressions; metaphysics merely relates"natural associations" to a false concept(substance), 291; the constancy and coherence 
of our sense impressions are thefoundation of our naive faith in a world 
independent of our consciousness, 292;
we speak of an identical thing, but theonly data we have are similar impressions, 
separated in time but united byassociational relations; HUME absolutizesthe sensory aspect of experience; he desired 
to explain the claim to logical exactitude 
of so-called "creative mathematical 
thought" in terms of psychology, 293 ; heplaces sovereign psychological thoughtas such above the "creative" fantasy; thecreative power of this thought is imputedto the faculty of the imagination ; thisthought is Arche, origin and law-giver of 
the cosmos of experience; but HUME fails 
to account for this transcendental Idea 
of Origin, because he had not yet arrivedat transcendental critical self-reflection;
his laws of association serve as lex continui, 
as the foundation of reality; he alsodestroyed the concept of the spiritualsubstance, 294 ; the conflict between materialism 
and idealism is one between 
"brothers of the same house"; SPINOZAwas an atheist to the idealists because he 
did not believe in a soul-substance; thenthe idealistic metaphysics of the immortal 
soul is also atheistic; HUME asserted 
that the universe of our experience isresolved into impressions and Ideas derived 
from them; the ego is merely acollective concept of the series of Ideasordered constantly in accordance withthe laws of association, 295; the mind itself 
is not really a theatre for "impressions", 
but consists in nothing else but"perceptions"; the "ego" is an illusion;
identity is merely a quality we attributeto different perceptions when we reflectupon them; in HUME the psychologicalscience-ideal has destroyed the personality 
ideal in its foundation, 296; causalityhad been an "eternal logical truth" to themathematical science ideal; LEIBNIZcalled it a "factual verity"; HUME did notdistinguish between naive experience andnatural science in a fundamental sense;
experience goes beyond the given sen



 

1. 01 HUME, DAVID 
sory impressions; then epistemologicaljudgments of supposed universal validityand necessity are given with referenceto the sensory impressions; we concludefrom a sensorily given fact to anotherfact that is not given, with the aid of theprinciple of the connection of cause andeffect; its foundation can only be soughtin the relations of impressions; two relations: 
contiguity and priority in timeof one event before another, 297 ; but the 
Idea of causality very decidedly goesbeyond these sensory relations; a judgment 
of causality does not state a merepost hoc, but is intended to indicate apropter hoc; there is no object which asa "cause" would logically imply the existence 
of any other object; the denial ofa necessary connection between causeand effect does not lead to a single logical 
contradiction; we remember that afterthe sensory perception of fire we haveregularly experienced the sensation ofwarmth; thereby is discovered the constant 
connection of two sorts of impressions 
that follow each other in time; inthis relation there is nothing in itself implying 
an objectively valid necessity;
from the mere repetition of any past impression, 
even to infinity, there willnever arise any new original Idea suchas that of a necessary connection, 298;
but the constant resemblance in the different 
instances does raise a new subjective 
impression in the mind, namelya tendency to pass over from an instantlygiven impression to the Idea of anotherimpression which in the past repeatedlyoccurred after the former; this is the impression 
corresponding to the Idea ofcausality; in his "Inquiry" he immediately 
introduces habit in connecting Ideasas a natural law; this habit compels usto join the Idea of an event B repeatedlyfollowing the same event A, with the Ideaof the latter, 299; the "propter hoc" cannever be demonstrated or understood rationally, 
it can only be believed; thisfaith is some feeling accompanying ourIdea; HUME'S acknowledgment destroysthe foundation of the psychical laws ofassociation as laws of human nature; but 
HUME appeals to these laws in a purelydogmatic fashion; he shook the pillars ofthe personality ideal and of the science-
ideal as well; he levelled the modal boundaries 
between the different law-spheres,
and was involved in antinomies, 300; hedid not understand that only theoreticalthought is in a position to isolate thepsychical aspect of reality; a concept isto him a mere copy of a psychical impression, 
thus he reduced the logical aspect 
to the psychical aspect; his basicdenominator for all given reality was notpsychical, but psychological, 301; HUMEundermined the claim to truth made byhis own theory; he recognized a relativemeaning-diversity in the cosmos within 

his absolutized psychical sphere; "pleasure 
and pain constitute the very essenceof beauty and deformity"; his mechanistic 
theory of the emotions; this theorywas the foundation of his ethics and his 
theoretical view of faith; the laws ofassociation are his explanatory principles; 
these laws are founded in the principle 
of the uniformity of human natureat all times, 302; primary impressions(of sensory perceptions) and pain andpleasure) ; secondary or reflective impressions 
(the emotions) ; calm and vehement 
emotions; direct and indirectpassions; the selfhood cannot be thecause but only the object of a passion,
303; in pride and humility the selfhoodis the object; in hate and love others arethe objects; on the validity of the lawsof association, 304 ; in his psychologicalmechanism there is no room for freedom 
of the will; "res cogitans" the selfhoodconcentrated in its mathematical thoughtas a substance was destroyed by HUME'Spsychological criticism; he conceives ofthe will as a mere impression felt incorporeal motion or in the production ofa new Idea in our mind, 305; he thoughthis doctrine of the psychological necessity 
of human actions to be essential bothfor morality and religion; his philosophywas the prelude to the shift of primacyfrom the nature motive to the freedom 
motive; he taught that reason alone cannever be a motive to any action of thewill, 306; nor can it oppose passion inthe direction of the will; reason is andought to be the slave of passion; evencausal natural scientific thought cannotinfluence nor activate the will; wherethe objects themselves do not affect us,
their connexions, discovered by reason,
can never give them any influence; action 
only arises from an emotion; nothing 
can oppose or retard the impulse ofpassion but a contrary impulse; the rationalist 
prejudice is rejected that thedecisions of the will are determined bytheoretical Ideas, 307; he sharply distinguished 
that which "is" from thatwhich "ought to be"; this implies thecontrast between scientific thought andethical action; ethics cannot be provenlogico-mathematically; if mathematicalthought could prove ethics, the characterof virtue and vice must lie in certain relations 
between the objects, or they are"matters of fact" discoverable by scientific 
reasoning, 308; if virtue were discoverable 
through thought, it would beeither an object of mathematical science,
or of natural science; rationalists thinkthat ethical norms can be proven a prioriand "more geometrico"; HUME derivesvice and virtue from feelings of pain andpleasure; this is antinomous; he explainsthat pleasure is a general term for verydifferent "feelings"; e.g. aesthetic feelingand that of taste are mutually irreducible; 


 

HUNDESHAGEN102 

but HUME'S mechanistic theory of humannature destroys the foundation for allnormative imputation, 309 ; the basis ofnormative ethical distinctions is the 
moral sense; a particular moral feeling isdue to moral impressions; the sense ofvirtue is a feeling of satisfaction from thecontemplation of a character; the factthat such a character pleases in a particular 
way makes us feel that it is virtuous; 
the motives of acts, even of moralacts, remain a-normative in HUME; actsare hedonistically determined; here is atendency to withdraw the personalityideal from the grasp of the science ideal,
310; he criticized the doctrine of naturallaw and the contractual view of the 
State; he appealed to the psychical condition 
of primitive people; his criticismof the contractual view aimed a blow at 
the mathematical ideal of science; his 
connection with the Tory party; primitive 
people cannot comprehend obedienceto political authority in terms of an abstract 
contract of individuals; he pointedout that the obligation arising out ofagreement is not of a natural but of aconventional character, 311; a contract

cannot precede the establishment of anordered community and the institutionsof the state; he replaced the contracttheory - generally justifying the statealong the mathematical logical path

by a psychological conception; in his"The Original Contract" he assumed anoriginal equality of men, hence an original 
consent of individuals to subject toauthority; such equality is not conceivedin mathematical exactitude; the originalagreement was psychological and intermittent, 
in terms of the impressions ofnecessity and utility in a given situation,
for the sake of submitting to somebodyof eminent qualities; frequent recurrenceof such situations gave rise to a customof obedience, 312 ; the right of authorityis due to the influence of time on the 
human soul; utility breeds the impulse toobey; HUME made the doctrine of naturallaw cave in under his critique, 313;
HumE's influence on KANT was only restricted 
in scope, 334; HUME sought themoral faculty in the moral sentiment, 338;
in the third period of KANT'S development 
he followed HUME in reducing allsynthetical propositions to the sensoryaspect, qualifying them as "empiricaljudgments", 341; HUME'S critique of theprinciple of causality stimulated KANT todemonstrate the transcendental-logicalcharacter of the synthetical categories,

353. 
II, 
A Treatise of Human Nature, 331;
cf. 12, 86, 96, 332, 333, 350, 430, 494.
-, II, psychologizes mathematics; this

leads to antinomy, 46; he refuted theview of space as an a priori receptacle,
96; he provided KANT with psychologis


tic epistemology, 494; his definition of
the imagination, and that of KANT, 515.
-, III, his psychologistic notion of substance, 
27. 


HUNDESHAGEN, III, emphasizes the fact
that CALVIN recognizes the functions that
the Church has in all the spheres of hu


man societal life, 520. 


HUSSERL, EDMUND, I, 
Ideen zu einer Phanomenologie und phiinomenologischen 
Philosophie, 52;
Logische Untersuchungen, 73;
Die Pariser Vortrdge, 213;
Cartesianische Meditationen, 213.
-, I, in the phenomenological attitude
the absolute "cogito" is opposed to the
"world" as the intentional "Gegenstand"
which is dependent on the cogito, 52; the


modal diversity of meaning can be transcended 
by means of a formalized logical
totality-concept; thus he arrived at the
"formal logical" relation "whole and its
parts" which is to be purified from any
non-logical speciality of meaning; then
he can formulate different purely logical
propositions and sdefinitions by means of
the concept "logical foundation"; but the
proposition : "the whole is more than its
parts" is not purely analytic; HUSSERL'S
concept of the whole is taken in the special 
sense of mathematics, which he considers 
to be reducible to pure logic, 73,
74 (note) ; the concept "whole" remains
enclosed in the analytical aspect which
pre-supposes the inter-modal coherence;
it cannot be a transcendental Idea of 
totality; his formalized concept of the
whole is conceived in the special sense
of pure mathematics which he reduces to
pure logic, 74 ; his "egology" excludes the
existence of limits for the "transcendental 
cogito", 91; his "absolute consciousness"
is a speculative metaphysical concept, 92;
his "eidetic logic"; direct intuition of the
essence by an "uninterested observer" in
the "epoche" can give an adequate essen


tial description of the act-life of man in
the intentional relation to the world, 213;
considers his phenomenology to be the
foundation of philosophy, 543, 544.


-, II, 
Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie
und phAnomenologischen Philosophie,
17, 18, 27, 29, 452, 453, 454, 543; 
Logische Untersuchungen, 27, 28, 224,


450, 452, 453, 454, 457, 459;
Cartesianische Meditationen, 489, 538,


543, 544, 549, 584; 
cf. 462, 468, 487, 488, 558, 560, 569.


-, II, his theory of "regions", 17; the
12th and 13th sections of his "Ideen",
and scholastic logic, obscuring the boundaries 
of the modal aspects, 18; Sinn (=meaning) 
and Bedeutung (= signification) 
-are identified; meaning is the
pure act in its noetic and noematical aspects, 
27; noetic consciousness is absolute, 
the residue of the destruction of the 



world performed by the epoch6 (= suspending 
the naïve attitude), 28, 29;
meaning cannot be reality itself for itcannot be burnt down like a house, 31;
on Erlebnis, 112; his idea of pure grammar, 
224; pure significations, 224, 225;
his structural conception of the lingualsign : expression, meaning intentions, reference 
to "thing", i.e. signification, 225;
a word signifies via its signification, 225;
he abstracted the subject's intention fromthe subjective signifying function; thesignifying he called a psychical act; butintending and signifying are not the act;
they are modalities in which the act isrealized, 226; his "reine Mannigfaltigkeitslehre" 
and juridical theory, 342;
conception of analytical judgment, 450;
its truth is independent of the Gegenstand 
and may be completely formalized;
the sentence; the existence of this particular 
house includes that of all its parts;,
formula : G ( a, /1, y, ...) implies ( a, /3,
...), 451; HUSSERL'S affinity with HILBERT'S 
conception of maths, 452; thewhole and its parts; independence, etc.,
are essentialia; pure concepts conceivedeidetically are empty basic forms,453; hismaterial regions of being are delimitedby the numerical (454) analogy in thewhole and its parts in the spatial modus;
continuous analytical extent; analyticaljuxtaposition and numerical juxtaposition 
accomplished in the movement ofthought; prius et posterius; kinematicanalogy, 455; his regions of being, 454—
456; formalization of judgments requiresmeaning-synthesis; "essential" forms;
material synthetical categories; the regions 
"thing", "soul"; he contrasts supertemporal 
essence ( : = eidos) with the purely 
accidental empirical fact; the wholeand its parts is a relation pre-supposingsubjective analytical synthesis and objective 
analytical systasis, because it isa logical unity in a logical multiplicityfounded onnumber, 456; extensivewhole; extensive parts, 457; all totalities(except the extensive ones) lack unifyingconnective forms; the relations of foundation, 
458; criticism of HUSSERL, 458; the 
transcendental consciousness constitutes 
the Gegenstand, 467; Wesensschau movesin acts of reflexion; modifications of experience 
through reflexion, 487 (note) ;heabsolutizes the phenomenological attitude,
489; his view of the a priori, 543; of theGegenstand; the task of phenomenology;
the transcendental constitution of the 
world; his universal concrete ontology;
concrete logic of being; his idea of whatis religious, 544 ; the phenomenologicalmonads, the absolute, primary being, 545;
his eidetic logic and the plastic horizon ofexperience, 558; he relativized his conception 
of the world of pure essences bythe motif of active and passive genesis,
558 ; his transcendental phenomenologicalegology makes the knowledge of God de

 


103HYPOSTATIZATION 

pendent on the phenomenological self-
interpretation of the transcendental ego560 (note), 561; his attack on KANT, 569;
he calls the a priori forms of sensibility`mythical constructions'; KANT thoughttranscendental truth accessible to the cognitive 
selfhood and unproblematical; thisbecame HUSSERL'S basic problem ; the ego'stranscendental synthesis is a hidden"anonymous" 
a- prioriact and is made visibleby phenomenological analysis, and alsoconstitutes pre-theoretical experience; thetheoretical horizon encompasses all dimensions 
of experience, and the religious 
dimension; the latter becomes theimmanent horizon of intentional phenomena 
constituted by a synthesis of thetranscendental ego; truth is the adaequa


tio (i.e. coalescence) of the intended withthe given; HUSSERL hypostatizes the horizon 
of theoretical truth, 570.
—, III, he functionalistically misinterprets 
the thing structure of reality as oneof "regions" of the material sphere next tothe sphere of functional-sensory quali


ties, spatial figures, etc.; on the so-called

copy-theory, 54. 

HUTCHESON, I, on the moral sense, 310;
the power to distinguish what is good

lies in the moral sentiment, 338; he replaced 
the absolutism of individuality inSHAFTESBURY by the absolutism of law,
characteristic of the rationalistic types ofthe Humanistic cosmonomic Idea, 463. 

HYLE, II, and morphê in ARISTOTLE, 10. 

HYPOSTATIZATION, I, PLATO and ARISTOTLE'Shypostatization of the theoretical activityof thought in its logical aspect as an immortal 
Ousia or substance; THOMASAQUINAS accommodated this view to thedoctrine of the church; the entire soul,
characterized by the theoretical activityof thought, must be an immortal and purely 
spiritual substance, 44 ; of the non-
sensory psychical, logical, and post-
logical 'functions of mental acts, 92; of"theoretical reason", in KANT, as Archimedean 
point, 107; of theoretical thoughtin the divine "Nous", 122; in the concept"realism of values", 136 (note) ; of theethical function into the "homo noumenon", 
in KANT, 143; of the modern functional 
concept of law, in LEIBNIZ, 202 ; ofthe concept "force" introduced into physics' 
by NEWTON, 231; of the ego as athinking substance, in LEIBNIZ, 297; of thepersonality-ideal in KANT'S "god" as thepostulate of the pure practical reason, 384;
of the universal concept "ego" in FICHTE,
416; of practical reason in FICHTE, 426;
of "nature" in the science-ideal, 449; ofthe moral norm, 450; of the absolute andsubjective ethical stream of life as "god",

in FICHTE, 475.

—, II, of reason in the metaphysical ideaof being, 26; PARMENIDES hypostatized therelation of identity expressed by the co



HYPOTHESES NON FINGO 104 

pula to be, 56 ; MALAN accuses DOOYEwEERD 
of hypostatizing a quantitativemode of being, 84 ; Realism and ChristianScholasticism hypostatized the universalia; 
universalia have intentional abstract 
existence in Scholasticism ; Nominalism 
denied them any existence except 
"in mente", 386; universalia postrem, as symbols of reality; Realism; Thomistic 
realism is moderate; universalia 
ante rem in God's mind, and in re in the 
world, 387; hypostatization of theoreticalthought in immanence philosophy, 435;
God as the hypostasis of the intellect, in 
KANT, 501; of theoretical thought in HEIDEGGER, 
526; of the normative aspects 
into super-temporal ideas, 538; of thestructure of human knowledge, 560; oftheoretical truth, 561; of the theoretical 
synthesis, 562; of an abstract part of thetemporal horizon to a transcendence, 564;
the separation between faith and reasonon the immanent standpoint reveals thehypostatization of synthetical thought,
565; KANT'S hypostatization of "transcendental 
truth", 569; of the horizon of 
transcendental-theoretical truth in KANT, 
and. HUSSERL, 570; of the relative, 572; of 
the idea of truth to the absolute supertemporal 
Truth, 578; of the meaning-synthesis, 
579; of the so-called transcendental 
consciousness in immanence philosophical 
epistemology, 583. 
—, III, of deified theoretical thought asarchê of substance, 4; of substance as the 
coherence between physical phenomenasince DESCARTES, 27; in critical realism,
45, 46; in OPPENHEIMER'S concept of the"immortal individuum" "life", 167; of the 
rational-moral nature of man in Thomism, 
of the Church and faith, 218; in 
post-Kantian transpersonalistic idealism,
244, 246, 249; LITT rejects the hypostatisof an. Ueberperson, a super personality,
295; hypostatization of faith in LUTHER,

513. 
HYPOTHESES NON FINGO, I, NEWTON'S 
adage, 337. 

I 

-I-, PURE ACTUAL, II, in HUSSERL, 584. 

IDEA, I, is a limiting concept referring toa totality not to be comprehended in theconcept itself, 8 (note) ; the immanentIdeas of the inter-modal coherence of 
meaning, and of the meaning totality aretranscendental limiting concepts, 21;
ideas are symbols of reality in LEIBNIZ,
240; ideas are complex representations,
distinct from sensible and spiritual impressions, 
in LOCKE, 264 ; simple andcomplex ideas, 265; the Idea is the' embodiment 
of the Humanistic personalityideal, HONIGSWALD, 328, 329; Idea as 
"differential of consciousness" is to cla


rify the relation of the particular to theuniversal, in MAINON, 408 ; HEGEL'S metaphysical 
idea, 500.

— II, and concept; basic transcendental 
Idea; the presupposition of phil.,
4; in KANT the Idea is the origin of thebeing of what is, 19; the transcendentalIdea of Christian phil., 25; the Idea inpost-Kantian freedom Idealism, 26; FrcxTE'S 
Idea as noumenon, 27; in Neo-Kantianism, 
27; Christian Cosmonomic Idea, 
30, 31; the Idea of meaning as the modeof being of creation, 32; transcendentalIdea and concept of Gegenstand; the Ideaof the homo noumenon in KANT, 44 ; in 
the metaphysics of the mathematicalscience' ideal the transcendental Idea is 
a "Ding an sich", 44; concept and modalIdea, 45; the number of theoretical ideas, 
45; Ideas depend on concepts in thefoundational direction; concepts dependon Ideas in the transcendental direction, 
186, 187, 188; the Idea of developmentoriented to the personality-ideal in KANT,
271; Id. of political development in MONtesquieu, 
350. 
IDEA LEGIS, I, is the cosmonomic Idea of 
Christian philosophy, 93. 

IDEALISM, I, versus naturalism, 121; LEI13.4 
NIZ' idealism is mathematical; of Greek 
thought, 122; HEGEL'S absolute idealism,
329; mathematical idealism and criticaltranscendentalism in MAIMON, 406; organological 
idealism of SCHELLING, 469.
—, II, HEGEL'S absolute Idealism, German 
Idealism yields to irrational historicism, 
19,20; idealistic metaphysics, 20; KANT'Stranscendentalism and his idea of the 
noumenon, 187. 

IDEALISM, CRITICAL, I, and the concept ofthe "transcendental subject of thought",

120. 
IDEALISM, ORGANOLOGICAL, I, in SCHELLING, 
469. 

IDEA OF CREATION, I, objections to thisterm, 95. 

IDEA OF HUMANITY, THE, I, in the Sturm 
and Drang, 454. 

IDEA OF HUMANITY, II, in the Enlightenment, 
358. 

IDEAL SUBJECT, I, in Immanence philosophy, 
110. 

IDEAL TYPES, III, of MAX WEBER, 171; theyare no structural principles; and antiqueand medieval forms of "political life",
175; these ideas are useless in sociology,

330. 
IDENTITY, PRINCIPLE OF, I, in FICHTE, 418. 

IDENTITY, II, the relation of identity mustnot be absolutized, 461; our experienceof identity, 500.
—, III, and change as a metaphysicalproblem, 3, 4. 


105 IMMANENCE PHILOSOPHY 


ILLEGAL ACT, II, in its primary meaningmodus there is an analogy of energy-effect 
in the factual juridical causality, 181. 

ILLUSION, I, the dialectical illusion, inKANT, arises when theoretical thoughttries to attain the knowledge of the supra-
empirical, 365. 

IMAGE, II, an image of movement is objective 
sensory, and requires a perceptible 
reference, appealing to our intuitionof movement, 100; psychical image, 375. 

IMAGINARY (NUMBER) , II, function of num


ber, 171. 
IMAGINATION, I, the creative power ofpsychological thoughts is imputed to the

faculty of the imagination, by HUME, 294;
productive imagination in FICHTE, 427,428, 429, 430, 431; produces the non-egoin FICHTE'S view, 434.

--, II, and the intentional structures, 115,118, 121; and sensory experience of motion, 
168; and feeling in Classicism, 347;
phantasms of sensory imagination are intentional 
objects apart from the sensoryobjectivity of real things, 425; KANT:
imagination and logical synthesis, 497;
the transcendental imagination in KANT,
513; productive, reproductive, synthetic-
imagination, 514; CUSANUS' view; HUME;
KANT, 515; productive imagination inKANT, the root of practical reason, afaculty of the soul ascribed to logicalthought, 520, 521 ; HEIDEGGER identifiesimagination with Dasein; the pure finiteselfhood is rooted in time, 524 ; the formative 
medium between the two stems of 
knowledge in KANT'S view, 525-529;
KANT'S "pure imagination" links the twostems of knowledge, but is not their root,
532; imagination and sensibility, 534; definition 
of KANT'S "pure imagination",

535. 
—,III, the copy theory of "naive realism",
35; empiricist atomistic view of sense impressions 
and perceptual images; thequalifying function of a thing dominatesits objective perceptual image, 104, 105;
an artist's productive fantasy is foundedin sensory imagination; a visual phantasm; 
an intentional visionary object; reproductive 
fantasy; in art; the fanciedobjective structure of a thing is a potentional 
structure capable of being represented 
in a real thing, 113-116; the sensory 
function of the imagination, 115. 
IMAGO DEI, I, man was created by God as

the expression of His image, 4; the imageof God was wiped out when man intended 
to be something in himself, 4 (note).
--, II, the supertemporal focus of all theaspects of creation, the fulness of meaning 
given in Christ, 30; the power inherent 
in it, 248; and faith, 300.

—, III, cannot be understood if the human 
person in its kernel is conceived asa substance, 6; in a religious sense loveis the fulfilment and radical unity of all 

temporal meaning, only found in the ima


go Dei revealed in Christ, 71. 

IMMANENCE PHILOSOPHY, I, accepts theself-sufficiency of philosophical thoughtin accomplishing its task, i.e., the autonomy 
of reason, 12; it does not reject themetaphysical way to what transcendshuman thought; classical imm. phil. wasbased on a metaphysical "prima philosophia"; 
rationalistic Imm. Phil. involvesthe attempt to overstep the boundaries ofphil. thought in the idea of an absolutedeified thought, viz., the "intellectusarchetypus"; Imm. Phil. does not necessarily 
imply the belief in the self-sufficiency 
of only logical thought; it variesfrom rationalism to modern logical positivism 
and the irrationalistic phil. of life;
modern existentialism, 13 ; Imm. Phil., 
taken in a narrow sense, views all realityas immanent in consciousness, breakingthe bridge between an extra-mental "Dingan sich" and the functions of human 
consciousness, 14 ; immanence phil. ina wide sense is all philosophy that seeksits Archimedean point in philosophic 
thought itself; on this standpointthere is a current which stresses the 
purely theoretical character of philosophy; 
the theoretical is only one of themany aspects from which we may viewthe cosmos, although it is the only onefrom which we can really grasp the cosmos 
in the view of totality; but thisschool of phil. also brings to the forethe self-sufficiency of "transcendentalthought" as its Archimedean point; thetheoretical cosmos is the creation of philos. 
thought, 14; religious and "weltanschauliche" 
convictions cannot claim recognition 
in the domain of philosophy;
this is the neutrality postulate; it is defended 
by RICKERT and THEODOR LITT,
a.o.; the inner problematic situation ofimmanence philosophy; the choice of thisstandpoint requires philosophy to transcend 
the limits of phil. thought, 15; thenecessary religious transcending in thechoice of the immanence standpoint; thischoice is not an act of a "transcendental 
subject of thought", because this "subject" 
is merely an abstract concept; it isa religious act of the full self whichtranscends the diversity of the modal aspects; 
this choice of the immanencestandpoint is a choice of position in anidolatrous sense, 20; RICKERT'S assertion"if we are able to determine the boundaries 
of thought through thinking, wemust also be able to exceed these limits" 
contains an overt contradiction on the 
immanence standpoint, 22 (note) ; on thisstandpoint RICKERT lacks an appreciationof the transcendence of our selfhood, 23; 
immanence phil. stands and falls withthe dogma of the autonomy of theoreticalthought, 35 ; imm. phil. seeks the startingpoint for the theoretical synthesis in 


 

IMMORTALITY 106 

theoretical reason, 45; such synthesis canbe performed with each of the aspects;
the process invariably amounts to the absolutization 
of a special syntheticallygrasped modal aspect; this is the sourceof many "-isms", 46;in Greek and scho


, 

lastic metaphysics the concept of "being"
as an "analogical unity" lies at the basisof the diversity of aspects, 47 ; "-isms" in"pure" mathematics, and in ethics, aesthetics 
and theology, 48.
—, II, immanence philosophy subjectivelyeliminates the cosmic time-order and absolutizes 
theoretical thought, 8; Meaningis distinguished from reality in Immanence 
Phil., 25, 26; the metaphysicalidea of being in Imm. Phil., 26; Imm.
Phil. never posited the problem of thecosmic order of succession of modal 
spheres, 49; its unmethodical treatmentof the coherence between the normative 
aspects, 49; Imm. Phil. was incapable 
of positing the problem of conceptformation correctly, 50; its form-matterscheme, its theory of phenomenon andnoumenon ; its concept of a psycho-physical 
world, 50; its hypostasis of theoretical 
thought, 435; and of the intellect inKANT, 501 (note) ; the hypostasis of theso-called transcendental consciousness, 

583. 
IMMORTALITY, I, of the rational soul, in 
THOMAS, 44. 

IMPERSONAL ATTITUDE, I, of philosophicreflection criticized by Existentialism,

170. 
IN-ACTUALIZATION, III, if the objectivequalification of a thing is no longer operative 
owing to changed historical circumstances, 
we speak of in-actualization ofthe qualifying function ; a medieval castlemay become a museum; there is a distinction 
to be made between the objectivereality of a thing and the subjective actualization 
of its qualifying function inthe subj.-object-relation, 143, 146, 147;
the shift in a thing's destination is ex


clusively concerned with the actualization 
relation, 148; the biotic function is 
necessarily included in the subject-objectrelation of a thing both in the openingand in the actualization relation, 149; 
things function in the biotic aspect intheir own typical structure; only thencan their qualifying normative objectfunction be actualized; such things belong 
to the objective human environment; 
by actualizing their objective destination 
man enriches his own existence, 
150; the actualization of a book structure, 
152; books broaden our horizon, 153. 

INCAPSULATED STRUCTURE, III, its internal 
operational sphere, and its external enkaptic 
sphere, ordered by the operationalsphere of the higher structure, 696. 

INCERTITUDE, III, HEISENBERG'S Concept of 

incert., 643 (note) ; BOHR'S relation of incertitude, 
715, 726, 727. 

INCARNATION, II, in the perspective horizon 
of experience we become aware ofthe fulness of meaning only in the lightof the Divine Revelation. For this reason, 
as the fulness of God's Revelation, Christ 
came into the flesh, 561. 

INDIFFERENCE, II, is an attitude of feeling,
as is also interest, 117. 

INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP, II, in the questionabout the great personalities of history,

245. 
INDIVIDUALISM, III, sociological individualism 
absolutizes the inter-individual relationships, 
cf. HOBBES, 182, 183; PoLos,
Thrasymachos, KALLIKLES, were individualists, 
199. 

INDIVIDUALITY, I, is "specificity in nature", 
in KANT, 387; true reality is in theirrational depths of individuality, according 
to HAMANN, 453; the conceptionof individuality in the Sturm and Drangperiod, 454 ; is the result of a metaphysical 
actus individuationis in which time 
acquires individual points of concentration, 
according to FICHTE, 474 ; natural 
individuality must be annihilated by theindividual spirit in the historical process, 
in FICHTE, 478; can only be understood 
from the individual communities, 
479; subjective individuality cannot existunless it is bound to a supra-individual

order, 493. 
—, II, historical individuality, 194 ; in


dividual causality in RICKERT, 254 ; in


dividual historical totality in J. F. HERDER'S 
Ideen, 272; in primitive societies,
273; the task of individual talent, 275; 
apart from the anticipatory meaning coherence 
historical individuality is an
apeiron, 276; the individuality of the
members of a primitive community, 320; 
indiv. as an apeiron when primacy is
ascribed to the form-motive in Greek 
metaphysics, 418, 419; in KANT individuality 
belongs to the sensory matter of
experience, 420; it is empirically determined, 
421; individuality in Neo-Kantianism 
originates from the "matter" of 
experience; it occurs only once in this
definite place in (sensory) space and
time; it is empirical uniqueness related
to values, 421; if, with KANT, individuality 
belongs to the sensory matter of experience, 
it can have no functions in the
modal law spheres, and remains an apeiron, 
422; in SCHELER individuality is the
absolute requisite in the concrete essential 
structure of experience, and is elevated 
above the law, 591. 
--, III, an inconstant individuality structure 
is found in works of art belonging
to music, poetry, drama, 110-116; the
individuality of a sculpture has an objective 
historical nuclear type; the inner 



107 INDIVIDUALITY STRUCTURES 


articulation of its geno-type; its phenotype, 
121; individual man in primitivesocieties, 194 ; individualism accordiingto SPANN, 239; there exist no "individuals" 
but only members of the body ofthe human race, according to KUYPER,
247 (note), 248. 

INDIVIDUALITY STRUCTURES, I, eliminated 
in the classical Humanistic science ideal, 
84, and the continuity postulate, 555.
--, II, this structure is not at all that of 
the metaphysical "substance" founded onan absolutized Gegenstand relation, 11,

419. 
--, III, specific structures of time; duration 
of things, events, etc.; in geneticprocesses; opening-process; inorganic,
organic, feeling, logical analysis, formative 
activity (culture) ; actualization ofpotentialities in the human body, 78;
structures of individuality belong to thelawside; have no real duration; theoretically 
knowable; factual duration of athing depends on its individuality structure, 
79; the internal structural principledetermines the subjective or objective individuality 
of the whole as the typicallaw of individuality; a unity of order inthe modal diversity of its aspects; theconfusion in modern biological systematism; 
taxon, phylon, isogenon, "reineLinie", 80; classificatory and typologicalmethods in psychology and psychiatry,
81 ; WEBER'S ideal-typical method; typological 
concepts in jurisprudence, 82; 
genera or radical types; kingdoms, 83, 84;
animal behaviour and vegetative reaction;
protozoa, infusiora; animal psychologyand behaviourism, 85, 86, 87; the denominator 
of comparison of radical types, 87;
the human body, 87, 88, 89 ; secondary radical 
types, 89, 90; leading and foundationalfunction of a structural whole, 90; the 
anticipatory structure, 91; interlacementsof different individuality structures maybe combined into a typically qualifiedform-totality or they may be not thus combined, 
92; structural interlacements find 
expression in special individuality-typesdistinct from those belonging to the irreducible 
inner structure of the whole; interlacements 
are necessary for the realization 
of the inner nature of a thing; natural 
and unnatural interlacements; parasitical 
forms of symbiosis are natural toone of the interlaced individuals, unnatural 
to the internal structure of the 
other, 93; geno-types within the radicaltype "animal"; sub-types; every geneticviewpoint pre-supposes these individuality 
structures; structures are not subjectto genesis and evolution, their realizationin changing individuals; ideo variations 
(mutations) give rise to hithertounrealized genotypes; every phylon presupposes 
radical and genotypes, 94; thecosmic plastic horizon determines the inner 
nature of all individual totalities 
which are subject to genesis and decay;
the older Darwinistic evolutionism construed 
a gapless continuity in its mechanistic 
system of phylogenetic series; DARWIN'S 
and HAECKEL'S conception has beenrejected; but modern evolutionism stillbelieves that the biotic, the psychical andthe so-called "mental" aspects of temporal 
reality have originated from physico-
chemical constellations in a processof continuous evolution ; the philosophical 
implications of evolutionism; the discoveries 
of palaeontology; the facts ofembryology; HAECKEL'S "biogenetic basiclaw"; the interpretation of the so-called"blood reaction", 95; classifications in 
biology based on the distinction betweenradical, geno-, and pheno-types, genotype 
has two meanings (note), 96; structural 
type and subjective (or objective)
individuality; the identity of the wholeis retained throughout all transformationof a thing within its "accidental" properties; 
this identity must be both a-typically 
individual and in conformity withits internal structural principle; this linden 
tree is interlaced with my garden(variability type), 97; the individualidentity of this tree is based on the structurally 
determined individual whole, notvice versa, 98; there are individualitystructures in the micro-world that are 
not objectified in the macroscopic perceptional 
world of naive experience, 98;
there are no original types of individuality 
in the pre-physical spheres, 99; the 
structure of atoms and molecules contradicts 
the positivist thesis that they arefictitious; because they can be madevisible, 99; Ding an sich; modern wave-
mechanics and the old rigid corpuscles;
and "Wellenpakete", 100; the thing structure 
expresses itself especially in its leading 
function,105; structural principles donot depend on the genesis of individualsin which they are realized; these principles 
are a-priori; but our knowledge ofthem is not a-priori, 106; there are natural 
things qualified by a structural object-
function : e.g., ant hills, birds' nests,
honey combs, spiders' webs, beaver damsetc.; they are objectively qualified by atypical animal-psychical function dependent 
on the animal's subjectivity for itsactualization; they have no independentradical type, only a secondary type; theyare not merely pre-biotic structures, 107;
their typical nature cannot be ascribedto an independent "substance"; their nature 
is meaning; mineral formations produced 
by the protoplasm of rhizopods;
the Si 02 formations of radiolaria, 108;
the reality of a thing is a continuous process 
of realization, 109; PRAXITELES' Hermes 
is an objective thing structure; relatively 
constant; but music, etc., have aninconstant individuality structure; books,
etc., signify the lingual or the aestheticstructure; there is an art of performance 


INDIVIDUALITY STRUCTURES 


in connection with music, drama, etc.;
gramophones; there is a secondary radical 
type: works of art, 110; a sculptureis an interlacement between a subjectivematerial structure (marble) and an aesthetically 
qualified objective structure;
the biotic function in a sculpture, 111;
implied in its objective sensory perceptibility; 
there are abstract sculptural artefacts, 
112; the Abbild-relation; the artist's 
aesthetic conception ; RICKERT'S viewrejected, 113; the latent objective aesthetical 
function of a natural thing andthe subject-object relation; the observer'stask of deepening his own natural aesthetic 
vision, 114; the thing structure hasno meaning, apart from its aestheticaltotality; the merely intentional characterof an object of fantasy; PRAXITELES hasprojected his Hermes as a merely intentional 
visionary object, 115; the sensoryimage of the Hermes is an intentionalvisionary object bound to the plastic hohizon; 
the sculpture's reality is the representation 
of the fancied thing structure; 
it is not the aesthetic objectification 
of the aesthetic subject function ofthe artist; it can only function in an intentional 
aesthetic subj.-object relation,
116; the organic vital function is implicitly 
intended in the artist's productivefantasy, and this intention is realized inthe thing, viz. the statue, 117; the typicalfoundational function of this sculpture;
this is not the marble, 118; marble is a 
phenotype of an original genotype of inorganic 
matter; the sensory objectifiedfantasy form is not the typical substratum 
of the sculpture; the marble is a: 
dynamei on, 119; the marble is a barematerial for the aesthetic expression; thesculpture's objective sensory image is notoriginal but representational; the artist'splastic activity is an original free formation 
pointing beyond the sensory aspect; 
the sensory figure is anticipatory;
the sculpture has a typical historicalfoundational function, 120; the nucleartype of individuality of the statue is itsobjective historical structural function;
the inner articulation of its genotype:
plastic work of art; pictorial, mimic,
sculptural types; sculptured figures anddeities; phenotypes: marble, bronze, etc.;
style is a typical historical analogy inaesthetic structures; there is no style innature; free art is not enclosed in an enkaptic 
structural whole lacking aestheticqualification , 121; the term "radical,
type" used in a modified sense with respect 
to products of human formation;
music, literature, 122; classification offine arts; interlacement of natural andaesthetic structures, 123; marble is anaggregate, the work of art is an unbreakable 
non-homogeneous whole determinedby its inner structural law; marble is avariability type of calcium carbonate

forming a homogeneous aggregate; its 

108 

cultural form in a statue is not homogeneous, 
124 ; the marble's physico-chemical processes are directed by the artist'stechnique in an anticipatory way to theaesthetic expression without being destroyed; 
this figure is enkapsis; thereshould be no dualism, 125; the artist hasto open the natural structure of his material 
through the aesthetic structure ofhis work, 126; the terms "form" and"matter"; a variability type points to anenkapsis of structural principles, 127;
there is an irreversable foundational relationship 
between the natural and theaesthetically qualified thing structures,
128; the wood of a piece of furniture ina tree; when sawn to planks the wooddisplays a secondary natural structure,
129; its ontic status is not on a level 
with that of, e.g., the shell of a molusc.,
130; the physico chemical propertieshave been put under the guidance ofthe vital function in a living tree; resulting 
in a variability type of wood;
planks are semi-manufactured materialas the foundation of the structure of 
furniture; semi-products have no leading 
function, 131, 132; different materialsmay be utilized in the same chair, etc.;
their inner structure remains distinct 
from the internal structure of the chair;
its pre-technical modi have only an anticipating 
type of individuality; e.g. numerical 
and spatial relations; physico-chemical 
properties; the technical project;
subjective and objective functions, 133;
weight, bearing power suit its typical objective 
destination; a chair is a seat: abiotic characteristic; a cultural need ofman, 134; subject-object relations are typical 
anticipations; logic modus; implicit 
pre-theoretical analysis; explicit theoretical 
analysis; its sensory perceptibletraits are implicitly conceived in an anticipatory 
sense; the general idea of theword chair does not exceed the naive 
concept, 135; the individual identity ofthe parts of a chair cannot be essentialto that of the whole; a dog's use of achair is without awareness of its structural 
meaning; at least if man is civilizedhe realizes this meaning, 137; the genotype 
furniture; their leading function issocial; free and applied (or bound) art;
handwork served as the historical occasion 
for the rise of independent plasticart, 138; mass production, bad taste andthe pursuit of gain and architecture awork of architecture is bound to the 
structure of the building, as a social cultural 
object; the aesthetic aspect is subordinate 
to the social function, 140;
furniture style has a bound character;
Louis XIV style, 141, 142; useful objectsbelong to the radical type of the kingdomof historically founded, objectively andsocially qualified utensils; the differencebetween a thing's structural destinationand our subjective end in using it; an 


 

109INSECT LARVAE 

antique shawl may be used as a walldecoration; inactualization, 143; historically 
founded social things are not alwaysusable for any subject; a wedding ring,
a throne, etc., have a subjective individualization 
of their objective destination;
this individualization may be symbolically 
indicated by initials, etc.; an altar,
chapel, temple, crucifix, rosary have anobjective destination for worship (apistic qualifying function) ; in a museumthey more or less continue to expresstheir societal pistic destination, 144 ; buttheir objective reality is strange to usunless we sympathise with the group thatused them, 145; in the subject-object relation 
we must distinguish between theobjective empirical reality of things andthe subjective actualization of their objective 
qualifying function; the preference 
for antique furniture; old shawls,
armours, weapons preserved for decoration 
or for their historical interest; patrician 
Amsterdam houses; medieval castles, 
146; a shift in their objective destination 
; i.e. this destination has been in-
actualized, it is no longer in operation;
the disappearance of knighthood; thepreservation of knightly attire; their objective 
qualification remains; but theirsocial destination can no longer be actualized, 
147; the three figures in thesubject-object relation : intentional representation; 
unfolding; actualization; theshift in the objective destination is onlya shift in the subject-object relation but 
does not affect the original structure, isonly concerned with the actualization relation; 
the shift occurs from the qualifying 
to the historical or aesthetical function; 
pageants, plays, with medieval attire; 
this kind of use is bound to their 
original structure, 148; a thing's structureexpresses itself in the order of modalities; 
the biotic function is necessarilyincluded in the subject-object-relation, inthe unfolding and in the actualizationprocess, 149; our sense perception ofthings pre-supposes the biotic stimulationof our visual nerves; things function intheir own typical structure; the unfolding 
relation; human environment; byactualizing things with an objective 
normative function man enlarges his environment 
and frees it from its static dependence 
on the physical-chemical functions 
given in nature; nothing can affectour sense organs (in the subject-objectrelation) 
which does not itself functionsubjectively or objectively in the bioticmodality; things function here in theirown typical structure, 150; a readingbook contains the intentional conceptionof its author signified in an objectivething-structure; differentiation of thistype depends on the nature of the ideasand conceptions signified (literary, scientific, 
musical content) ; variability-typesof books; the structure of a book has a 

cultural foundation and a symbolicalleading function, 151 ; ARISTOTLE'S failureto explain the structure of a book, 152,153; genetic and existential structures,
174; cf. Sociology. 

INDIVIDUALIZATION, SUBJECTIVE, III, of historically 
founded social things: a throne;
a wedding-ring; an altar, etc., 144. 

INDUSTRIAL LIFE, MODERN, III, was individualistic 
and mercilessly capitalistic,

595. 
INERTIA, II, is a.kinematical concept, 99;
principle of GALILEI, 100. 

INFALLIBLE CHURCH, III, Of Rome, in 
THOMAS' view, as the interpreter of natural 
law and the limits of the State's 

competence, 221. 

INFANT BAPTISM, III, is based On the 
Covenant, 541. 

INITATION RITES, III, of a primitive cultcommunity which is guided by the natural 
family structure, 362. 

INITIATIVE, II, human initiative in history, 
according to WELLS, 270 (note). 

INNATE IDEAS, I, in DESCARTES; are present 
at birth, according to REGIUS, 222;
are dormant virtual representations inLEIBNIZ, 237; rejected by LOCKE, 264.
—, II, according to DESCARTES, and to

HUSSERL, 584. 

INNATE HUMAN RIGHTS, II, this theme was 
conceived by LOCKE, and expanded byROUSSEAU; it gave Western culture a rationalistic-
individualistic form, 357; thetheory of personality rights was derivedfrom that of innate human rights, 413. 

INNERE SPRACHFORM, II in the theory of

W. VON HUMBOLDT; it is the formative law 
of the structure of linguistic signifying,
222. 
I-NESS, I, shares in the Archimedean 
point, 59; is rooted in a spiritual community 
directed to the Divine Thou, 60.
—, II, the I-ness is a formal concept, in

KANT, 502, 503. 
—, III, AUG. BRUNNER'S view, 6; the meet


ing of I and Thou, 781. 


INFINITE, I, the doctrine of the infinite 

in CUSANUS, 200. 

INFINITUDE, I, and the Renaissance; inLEIBNIZ; in BRUNO; and man, in CUSANUS,
194; of nature glorified by BRUNO, 199;
actual infinitude of the monads, in LEIB


NIZ, 255. 

INFLUXUS PHYSICUS, I, in DESCARTES, 219. 

INFUSIORIA, III, their psychical qualification, 
85, 86, 87 ; they have dissimilar nuclei; 
each of them has two nuclei, a 
generative and a somatical nucleus, 722. 

INSECT LARVAE, III, 774. 


INSTITUTIONAL CHURCH 


INSTITUTIONAL CHURCH, III, is a real or 
ganized community, with four offices,
520; qualified by faith, and with a typical 
historical foundation, 521; a temporalinstitution according to Dr. A. KUYPER,
526; the mother of our faith, 535; temporal 
church and Kingdom of Heaven areidentified by Sorim, 552. 

INSTITUTIONAL IDEAS, III, function as 
structural principles in society, according 
to M. HAURIOU, they influence all individuals 
through the elite, 189. 

INSTITUTIONAL SCHOOL OF LAW, III, was 
founded by HAURIOU, 189. 

INSTITUTIONS, III, definition, 187; secondary 
institutions, 188; there are institutional 
and non-institutional communities; 
Church and State, 189; the institutional 
church is confessional, not national, according 
to Dr. A. KUYPER, 540; naturalinstitutions and differentiated organizedcommunities are interwoven, 658. 

INTEGRATION, II, cultural integration, 244;
and differentiation in History; DURKHEIM, 
260, 396, 397. 
--, III, integration theory of SMEND criticized 
by KELSEN, 260 (note) ; horizontalintegration brought about by organizedindustrial groups, 594. 

INTEGRATIONSLEHRE, III, and the dialectical 
cultural scientific method, 387. 

INTELLECTUS ARCHETYPUS, I , is absolute 
deified thought, comprising the fulnessof being in a purely logical sense, 13; therationalistic metaphysics that distinguished 
archê and Archimedean point, absolutized 
the logical aspect of actualthought only in the Archê as the Intel-.
lectus Archetypus, 20; in KANT it is derived 
from LEIBNIZ, 361. 
—, II, in KANT, 420; in LEIBNIZ the intellectus 
archetypus chooses from the possible 
to create the actual, 512. 

INTERESTS, II, a general concept in VONJHERING, 401. 

INTERESTS, THEORY OF, II, this theory wasintroduced by R. VON JHERING, 400. 

INTERLACEMENTS, III, natural and unnatural 
interlacements; interlacements are 
necessary for the realization of the innernature of a thing, 93 ; interlacement ofaffections in the family: national feeling,
feeling of social standing, feeling for thechurch, etc., 295. 

INTERNATIONAL, III, international relations 
and the "sacred egotism" of theseparate states, 596; international tradeis founded in traffic, 661; international 
law is an inter-communal legal order,

661. 
INTERPENETRATION (PSYCHICAL), II, of modal 
retrocipations of feeling, 169. 
INTERPRETATION (LEGAL), II, of legal states 

110 

of affairs is law-making, if done by acompetent organ, 138. 

INTRUSION (CULTURAL), II, Western intrusion 
in underdeveloped cultures, 260. 

INTUITION, I, of the essence, Wesensschau, 
in HUSSERL, 213; was a faculty of thecogito, the basis of all mathematicalproof, in LOCKE, 270; and feeling inFICHTE, 444; intellectual intuition, in 
SCHELLING'S view, 471. 
—, II, according to KANT space and timeare forms of intuition, 12, 96; of originalmovement, 99; movement intuition needs 
no sensory perceptible system of reference, 
but requires its coherencec withstatic space intuition,100; intuitive insightinto retribution replaced by analogical.
concepts, 132; in Immanence Phil. intuition 
is either inner certainty of feeling, ora superior rational organ, or the immediateevidence of truth, 430; intuition is the 
bottom layer of the logical function whichis in continuous contact with all the aspects 
of our own reality; it exceeds thelogic. function; it cannot be theoreticallyisolated; it is a cosmic intuition of time, 
473; cosmic intuition and selfhood, and 
cosmological consciousness of self; theoretical 
intuition, 473; intuitive self-reflexion 
on the modalities and theoretical 
synthesis; the I-ness is the central pointof reference in our cosmic experience;
intuition does not transcend time; it remains 
at rest (in the naïve attitude) in

the systasis of the datum ; Erleben andHineinleben, 474; conscious Erleben is 
the temporal basic layer of all cognition;
non-intuitive knowledge cannot exist;
VOLKELT contrasts logical necessity withintuitive certainty, 475; he thinks he cananalyse intuition psychologically; he hasno insight in the subject-object relation;
he seems to hold logical intuition something 
radically different from moral, aesthetical 
and faith intuition, 476; he distinguishes 
two types of certainty; hisdefinition of intuition; of experience; hissensualism; difference between experience 
and animal awareness of sensations; 
his Kantian prejudices, 477; VOLKELT 
restricts experience to sensory impressions; 
intuition enters into the cosmic 
stream of time; objectivity; the sensory 
subj.-obj. relation; a sensory impression 
is intentional and objective; a"pure sensation" is an idle phantasm ; intuition 
moves to and fro between theoretical 
analysis and Gegenstand to unitethem in an inter-modal synthesis, 478;
trough intuition deepened thought is ableto analyse the Gegenstand; its referenceto the religious root, in transcendentalreflection; intuition is a transcendental 
condition of the cognitive meaning synthesis; 
we can have an Idea, not a coneept 
of it; in theoretical thought ourtheoretic intuition is actualized in the 
synthesis of meaning as insight; a deep



 

111JACOBI. 

ening of pre-theoretical intuition; the
pre-theoretical and the theoretical consciousness 
of self, 479; sub-human creatures 
are extatically absorbed by their
temporal existence; man's selfhood enters 
enstatically into the temporal cosmic 
coherence; intuition is not a mysterious 
non-logical faculty; SCHELLING'S
view of the intuition of men of genius;
"intellectual intuition"; BERGSON on intuition; 
analytic thought is adaptation to
biological matter; science is merely technically 
useful to man ; intuition he calls
an immediate subjective psychical empathy, 
480; penetrating with intellectual
sympathy into the duree; BERGSON psychologizes 
intuition; his "fluid concepts", 
481; his metaphysical absolutization, 
482; analysis cannot do without 
intuitive insight; H. POINCARE; men
of genius and intuition; can they intuitively 
grasp a state of affairs without
the aid of the analytical function? intuition 
and the instinct; intuition of genuises 
is not infallible; it also has to distinguish 
and to identity logically; the
free direction of our attention to abstract 
modal states of affairs is typical for theoretical 
intuition, 483; WEIERSTRASZ' discovery 
of the general theory of functions
and intuition; RIEMANN'S contribution to 
this theory; theoretical intuition, 484;
pre-theoretical intuition and analysis,
485; Intuition in RIEHL; and thought in
the cogito, 519. 


INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE, I, is not found in 
theoretical metaphysics, according to
KANT, 350.
—, III, and symbolical knowledge, 145. 


INVENTION, I, in the logic of PETRUS RAMUS, 
198. 


INVENTIONS AND DISCOVERIES, II, are without 
historical consequences if they are
not generally accepted, 259. 


INVISIBLE CHURCH, III, and sacramental 
hierarchy in Roman Catholicism, 217; invisible 
church as the corpus mysticum
whose Head is Christ, 234.; and the visible 
church, 509; its temporal manifestation 
in the Church Institution, 522. 


IONIAN THINKERS, I, deified the matter 
motive of the ever flowing stream of
life; they did not distinguish the physical
from the mental sphere, and held matter
to be animated, 26.
—, II, their reflection on justice found
retribution as its essence; HERACLITUS ; 
PYTHAGORAS ; PARMENIDES, 132. 


IPSEN, GUENTHER, II, 
Sprachphilosophie der Gegenwart, 222,


224. 
—, II, opposes HUSSERL'S "pure grammar"
which cancels language itself, 224. 
IRRATIONAL HISTORICISM, II, came after 
German Idealism, , 19, 20. 

IRRATIONALISM, I, absolutizes the factual 
side of time, 28; considers the "theoretical 
order" as a falsification of "true 
reality", 110; in LITT's view, 148; in the
second phenomenological trend (W. Dm-
THEY), 214; in FICHTE'S third period, 451; 
Of HAMANN; in J. F. HERDER'S philosophy
of feeling; in the philosophy of the Sturm
and Drang, 453; aesthetical; the morality
of genius; SCHILLER'S view of the beautiful 
soul; in SCHELLING, 465; irrationalism 
reduces the true order to a function 
of an individual subject; the philosophy
of life, 466; philosophical irrationalism
is rooted in the Gegenstand relation, and


sanctions antinomy, 467.
—, II, of HERDER'S personality ideal, 272;
of the Historical School, 279. 


IRRATIONALISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY, I, phenomenology 
in HEIDEGGER, 53; personality 
ideal in FICHTE, 489; ethics of E.
BRUNNER, 519. 


INSIGHT, II, and analysis, in POINCARE,


483. 
ISOGENON, III, in biology, 81. 

I-THou-WE, I, in a spiritual community,
and the Divine Thou, 60. 

I-THou, II, I-Thou-relation versus impersonal 
relations, in GOGARTEN and BUBER, 
143; I-Thou-relation and impersonal I-itrelation 
are dialectically opposed by AALDERS 
and BRUNNER, 159; in SCHELER, 590. 

IvER, R. M. MAC, III, 
Community, 177. 

I-WE-RELATION, II, is religious, and implied 
in the I-Thou-relation to God, 160. 

JACOBI, I, his philosophy of feeling strongly 
influenced FICHTE, 451 ; he was a typicalrepresentative of the German Sturm andDrang; there was true enthusiasm andoptimism of the "Deed", 452; their philosophy 
was irrationalistic; their philosophy 
of life culminated in the demand forsubjective ethical freedom; freedomagainst every rule, authority, compulsion,
dependence, freedom of feeling, 453; JACOBI 
taught that the "unconditioned.
Being" could not be demonstrated theoretically, 
but only felt immediately byemotional faith; he did not restrict the 
truth value of immediate feeling to senseperceptions, but considered the certaintyof supra-sensory belief as the secondbasic form of immediate feeling; he identified 
feeling with naïve experience, 458;
he opposes "emotional faith to the understanding: 
"Heathen with the head, Christian 
with the heart"; he found true Christianity 
in the postulates of the Human



 

JACOBSOHN, H.112 

istic personality ideal: belief in the personality 
of God, in moral freedom andautonomy, and in the immortality of human 
personality, 459; he could never recognize 
the value of FICHTE'S "doctrine ofscience", 460. 

JACOBSOHN, H., II, on Aktionsarten (character 
and aspect of verbs), 126. 

JAEGER, F. M. III,

M.,
Lectures on Principles of Symmetry,

705. 
JAEGER, WERNER, III, 
Aristoteles, 13, 14. 
—, III, on ARISTOTLE'S "Metaphysics" and
its earlier and later conceptions, 13, 14. 


JAMES, W., II, on analytical economy, 123. 


JANDUN, JOHN OF, I, 
Defensor Pacis, 188. 
—, I, introduced the process of secularization 
in Nominalism, 188. 
—, III, an Averroist Nominalist; grounded
the authority of the state and legislation
in the general will of united individuals,
224 ; appealed to the idea of an organism
to defend the desirability of intermediary
corporations between the citizen and the
state, mitigating State absolutism, 236. 


JANENSKY, I, 
Lavater, 454. 


JASPERS, KARL, I, 
Psychologie der Weltanschauungen, 126.
"philosophy gave impulses, drew

up tables of values, made human life
meaningful and purposive, ...gave a view
of life and the world"; prophetic philosophy, 
125; his theory of possible lifeand-
world-views is a "Psychology of the
Life and world views", 126. 


JANSENISTS, I, the Jansenists of Port 
Royal accepted Cartesianism as an exact
method of thinking and supposed they
could find an inner affinity between
DESCARTES' founding all knowledge in
self-consciousness and the Idea of God, 
and AUGUSTINUS "Deum et animam scire 
volo", 196, 223. 


JELLEMA, D., II, 
Dooyeweerd and Hartmann, 51. 


JELLINEK, GEORG, II, 
System der subj. Offentl. Rechte, 402;
cf. 410; 
—, II, legal power or competence, a self-
restriction of political power, 70 ; a subjective 
right of a sovereign to the juridical 
obedience of citizens; he promotes
legal duty to an object, 402.
—, III, 
Allgemeine Staatslehre, 400, 432.
—, III, considers the unity of an organized 
community as a category of consciousness, 
241; he tried to combine the 
antithetical conceptions of the State of
the juridical and the sociological school,
385; his dualistic theory of the State, 400; 


he detected the weak spot in the theory
of the purposes of the State; opposed the
introduction of political postulates in the
theory of the State; he conceives of an
organized community as a "purposive
unity" in a socio-psychological sense; he
defines the State according to its aims in
a subjectivistic individualistic way; he
confounds the ideas about the external 
extent of the State's task with the structural 
principle of the State, 432; KELSEN'S
"normologIcal" theory resulted in the
theoretical negation of State and law, 433. 


JELLY-FISH, III, their medusas, 649. 


JERUSALEM, I, sociology of thought, 165. 


JESUS, I, In FICHTE Jesus is the immediate 
individual revelation of the Idea of 
God in the appearance, 492. 


JHERING, RUDOLPH VON, II, 
Geist des rOmischen Rechtes, 124, 125,
400, 401; 
cf. 141, 277. 
—, II, the legal order of a body politic is
the whole of law; he eradicates the subject-
object relation and the boundaries
between subjective right and competence,
401; on the difference between subjective
right and reflexive permission, 404. 


JOINT FAMILY, III, or extended family,
305; the patriarchal joint family, 350; the
joint family interlaces different individuality 
structures in an intra-communal 
sense, and is founded in some power-
formation closely bound to biotic conditions, 
349; the joint family and the
sib, in GROSSE, 359. 


JORDAN, P., III, 
Quantumphysikalische Bemerkungen zur
Biologie and Psychologie, 643, 644;
Die Naturwissenschaften, 644; 
—, III, organisms are essentially microphysical 
systems; vital processes are peculiar 
to the atomic order of magnitude
and direct the reactions in the macroscopic 
world which proceed a-causally;
the laws of quantum mechanics cannot
form a sufficient basis for the theory of
intensification, 644. 


JOSSERAND, LOUIS, II, abuse of right; droit
social; Bolshevist Russian Civil Law, 396. 


-9

 III, 
De L'Esprit des Lois et de leur Relativite,

463. 
—, III, his theory of the abuse of rights;
civil subjective rights should be viewed
as private rights granted by society only
if they are in accordance with the social
economic function they ought to serve,
463. 
JUDGMENTS, I, theoretical and a-theoretical 
judgments, in LITT, RICKERT, KANT,
151, 153 ; of perception, and those of experience, 
in KANT, 158, 159; synthetical
and analytical, in KANT, 340; particular 



 

113JURIDICAL ASPECT 

judgments originate from the principle ofdeterminability, in MAINON, 409 ; empiricaljudgments are synthetic, but do not hangtogether systematically according to theprinciple of determinability, 410.
—, II, KANT on analytical and syntheticaljudgments, 435; logical and linguisticstructure of a judgment multi-vocality ofthe word "is", 436; empirical judgments;
PFANDER on KANT'S theory, 440, 441, 442;
SIGWART'S and SCHLEIERMACHER'S interpretations, 
442-444; ARISTOTLE'S categories, 
445; the judgment "this rose is red"
is pre-theoretical and has universal validity; 
it has an analytical aspect and issubjected to the logical principles; S Pis its formula, but cannot replace thejudgment; the judgment claims to be true;
it refers to the temporal horizon of experience 
and has a logical aspect; thelogical objective systasis of this rosehere; in the sensory impressions as suchthere is no logical identity, they cannotbe the basis for the application of thefundamental logical norms; rationalisticepistemology recognizes only non-individual 
concepts; concrete existential judgments 
then leave it in an impasse, 450;
HUSSERL'S formalized judgments andKANT'S distinction between analyticaland synthetical judgments, 451; 'symboliclogic, 452; HUSSERL critized, 453; alltheoretical judgments are synthetical andhave a logical aspect; S = S; implicitand explicit synthet. judgments, 460, 461;
pre-theoretical judgments, 462; theoretical 
judgments and sphere-sovereignty,

577. 
JUDGMENT OF IDENTITY, I, only in thisjudgment can metaphysical being be ascertained 
by logical thought, in KANT,

335. 
JURA IN Re, II, and legal power, 198. 

.A URA IN PERSONAM AND JURA IN Re, II, in 
VON SAVIGNY'S thought, 398. 

JURIDICAL ANALOGIES, II, explained ashaving a mathematical meaning, in KANT,
GROTIUS, ROUSSEAU, FICHTE, etc.; according 
to the nominalistic individualisticdoctrine of natural law, 167. 

JURIDICAL ASPECT, I, in a closed primitivejural order the anticipating connectionwith morality — as expressed in theprinciples of equity, good faith, goodmorals, punishment according to guilt,
etc. is absent, 29; embraces all kinds of 
law in a horizontal functional coherence; 
the conception of merely technical constructive 
scientific concepts, 550, 553.
—, II, STAMMLER, 16, 17; legal economy;
juridical proportion; primitive talion, 67;
political mastery; competence; legal power, 
69; JELLINEK'S view; legal power isrealized on the basis of historical power,
even in primitive society, 70; J. STUARTMILL on the conditio sine qua non, 119; 

misuse of the principle of economy; legalwill; juridical fictions; legal technique;
R. VON JHERING, 124 ; FRANCOIS GENY ; 
modern jurists call juristic basic concepts 
fictions, reduce them to the "onlyreal psycho-physical" states of affairs,
125; juridical retrocipations in the aesthetical 
aspect, 127 ; retrocipations tofeeling, analysis, sociality, language, economy, 
128; the meaning-kernel of thejural aspect is retribution; the kernel isintuitively apprehended ; only describablein analogical terms, 129; retribution "inma'am et in bonam partem"; LEO POLAK'Senquiry, 130; retribution and economiclife, 131; justice as suum cuique tribuere,
Dike, anangkê, rita, tao; in HERACLITUS ;
the Ionian philosophers; PYTHAGOREANS ;
justica as cosmic order; a rigid andmerciless justice, 132; the deificationof natural forces; necessity; the Erinues;
PARMENIDES' being, bound to the spherical 
form by anangkê or Dike, 133;
retribution and love, the legal orderand sin; reaction against ultra ires;
attribution in a social and in a juridical 
sense; and egotism; retribution isnot a feeling drive; and altruism, 134;
equality is a mathematical retrocipation;
ARISTOTLE'S arithmetical and geometricalproportions in retribution, 135; social retrocipations 
: communal and inter-individual 
interests; economic and aesthetical 
retrocipations; economical retr. in primitive 
retribution, a tariff of compositions, 
136; symbolism to denote juridicalrelations; implied undertakings; juridical 
and linguistic interpretation, 137;
such interpretation is law-making; competent 
legal organ is required; judge andjurist; the Historical School on thesources of law, 138; E. BRUNNER on "perfect 
justice and love", 157; the legal validity 
sphere, 166; mos geometricus in"natural law"; Social Contract; Neo-
Kantian quantitative categories in law;
COHEN, HOBBES, FICHTE, GROTIUS, Rous 
SEAU, KANT; the absolutized legal orderof the State, 167; a legal fact and energy;
causality, 181; primitive criminal law;
Erfolgshaftung; juridical causality; itslogical substratum ; normative imputation;
risk; guilt; etc.; the physical nexus; causation 
by omission ; primitive retribution, 
182; and social intercourse; hostes; 
ex-lex; do ut des; formalism in contracts; 
primitive inertia of thought and sensorysymbolism; wer; Gewehre; faith directsprimitive legal life, 183; feeling of guilt;
good faith, good morals, are limitingfunctions guided by the ethical aspect,
185; legal history, 197; legal power overpersons is essential to jura in re, 198;
STAMMLER'S view of positive law, 208;
positivization of juridical norms, 241;
the Historical 'School of Jurisprudence,
234, 249; juridical anticipation in thehistorical aspect; Weltgericht; God's

guidance in history, 290; moderation and 


 

JURIDICAL ASPECT 114 

justice developed under the guidance ofpopular faith in ancient Greece; PLATOand ARISTOTLE, 321 (note) ; juridical aspect 
was deified in ancient Egypt: Osiris,
324 ; mathesis universalis, natural law, social 
contract, etc., HUSSERL, FR. SCHREIER, 
342 ; COHEN, 343 ; GIERKE'S organological 
theory, 344; freedom of contract; doctrine 
of justa causa; H. DE GROOT'S pactasunt servanda; HOBBES' soc. contract; 
justum pretium; HOBBES' constitutionaland civil law, 359; subject-object relations; 
subjective rights; the ClassicalRoman jurists conceived subjective rightas individual subjective power; the juralsubject was an "individuum"; the corporation 
(= universitas) a jural unity;
the Stoic construction; its bond; Germanic 
conceptions of an objective juralsphere, 392; the Roman "thing"-concept(rEs) ; jus pars pro indiviso; the rEs wasconsidered as a juridical singularity;
there was essentially only one direct iusin re, viz the right of property; the originof this conception ius in re aliena;
the subject-object-relation in personalrights of Roman law; mortgage on anobject of usufruct, 393; a dilemma; incorporeal 
and corporeal "things"; theconstruction of rights to rights;
GIERKE'S criticism, 394 ; rights to rights,
e.g., to sleeping, walking, breathing,
living, etc., 395; HEGEL'S view of subjective 
right; he excluded the idea of purpose; 
this attitude influenced later conceptions, 
e.g., of the abuse of right, 396;
subjective right as will-power came toeliminate the jural object, 397; jura inpersonam et jura in re, 398; various theories, 
398; the will power theory was anti-
nomic, 399; HEGEL'S dialectical view, 399; 
positivistic will power theories of subjective 
rights; got involved in antinomieswhich were masked by means of fictions;
subjective right and juridical norm areboth a psychological imperative, 400;
competency and subjective right; andobjects; content and object; JELLINEK'Serror; the disposal of a right in an actof law-making, 402; VON JHERING; THON ;
WANDSCHEID ; KIERLEEFF ; HAELSCHIRER ; 
HOBBES, 403; subj. right and reflex-permission; 
VON JHERING'S criterion; the 
Roman actio popularis; Dutch Civil Servants 
Act, 1929; on abuse of power; theinterdicts of the Roman Law of possession 
; possession and property, 404 ; thesubject-object relation in subjective right;
dependent objective juridical facts; ajuridical object is related to the subjective 
power of disposal and enjoyment;
such an object is never the full reality ofa thing, or an object of sensory perception 
(rEs corporalis) ; it is a modal function; 
retrocipations in the juridical aspect, 
405; definition of the concept of thejuridical aspect; possibility of juridicalobjectification, 406; only things functioning 
economically can be juridical objects; 

and things under cultural control; MareLiberum by HUGO GROTIUS ; possibility ofobjectification of post-juridical functionsand relations in the retributive sphere;
Dutch High Court of Justice on obligation 
of morality and decent behaviour incivil law, 407; here are anticipations tomorality in the subj.-obj. relation; natural 
juridical obligations between husband 
and wife and parents and childrenexceed civil law, 408; rights to rights;
GIERKE'S opinion ; ius in re in an immovable 
is independent of the subject in theGerman "Reallasten", 408; an objectifiedright in an immovable may become the 
object of another right, e.g., mortgage;
Reallast; a parallel with the objectifiedimage of a subject-object-relation in thesensory sphere; can competence overpersons be the object of a subjectiveright? compare public rights, 409; medieval 
regalia considered as res in commercio, 
410; in a modern state no single juridical 
authority over persons can be theobject of a private right; the subject ofpublic right is the State; definition ofobedience, 410; patria potestas in Romewas an office and a right; a juridicalobject can only be the juridical object-.
ification of cultural and economic interests, 
411. 
—, III, ARISTOTLE'S view of the two forms 
of justice : commutative and distributive,
212; equality and inequality, 213; juridical 
relations in the natural family:
penal and disciplinary competence; rightsand duties, 276; natural obligations andtheir civil legal consequences; a realization 
of the moral anticipations in the jural 
sphere; there is no question of general 
positive legal norms in a family; lawmaking through case law; also in AngloSaxon countries, 277; inner structural legal 
subjectivity; a child's legal subjectivity 
is closely bound up with that of itsparents and his connection has externalcivil legal consequences; the individualistic 
view of a child as an incompetentindividual whose father is its natural 
legal representative; this view ignoresthe child's legal subjectivity displayingcommunal juridical relations; its externalinter-individual relations do not pertainas such to internal family law; there isa partial legal intertwinement of representative 
and represented legal subjectivity; 
an organic juridical retrocipations,
278; juridical imputation joins the legalactions of the one with the rights and 
duties of the other; HOLDER and BINDER 
assert that legal representation destroysthe juridical personality of the represented 
in favour of that of the representative; 
this theory is contrary to positivecivil law and is also incompatible withthe modal meaning of law as such, for itdenies the partial intertwinement andunity in the civil legal subjectivity offather and child; there is an identical 


115 KANT, IMMANUEL 


partial two-unity in the legal relationbetween curator and curandus, and between 
a guardian and his ward, 279; theinterlacement of the juridical functionsof the members of a family, or of thoseof representative and represented is constitutive 
in the legal subjectivity of theindividual persons; the recognition ofthe legal subjectivity of every man assuch apart from his specific communalbonds has been achieved in a long process 
of emancipation, 280; in civil lawparental authority has only inter-individual 
functions; they require a warrantof attorney for civil actions of minors;

e.g. a civil marriage; civil legal administration 
of the children's property; civillaw recognises educational disciplinarycompetence of parents and the children'sright to sustenance of life by their parents; 
but they are not sufficient to realize 
the internal family law; the contractmade between law and morality is ofHumanistic origin, 281; the insufficiencyof the juridical concept of function; "natural 
law" and individualism; the Enlightenment 
and the social contract; CHR.
WOLFF on the patria potestas; jura excontractu; jura acquisita; jura connata;
sphere sovereignty limits the competenceof lawmakers, 282; absolute power oflegislators is incompatible with the 
meaning of retribution; sphere sovereignty 
within natural organized communities,
intercommunal and interindividual relationships; 
the expression of the structural 
moral and juridical functions in the
aesthetic aspect of the internal family-
relations, 283. 


JURIDICAL CAUSALITY, II, if in the functionalistic 
way "empirical reality" is conceived 
of as the synthetically arranged
sensory phenomena, the idea of juridical
causality is taken to be a construction of
thought, 537. 


JURIDICAL INTERPRETATION, II, is theoretical, 
according to VON SAVIGNY, 138. 


JURIDICAL PERSON, II, is considered as a 
construction of thought in the functionalistic 
view of "empirical. reality", 537. 


JURIDICAL FORMALISM, II, in the primitive
law of contract, as yet little developed,
is very strict, and frequently exhibits
magic traits; all juridical acts are tied
down to the sensory symbol, 183. 


JURISDICTION, III, has to form law in concreto; 
it refuses to judge the internal
structure of unlawful governmental actions 
by means of a civil standard, 687. 


JUSTICE, I, the idea of justice in EM.
BRUNNER as a "purely formal value" is
Neo-Kantian, 520. 
—, II, perfect justice is a contradiction
in terms, according to EMIL BRUNNER,


157. 
--, III, in PLATO, an order of justice in 
the polis for the harmonious cooperationof rulers, soldiers, and labourers, 207; 
the idea of justice and the power of thesword, 381; the unlimited competence ofthe polis and its dialectical tension withjustice, 398. 

JUSTINIAN ( THE ROMAN EMPEROR) , III,
abolished the last remmants of the ancient 
cvil law; jus gentum et jus civile,

449. 
JUSTUM PRETIUM, II, in HOBBES'S theoryof natural law the Aristotelian Thomistic 
doctrine of justum pretium was givenup, 359. 

K 

KAHL, K., III, 
Lehrsystem des Kirchenrechts and der
Kirchenpolitik, 552. 
—, III, SoHm wrongly represents his
thesis concerning the incompatibility of
law and Church as the result of historical 
research, 552. 


KALLIKLES, III, a radicalistic individualist, 
a Sophist, 199; he started from the
Greek matter-motive and defended a naturalistic 
individualistic idea of the political 
ruler, a prelude to 1N IETSCHE'S "Herrenmensch", 
398. 


KALOKAGATHON, I, the Greek ideal of


the beautiful and good, 122; cannot be
identified with SCHILLER'S modern Humanist 
aestheticism, 123; it was transformed 
by SHAFTESBURY, 462.
—, II, after the manner of the Socratic 
Idea of the Kalokagathon the process of
becoming in the sensible world is understood 
as a genesis eis ousian, 10; the Kalokagathon 
embodied the Greek ideal of
personal perfection, 177. 


KAMP SCHULTE, III, 
Joh. Calvin, 520, 546. 
—, III, this Roman-Catholic writer holds 
that CALVIN seeks the sovereignty over
the Church in the collective will of the 
Church members, 520, 521; his quotations
from CALVIN are to prove that the Reformer 
started from the principle of the
sovereignty of the congregation, but are
irrelevant or prove the very opposite, 546. 


KANT, IMMANUEL, I, 
Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 27, 75, 107,
118, 261, 340, 345, 352, 353, 354, 357, 359, 
362, 363, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371,
372, 374, 377, 381, 85, 390, 400; 
Entwurf der notwendigen Vernunftwahrheiten, 
339; 
Letter to Garve, 351; 
Reflexionen Kants zur kritischen Philosophie, 
341, 344, 345, 349, 350; 
Allgemeine Naturgeschichte des Himmels,


332, 547; 
Der einzig mOgliche Beweisgrund zu 



 

KANT, IMMANUEL116 

einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes, 
336;
Versuch den Begriff der negativen GrOszen 
in die Weltweisheit einzufiihren, 336, 
340; 
Untersuchung caber die Deutlichkeit derGrunds5tze der natiirlichen Theologie undMoral, 336, 337; 
Beobachtungen caber das Gefiihl desSchiinen und Erhabenen, 338; 
Vom ersten Grunde des Unterscheides der 
Gegenden im Raume, 342, 343;
Traume eines Geistersehers erlautert 
(lurch Triiume der Metaphysik, 333, 334,340, 346; 
Physische Monadologie, 33;
De Principiorum primorum cognitionismetaphysicae nova dilucidatio, 335;
Prolegomena zu einer jeden kiinftigenmetaphysik, 107, 159, 162, 344;
De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilisforma et principiis, 345, 346, 347, 348,350; 
Versuch einiger Betrachtungen caber denOptimismus, 347;
Kritik der Urteilskraft, 354, 385, 386, 387, 
389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 
398, 399, 401; 
Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten,
65, 75; 
Vom ewigen Frieden, 469;
Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 354, 357,369, 373, 374, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 
382, 384, 385, 392, 401; 
Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Rechtslehre, 
529;
Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte inWeltbiirgerlicher Absicht, 529 ;
Gedanken von den wahren Schiitzung derlebendigen KrAfte, 547.
----, I, time is a transcendental form of 
intuition, coordinated with space, theform of intuition, 27; number originatesfrom a schematizing category of quantityin time, 2; Kantian epistemology is involved 
in a theoretical dogmatism, because 
it starts from the dogma of theautonomy of theoretical thought, 35;
since KANT the religious background tothe Humanistic ideal of science and personality 
has found expression in thebasic motive of nature and freedom, 36; 
he is the father of critical-transcendental 
philosophy; he sought a starting-point in 
theoretical reason as the basis of everypossible theoretical synthesis; his "Gesinnungsethik" 
rationalizes the "disposition 
of the heart" as the criterion of 
morality; he absolutized the moral aspect,
(note) 49; he identifies the act of thinkingwith a purely psychical temporal event,
the "Gegenstand" to the "transcendentallogical 
cogito"; his dualistic view of reality, 
50, 51; his "transcendental-logicalunity of apperception" is a s ubjectivepole of thought in the "Verstand" (i.e.
the logical function of thinking) ; representation, 
i.e. concepts of empirical Gegenstande, 
must be accompanied by the 

"I think" if they are to be my representations; 
the "cogito" can never be a"Gegenstand" of the "transcendental-logical 
subject of thought", 53; we do notpossess real self-knowledge, for knowledge 
is concerned with the forms of intuition 
and the logical categories in connection 
with the sensory world; thetranscendental-logical ego remains caughtin the logical pole of the theoretical Gegenstand 
relation, the counter pole is thenon-logical aspect of sense perception,
54 ; theoretic self-reflection in thoughtpre-supposes self-knowledge, the concentric 
direction of theoretic thought canonly start from the ego; KANT has overlooked 
this truth, 55; his motive of nature 
and freedom, 62; KANT'S verdict: the 
antinomy cannot be solved, 65; KANT deprives 
nature (in the natural-scientificsense) of all divine character and evendenies its divine origin; God is a postulate 
of practical reason, i.e., 67; of autonomous 
morality, which is completelydominated by the Humanistic freedommotive, 68; his distinction between synthetic 
and analytic judgments, 73; theunity of reason was dissolved by KANT 
in the dualism of theoretical and practical 
reason, 75; in his epistemology hecalls "reality" one of the "categories ofmodality", 76; KANT'S "transcendentallogical 
subject" and THEODOR LITT'S, 78;
the tri-unity of the transcendental Ideas:
the idea of the universe of the ultimate 
unity of human selfhood -and of the 
absolute Origin; they are the hypothesisof every philosophy, which fact KANTdoes not recognize, nor does he realizethat the theoretical ideas have a content 
depending on supra-theoretic pre-suppositions; 
he restricts their significance to 
their purely formal-logical regulative systematic 
function; the deeper reason forhis view was his awareness of the unbridgeable 
antithesis in the basic motiveof nature and freedom, and he refused 
to attempt a dialectical synthesis; hisconception of the autonomy and spontaneity 
of the transcendental logical function 
was ruled by the freedom motive;
the nature motive found expression (89)
in his view of the purely receptive character 
of sensory perception subjectedto the causal determinations of science; 
he accepted the a priori relatedness of thetranscendental categories to sensory experience, 
but rejected this synthesis inhis ethics; his "dialectic of pure reason";
the transcendental ideas point to thetranscendent realm of the "noumenon" 
in which the ideas of free autonomous 
will and of God have "practical reality";
theoretical thought has no other limitsthan its bond with sensory perception;
ffeedom is dialectically related to causality 
and is the hypothesis of transcendental 
logic, 90; the same Idea obtains"practical reality" for "reasonable belief" 


 

117KANT, IMMANUEL 

in de Krit. d. pr. Vern., 91; his hypostatization 
of "theoretical reason" as the 
self-sufficient Archimedean point of philosophy 
eliminates the cosmic temporalorder; it was the source of subjectivismin the development of philosophicthought; his "Copernican revolution"
proves the impossibility of a truly critical 
critique of theoretic reason apartfrom the insight into the cosmic timeorder; he wants the reader to acceptnothing as given except reason itself;
this amounts to an abdication from the 
preliminary questions of critical thought,
107; in his "theoretical" philosophy the 
subject is only epistemological, the Arch&
of the form of the theoretical laws of 
nature; the "transcendental subject" islawgiver of nature; pre-psychical realityis a synthesis of logical and sensory functions 
of consciousness; their modal and 
structural laws are replaced by a-prioritranscendental forms of theoretical 
understanding and of sensibility in ana priori synthesis; in his "practical"
philosophy the subject is homo noumenon 
(pure will), the autonomous lawgiver 
for moral life, 109; his epistemology 
has a theoretical dogmatic character, 
118; his "critical" standpoint; the"universally valid" transcendental subject", 
stripped of all individuality isthe formal origin of the real "Gegenstand" 
of knowledge; his theoretical Idea(130) of the totality of reality was viewedby KANT as essentially an infinite taskfor thought, 131; the ideal of personalitygained the upperhand over the Humanistic 
science ideal of the intellectualistic 
Enlightenment, viz., in KANT'S primacy ofthe practical reason, 137; KANT'S "homonoumenon" is a synthetical hypostatization 
of the ethical function of personality; 
theoretical thought is ethically determined, 
143; "universally valid" is independent 
of all "empirical subjectivity",
valid for the "transcendental consciousness", 
the "transcendental cogito", whichis the origin of all universal validity; thesynthetic a-priori, making objective experience 
possible, is universally valid;
perception has merely i"subjective validity"; 
he distinguished judgments of perception 
from judgments of experience,
158; the former require no pure conceptof the understanding but only the logicalconnection of perceptions in a thinkingsubject; the latter require special concepts 
originally produced in the understanding 
as well as the representationsof the sensory intuition; "the sun heatsthe stone" is merely subjectively valid,
but if I say : "the sun causes the heat ofthe stone", I add the concept of the understanding 
(viz. causality) to perception, 
and the judgment becomes universally 
valid, 159; the datum of experienceis chaotic and must be formed by thetranscendtal consciousness to an object


ive coherent reality; the secondary qualities 
are merely "subjective", 161; heeradicates the difference between theoretical 
knowledge and pre-theoretical experience, 
162; since KANT the transcendental 
basic Idea of Humanistic thoughthas to be designated as the motive ofnature and freedom, 190; the Idea of a 
personal God was accepted as a postulateof practical reason by KANT, 191; hecriticized the Humanistic metaphysics ofnature, 203 ; the extremely refined antinomies 
hidden in LEIBNIZ' haughty metaphysics 
were scrutinized by KANT in his"Kritik d. r. Vern." in order to uprootthe primacy of the ideal of science, 261;
KANT did not make any fundamental distinction 
between naive experience andnatural science, 297; KANT was the first 
to undertake the actio finium regundorum 
against the primacy of the science-
ideal over the personality ideal, 310; perhaps 
KANT was influenced by the fourthbook of ROUSSEAU'S Emile where sensorynature was opposed to the feeling of freedom,
316 (note) ; the general will in whichevery citizen encounters his own will,
cannot do any injustice to any one: volenti 
non fit injuria, 323; KANT'S philosophy 
inaugurated the phase of "transcendental 
freedom-idealism"; the ideal of 
science is limited to the world of sense-
phenomena; the root of human personality 
is sought in the normative ethicalfunction of its free will; there is a growing 
self-reflection of Humanism on the 
religious foundations of its philosophicattitude, 325; RICHARD KRONER holds that 
KANT was the first to have expressed theintrinsic spirit of the Christian faithwithin a so-called philosophical life- andworld view; he conceived of God no longer 
as an objective Idea, Pure Form, FirstCause and Substance, but rather out of 
the depth of the ethical-religious life";
Roman Catholic thinkers consider German 
Idealism since KANT as the philosophical 
expression of the Reformed viewof the relation between God and His 
creation, 326; KANT has been historicallyinfluenced by Puritanism and Pietism;
his transcendental basic Idea is ruled bythe Humanistic motive of nature and 
freedom; criticistic idealism has deeplyinfluenced the philosophical thought ofProtestantism; this fact reveals the invasion 
of the Scholastic spirit of accommodation 
originating from the basic motive 
of nature and grace in its nominalistic 
conception; this motive impeded theinner reformation of philosophicalthought; in KANT'S phil. the Humanisticideal of personality awakens from its lethargy, 
327; the freedom-Idea in KANT is 
religious totality and Origin of meaning;
RICHARD HONIGWALD On the conception ofthe Idea as the embodiment of the Humanistic 
personality-Ideal; this development 
starts with KANT'S Kritik d.r. Vern., 


 

KANT, IMMANUEL

329 ; KANT struggled with various motives, 
viz. in NEWTON'S natural science, 
and the Enlightenment, LEIBNIZ-WOLFFmetaphysics of the mathematical science-
ideal, in HUME'S psychologism, in Rous-
SEAU'S free personality; Puritanism andPietism ruled his rigorous attitude towards 
sensory human nature, 330; hetried to find a scientific foundation for 
his moral and religious conviction, andbegan to realize that the speculative metaphysical 
mathematical science-idealwas no use in this attempt; but he stillheld the spirit of the Englihtenment inhigh esteem, 331; he repeated DESCARTES'motto: "Give me matter and I will build 
a world from it"; he never repudiatedthe spirit of NEWTON; his doubt onlyconcerned the metaphysics of the mathematical 
science-ideal; he was deeplymoved by ROUSSEAU'S proclamation of thefreedom of human personality from thesubjection to science; this influence wasdecisive, 332; in his "Dreams of a visionary" 
he confesses that his disdain for"the mob who do not know anything"
has vanished and that ROUSSEAU has set 
him right; he has learned to honour men;
"true wisdom is the companion of simplicity 
and with it the heart lays downthe law to the understanding, it generallyrenders the elaborate equipment of learning 
superfluous"; with SOCRATES he says:
(333), "How many things there are thatI do not need at all!" This means the 
end of the domination of the science-

ideal in KANT'S thought; his humorouscriticism of SWEDENBORG was turned 
against rationalistic metaphysics (LEIBNIZ, 
WOLFF) ; like ROUSSEAU and HUME, 
KANT conceived of the personality idealas the function of feeling; theoreticalmetaphysics was intended to criticize thefoundations and limits of mathematical 
knowledge of nature; he did not reducecausality to the succession of psychicalIdeas like HUME, nor did he follow 
ROUSSEAU'S complete degradation of themathematical science-ideal, 334 ; he tried 
to limit mathematical and causal thinkingto sensory experience; in his PhysischeMonadologie he differentiated betweenLeibnizian metaphysics and the mathematical 
conception of space; he opposedWOLFF'S attempt to derive causality fromthe logical principle of contradiction;
with CRUSIUS he distinguished between"logical ground" and "ground of being";
he rejected the ontological proofs of theexistence of God; but he still held to 
WOLFF'S metaphysics which would furniish 
a priori knowledge from mere concepts; 
the "metaphysical" root and origincannot be derived from the logical unthinkableness 
of the opposite; KANT heldthat metaphysical being can be ascertained 
by logical thought only in thejudgment of identity, 335; the differentmethods of mathematics and of meta


118 

physics; mathematical definitions aresynthetical, metaphysical definitions areanalytical; mathematics creates its ownGegenstand, its definitions come first; inmetaphysics the concepts of things aregiven, definitions come at the end; thetrue method of metaphysics is like NEWTON'S 
method of mathematical physics,
336; "hypotheses non fingo" was NEWTON'S 
adage : natural laws formulated withthe aid of mathematical thought must inthe last analysis be subjected to the testof experience; the causes of phenomenacannot be devised by thinking; even mathematical 
thought remains bound to theconfines of sense experience; KANT accepted 
this view, thereby implying thatthe line of demarcation between the 
methods of mathematics and philosophyin his writings of 1763 was not definitive; 
with him the science-ideal, at least 
partially, still has the primacy in thesense formulated by NEWTON, 337; he rejects 
the freedom of the will; under theinfluence of English psychologism KANTdistinguishes the knowing faculty representing 
what is true and the power todistinguish what is good; the latter is themoral sentiment (cf. SHAFTESBURY, HUTCHESON, 
HUME) ; "the judgment: 'this isgood', is wholly incapable of demonstration, 
and an immediate effect of the consciousness 
of the feeling of the pleasurewe take in the Idea of the object"; thefirst principles of "natural theology";
they are capable of moral certainty onlyinsofar as they are concerned with God'sfreedom in action, His justice, and goodness; 
K. took the path of psychologism; 
cf. his "Considerations on the feeling ofthe beautiful and the sublime"; ethics is 
based on the feeling of beauty (SHAFTESBURY) 
; KANT made CRUSIUS' distinctionbetween the logical ground of knowledgeand the ground of being the foundationof his critical investigations, 339; he affirmed 
that in physics the terms negativeand positive have an entirely differentsignificance from that ascribed to them 
in logic and mathematics; in his thirdperiod KANT was close to HumE's scepticism, 
and ROUSSEAU'S thought led KANTto emancipate the science-ideal from thegrasp of theoretical metaphysics; K. introduced 
the distinction between analytical 
and synthetical judgments, 340; heconsidered all synthetical propositions tobe concerned with sensory experience,
i.e., to be "empirical" judgments; thus hewas sceptical with respect to the universally 
valid foundations of mathematicalphysics; physical "causality"; its principle 
is not universally valid or necessary; 
then he saw that such scepticismwould destroy the very foundations ofmathematics, 341; he was now interested 
in the relation of space and time to realthings; he defended NEWTON'S andEULER'S mathematical doctrine of "ab



 

119 KANT, IMMANUEL 

solute pure space" against LEIBNIZ' conception 
that space is nothing but an "apriori order of possible coexistences";
space is not the product of the relationsof material parts, but the pre-requisitefor the relations of spatial things to eachother; but he did not take over NEWTON'Sabsolute space as "sensorium Dei", 342;
he discovered the mathematical antinomies; 
he rejected NEWTON'S and EULER'Sview and accepted that of LEIBNIZ : "spaceand time" are a priori forms of purethought, 343; K. did not ascribe any valueto the metaphysical application of LEIBNIZ' 
creative a priori concepts of themind; in a new schema he coordinatedspace and time with actuality, possibility, 
necessity, etc.; he reckoned all ofthem to ontology, related to the rest ofphilosophy as mathesis pura to mathesisapplicata, 344; in his inaugural addressat Kiinigsberg University KANT calledspace and time "conceptus singulares"
and also "intuitus singulares purl"; heopposed them to "conceptus universales"
acquired by abstraction; there is onlyone space and one time, including alllimited spaces and all finite periods oftime as their parts; this new conceptionmarks a reaction against theoretical metaphysics 
on the part of KANT'S graduallymaturing new conception of the personality 
ideal, 345; his inaugural addressmakes the important distinction betweenthe sphere of sensory phenomena andthe intelligible world; the value of personality 
is not dependent on scientific 
thought; K. still adhered to the sentimental 
religion and ethics of ROUSSEAU andthe English psychologists; but pietisticmotives made KANT increasingly moresuspicious of sensory human nature, 346;
it became impossible to harmonize thesensory nature of man with the Idea ofnormative autonomous freedom; his pessimism 
of the "radical evil"; nature asthe sole experienceable reality is degraded 
to "mundus sensibilis"; space is asynthetical form of the "outer sense",
time of the "inner sense"; both are necessary 
conditions for sensory experience, 
347; the "Dinge an sich" are fundamentally 
excluded from the sphere ofexperience; mathematics and naturalscience are therefore, limited to the phenomenon; 
corporeal things fill mathematical 
space; space is an a priori form ofintuition; the usus logicus of logical understanding; 
the usus realis, 348; the intelligible 
world is that of the "Dinge ansich" as the new conception of the personality 
ideal; our pure autonomous will,
only determined by the form of morallegislation, is itself an "example of anIdea of freedom, of an intelligible substance"; 
two tasks performed by metaphysics: 
an elenctic and a dogmatic one;
knowledge from concepts of the mind isonly "cognitio symbolica"; he denied to 

theoretical metaphysics every mode ofintuitive adequate knowledge; he rejectsLEIBNIZ and WOLFF'S view that sensoryknowledge is a "cognitio confusa"; KANTholds that sensory intuitions of space andtime furnish us with the most distinct 
cognitions of all, namely the mathematical 
ones"; the "mundus intelligibilis" isCivitas Dei; he identifies it with themundus moralis; God is the "practicaloriginal Being", this is the moralisticideal of personality, 350; the idea of theautonomous self-determination of personality 
became KANT'S hypothesis of theoretical 
knowledge; the discovery of theantinomies of theoretical metaphysicswas the occasion of his transition to critical 
Idealism ; the real motive was religious; 
the intellect is law-giver to "nature"; 
in the spontaneity of the intellectis expressed the sovereign value of thepersonality; his letter to MARKUS HERZ in1772; the intellect possesses an "ususrealis" in the a priori foundation of the"mundus visibilis"; the problem of the apriori synthesis, 351; universally validexperience is identical with "Gegenstand", 
and the latter with "objectivity"
in KANT; on what is the relation betweenour representation and the Gegenstand(object) based? This Gegenstand is achaotic mass of experience, of intermingled 
sense impressions; but they arereceived in the a priori forms of intuition, 
space and time; our representationsof things in the external world are syntheses 
of our consciousness; the universal 
validity of such syntheses originatesfrom the a priori function of pure logicalunderstanding with its categories; KANTdeveloped the programme of the Transcendental 
Analytic, 352; the central problem 
of his critical work is that of the 
possibility of synthetical judgments apriori; he soon found the metaphysicaldeduction of the categories; his systemof the Critique of Pure Reason took nineyears to elaborate; the difficulty was the"transcendental deduction", which was to 
explain why the categories are necessarily 
related to the "Gegenstand"; in the"transcendental deduction the foundations 
of the mathematical and natural 
scientific pattern of knowledge were atstake; the core of his Critique is found inthe Dialectic of Pure Reason, 353 ; he 
wished to open the way for the a priorirational faith in the reality of the autonomous 
freedom of the personality bydenying the claims of theoretical metaphysics; 
his three "Critiques" are onewhole; his "Copernican Deed" is the reversal 
of the relation between the knowing 
subject and empirical reality, 354;
this reversal is only significant in thebasic structure of KANT'S transcendental 
ground-Idea; since DESCARTES' Humanistic 
philosophy had sought the foundations 
of reality in the knowing subject 


 

KANT, IMMANUEL 120 

only; but KANT did more than repeatthis thought; he withdrew the "Ding ansich" from the domination of the mathematical 
science ideal and limited theoretical 
knowledge to sense phenomena inorder to safeguard the Humanistic religious 
freedom motive of the personalityideal, 355; he sought the transcendentroot of human existence in the rational-
moral function of sovereign personality;
with regard to knowledge of nature K.
held to the sovereignty of mathematicalthought; but the science ideal cedes itsprimacy to the ideal of personality;
KANT bound mathematical and natural 
scientific categories to the sensory function 
of experience, 356; KANT proclaimedthe "primacy of practical reason"; theCritique of Pure Reason and the Critiqueof Practical Reason break the cosmos into 
the sphere of sensory appearance andthat of super-sensory freedom; the idealof science makes the mind the law-giverof nature, since it constitutes empiricalreality as "Gegenstand"; but this idealis not permitted to apply its categoriesoutside of sensory experience; in therealm of freedom the homo noumenon is 
the sovereign (i.e.. the hypostatized rational-
moral function) ; the noumenon isa self-sufficient metaphysical reality, butit avenges itself by logical formalism inethical questions, 357; KANT'S "transcendental 
unity of apperception"; its relation. 
to the absolutely autonomous moral 
freedom is unclarified; his "transcenden


tal cogito" has no metaphysical meaning;
but it does not belong to the phenomenonsince he considers it as the formal originof natural phenomena; the "transcendental 
cogito" is merely a logical function,
358 ; it is a pure spontaneity of the uniting 
act synthesizing the plurality of apossible sensory intuition ; a final logicalunity in consciousness above all logicalmultiplicity in concepts; but there cannot 
be a real unity of selfconsciousnessin the Kantian conception because of thegulf between "theoretical" and "practicalreason"; the cogito is lawgiver of "nature"; 
the transcendent subject of autonomous 
moral freedom is law-giver ofhuman action; the antinomies of natural 
necessity causal law and norm; naturalnecessity remains a counterforce againstthe moral Idea of freedom, 359; KANT'S 
epistemology opposes sensibility to logical 
understanding; sensibility is purelyreceptive and an insurmountable limit tothe sovereignty of theoretical thought;
logical understanding (the "Verstand")
is lawgiver in a formal sense only; thematerial of knowledge remains deeply a-
logical: the "Ding an sich" behind it canaffect sensibility; Ding an sich then is asubstance, incompatible with the "homonoumenon" Idea; the "Ding an sich" destroys 
the sovereignty of thought, 360;
KANT tried to avoid the antinomy in his 

delimitation of the science-ideal by anatural "Ding an sich", in his construction 
of an "intellectus archetypus", anintuitive Divine Mind creating its Gegenstand 
in direct non-sensory intellectualintuition, 361; KANT introduced the transcendental 
Ideas of theoretical reason; the 
limitation of the categories to the sensoryphenomenon makes it impossible for theintellect to conceive of the "Ding ansich" in a positive sense as the absolute;
the concept of a noumenon is merely a"limiting concept", 362; he criticized theLeibnizian-Wolffian school in the statement 
: concepts without sensory intuitions 
are empty, intuitions without concepts 
are blind; "Verstand" (the understanding) 
brings unity to the phenomenaby means of rules; Reason ("Vernunft")
creates the unity of the rules of understanding 
under principles; the reality of"things in themselves" is only secured by"practical Reason" in a-priori faith; theconcept of a "noumenon" as the "Gegenstand" 
of an infinite intuitive intellect; 
the intellect recognizing the infinity of 
its task in the determination of the "Gegenstand" 
submits to "theoretical Reason" 
with its transcendental Ideas; the 
latter point the understanding the wayto bring unity to its rules; the Transcendental 
Idea is the absolutized logical category, 
363; "Pure reason" is never related 
to "Gegenstdnde" but only to thea-priori concepts of "Gegenstdnde";
KANT'S table of transcendental Ideas of 

pure Reason; the Idea of a SupremeBeing; the Idea of the Soul; that of theuniverse; that of the Deity; not anytranscendental Idea is related to experience; 
they do not give us scientificknowledge, 364 ; the "dialectical illusion"
arises when theoretical thought supposesit can attain to knowledge of the "supraempirical"; 
the task of KANT'S Critique;
he rejects metaphysical psychology, cosmology 
and natural theology, in his"Paralogisms of Pure Reason" he reduced therationalist psychology, as theoreticalmetaphysics, to absurdity and struck atthe root of the Cartesian conclusion from 
the cogito to the esse, 365; the basic 
theses of metaphysical psychology: thesubstantiality, immateriality, simplicity,
immortality and personality of the "thinking 
ego"; by means of the logical categories 
these conceptions are based on relating 
the empty logical form of transcendental 
self-consciousness to the "external 
world", to a supra-empirical "Gegenstand"; 
the basic problem of Humanistic 
metaphysics is the relation of thematerial substance to the soul substance 
and became null and void to KANT; this 
problem he reduces to the relation between 
subjective psychical phenomena ofthe "inner sense" (366) and the objective

psychical phenomena of the "outer

sense"; the theoretical function of the 


 

121 KANT, IMMANUEL 

transcendental Idea of the soul; it directstheoretical thought to the homo noumenon; 
KANT reduced to absurdity rationalist 
cosmology, 367 ; if reason draws conclusions 
from the cosmological ideas ofthe universe with respect to the "Dingean sich", it is involved in antinomies; ifit is possible to prove both the thesis andits antithesis of a speculative proposition,
the logical principle of contradiction isviolated, and it is evident that the supposed 
object of such a proposition cannot 
be a real "object of experience";
KANT posited four theoretical antinomies:
two mathematical and two dynamical antinomies; 
a limited or an infinite worldin space and time; its divisibility intoabsolutely single parts, or the opposite;
causality through freedom. — or mechanical 
necessity; the existence of an absolutely 
necessary Supreme Being can beproved and disproved, 368; KANT'S Idealof Personality is founded in causalitythrough freedom, the "homo noumenon"
and God as the final hypostasis of themoral Idea of freedom; he chooses theside of the theses with respect to "Dingean sich"; and the antitheses with regardto sensory appearance; in this dialecticof "theoretical Reason" the root and origin 
of the cosmos is concerned; but thenthe insoluble antinomy in his dualistictranscendental basic Idea is in evidence;
this Idea implies "purity", i.e., unconditionedness; 
thus there arises an uneradicable 
cleft between the science and 
the personality ideal, 369; in the solution 
of the dynamic antinomies he appeals tothe supra-sensory sphere of human personality 
in favour of the thesis; in that ofthe mathematical antinomies he excludes 
such an appeal, 370; the reason for thisdifference; but his argument is not convincing; 
LEIBNIZ' monad is spaceless;
KANT'S second antinomy: every composite 
substance in the world consists of 
simple parts and there exists nowhereanything but the simple and what is composed 
of it; LEIBNIZ taught that the seriesof spatial analysis originates in a noumenon 
which is dissimilar to the partsof space; the thesis is: cosmic time originates 
in eternity (as timelessness) ;
KANT depreciates the theoretical Idea ofGod; his own Idea of God has to pavethe way for the practical Idea of thedeity as a "postulate of practical reason";
his Krit. d. r. Vern. destroys the entiretheologia naturalis, 372; the kernel of 
KANT'S transcendental basic Idea is the 
freedom and autonomy of the ethicalfunction of personality in its hypostatization 
as "homo noumenon"; the latteris identified with the moral law, as "purewill"; the ego only becomes an ego whenit obeys itself (KaoNER) ; the self-legitimating 
law elevates Reason above allfinite connections; self-consciousness hasa vague existence in the "transcendental 

unity of apperception", but in the Critique 
of Practical Reason it discloses its"metaphysical root", 373; his dualisticconception of the selfhood is antinomous;
his logical formalization of ethics andtheology; theoretical logic dominates theideal of personality as formulated in thecategorical imperative, contrary to KANT'Sown intention; the either or between sensory 
experience and reason induced himto apply the form-matter schema to themoral principles; his categorical imperative 
is a logicistic judgement, 374 ; thetranscendental concept of freedom is merely 
negative and is to become positivethrough the principle of autonomy; butthe latter lacks meaningful content whichis only a formal principle; he teaches theself-sufficiency of the homo noumenon;
this makes any moral autonomy of manmeaningless; his logistic hypostatizationof the "categorical imperative" only offers 
"stones for bread"; KANT'S Eulogyof Duty, 375; free personality is an endin itself; man is unholy, but "humanity"
in his person ought to be sacred to him;
this "human value" is the sacred "horn()
noumenon", the empty formula of thecategorical imperative; morality versuslegality, 376; man can be an end in himself 
only in the subject-object relation;
but not in the religious sphere, becausethere it would contradict the ex-sistent 
character of the religious centre of human 
personality; the religious root of ourexistence is nothing in itself, because it 
is the imago Dei; in KANT'S practicalphilosophy the absolute freedom of thehomo noumenon exists by the grace ofthe same logical understanding that inhis epistemology he had bound to thechain of sensory phenomena; this understanding 
subjects the personality ideal tological formulization, 377; that which is . said generally in the ethical rule (in abstracto) 
must be applied to an action inconcreto by the practical faculty of judgment; 
a concrete action is always "empirically 
determined", i.e., belongs to thesensory experience of nature; thus thehypostatization of the moral function isdestroyed; KANT'S "solution" of the difficulty, 
378; if a subjective maxim of action 
cannot be thought of in the form ofa natural law as a universal law of human 
action, it is morally impossible; the dualism 
between "nature" and "freedom" becomes 
an antinomy, 379; he called psychological 
freedom — which he subsumed 
under the mechanism of nature — the 
freedom of a turnspit, which also executes 
its movements of its own accord after 
it is wound up; he rejects the Leibnizianautomaton spirituale; God has createdman as a homo noumenon, not as phenomenon; 
according to KANT God cannotbe said to be the cause of the sense world 

and at the same time to be the cause of 

the existence of the acting being as "nou



 

KANT, IMMANUEL 122 

menon"; but the "causa noutnenon" of 
sensory actions is merely the absolutized 
form of the law "iiberhaupt"; here is 
antinomy; the categorical imperative is 
the moral law and also the subjective 
"causa noumenon"; the subjective moral 
volitional function cannot be comprehended 
as "free cause" because it is dependent 
on sensory nature; KRONER'S attempt 
to solve this antinomy, 380 ; the origin of 
this antinomy is the impossibility of 
thinking the moral logical form of reason 
together with its sensorily determined 
material; in K.'s Dialectic of pure reason 
the natural scientific category of causality 
is exclusively related to sensory experience, 
never to "Dinge an sich"; in 
practical reason K. tried to re-establish 
the coherence between nature and freedom 
by means of the concept of the highest 
good; he observes that the old ethics 
sought after an "object of the will", 381; 
in heteronomous ethics the concept of 
the highest good becomes the "unconditioned 
totality" of the object of pure practical 
reason; it pre-supposes the final determinative 
ground of the moral law; in 
the concept of the highest good virtue 
and happiness are necessarily united; 
this union of virtue and beatitude cannot 
be conceived analytically, for freedom 
and nature do not logically follow from 
each other but rather exclude each other; 
it can only be thought of synthetically; 
if happiness is the moving cause of moral 
action, there is no autonomy; if happiness 
is the result of moral action (382), 
the will is directed by the knowledge of 
natural laws and not by its own moral 
inclination; this is the "antinomy of practical 
reason"; happiness as the result of 
moral action is a false thesis only in so 
far as it considers virtue a cause in the 
sense world thus ascribing only a phenomenal 
existence to rational beings; an intelligible 
Creator may have set moral inclination 
in a necessary causal coherence 
with beatitude as its effect in the sense 
world; KANT had hypostatized the moral 
personality, and the "intelligible Creator" 
is a postulate to escape his antinomies; 
this postulate rests on a universally 
valid and necessary reasonable faith (like 
two other postulates of practical reason: 
positive freedom and immortality) ; nature 
and freedom are to be brought into 
a deeper coherence, 383; but then he 
must abandon the Idea of the "homo noumenon" 
as "Ding an sich"; the intrinsic 
character of the pure practical reason is 
autonomy, but this is undermined by 
KANT'S inclusion of happiness as a material 
determination in the pure moral law; 
in the concept of the highest good all the 
antinomies between the personality- and 
the science-ideal are crowded together; 
KANT'S "deity" as postulate of "pure practical 
reason" is the final hypostatization 
of the ideal of personality; this reason


able God is the categorical imperative itself; 
the principle of morality extends to 
all beings that have reason and will, even 
to the infinite Being as Supreme Intelligence; 
K.'s religion is one within the 
boundaries of mere Reason, 384 ; his lack 
of insight into the essence and starting 
point of Christian doctrine; the faith of 
pure reason he supposes to be the kernel 
of all religious dogmas; the fall into sin 
is the antagonism between sensory and 
moral nature; the "radical evil" is the 
tendency to subject the will to sensory 
inclinations; regeneration is a free deed 
of our moral nature through which the 
good conquers the evil; the God-man is 
the "moral ideal man", the pre-requisite 
for regeneration; in the two Critiques (of 
pure reason, and of practical reason) the 
antinomy between the science and the 
personality ideal had remained unsolved; 
a new attempt was mode in the "Critique 
of Judgment", 385; he acknowledged that 
the super-sensory ought to influence the 
sensory world; there must be a ground 
of unity of the super-sensory lying at the 
foundation of nature, with the practical 
content of the freedom-Idea; the concept 
of this unity has no proper realm, but it 
must enable us to pass from the principles 
of nature to those of freedom; nature 
must be subsumed under the freedom 
of reason, 386; only in his aesthetic 
philosophy KANT recognizes subjective 
individuality in his doctrine of the creative 
genius; as a rule he called individuality 
"specificity in nature", and identified 
law and subject; in the "class of the 
higher cognitive faculties" there is a link 
between understanding and reason, viz. 
the power of judgment (Urteilskraft) ; it 
subsumes the particular under the universal 
laws; it is a "determining transcendental 
faculty of judgment" and constitutive 
for experience, 387; as a "reflecting 
faculty it judges the particular in its 
accommodation to the universal laws given 
to nature by the understanding in the a 
priori synthesis; reflecting judgment 
judges of the particular multiplicity of 
nature as if a higher than human understanding 
had given the laws of nature for 
the benefit of our cognitive faculty in 
order to make possible a system of experience 
according to particular laws of 
nature; the soul has three original faculties: 
the cognitive, the feeling of pleasure 
and pain, the desiring faculty; he relates 
the reflecting judgment to feeling; in 
every feeling we order an imagined object 
to an end, 388; the a priori universally 
valid principle of the reflecting 
judgment is that of the "formal teleology 
of nature"; this transcendental concept 
of teleology dictates a law to itself in order 
to judge nature; viz. the law of specification; 
a mere regulative principle 
for our view of nature, 389; but the teleological 
mode of contemplation must not 


123 KANT, IMMANUEL 

encroach upon the domain of the science of the reflective faculty of judgment isideal; the connecting link between un- taken for the heteronomy of the deterderstanding 
and reason is a third imma- minative faculty, 396; but this antinomynent function of consciousness; the fa- cannot be solved by referring either ofculty of judgment compares sensory in- these functions to its own a priori printuition 
and logical understanding, 390; ciples; the principle of their compatibithe 
Urteilskraft can establish that a given lity must lie outside both and yet containsensory representation has an appro- the ground of them; this is the superpriate 
accommodation to our understand- sensory; but we cannot acquire any theoing; 
or it can judge that a concept has retical knowledge of the supra-sensoryan appropriate accommodation to the substratum of nature, 397; here is evil-
visible reality of an object; in the first ence of NEWTON'S view of the compatibiease 
the representation is joined with a lity of mechanism and divine teleologyfeeling of pleasure, it is a teleological re- in nature; KANT says: "we may not pre-
presentation of an aesthetic character; in tend, however, that there actually existsthe second case the teleology is laid in a particular cause having its determinathe 
thing of nature; hence KANT'S Criti- tive ground in the idea of a goal", 398;
que of the aesthetic and that of the teleo- "there is a certain casuality in the con-
logical judgment, 391; he formulates the stitution of our understanding" necessidualism 
between the science- and the per- tating a teleological judgment of nature;
sonality ideal with great acumen; the Kr. he contraststhe intuitive Divine under-
d. Pr. Vern. furnished the idea of causal- standing which is creative in a materiality through freedom; it ought to exist; sense, with human understanding whichthe Urteilskraft is to furnish the media- is only creative in a formal sense; senting 
concept in that of a teleology in sory material is the ground of all continnature, 
392; but the homo noumenon as gency of the particular in nature; our 
Ding an sich and its moral freedom are understanding must distinguish betweento have unconditional validity; in this possibility and reality, for it has to rely 
way the freedom motive is almost com-on logical understanding and sensory inpletely 
reduced to the logical principle tuition; an absolutely intuitive under-
of contradiction; human personality as standing could only know reality; the 
an end in itself enables this motive to Idea of the absolute necessity (unitingescape dissolution into a formal tauto- possibility and reality) is itself only so-
logy, 393; in nature the living organisms mething possible, as an Idea it is distinctset a limit to causal explanation and thus from reality; there is a similar situationjustify the critique of teleological judg- with respect to the relation between 
anent; a natural organism must be related mechanism and teleology in nature, 399; 
to itself as cause and effect; it gives "ob- the principle of teleology remains a ficjective 
reality" to the concept of a goal; tion, an as-if consideration of humanthe causal coherence in an organism can reason; the basic antinomy between thenever be a nexus effectivus; the organism science and the personality ideal remainscannot result from an external cause; its unsolved; it has everywhere crystallizedcausal relation is that of a nexus finalis, in the dialectical form-matter schema,
in which the effect is a causa finalis; the 400; but in KANT'S system a teleology canparts of an organism can only exist never be a teleology of nature, since thethrough their relation to the whole, and sensory and the supra sensory are diviare 
connected to the unity of the whole ded by an unbridgeable cleft; the merelythrough their being the mutual cause and subjective principle of teleology is re-
effect of each other's form, 394; such a lated to the sensory material which inteleological union is only known to us this way is subjected to two principlesfrom our own human action; we may that are mutually exclusive, 401; his 

judge the living organism only as if a dualistic transcendental basic Idea lacksteleological activity lay at its found- an unequivocal Archimedean point andation; this principle leads to the idea of Idea of totality; the "Ding an sich" ofnature as a "universal organism"; every- nature continued to be a counter-instancething in the world is good for something against his moralistic Idea of totality, 402;
whatsoever; nothing in it is aimless; this by the dialectic of theoretical reason withtranscendental Idea only has heuristic its transcendental Ideas reason is elevatedvalue; it results in an ethical teleology, by KANT above the limits of sense ex395; 
KANT formulates his antinomy as perience, 403; a theoretical dialectic with 
follows : "All production of material insoluble antinomies is a proof of a spethings 
is possible according to merely culative misuse of the transcendentalmechanical laws"; and: "Some product- Ideas; KANT'S dualism between reasonion of the same is not possible according and sensibility, universally valid a priorito merely mechanical laws"; the postu- form and sensory empirical matter; translate 
of continuity of the science ideal and cendental, selfreflection on the personal-
that of the personality ideal are irrecon- ity ideal as the root , of science, 404; 
cilably antagonistic; KANT ascribes this KANT had tried to solve the problemantinomy to the fact that the autonomy of the relation between the universal 


 

KANT, IMMANUEL124 

a priori forms of the "transcendentalconsciousness" and the particular matter; 
he used LEIBNIZ "intellectus archetypus" 
with its mathematical analysiscompleted in a single intuition of thewhole individual reality to bridge thegap; this idea remains merely a regulative 
principle for the use of the understanding; 
his teleology, 405; KANT haltedbefore the eradication of the limits between 
theoretical reason, practical reasonand faculty of judgment in the interest ofthe science-ideal, for he did not want toreduce the latter to the freely creativemoral activity of the "homo noumenon"
like FICHTE, 417; reality is a category ofquality, 418 ; KANT had not really solvedthe problem of the epistemological synthesis, 
423; the transcendental productiveimagination achieves the synthesis of sensory 
matter and pure forms of thoughtby means of the schematizing of the categories 
in time as a form of intuition, bythe creation of a "transcendental pattern"
for all empirical "Gegenstãnde", 427; butthe a priori synthesis issues from thetranscendental logical function, 430; his"Kritik der Urteilskraft" oriented the 
aesthetic judgment to free feeling andrecognized the absolute individual valueof genius; it offered a point of contact toSCHILLER'S Aesthetic Idealism, 462; in 
his critical period he proclaimed three-
dimensional space to be a transcendentalcondition of geometry; several Kantiansopposed EINSTEIN'S theory of relativity 
on the ground of KANT'S thesis; but 
others, the Neo-Kantians GAUSZ, LOBATSCHEWSKY, 
RIEMANN, BOLAY, etc., hastened 
to accommodate Kantian epistemology 
to the non-Euclidean geometries;
the same applies to KANT'S conceptionof causal natural law oriented to the 
classic physics of NEWTON, which couldnot be maintained against modern quan


tum physics; in his pre-critical periodKANT had admitted that a non-Euclidean 
space is conceivable,547 (note) ; theKantian conception of the a-priori andthe empirical moments in human knowledge 
identifies the "empirical" with thesensory impressions, 549.

,II, 
Kritik d. reinen Vernunft, 12, 13, 14, 15, 
17, 18, 19, 27, 43-47, 58, 77, 79, 82, 86,95, 96, 120, 123, 141, 142, 149, 150, 151,167, 176, 186, 187, 396, 420, 421, 422, 430,431, 432, 434, 435, 436-449, 455, 459, 466,

467, 477, 492-518, 520, 521, 522-528,532-534, 550, 575;

Kritik d. teleol. Urteilskraft, 201, 271, 421,
422, 506, 507; 
Idee zur einer allgemeinen Geschichte in


weltburglicher Absicht, 271, 272;
Kritik d. Prakt. Vernunft, 506, 538, 543;
Ueber die Fortschritte der Metaphysik seit
Leibniz and Wolff, 507, 508, 530-536;
Logik, 450;
Further references to KANT: 219, 270, 


326, 327, 333, 358, 396, 569, 573-575, 585-587. 

-, II, uses the form-matter-scheme, 12;
categories are concepts of pure synthesisa-priori, 13; they have no genus proximum; 
transcendental and formal logic;
generic and specific concepts in the teleological 
judgment, 15; the Idea is theorigin of the being of what is, 19; theoretic 
antinomies; idea of reason, 42; cosmological 
ideas and categories; dialectical 
illusion; mathematical and dynamicantinomies; nature and freedom; and theantinomies; understanding and reason;
noumenon is absolute normative Idea, 43;
homo noumenon ; dialectic of pure reason; 
speculative metaphysics and theology; 
reality is identified with sensory andlogical experience; the moral aspect absolutized 
into the transcendent noumenon, 
44 ; phenomenal and noumenalworld; nature and freedom; the numberof antinomies, 45; their nature and origin, 
46; KANT reduces antinomy to logical 
contradiction ; theoretic thought separated 
from the cosmic coherence, 47;
only three transcendental determinations;
an artifical result; his categories of quantity 
are analogical, 58; he saw that it wasimpossible to derive number from logicalsynthesis; he conceived of movement ashappening within space, 95; called spacea transcendental form of intuition; thisantinomic notion had already been refuted 
by HUME, 96; his faculty psychology, 
111; causality as a transcendental logical 
category, 120; analytical economy,
123 ; Gesinnungsethik; Categorical Imperative; 
respect for "humanity", 149; dialectical 
motive of nature and freedom;
love is sensory inclination ; the essenceof man is his will; legal order is an orderof peace; external; the radical evil; thisis a secularized Christian conception,
150; he explained juridical analogies ofnumber in a mathematical way, 167; theoritical 
reason interrogates nature as ajudge, 176; theoretical and practicalideas; his abuse of the theoretical idea ofthe homo noumenon; he restricts scienceto sensory impressions of nature, 187(note) ; teleological judgment; he influenced 
neo-Kantiani, 201; absolutized formalethics in his categorical Imperative, 206;
his positive humanistic view of history,
270; his Idea of development was orientedto the personality ideal; his judgment "alsob" (=as if) ; he shared ROUSSEAU'S criticism 
of the Enlightenment; he opposed civilization 
to morality, 271; the League ofnations as the aim of history, 272 ; heblamed HERDER for the lack of direction 
in HERDER'S Ideen zur Philosophie derGeschichte, 277; KANT'S transcendentalism 
and moralism, 278; influenced theAustrian Civil-Code, 358 ; he excluded theidea of purpose from the concept of subjective 
right, 396; he seeks the principleof individuality in the sensory matter of 


125 KANT, IMMANUEL 


experience; the intellectus archetypusidea; the view of nature as the work of adivine architect is teleological; the regulative 
use of theoretical ideas; the law ofspecification, 420; the extension and thecontent of a concept; generic and specific; 
the rule of variety in the similaramong the lower kinds; homogeneity andcontinuity, 420; all individuality is empirically 
determined, 421; this view iscriticized; KANT'S law of specification isan a-priori logical rule; there are degreesfrom the general to the particular, 422;
his epistemology : "Ding an sich" is : "substance"; 
the Gegenstand, 430; synthesisof logical categories and forms of intuitions; 
the datum; his implied pre-suppositions, 
431; his startingpoint is dogmatic; 
ancient, Scholastic and pre-Kantianmetaphysics gave an account of their cosmonomic 
Idea, KANT did not, 432; analytical 
and synthetical judgments; "all bodies 
are extended" is an analytical judgment; 
"all bodies are heavy" is a synthetical 
judgment, 435; body and extension 
cannot be identified logically, 436;
"body" in KANT'S "Transcendentale Aesthetik"; 
and extension; he states: "extension" 
is implied in the concept "body";
therefore this concept embraces morethan mere extensiveness; viz. its substratum 
of sense impressions; it is not an exclusively 
and "purely" analytical concept; 
he means "body in the sense of"material body"; then it necessarily implies 
"heaviness", 437 ; he calls "empirical" 
judgments synthetical; if empiricalpredicates are excluded from the conceptof the subject of a judgment, these predicates 
are not subject to the logical principles; 
then they cease to be "predicates";
if they are genuine ju,dgments, they mustbe analytical; 2 2 = 4; causality, 438;
RIEHL, PFANDER explain KANT'S "notes" 
on the distinction between analytical andsynthetic judgments, 439-441; criticismOf KANT'S theory, 442; SCHLEIERMACHERand SIGWART'S attempts to clear thingsup, 442, 443; KANT'S dualistic cosmonomic 
Idea; SIGWART confounds linguisticand logical structures, 444; KANT adoptedARISTOTLE'S substance and accidentia in 
a modified form; his substance is only related 
to the senses; accidentia are modes 
of existence; his remark on empiricaljudgments, 445; his theory of syntheticjudgments is confused, 446-449; he callsthe expression "general concept" tautological, 
450; a discursive specific conceptand its specima; space and the wholeand its parts, 455; KANT'S Categories andforms of intuition are false formalisms,
459; his view of the Gegenstand of theoretic 
thought, 467; Kritik der reinen Vernunft 
interpreted by HEIDEGGER, 492;
KANT'S epistemology is based on his Ideaof human personality; his doctrine ofIdeas is determined by his faith in reason; 
although he suggests that his "Kritik" 

is religiously neutral, 493; his Transcendental 
Aesthetic and Logic are not to beisolated; such isolation is due to a misconception 
of epistemology; the sensorymaterial is not really the datum; his debtto HUME, 494 ; his isolation of the sensorymaterial of experience is a problem; itcreates an antinomy; he assumes an a-
priori reference of the categories to sensibility, 
but no reference of sensibility tothe categories, 495; metaphysical "Dingan sich" is unknowable though it affectssensibility; which latter is purely receptive; 
the understanding is free, active,
spontaneous, 496; synthesis is the combination 
of a plurality and transcendental 
logical unity; it is the result of theimagination; and conceived by the understanding 
in a conceptual form; eventhe unconscious imagination executesthis synthesis by means of the logicalfunction; theoretical synthesis is the prerequisite 
of analysis, 497; KANT does notdistinguish logical from intermodal synthesis; 
logification of cosmic and cosmological 
self-consciousness; his categoriespre-suppose the basic unity of selfconsciousness, 
498; but selfconsciousness 
transcends the logical function; KANT'S"law of the unity of apperception"
is the well-known logical: Cogito; hemerges the self into the logical unityof thought, 499; definition of self-
consciousness; KANT'S Kritik is self-destructive; 
his unity of apperception is synthetical, 
i.e., a law conformity determining 
all experience; an a-priori relatedness of 
a plurality (in intuition) to the cogito;
RICHARD KRONER realized KANT'S self-refutation, 
500; self-consciousness as thelogical unity excludes sensibility; intuitive 
and creative thought are only inGod as the intellectus archetypus; humanknowledge is always conceptual. KANTdenies the theoretical intuition, 501; histranscendental logical I-ness is a formallogical unity above multiplicity, a transposition 
of "soul" as "substance" into thelogical modus; transcendental logic concerns 
synthetical cognitive thought, 502,503; his doctrine of the pure understanding; 
we think "Gegenstande" a-priori; general 
or formal logic; transcendental logicoperates in the categories, which are conceptus 
dati a-priori applying to objects,
504; KANT'S table of judgments, 505; thesynthesis of the categories is purely logical; 
neo-Kantians; a substance is a subject 
without the capacity to become apredicate to anything else, 506; categories 
are independent of sensibility, 507;
they do not imply any inter-modal synthesis; 
there is only a synthesis of thecategories and time; but KANT cannot recognize 
this as a synthesis because it isnot a logical function of the understanding; 
quantity categories, 508; those ofquality; reality, negation, limitation, areanalogies in a logical respect; movement 


 

KANT, IMMANUEL126 

is misrepresented as an a-priori synthesisof sensation with the representation oftime; NEWTON'S time concept, 509; inkinematic time the impressions of the"inner sense" are received; KANT'S viewis confused; the categories of quantityand quality are related to "Gegenstandeiiberhaupt"; in time as a sensory intuitional 
form the categories cannot becomenumerical or kinematical; qualitative categories 
determine mathematical kinematical 
meaning, 510; but KANT'S categoriesare mathematical themselves; logical synthesis 
replaces intermodal, 511; his logical 
relation is analogical: the principium 
rationis sufficientis; logical imputation 
of an effect to a cause is not something 
physical; KANT ascribes physicalmeaning to the category of causality;
ARISTOTLE'S categories; LEIBNIZ identifiedpossibility and logical possibility; theactual is the Divine selection from the 
possible, 512; KANT relates logical categories 
of modality to sensory phenomena;
the sensory only is actual ; actuality assuch is a category of thought; in KANT'S"transcendental logic" the notion of the"transcendental imagination" is introduced, 
which is central in the chapter onthe "transcendental schema"; this schemaoriginates in "the productive faculty ofthe imagination"; the pure concepts ofthe understanding are mere "forms ofthought"; sensibility is "the receptive representative 
faculty; based on this sensibility 
is a certain form of a priori sensoryintuition in the mind; so that the understanding 
can determine the inner sense bymeans of the plurality of given representations 
in accordance with the syntheticunity of apperception; thus the categoriesobtain objective reality, 513 ; the a priorisynthesis of sensory intuitions as a "synthesis 
speciosa" or "figurative synthesis"
is distinct from the "synthesis intellectualis"; 
intellectual synthesis is called"Verstandesverbindung"; the figurativesynthesis is called the "transcendentalsynthesis of the imagination", 514 ; HUMEconsiders the imagination to be the faculty 
enabling us to picture somethingnot actually given in sensory impressions; 
KANT says that this imaginationcan function only through the transcendental 
"figurative synthesis of imagination"; 
it belongs to receptive sensibility;
as and act of spontaneity of the understanding 
operating on sensibility, it is thefirst application of the understanding tothe objects of possible intuition and thebasis of all other applications; it is, therefore, 
the synthetical activity of the productive 
phantasy which is ascribed tothe logical function of thought; this figurative 
synthesis is a synthetical influenceof the understanding on the "innersense"; the problem is exactly the possibility 
of this influence, 515 ; the synthe


tical unity of "transcendental appercep


tion" is distinguished by KANT from sensory 
intuition; the understanding doesnot find a conjunction of the manifold inthe inner sense by affecting the latter butcreates it; the interfunctional synthesis isonly ascribed to logical thought; KANTsticks to the dogma concerning the formative 
autonomy of theoretical thought,
516; the doctrine of the categories doesnot belong to general epistemology butto the cosmological analysis of the modalmeaning structures; KANT constantlyavoids the genuine epistemological problem 
; his solution is not a really criticalone; he posits a third something betweena category and a phenomenon; this something 
must be intellectual as well as sensible; 
it is a mediating representation,
viz., the transcendental schema, 517; heexplains the possibility of the interfunctional 
synthesis between logical categoryand sensory phenomenon by an appealto the interfunctional synthesis in the apriori schematized category, 518; a transcendental 
determination of time being ofthe same kind as a category in that it isuniversal, is based on a rule a priori; itis also homogeneous with a phenomenon;
thus its application to phenomena ismade possible; this argument begs thequestion of the inter-functional synthesis,
519; KANT'S view of the transcendentalunity of self-consciousness involves himin an impasse (an aporia) ; his criticalconscience has been roused in the chapteron the schematism; HEIDEGGER holds that 
the productive imagination also functionsas the root of practical reason in KANT;
KANT speaks of three subjective sourcesor faculties of the soul: sense, imagination, 
apperception, 520; each with itsown synthesis; he assumed the possibilityof a common root; but in the secondedition of the Krit. der r. Vern. he retracts 
this view, 521; then there is nopossibility to find the unity between sensibility 
and pure thought, nor to positsuch unity as a problem; KANT wrote hisKritik d. r. Vern. for the sake of his 
metaphysics of practical reason; his critique 
of theoretical reason is oriented tohis idealistic conception of the supertemporal 
noumenon, a fundamental themeof the traditional metaphysica generalis,
522 ; KANT sharply distinguishes betweenphenomena and noumena; the practicalIdeas are absolutely transcendent abovethe temporal world; he clings to his rational 
faith in the homo noumenon; HEIDEGGER 
interprets KANT from a historistic,
irrationalistic point of view, 523 ; he callsthe transcendental imagination the rootof knowledge and holds it to be identicalwith "pure reason" (theoretical and practical), 
and with the "pure finite self"
rooted in time; the pure reason is purereceptive spontaneity, or sensory reason;
human reason does not create but receives 
its "objects"; for human life (Da



 

127KANT, IMMANUEL 

rein) is at the mercy of "das Vorhandene" 
but capable of understanding thatwhich is; if Dasein designs an a prioriimage of the being of what is; the question 
is: how can a finite being know the"Vorhandene" before any reception ofwhat is?, 524; the transcendental imagination 
must be understood as the "formative 
medium of the two stems of knowledge"; 
HEIDEGGER approaches KANT from 
the modern state of decline of the Humanistic 
cosmonomic Idea; in KANT theideals of personality and science are stillunshakable pillars of the cosmonomicIdea, 525; HEIDEGGER has seen that wecan only isolate understanding from sensibility 
on the basis of a primary inter-
modal synthesis; but he does' not see thatsuch isolation is made possible by starting 
from the fulness of the temporalmeaning systasis; HEIDEGGER seeks theselfhood in the temporal (historicallyconceived) Dasein, 526; and he supposesthat reality is only accessible to the selfin theoretical abstraction of the "gegenstiindliche"; 
this is the phenomenon;
human knowledge is delivered to what isgiven (das Vorhandene) in nature, thePlatonic me on, the relative nothing; heeliminates the cosmic order of time, merging 
the self into time, 527 ; pure thoughtand pure sensibility are moth of the 
"transcendental imagination", which inessence is time and selfhood; KANT'Sthree modi of the cognitive synthesis aremerely the present, the past and the future; 
time and the cogito are identified;
time is pure self affection, the basis ofthe finite ego, and the finite ego is, "pureunderstanding"; this explanation doesnot solve the problem of the intermodalsynthesis, 528; HEIDEGGER makes the two 
cognitive functions flow together, thereby 
cancelling the possibility of a real synthesis; 
designating KANT'S "pure understanding" 
as "pure sensory understanding" 
results in a dialectic that KANTwould have rejected; to KANT "representation 
in general" is the genus proximumof thought and sensory intuition; thegenus concept is of a logical origin, 529;
in his treatise : Ueber die Fortschritte der 
Metaphysik seit Leibniz and Wolff, KANTemphatically rejects the identification ofthe transcendental self-consciousness 
with time as "pure sensibility", 530; HEIDEGGER 
makes one of the "stems of knowledge" 
into the origin of the other; his"existential time" is not cosmic time; he 
seeks the transcendence of the self in the 
inner experience of the "ex-sistere", thehistorical mode of time anticipating thefuture, 531; KANT'S "transcendental imagination" 
is the connecting link betweenthe two stems of knowledge, not its "hidden 
root", 532; the subjective viewpointconsiders the pure understanding andits possibility; this is not an essentialelement in KANT'S aim; his principal 

concern is to ascertain how much and 
what can understanding and reason knowa priori?, 533; KANT ascribes the transcendental 
imagination to "pure sensibility" 
relating to the transcendental unityof the apperception ; first he follows aline of reasoning that descends from thetranscendental unity of apperception;
then he follows a course of argument inthe opposite direction ; apperception renders 
pure imagination intellectual, 534;
all knowledge is based on the faculty ofpure imagination; KANT starts from anecessary systasis, viz. that of sensibilityand that of pure thought; he misrepresents 
it as a systatic datum, 535; in thesupposedly "given" unity of pure thoughtand pure intuition the logical functionremains the law-giver and determiningfactor in KANT'S view; the Kantian conception 
of experience has become theshibboleth between the "critical and the 
dogmatic trends of thought; this conception 
was precipitated in the "Satz desBewusztseins" or the "Satz der Immanenz", 
536; the influence of the Kantianconception of "empirical reality" in thenormative special sciences, 537 ; for thebenefit of the "Satz des Bewusstseins" 
naïve experience is fundamentally misinterpreted, 
in "empiricistic-positivistic"
thought; in HUSSERL'S phenomenology;
KANT is entirely dominated by his dualistic 
cosmonomic Idea: the normative aspects 
of reality fall outside of experience;
experience is only allotted to the mechanistic 
science-ideal; it is not possible forChristian thought to accept KANT'S viewof experience in his Krit. d. r. Vern. andto reject his Krit. d. pr. Vern., 538;
KANT'S conception of matter is a theoretical 
abstraction, not a datum of experience; 
the sensory aspect of reality isexperienced only in its subject-object relations 
in the cosmic meaning coherence;
animals merely undergo sense-impressions; 
if nothing outside of the psychicfunction has been given, we should nothave been given anything at all, not eventhe sensible, 539; the data of experiencehave not been given to the sensory function 
but to our self-consciousness, 540;
epistemology has long accepted the restriction 
of experience to the sensory andlogical aspects because it was dominated 
by the dualistic Humanistic cosmonomicIdea, 541; his idea of the a priori as theuniversally valid transcendental forms; allsynthetical judgments of universal validitywhich cannot be founded on sensory experience, 
543; his categories of modalityare supposed only to express the relationof the object (intended in the concept)
to our cognitive faculty; but possibilityand necessity can be conceived in everyabstracted meaning modus, whereas "reality" 
can never be enclosed in an abstractmodal meaning, 550; KANT'S "Grundsdtzedes reinen Verstandes" were inspired by 


 

KATTENBUSCH 128 

the' science ideal, and could not stand thetest of the progress of natural science,
556; KANT understood the traditional Ideaof truth as a mere "explanation of aname"; he asks how the adequacy ofthought and reality is possible, 567; heseeks the criterion of truth in the activityof the transcendental logical ego and restricts 
truth to the sensory phenomena; apriori synthetical judgments constitutethe guarantee of truth; they are the sourceof all truth before all experience; empirical 
truth is' relative; experience is identified 
with theoretical cognition; its direction 
to the absolute ideal; the correspondence 
between representation and"object"; his criterion of truth leads tothe denial of the possibility of non-
mathematical -natural- scientific-theoretical 
knowledge, 568; his concept "transcendental 
truth" undermines everytrans-subjective validity of theoreticalverity; the 'transcendental subject is theseat of transcendental truth; his view ofthe empirical world was determined bythe classical Humanistic science ideal;
it landed him in an inner autonomy withregard to his conception of truth, 569;
his principles of pure understanding(Grundsãtze des reinen Verstandes), cannot 
hit off the transcendental structure 
of theoretical truth, because they are notoriented to the transcendental direction 
of time; functionalistically they isolateand absolutize two aspects of the theoretical 
horizon of experience, 575; on theimmanence standpoint the subjectivistica priorism of the rationalist Kantianepistemology had to be outbid by anirrationalist a priori view, 583; KANTcould only assign a place to individualgenius in the field of artistic creation,

595. 
—' III, 
Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 27;
Metaphysik der Sitten, Rechtslehre, 317,
427, 428; 
Met. Anfangsgriinde der Rechtslehre, 444;
Krit. d. prakt. Vernunft, 748, 749.
Krit. d. teleol. Urteilskr., 748. 
—, III, his "critical" concept of substance 
as a synthetical a priori concept
of function, 27; he misinterpreted our
naïve experience of a thing's identity as
the classical physical function concept of
the quantitatively constant matter; things
became "Gegenstande" of natural scientific 
thought; critical epistemology, 28;
he dominated RIEHL'S epistemology, 47;
his theory of positive law as the general
will, volenti non fit iniuria, 232; the destructive 
character of Kantian autonomy;
authority and subordination in the family; 
KANT considers this heteronomy in
an ethical sense to be opposed to morality; 
KANT has no room for moral community; 
KANT'S absolutization of morality;
this aspect has become meaningless, 273;
KANT replaced the bond of love by a 


legalistic motive of respect for autonomous 
ethical law, 274 ; the law of natureis a. law of reason giving priority to thepersonality ideal; his crude definition ofmarriage as the union for life long possession 
of each other's sexual qualities,
317; KANT'S distinction between autonomy 
and heteronomy in the sociology 

Of FR. DARMSTAEDTER,, 408; KANT iden


tifies public and civil law; to him law is
an a-priory idea of civil law; the prin.
ciple of civil co-existence; his view of
public law, 427; the state is a union of a
multitude of people under legal rules;
KANT ignores the historical foundational
function of the monopolistic military
power almost on purpose, 428 ; he derived
his: definition from CicEito, 429; KANT'S
idea of the salus publica, 442, 444 ; his
concept of iustitia distributiva, 445;
DRIESCH'S "Ordnungslehre" is influenced
by KANT'S epistemology, 737; the metaphysical 
question of freedom in his Critique 
of Practical Reason, 748; totality
idea in the Krit. der Urteilskraft, 748, 749;


categorical imperative, 749. 


KATTENBUSCH, III, 
Doppelschichtigkeit in Luthers Kirchenbegriff, 
509, 514. 


KATZ-ENGELMAN, II, on space perception,


373. 
KAUFMANN, FRITZ, II, 
Geschichtsphilosophie der Gegenwart,


230. 
KAWERAU, WALD., III,
Die Reformation and die Ehe, 314. 


KEIL, JOH. CHR., III,
Ueber die Lebenskraft, 735. 
KELSEN, HANS, I,


Reine Rechtslehre, 98, 555, 556.
Hauptprobleme der Staatslehre, 210.


—, I, his "reine Rechtslehre" identifies 
the legal rule with a logical judgment,
and dissolves the juridical aspect and its
subjective right into a logical complex of
legal rules, 98; he reduces all other typical 
juridical spheres to State-law; or
to law of a supposed international super-
State (civitas maxima) and completed
the confusion between modal functional 
and typical-structural viewpoints by the
pseudo-logical identification of law an
State, or law and Super-State; but if State
and law are identical, it makes no sense
to speak of State law; if all positive juridical 
norms are of the same formal nature, 
and typical material differences are
meta-juridical, then it is contradictory,
555 (note), to introduce into this modal


functional conception of law the typical
characteristics of State law or of Super-
State law, 556.


Reine Rechtslehre, 17, 46, 209, 212, 343,
399, 422.


—, II, pure theory of law, 17 ; he logifies
the jural aspect; this is antinomous, 46; 



 

12 9 KOELLREUTER 

he deemed formal sociology to be im


possible, and considered sociology as a

causal science like natural science, 212;

a positive legal norm is a logical propo


sition, 343; he abandons the concept of

subjective right, 399; and calls the juri


dical modus an empty form of thought;

his theory of degrees of law making; and

of, positive law, 422.

—, III, 

Der Staat als Integration, 260, 661;

Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie,


386, 607; 


Allgemeine Staatslehre, 407, 607, 608.


—, III, criticizes SMEND's integration


theory, 260; he holds that the organiza


tional problem of an economic business


and that of the State are the same, 386;


his "normological" theory; the State is a


logical system of legal norms, 387; he


caricaturized the naturalistic sociologistic


view of the State, 401; he identifies State


and law and conceives of every State as


"law", 431, 432-434; his formalistic view


of public law, 439; sovereignty of law


from a normological viewpoint, 461;


KELSEN ascribes axiological relativism to


democracy; autocracy is supposed to be


founded in the belief in an absolute ve


rity, 608; he appeals to the principle of


proportionality to attribute prevalence to
the opinion of a parliamentary majority;
this appeal is unwarranted on a relativistic 
standpoint, 608. 


KENZIE, R. T. Mc, III,


British Political Parties, 605. 
KEPPLER, I, founded modern natural


science, with GALILEO and NEWTON, 201. 


KEUGEN, F., III, 
Aemter und Ziinfte, Zur Entstehung des


Zunftwesens, 674. 
KIDNEYS, III, lungs, etc., have relative in


dependent individuality, 634. 
KIERKEGAARD, S., I, the antinomy cannot


be solved, 65; he strongly influenced modern 
"existential philosophy", 125; and


Hegelianism, 214.
—, III, existentialistic philosophy and
the Divine Revelation in Jesus Christ 
he considered to be separated by an


unbridgeable gulf, 782. 


KIERLUFF, II, 
Theorie des gemeinen Civilrechts, 399.
—, II, defines subjective right as the con


crete unity of the will of the state and
the individual subjective will, 399; eliminated 
the element of interest from subjective 
right; cancelled the power of enjoyment, 
contained in the concept of
subjective right, 403. 


KINEMATICS, II, in its original sense movement 
cannot have the meaning of an
effect of energy. Kinematics or phoronomy 
can define a uniform movement without 
any reference to a causing force; the 


concept of acceleration is physical, nOkinematical, 99; of GALILEO; his definition 
of inertia is purely mathematical-

kinematical, 99, 100. 

KINSHIP, III, the structural principle ofthe kinship community; and its different

functions, 344, 345. 

KIRCHE DES GLAUBENS, III, and "Kultge_
meinde", in EMIL BRUNNER, 509. 
KIRGHIZIAN AUL. III, is an interlacement

351. 
KJELLEN, RUDOLF, III, 
Der Staat als Lebensform, 197, 484. 
—, III, applies the substance concept tothe State, 197; his vitalistit-organic ideaof the power State; he defends autarchyas the principle of "the individuality ofthe State in the economic sphere", likegeographic individuality of the State's

territory and like nationality (= demic

individuality), 484. 

KLEIN, E. F., II, 
Preussisches Landrecht, 358, 559. 


KLEIN, F., II, 
Einleitung in die hOhere Geometrie, 106
—, II, his projective geometry (with CA


LEY) 105; geometrical transformations in
space form a group of "Operationen"; the
logical origin of mathematical concepts;


a dilemma, 106. 


KLIEFOTH, III,
Acht Biicher von der Kirche, 545. 
KLOPSTOCK, I, his PROMETHEUS' motive:


"Forces of the other world are contained 
in the Idea of God, but man feels like a
second Creator, able to reflect the Idea


of the Universe", 454. 


KLUCKHOHN, III, 
Die Auffassung der Liebe in der Litera


tur der 18. Jahrh, und der deutschen Ro


mantik, 316. 
KNOWING, II, is classed with feeling and


volition as one of the three classes of Erlebnisse, 
in modern psychology, 111. 


KNOWLEDGE, I, depends on self-know1edge, 
196; the grounds of certain know1edge 
in HUME, 279; cf. s.v. Epistemology;


and also: Truth. 


KNOWLEDGE, IMPERSONAL, III, of a merely
ymbolical nature is not naive expe


rience, 145. 


KOCH, WOLDEMAR, III, 
Die Staatswirtschaft des Faschismus, 484.
—, III, Fascist autarchy in economic res


pects; The programme of economic in-
tegration of the Italian Fascist State, 484;
he adds that the one-sided dependence on 
foreign countries is founded in the natural 
basic conditions of the Italian na


tional economy, 485. 

KOELLREUTER, III, 
Deutsches Verfassungsreeht, 431. 



 

KOHLER 130 

KOHLER, II, on subjective rights, copyright, 
and the right to a patent, 412. 


KOHNSTAMM, Dr PH., I, 
Pedagogy, Personalism and Philosophy of
the Cosmonomic Idea, 105. 
--, I, joined STOKER'S opinion after his
transition to the philosophy of the cosmonomic 
Idea, 94; he raises the question
why it should be in cosmic time that the
totality of meaning is refracted into coherent 
modal aspects, 106. 


KOLZOFF, III, his materialistic biology,
721; a mechanistic biologist, 733. 


KOPPERS, W., HI, 
Ehe und Familie (HandwOrterbuch der
Soziologie), 305, 332, 333;
VOlker und Kulturen, 334, 360. 
—, III, tried to explain the rise of the
totemistic clans in terms of economic 
causes, 359; he even included the faith 
aspect of these clans, 360. 


KORPERSCHAFTEN, III, TONNIES' view, 579, 


580. 
KOSSEL, III, experiments with crystals,
705. 
KOSTLIN, J., III, 
Luthers Theologic, 314. 


KRABBE, III, proclaims the sovereignty of
law from an ethical-psychological point
of view, 461. 


KRAUSE, I, elevated the knowledge of the 
arch-essential (das Ur-wesentliche), the
intuition of essence, above the relative
knowledge from concepts, 471. 


KROH, II, 
Psychologie des Grundschulkindes, 178. 


KROLL, MICHAEL, II, 
Das Rdtzel .“Volkswirtschaft", 123, 


KRONECKER, II, whole numbers have been 
made by God, all the others are the work
of man, 88. 


KRONER, RICHARD, I, 
Von Kant bis Hegel, 326, 360, 361, 373,381, 384, 421, 423, 434, 438. 
—, I, a Hegelian philosopher; his view ofKANT and the Christian religion, 326;
KANT'S -"things in themselves" confrontthe subject with a predominant principlethat is ,nOt mediated in thought; "affection" 
is a mysterious word taking theplace of a concept that is lacking, 361(note) ; his view that the Idea of the understanding 
producing its own Gegenstandleads beyond logic as epistemology: it isa limiting concept, 361; KANT'S ego becomes 
an ego only 'when it obeys itself; adouble sense is included in KANT'S "Idea 
of moral autonomy", 373; KRONER tries tosolve the Kantian, antinomy of the "causanoumenon" of sensory action as the absolutized 
form of the law "iiberhaupt",
380; but a "pure" 'will cannot be 'ernpiricaiiy 
,contlitoned without losing its 

purity", 381; the autonomy of pure practical 
reason is undermined by the inclusion 
of happiness as material determination 
in the pure moral law, 384; in his"Wissenschaftslehre" of the year 1794FICHTE raised ethics to the position ofmetaphysics, 421; FICHTE'S proposition ofthe selfcreative absolute ego is "the basic. 
law of pure practical reason in its speculative 
use", 423.

II, 
Von Kant bis Hegel, 500.
—, II, realized KANT'S self-refutation, 500. 

KRUISINGA, E., II, 
A Handbook of Present Day English, 126, 


127. 
----, II, on Aspect and Character, 126, 127. 
KRUEGER, FELIX, II, on the universality of
feeling, 111, 112, 


KRUYT, J. P., III, 
Gemeenschap als Sociologisch Begrip,
177, 183. 
—, III, on MAX WEBER'S conception of
"community", 183. 


KUHN, H., II, 
Kunst und Kultur der Vorzeit Europas,


314. 
KULTURKREISLEHRE, III, ( i.e. the doctrineof cultural circles), the doctrine of cultural, 
circles was adhered to by ANKERMANN, 
GRAEBNER, HAHN, FOY, W. SCHMIDT,

W. KOPPERS and others; the founder of 
this school was LEO FROBENIUS ; theywant to trace the genealogical coherence-
between "cultural orbits" and give a picture 
of pre-historic humanity; some adherents 
of this theory of historical coherences 
reject the method of complexformation on geographical grounds, viz., 
BOAS, LOWIE, MARETT, SWANTON, GOLDENWEISER, 
etc. Criticism of W. SCHMIDT'S 
conceptions of pygmean culture; the one-
sided causal explanations of this school;
KOPPERS' rationalistic view of matriarchyand totem belief as due to economic factors, 
333; this school ignores the difference 
between open and closed cultures;
it pre-supposes that the cultural circlesfirst developed in complete isolation before 
getting into contact; this is not truefor deepened cultures; SCHMIDT'S andKOPPERS' cultural orbits are irrelevant to 
the historian; ethnological time becomesdeepened in historical time, 334 ; historical 
science requires written documents,
etc., 335; the doctrine of cultural orbits 
ignores the differences between ethnologyand history; the Roman Catholic scholarsSCHMIDT, KOPPERS, and others had an eyefor the structural principles of marriage,
family, and kinship as given in the orderof the creation they distinguish betweenthe external and the internal functions of 
these communities; however, their conception 
of the state is vague,336; SCHMIDTand KOPPERS point to the fatal influence 


131 KUYPER SR., D . A. 


some external forms have on the internal 
solidarity, purity and intimacy of thesecommunal bonds; this axiological viewpoint 
is indispensable to social science,
336; only from a nominalistic a-priorican we try to understand subjective human 
social relations apart from their individuality 
structures, but then we shallfail to grasp them; marriage and familyare fully alive among the very old extantprimitive peoples; the order of succession 
of the primitive cultures, 337 ; monogamy, 
matrimonial fidelity, parentallove, married love are normal amongthem; Lowy says that the simplest cultures 
lack the sib and possess the family;
matriarchy appears with the rise of agriculture; 
the nature of this connection; 
bina marriage; the avuncular relationship, 
338; matriarchal phenomena do notbelong to the internal domain of marriageand family, 339; Kulturkreislehre andits theory about polyandry, 340; tarwadhouse, and tarwad property; originalpolyandry was strictly monogamous;
polyandry is not a matrimonial form;
only a sanctioned juridical proprietaryshare in the wife; polyandry outsideof the brothers is found, e.g., amongthe matriarchal Nayar caste in India;
SCHMIDT thinks this practice originatedfrom an irregular concubinage; the factsof pirra-ura-relations; here the abnormal 
sex relations are interwoven in 
an external enkapsis with marriage, 341; 
[cf. sub voce Undifferentiated organizedcommunities;] ; the patriarchal "joint family" 
is called a "family form" of pastoral 
nomads, by the Kulturkreislehre, X50;
the Kirghiz `aul', 351 [cf. sub voce RAD',
OFF] ; ancestor worship of the Greekand Roman `gens', [s.v. FUSTEL DE COULANGE 
; LowIE refuted the theory of the"primary cultures" in the Kulturkreislehre; 
the least developed primitive cultures 
do not know the sib but they doknow the conjugal family and the kinship, 
354 ; W. SCHMIDT'S theory of secretmen's unions must seem the most satisfactory 
attempt to explain these politicalorganizations, 366. 

KULTURSYNTHESE, II, the historical Idea 
is considered to be restricted to an immanent 
Kultursynthese, according to modern 
Historicism, 267. 

KUNG CHUAN HSIAO, Prof., III, 
Political Pluralism. A Study in Contem


porary Political Theory, 465.
—, III, political pluralism results in
"economic monism", 465. 


KURZ, P. E., III, 
Individuum and Gemeinschaft beim Hl. 
Thomas Aquinas, 218, 219. 


MISTER, E., III, 
Die Zelle and die Gewebe des pflanzlichen 
Organismus, 720. 


KUYPER SR., Dr. A., I, 
developed the Calvinistic life and worldview in the Netherlands in the last decades 
of the 19th century; the pressureof the scholastic notion of science, the 
necessity of defence against the rulingHumanistic view of science, stimulated 
young neo-Calvinism to consider its religious 
calling in the realm of science, 157;
the phi'. of the Cosmonomic Idea is to beunderstood only if the Calvinistic revivalof the 19th century is taken into account,
which revival was stimulated and led byKUYPER, 523; his Idea of the religiousantithesis, 524.
—, II, 
Gemeene Gratie, 33; 
Encyclopaedic der HeiligeGodgeleerdheid, 
299, 309, 310. 
—, II, Common Grace, 33; on the function 
of faith, 299; Christianity and paganism 
are related in the same way asthe plus- and minusdirections of the sameseries, 309; the deterioration of faith in 
which man has been abandoned to the 
inclination of his heart, 310 (note).
—, III, 
Encyclopaedic der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, 
247, 248, 506, 521, 524, 526, 531, 535, 
540, 541; 
De Gemeene Gratie, 506; 
Tractaat van de Reformatie der Kerken, 
532, 535, 539, 540, 541, 559. 
--, III, election in Christ the Head of reborn 
humanity; the operation of the spiritual 
factor is also individual, 247; but 
individual in connection with and as a 
result of the operation on the whole. Individuals 
do not exist in themselves; thereonly exist membra corporis generis humani, 
248; the State belongs to the general 
temporal life of the world, and owesits existence to common grace as an "institution 
ordained on account of sin",
506; we cannot subsume the Church institution 
under some higher general concept, 
521; the church as an organism,
524 ; the institutional Church as a temporal 
organization has been instituted byChrist within the modal and radical 
structural types of individuality structures 
given already at the creation, 526;
it is impermissible to isolate "the doctrine 
of Jesus" from the context of the 

whole of the Divine Word-revelation, 
531; sects nearly always arise throughthe fault of the Church, 532; the institutional 
Church is the mother of our faith 
in Christ Jesus, 535; in the days of theOld Testament there was a visible church 
manifesting the invisible ecclesia invisibilis 
electorum, but there was no institutional 
Church, 539; the institutional 
Church is confessional, not national in 
character, 540; "you cannot prevent yourChurch from deteriorating even if youcould equip your Church governmentwith a strictly Orthodox personnel, ifyour Church government is bad, 541; the 


KUYPERS, K. 132 

apostles never mention a Church that is a

more comprehensive body embracing . a

number of local churches; 559. 

KU.YPERS, K., II,

Theorie der: Geschiedenis, 202, 207,. 243. 

II, tradition iS . the nucleus of history;
RICKERT'S distinction between individualizing 
and systematic. sciences criticized,
207; historical :subject must have an .anal

lytical sense of meaning, 230; tradition
and historical .. continuity, 243. 


KUIJPERS; G., III„ 
De Russische Problematiek in het Sowjet-
Staatsbeleid, 459. 


LABAND, I,. and his .school,.. their "material
concept of:statute law", 322.


III, ..a formalistic positivist in cOnsti.ytutional-legal. theory.,.: 399; • his formalisticjuridical method :in'..the science:off constitutional 
law, with .its internally contra


dictory dualism of "right and might" led.
to . a dualistic theory of. the State, (empirical 
versus normative juridical. theo


ry), 400. 

LACHELIER, I, an anti-rationalistic Neo-
ScholaSticist, 525, 

LACTANTIUS, II, 

Div. Instit., 411. 

LAGRANGE, II, a mathematician referred 
to by DIDEROT, 339. 

LAING, B. M., I,
David Hume, 275, 287, 308.


—, I, HUME'S conception of unity is found


in. Sextus Empiricus, 287 ; in HUME'S dis


tinction between what is and what ought


to be, 308. 


LAMBERT, I, developed. CRUSIUS' distinctions 
further, 340. 
LAND, III, 


Inleiding tot de Wijsbegeerte, 28. 
LANDSCAPE, II, the Beauty of landscape,

381. 
—, III, and its fauna and flora are not
structural wholes proper, and are ruled
by a law of biotic balance, 650. 
LANGER, SUSANNE.. K., III, 
Feeling and Form, 138. 

LANGUAGE, II, logical unity of scientific

language aimed at by the Unified Science

Movement, 59, 60. 

LANSON, GUSTAVE, II,
Boileau, 348. 

LAPRUNE, OLLA, I, a neo-scholastic thinker, 
and teacher of MAURICE BLONDEL, 

525. 
LARENZ, KARL, 
Staatsphilosophie, 433.. 

MASK, EMIL, I, 
Gesammelte . Schriften, 416, 451, 459, 460,486, 491, 492.
—, I, FICHTE'S "absolute ego" is onlyan hypostasis of the universal concept"ego" as the totality of reason, 416; hesharply analysed the various phases ofdevelopment in FICHTE'S thought since1797, 451; the change in the valuation ofindividuality brought FICHTE to a metaphysics 
that was completely differentfrom his former identity-philosophy, 470;
FICHTE'S initial dualism between empirical 
individuality and value is removed infact by the ascription of value characterto that which is irrational; this ascriptionis not made a problem until FICHTE'S lastphase (Staatslehre) • then he discoversthe logic of historical truth; here he triesto synthesize nature and freedom in thehistorical field, 486; FICHTE developed atranscendental logic of history in contrast 
with the metaphysics of HEGEL, 492; 
his logic of philosophy, 544. 

II, 

Die Lehre vom Urteil, 436.
—,II, culture and nature, 201; warns
against confounding the linguistic and
the logical significations of the copula


"to be", 436.


—, III, a Neo-Kantian, 409. 


LASKI, HAROLD, III, 
A Grammar of Politics, 387, 465.
—, III, he characterizes the guild socialist 
view of the State as the opinion that


the State is "a body on the same footing
as the Miners' Federation", 387; calls political 
pluralism "guild-socialism"; he
himself overstrains the economic function 
of the State; "the State is the body
which seeks so to organize the interests
of consumers that they obtain the commodities 
of which they are need"; the
State has coercive membership and a
territory, these two features are its dis


tinctives, 465 (note). 


LASCO, JOH. A, III, 
Forma ac ratio tota ecclesiastici ministe


rii, 520. 
LAUE DIAGRAM, III, and the atom; the dia


gram shows the deviation Of RONTGEN 
rays through crystal lattices, 704. 

LAUGHING, II, and weeping, 378. 

LAVATER, I, a representative of the Ger


man "Sturm und Drang", 452. 
LAVES, F., III, 
Fiinf und zwanzig Jahre Laue Diagramme,


705. 
LAVOISIER, III, he law about the mass of
a combination, 704. 

LAW (LEx), I, the concentric law, 11;
without the law the subject would dropaway into nothingness, 12; CALVIN'S judgment: 
God is not subject to the laws, butnot arbitrary, 93; the cosmonomic Idea; 


 

133LEGAL, POWER 

implies a transcendental Idea of subjectivity; 
objections against the term "cos,. 
monomic Idea", 94 ; PLATO'S Philebus argues 
that the nomos lex) is, ex origine, 
limitation of a subject, 95; the lexis the boundary between the Being ofGod and the "meaning" of the creation;
Christ Jesus, with respect to His humannature, was under the law, but not with 
respect to His Divine nature, 99; everymodal aspect of temporal reality has itsproper sphere of laws, irreducible tothose of other modal aspects; this is theprinciple of sphere sovereingty, 102, 103;
this principle is indissolubly connectedwith the transcendental Ideas of the Origin 
and the totality and unity of meaningand with the Idea of cosmic time, 104;
the modal structures of the modal aspectsare structures of cosmic time; as structural 
laws they are founded in the cosmic 
time order and are principles of temporal 
potentiality;. realized in individualthings, they have time duration and actuality 
as transitory factual structures,
105 ; sphere sovereignty of modal aspectsmakes no sense in the fulness, and radical 
unity of meaning; cosmic time refracts 
this unity and totality into coherent 
modal aspects, 106; the lex originates 
from God's holy creative sovereignty; 
everything created is subjected to alaw, 108 ; the concept of the lex in positivism, 
110; in ancient Greek thought itdepended on the form-matter motive;
first the lex has the juridical sense 
of justice (dike), (cf. ANAXIMANDER, p. 
67) ; this Dike is inescapable fate, Anangice; 
in the form motive of the later, culture 
religion the lex is order, in a teleological 
sense with respect to all "naturalsubjects", 112; SOCRATES introduced thisconception; PLATO; ARISTOTLE elaboratedit metaphysically; it was opposed to theSophists' nomos as pure convention insociety and the absence of "laws" in nature; 
in ARISTOTLE, the subject is composed 
of matter and form, ruled by naturallaw in the striving of matter to its properform; PLATO'S peras or natural law setting 
a limit to the apeiron and the formless 
stream of becoming receives thecharacter of a genesis eis ousian (becoming 
to being) • criticism of these conceptions; 
the Christian Scholastic concept 
of the law and the subject is dominated 
by the motive of nature and grace,
113 ; a real law can never acquire thefunction of a mere register of the subjective 
facts in their complete individuality;
individual subjectivity cannot exist un


less it is bound to a supra individual order, 
493.

—, II, and subject are mutually irreducible 
and indissolubly correlated, 8;
STAMMLER'S view, 16; cosmic laws cannot 
be antinomous, 37; law and sin, 134;
law-making, 138; law regulates externalbehaviour, according to THOMASIUS, 151 

(note)* natural law, 167, (342); CanonLaw, 1'97; BINDER'S concept of law, 215;
Bolshevist law, 396 (note) ; according to 
VON JHERING, the whole of law is the legalorder of a body politic, 401; lex aeterna,

559. 
--, III, H. GROTIUS' four main principle§
of natural law, 212; law is contrasted
with morality by E. BRUNNER, 281 (note)
law is a coercive regulation according toTHOMASIUS, and to KANT, 427; Common 
Private Law is bound to the State, 451;

law according to DUGUIT, 461-465; lawand GOSPEL in SoHm, 551. 

LAW OF CONTRACT, II, in primitive society, 
183. 

LAW STATE, II, Of LOCKE is the classical 
liberal idea of the State, conceived interms of the social contract, 360.

--, III, the political decline of the ideaof the law-state, 383; various conceptions, 
399, 400; law-state and welfare 
state; culture state; the old liberal view,
426; LOCKE, KAN,T, THOMASIUS, 427; MONTESQUIEU'S 
trias politica; KANT'S view,
428; definition formulated by STAHL,
429; 0. BAHR; R. GNEIST; KELSEN, 430,

431. 
LEADING FUNCTION, III, of an association 
is not identical with the purpose that the

founders had in view, 574. 


LEADING PERSONALITIES, I, in history realize 
the absolute metaphysical Idea, in


FICHTE, 477.


—, II, in a historical group function, 244. 


LEE, A. MC CLUNG, III,
New Outline of the Principles of Socio


logy, 177. 


LEENDERTZ, A. C., II,
De Grond van het Overheidsgezag in de
anti-revolutionnaire Staatsleer, 233.


—, II, facts and norms, 233. 


LEGAL ECONOMY, II, the prevention of excessive 
reactions against tort or crime,


67. 
LEGAL FACT, II, the juridical causality of
a legal fact, 181. 
LEGALISM, III, tries to derive legal norms


from the New Testament, 312. 


LEGAL MARRIAGE REGULATIONS, III, are held 
in Roman Catholic practice to be the exclusive 
competence of the Church, 555. 


LEGAL ORDER, II, acc. to KANT, it is an Or


der of place, 150.
—, III, and the Church are considered to 


be mutually exclusive by SoHm, and by
Emil, BRUNNER, 551; legal order is, however, 
necessary in the cult community,
(to be distingushed from the Glaubens-


Kirche), in E. BRUNNER, 552. 

LEGAL POWER, II, or competence, 69; JELLINEK'S 
view; it is based on historicalpower even in primitive society, 70. 


 

LEGAL REPRESENTATION

LEGAL REPRESENTATION, III, BINDER Supposes 
that legal representation destroysthe juridical personality of the represented 
in favour of that of the representative, 
279. 

LEGAL SPACE, II, cannot be perceived,
must be signified, 65. 

LEGAL SUBJECTIVITY, A CHILD'S, III, is 
closely bound up with that of its parents,

278. 
LEGAL TECHNIQUE, II, in VON JHERING, 
124. 
LEGAL VALIDITY, II, 165. 

LEAGUE OF NATIONS, II, is tie aim of history, 
according to KANT, 272.
--, III, KANT'S individualistic project,
474; The Acte Gênerale of 1928; the San-
Francisco Charter; the United Nations, 


475. 
LEAGUE, ANTI-CORN-LAW, III, was not a 
political party, but an organization ad
hoc, for a definite aim, 612. 


LEHMANN, FR. Run., II, 
Man a, 316. 


LEHNARTZ, E., III, 
Die chemischen Vorauszetzungen• des L
bens, 727. 


- III, the composition of extremelycomplicated proteins containing amino-
acids and other "prosthetical" groupswhich can be split off from albumenoidswithout any alteration of the latter, 727. 

LEIBNIZ, I, 
Letter to Jacob Thomasius, 223; 
Letter to Remond de Montfort, 223, 231;
Letter to Clarke, 231; 
Letter to Johann Bernouilli, 256; 
De Rerum originatione radicale, 224;
Disputatio metaphysica de principio individui, 
224; 
Dissertatio de stilo philosophico Nizolii,
224, 244; 
Principes de la nature et de la grace, 226,
227, 233, 238, 251; 
Nova methodus pro maximis et minimis,


227; 
De geometrica recondita et analyse indivisibilium 
atque infinitorum, 227;
Cum prodiisset atque increbusset analy


sis mea infinitesimalis, 228; 
Meditationes de cognitione, veritate, et


ideis, 229, 273;
La Monadologie, 230, 232, 235, 248, 257;
Systeme nouveau de la Nature, 231, 235;


Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement, 237,


241, 242, 243, 244, 249;


De libertate, 238;
Causa, Dei asserta per justitiam eius, 239;


Theodicee, 239, 252, 257, 258, 261;
Quid sit idea, 240; 
Reflections sur l'essai de Locke, 243, 256;


De arte combinatoria, 245, 246;


Opuscula, 246; 


134 

Generales inquisitiones de analyse notio


num et veritatum, 246;
Dialogus de connexione inter res et verba
et veritates realitate, 247; 
Essais sur la bontê de Dieu, la liberte de
l'homme, et l'origine du mal, 253 ff.;
Discours de la conformite de la foi avec 
la raison, 261; 
Meditation sur la notion commune de la 
justice, 308.


I, his "theism"; his idealism ismathematical and ruled by the motive ofnature and freedom, 122; the form-mattermotive and that of nature and grace assume 
a new sense in the philosophy ofLEIBNIZ, 190; he considered the limitedas "metaphysical evil", 194; the motiveof logical creation was carried throughcontinually, especially by LEIBNIZ, 197;
in his Monadology the concept of "sub-stance" 
has nothing to do with the Aristotelian-
Thomistic "substantial forms"; it 
is the hypostatized modern functionalconcept of law, "the abiding law for a 
series of changes"; the functional coherence 
becomes the "invariant", 202; he 
founded the metaphysical law-idea of the"lex continui" in the differential calculus, 
204 ; the question of a reconciliation inLEIBNIZ between the new mathematical-
mechanical view of nature and the teleo


logical Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrine ofthe "substantial forms"; his letters to JACOB 
THOMASIUS and to REMONT DE MONTFORT, 
223 his emphasis on the "philosophia 
perennis"; his doctrine of "eternalverities" existing in God; his letter concerning 
Platonic philosophy; but his ownreal Arch& is deified mathematical 
thought; the origin of the cosmos is in"divine mathematics" functioning in Godas creative thought; his Nominalistic doctor's 
thesis; his praise of the "sect of theNominalists", 224 ; his moderate Nominalism 
maintained the necessity of logicalrelations in opposition to HOBBES' radical 
Nominalism; eternal verities are eternal 
possibilities in God's creative mathematical 
thought, 225; he uses ScholasticAristotelian terms in a modern Humanistic 
sense: grace becomes the sphere ofcreatures with freedom of clear and distinct 
thought and ruled by ethical laws;
nature that of creatures lacking' freedomand ruled by mechanical laws, 226; hisidea of a pre-established harmony; God'screative will is bound to the eternal metaphysical 
verities; his Idea of a City of 
God; of sin as privatio in a Cartesiansense; he introduced the mathematicalconcept of function in the differentialand integral calculus and used it to carrythrough the continuity principle; the concept 
of function had to level the modalaspects according to the continuity ofthought and thus became a metaphysicalconcept, 228; his idea of mathesis universalis; 
his arithmeticism is Humanistic, notCalvinistic; his logicism in mathematics; 


 

135LEIBNIZ 

the monadology was opposed to metaphysical 
space universalism and materialistic 
atomism; monads are differentialnumbers, 229; they fill the noumenal cosmos as animate beings in gapless densityreflecting (each of them) the entire universe; 
they are absolutely closed, self-
sufficient, windowless, spaceless, pointsof force; compared with BRUNO'S aesthetical 
monadology; LEIBNIZ consideredqualitatively different individuality as afunction of progression and accessible torational calculation; both personality andscience ideal were thus reconciled, 230;
he hypostatized the concept of force introduced 
by Newtonian physics; it assumed 
the Aristotelian form of "entelechy" 
and "causa finalis" but intended ina modern Humanistic sense; space is anarrangement of co-existence, time is oneof succession; mechanical matter is themode of appearance of metaphysicalforce belonging to the essence of themonad; the force of the monads is materia 
prima, 231; the self-sufficiency andautarchy of the monad is in conflict withAristotelian metaphysics, especially withthe Aristotelian doctrine of the relation 
between body and soul; he tried to express 
the basic tendency of the personality 
ideal in a metaphysics of the science-
ideal, which caused polar tensions; thescience ideal remained supreme, espec.
in its Faustian domination motive; mathematical 
science must construe the relation 
between totality and diversity inthe meaning coherence; his common denominator 
of the aspects is the "perception" 
of the composite or what is outward 
in the simple substance, 232; allmonads are perceiving points of force reflecting 
the cosmic coherence in theirrepresentations; to these he applies thelex continui, arranging them in mathematical 
progression; their qualitative difference 
is quantified according to theirdegree of clarity and their tendency topass from one perception to another, 233;
the material, unconscious perceptionspass into conscious but confused representations 
(of the sensory soul monads),
to the clear and distinct apperceptions ofthe limited spiritual monads; and thento the infinite creative mathematical 
thought of the Deity; man is placed between 
matter and Deity; his limitation;
here Theism becomes pantheism; "universal 
harmony is God"; because of itslimitations human thought cannot get aninsight into the absolute (mathematical)
necessity of a seemingly contingent eventin the world of phenomena; the logification 
of the dynamic personality ideal,
234 ; the activity of all the monads has"Vorstellung" (representation) for itsbasic denominator; their autarchical activity 
was interpreted as a tendency (appetition) 
to pass from one into another,
a "causa finalis", 235; he interprets ori


ginal motion as movement of thought; healso logicized "force"; force as a tendency 
is the expression of LEIBNIZ' individualistic 
personality ideal, 236; sensoryperceptions are produced in absoluteautarchy, entirely from the inside of thehuman soul monad; error of thought and"sin" are due to metphysical imperfection 
of the finite rational monads; sin anderror are gradual conditions; innate ideasare dormant, virtual representations ofwhich we are not yet aware; they gradually 
develop into clear, distinct concepts, 
237 ; all monads experience thesame things, so that their representationsexactly correspond with one anotherthrough pre-established harmony; this isa stringent determinism; the slightest deviation 
in any one moment would disturbthe whole cosmos; "the present is pregnant 
with the future"; there is no freedom 
of the will; nothing happens without 
cause; the freedom of indifference isimpossible, 238 ; the spiritual monadis an automaton spirituale; determiningcauses are "inclinantes, non necessitantes"; 
freedom is in proportion to ouragreement with reason ; the lex continuiand "harmonia praestabilita" owe theirorigin to the deity; the latter is the hypostasis 
of creative mathematical thoughtuntroubled by sensory representations;
volition is a modus of thought, 239; thedeity is world-harmony; SPINOZA'S "Deussive natura" becomes "harmonia universalis, 
id est Deus" in LEIBNIZ; the kernel 
of this harmony is the mathematical lexcontinui; ideas are symbols of reality inL's nominalistic philosophy; he quotesOccAM's distinction between conventional 
votes and universal symbols; naturalsymbols require a certain similitude(240) like that between a geographicalmap and the region represented by it;
or a connection like circle and its 
perspective ellipse; the human mindcan produce results from its own activitycompletely agreeing with the actualresults in things; "in nature everythingoccurs in a mechanical manner" is a 
thought laid by reason at the foundation 
of our experience of reality; hisapparent fight against Nominalism; heclothes his Humanistic conception in traditional 
realistic scholastic terminology;
he is concerned with the maintenance of 
his "eternal truths" against the view thatuniversal Ideas are mere creations of language 
(HoBBEs) ; an Idea is an object ofthought which is immanent to thought,
the expression of the qualities of things;
realists and nominalists both were right;
simple Ideas and those of substance aregrounded only in the possibility ofthought; universalia do not have a modelin natural reality; the essentiae are the"eternal truths", i.e., logical possibilitiesin creative mathematical thought, 242; the

eternal truths are by no means arbitrary 


LEIBNIZ 136 

symbols; their reality is that of thoughtitself; nominal definitions are arbitraryunions of symbols functioning in thoughtas "counters"; real definitions reveal thelogical possibility of a thing by discovering 
the logical principle of its origin; butto L. Ideas do not possess any real existence 
outside of thought; they belong tothe representations of the monads, 243;
he took the side of the moderate Nominalism 
of the school of OCCAM, and 
fought against the conception of Nizomus,
244; according to L. the real significanceof the universal is in the universal validity 
of the judgment founded exclusivelyin the universal Idea or definition of 
terms, which indicates the a priori possibility 
of the genetic construction, i.e., themethod of "logical creation"; it is therationalistic Humanistic concept of thelaw implied in the mathematical scienceideal; he blames HOBBES for doubting thetheorem of PYTHAGORAS "that has been 
deemed worthy of the sacrifice of a hecatomb"; 
L.'s idea of a logical alphabet, auniversal symbolical characteristic; hegave it a primitive form in his youth,
245; elaborated it in his analysis of theinfinite; his "Ars Combinatoria"; concepts 
can be subjected to an infinitesimalanalysis; the truth of a judgment depends 
on a general rule for the movementof thought allowing us to conclude withcertainty that the distinction in the judgment 
between subject and predicate mustapproach zero in the prolonged analysis;
the lex continui, 246; factual contingencymust approach infinitesimally close to"eternal truths" of mathematical thought;
the central significance of the Leibnizianuniversal Ideas as symbols of relations;
his transcendental basic Idea bears a 
subjective Idealistic stamp and seeks itsArchimedean point in the "cogito"; thehypostatization of individuals; monadsare subjective mirrors of the universe,
247; essentiae, possibilitates, or eternaltruths have not a realistic sense; Divinethought is only creative thought in whichmathematical possibility and reality coincide; 
this creation motive is foreign to 
PLATO'S divine nous as demiurge; L.'s conception 
secularizes the Christian (248)
view of God's sovereignty as the Creator;
the modal aspects are modi of a mathematical 
order; the lex continui maintainsthe coherence; the universe in the representation 
of the monads is sensoryphenomenon; the monads are the rootof reality, the noumenon, 249; the spiritual 
ones are the autarchical individuals 

of the ideal of personality; verites de

raison versus verites de fait"; the former 

are eternal, necessary truths; purely nou


menal; products of pure thought; analy


tical truths; the latter are contingent

truths, empirical, established by thought

in confrontation with sensory experience;

the principium rationis sufficientis has a 

natural scientific causal meaning; in thedeity the difference between verites deraison and verites de fait disappears,
250; he consciously rejects SPINOZA'S view 
"eternal" and "metaphysical truths" areonly vaguely present in the "petites perceptions" 
of material monads and hidden,
in the human soul as "unconscious representations"; 
these representations arecontained in experience as a logical apriori of which we gradually becomeconscious; "contingent truths" thus become 
preliminary to eternal mathematical 
truths; this view reveals a mathematicistic 
Idea of the Origin; the sensoryaspect is merely a phenomenal expressionof mathematical relations; the same thingapplies to the other modal aspects ofreality; even the aesthetic aspect is subsumed 
under mathematical thought; hisview of music, 251; even (ethical) perfection 
is such a freedom of the will that 
the latter obeys reason ; the moral goal isrational self-determination in which man 
acts according to clear and distinct concepts; 
rational freedom is obtained bythe logical understanding of adequate representations 
of the other monads andby the insight into the harmonia praestabilita; 
his theodicy was to reconcile evilreality and the ethical ideal, 252; he triesto resolve the antinomy between the mathematical 
science-ideal and the ideal. of 
personality; his formal reconciliation of"causae efficientes" and "causae finales" 
in the divine world-plan; his radical optimism 
is typical of the faith of the Enlightenment 
in the final unity of the antagonistic 
factors in the Humanistic basicIdea; scientific thought was believed tomake humanity free; the antinomy between 
science and personality ideal assumed 
the form of that between nature 
and grace in LEIBNIZ; their deeper unitywas creative mathematical thought; thedeceptive formulation of the polar tension 
in the Humanistic transcendental 
basic Idea in terms of Christian doctrine,
253; his view of predestination; his Ideaof God; the existing cosmos is only therealized choice out of an infinite possibility 
of worlds, 254 ; the basic antinomyin the Humanistic cosmonomic Idea assumed 
the form of a mathematical problem 
in LEIBNIZ : the reduction of the discreteness 
of the monads to mathematical 
continuity; here is the mathematical an


tinomy of actual infinity in the monad;
for the infinitesimal can never possessactual existence; L. points out the merelymethodological origin of his "infinitesimal"; 
it is not a smallest part of spatialmatter; but an ideal hypothesis for themathematical process, 255; in the face ofreality the differential is a mathematicalfiction, also according to L. himself;
nevertheless he elevates it to actual reality 
in the concept of the monad; his purpose 
was to reconcile the science ideal 


 

137LEIBNIZ 

with that of the personality; but his logicistic 
continuity is in conflict with thediscreteness of the monads; in his theodicy 
he contrasts the actual infinity ofthe cosmic monads as finite with the infinity 
of divine creative mathematicalthought; finitude is the metaphysical evil;
the monads must be finite substances,
256; they must be confined within theirown borders if the cosmos is not to flow 
together into a formless whole; the spiritual 
monads participate in mathematical 
thought together with the deity, andform the Civitas Dei; metaphysical evil isnecessary if there is at all to exist a cosmos; 
the origin of evil lies in the eternaltruths of mathematical thought; evil isnot from matter; the ancients thought itwas because they considered matter asuncreated and independent of God; L.'screation motive is a secularized biblical 
thought, 257; the human spiritual monadis limited in its thought, not omniscient,
liable to error and to moral faults; threekinds of evil: physical, moral, metaphysical; 
physical and moral evil is possible,
not necessary; metaphysical evil is necessary; 
the latter evil is privatio, lackof perfection; its cause is a causa deficiens; 
physical and moral evil are anegative condicio sine qua non for therealization of the good; physical good ispleasure; ethical good is free personality,
a member of the Kingdom of grace; without 
evil the cosmos would not leave anyroom for the free rational personality ofman, moral freedom is a requirement ofthe continuity principle of the scienceideal; since there must be room for anorganic union of soul- and material. monads, 
and the continuity in the species ofsubstances must be actualized, 258; in theactual infinity of the intuitive analysis ofdivine creative mathematical thought theindividual evil of the monads disappearsin the relative perfection of the cosmosconceived in the spaceless continuity ofcreative mathematical thought; nature isidentical in its root with grace; grace isthe intelligible world of the clear and distinct 
concept; causae efficientes, causaefinales and harmonia praestabilita arebrought into complete harmony with theappetitionsin the monad's representations; 
the inner contradictions of thistheodicy, 259; LEIBNIZ' theodicy waspointed against PETER BAYLE, 260, 261;
he sought to free himself of the Cartesiandualism, 264 ; praised the principle of theeconomy of thought as one of the treasure 
troves of Nominalism, 272 ; he combated 
HUME's radical sensationalism from 
the very beginning, 284; the ego, the personality 
is identified with mathematicalthought and hypostatized as a thinkingsubstance, 295; he conceived "causality"
as a "factual verity" but held to its logical 
foundation in our judgment, 297;
causality is the foundational principle of 

all judgments of experience, bound to"factual verities", 298; he distinguisheswhat is from what ought to be; but ethical 
action remains dependent on clearand distinct thought; he agrees in principle 
With DESCARTES' ethics; LEIBNIZ' rationalism 
is mitigated by a mystical motive 
: that of a "supra-natural" participation 
of human reason in the creative 
thought of God, which produces love andpiety, 308; his monadology was .attackedby CHR. AUG. CRUSIUS with a famous argument, 
339; space is an a priori orderof possible coexistences, 342; space andtime are a priori forms of pure thought,
"notions", or "conceptus intellectuspurr; we become aware of them on theoccasion of our sensory perceptions ofcorporeal things, 343 ; the apriori concepts 
enable us to know the "eternaltruths"; the metaphysical order of thecosmos; the laws of the "noumenon", the"Dinge an sich", but sense experience isa lower function of knowledge concernedwith contingent truths only, 344; KANTderived the expression "symbolical knowledge" 
from LEIBNIZ, 349; KANT rejectedLEIBNIZ' and WOLFF'S theory of sensoryknowledge being only "cognitio con-.
fusa"; LEIBNIZ' God was deified mathematical 
thought, 350; L.'s logistic cosmonomic 
Idea of pre-established harmony included 
the free personality in a continuous 
mathematically construed cosmicorder and relativized the distinction between 
sensibility and rational freedom„
356; the Idea of the inteliectUs archetypus 
in KANT is derived from LEIBNIZ,
361; KANT'S characterization of the Leibnizian 
conception of free personality asan automaton spirituale, 380; his doctrine 
concerning the "petites perceptions" 
was introduced into Kantian epistemology 
by MAIMON who wanted totransform KANT'S antithesis between sensibility 
and logical understanding froma fundamental into a gradual one, 404;
to bridge the gap between the universaland the particular KANT used LEIBNIZ'theological Idea of the "Intellectus archetypus", 
405; LEIBNIZ gave to phenomenain their sensory form a foundation increative mathematical thought, 406; the.
Neo-Kantians began toas LEIBNIZ' 
principle of continuity as a transcendental 
logical principle of creation to KANT'scategories, 407; LEIBNIZ' conception ofthe relation between phenomenon andnoumenon, 411; L.'s speculative Idea ofGod lost positive significance in MAIMO/i'S.
later works, 412; LEIBNIZ, the genius ofthe German Aufkldrung, grew up in theSchool philosophy started by MELANCH


TON, and transformed its motives in a

rationalistic Humanistic sense, 513. 
—, II, cf. 86, 103, 118, 171, 272, 327, 345;


Von der Weisheit, 347 (note).
—, II, his law of continuous movement
of thought, 90 ; analysis situs, 103, 104; 



 

LEMERCIER138 

apperception and perception, 118, 119;
idea of historical development, 232, 272;
and mathematics, 338; intellectus archetypus 
chooses from the possible to createthe actual, 512; lex aeterna, 559; verites 
éternelles and ScHELER's philosophy, 592.
—, III, his monads are metaphysical concentration 
points of "force"; this "force"
is an undefined physical concept; itsmetaphysical application was inspiredby the autarchy motive of the Humanisticpersonality ideal; and LEIBNIZ' view was 
influenced by NEWTON'S concept "force"; 
STOKER'S use of this notion, 70; LEIBNIZ' 
monadology, 182. 

LEMERCIER, III, his chapel at the Sorbonne, 
142. 

LENEL, II, will power as a subjective 
right, 397. 

LENIN, III, realized that a communistic 
community is incompatible with the State
institution; its realization in the Marxian 
sense is Utopia, 464. 


LENNEP, Mr. L. H. VAN, III, 
De Rechtskracht van de Verordeningen
der Christelijke Kerkgenootschappen, 690. 


LENTZE, H., III,
Der Kaiser and die Zunftverfassung in 
den Reichsstddten, 479. 


LEON, XAVIER, I, 

Fichte et son temps, 451. 

LEVER, J. and H. DOOYEWEERD, III, 
Rondom het biologisch soortbegrip, 81. 

LEVIATHAN, I, in HOBBES, and in ROUSSEAU, 
317. 

LEVIRATE, III, an abnormal external form 
of marriage, 339, 340. 


LEVY-BROHL, II, 
Les fonctions mentales dans les societes 
inferieures, 329.
--, III, attributes characteristics to the 
primitive mind that have nothing in common 
with our civilized mind, 33. 


LEX AETERNA, I, in Patristic Thought,
173; expressed in the lex naturalis, 178;
and substantial forms, 202. 


LEX CONTINUI, I, in Neo-Kantianism; 
founded in the differential calculus by 
LEIBNIZ, 204 ; applied to the representations 
in the monads, 233; and harmonia


praestabilita, 239; in LEIBNIZ, 246; the lex
continui maintains the meaning coherence, 
249; as a developmental series 
from inorganic matter to organic life and
human history in HERDER, 455. 


LIBERAL IDEA, II, of the law state, 360. 

LIBERALISM, II, resisted the reactionarypolicy of the Restoration in the 19th century, 
but evoked the reaction of socialismand communism, 362. 

LIBERUM ARBITRIUM INDIFFERENTIAE, I, in 
DESCARTES, 238. 

LIERMANN, H., III, 
Das deutsche Volk, 497; 
Deutsches Evangelisches Kirchenrecht,
545, 548. 
—, III, In the Lutheran Church, also with 
the sovereigns, office became right, service 
turned into dominion, 545; modern 
parliamentary ideas gave rise to the German 
Synodal-Konsistorial system of the
19 century, 548. 


LIFE, II, as a "substance" in DRIESCH, 

110. 
LIFE AND WORLD VIEW, I, Genuine Christian philosophy requires a radical rejection of the supra-theoretical pre-suppositions and "axioms" of immanence philosophy, 114 ; 

because of the Christian radical critical standpoint Christian phil. isable to enter into the most inward contact with immanence phil.; it distinguishes sharply between philosophical judgments and supra-theoretic prejudices; apopular argument against the possibilityof Christian science and philosophy; 2 X2 = 4; this arithmetical truth holds for Christians and heathens; it draws the attention to undeniable states of affairs which form the basis for the cooperationof different schools, 115; 

the proposition2 X 2 = 4 is not "true in itself", but onlyin the context of numerical and logical laws; this proposition refers to a "state 
of affairs" independent of the subjectivetheoretical view and its supra-theoreticalpre-suppositions; and is dependent on thecosmic order; the latter is the same for 
every thinker; and every thinker has tothrow light on the state of affairs fromthe standpoint of his transcendental basicIdea, 116; 

in the philosophical effort toaccount for the states of affairs the various 
schools of thought can learn fromeach other and compete; Christian philosophy 
cannot claim any privileged position, 
it is not infallible; Christian phil.
does not place itself outside the historical 
development of philosophic thought; 
it aims at reformation, 117; 

the idea of 
the Philosophia Perennis; this Idea isrequired by the religious transcendentalbasic Idea; DILTHEY'S philosophy of lifeand world views is historical relativism 
with respect to truth; OSWALD SPENGLER;
Christian phil. turns against the Humaniistic 
view of science with the philosophic 
idea of the sphere-sovereignty; inspite of its inner historical connectionwith KANT'S Kritik d. r. Vernunft, Chr. 
phil. turns against the Kantian theoretical 
dogmatism of his epistemology, 118;

the religious starting point of Christianphil. and consequently the whole direction 
of its thought remains consistent;
any Scholastic accommodation is rejected; 
historical development implies 


139 LIFE AND WORLD VIEW 


the biblical-Augustinian idea of thestruggle in the religious root of historybetween the civitas Dei and the civitas terrena, 119; 

in immanence philosophythe antithesis of standpoints takes themodern form of a theory of life- andworld-views (Weltanschauungslehre) ;
the most ancient is that between idealism 
and naturalism; "critical" idealism 
insists on it that the effort to reduce 
theoretical thought to a natural objectpre-supposes a "transcendental subject ofthought" or a "transcendental consciousness; 
others make philosophy itself intoa neutral "theory of the life and worldviews"; DILTHEY'S three types; RICKERT'Sseven types, 120; 
such classificationsobliterate the only really radical antithesis 
and proclaim relative oppositionsas absolute; all oppositions on the immanence 
standpoint are relative; and become 
irreconcilable on account of absolutization; 
idealism is opposed to naturalism 
in consequence of the inner antinomyin the humanistic central religious motivebetween the ideal of science and that of 
personality; aestheticism and moralismare not polar oppositions; "theistic philosophy" 
was built on a metaphysicalidea of God, viz. the hypostatized nous,
121; 

the divine nous as actus purus andpure Form, etc., is hypostatized theoretical 
thought; the theistic philosophy ofDESCARTES or LEIBNIZ ; was ruled by theHumanistic motive of nature and freedom; 
the philosophical meaning of termslike idealism, materialism, intellectualism, 
etc., depends on the transcendentalbasic Idea ruling their contents; LEIBNIZwas ruled by the science ideal; Greek"idealism" by the Form motive; ANAXIMANDER 
and ANAXIMENES were "materialists" 
in the sense of the Greek matter-
motive; HOBBES' materialism was mechanistic 
scientialistic; DEMOCRITUS' atoms 
were "ideal forms" in the sense of the 
Greek Form-motive; the Greek ideal of 
the Kalokagathon (122) differs fromSCHILLER'S Humanist aestheticism; KANT'S 
moralism is not affiliated with SOCRATES' 
ethical thought; DILTHEY and RICKERThave interpreted ancient and medievalthinkers after the pattern of modern Humanism; 
the only ultimate and radicalantithesis is that between deified meaningand thought turning to God in Christ andrealizing the relativity and self-insufficiency 
of all created meaning; the antitheses 
within the dialectical basic motive 
have the character of polar tensions,
123; 

RICKERT'S criterion for the difference 
between philosophy and a life andworld view; LITT'S criticism of RICKERT,
124; 

LITT'S criterion; NIETSCHE'S view; 
modern existentialistic opinion; KARLJASPERS and "prophetic philosophy", 125;

his "Psychology of Life-and-WorldViews"; Lives view; he refers to the atmosphere 
of the common convictions in a community, to myths & dogmas andpopular wisdom; GEORG SIMMEL characterizes 
philosophy as a "temperamentseen through a picture of the world";
and "the revelation of what is deepestand final in a personal attitude towardthe world in the language of a picture ofthe world", 127; 

a life and world view 
is a view of totality; it implies an Archimedean 
point, and has a religious basicmotive; it requires the religious commitment 
of our selfhood; its attitude is pre-
theoretical; it conceives reality in its typical 
individuality structures; it appliesto everybody, the simplest included; theDivine Word-Revelation does not give adetailed life and world view but it givesboth to philosophy and to the outlook onlife and the world their starting point anddirection in a radical and integral sensedetermining everything; in the root philosophy 
and life and world view areunited, but not identified; each has a 
task of its own ; philosophy has to give atheoretical account of a life and world 
view, 128; 

RICKERT'S defence of the neutrality postulate, 129; 

reality versus values; 
to philosophy "reality" has validityas a category of thought in RICKERT; phi-.
losophic problems are theoretical problems 
of meaning and value; values areto be traced down to the life of culture; 
philosophy re-unites reality and value,
131, 

the connecting link is "meaning";
meaning belongs to all "acts" in so far asthe subject chooses a position in themwith respect to values; in the "immanentmeaning of the act" value and reality aresynthetically together; the immanentmeaning is not itself value, but reality ishere related to values. Historical science 
has to do with reality to which valuescling. Value is transcendent, timeless, absolute 
meaning; reality is the object of thetranscendental epistemological subject,
and in the realm of values there is no 
subjectivity at all, 132; 

such a systemof a-theoretical values (beauty, holiness,
morality, happiness) is an open system;
"a formal order of the stages of value";
phil. must not be "prophetism", nora life and world view; the object ofphilosophy is the totality of the cosmosinclusive of the subject, 133; 

the "neutrality-postulate" defended by RICKERT, although 
he recognizes the necessity forreligion to penetrate the whole of lifeand never to put up with its coordinationwith other "values"; he also recognizesthat the axiological viewpoint cannot exhaust 
the essence of religion, 134; 

hisopinion that the absolute validity of thetheoretical "truth-value" can be proved,
theoretically is untenable : every theoretical 
proof pre-supposes a norm for itscorrectness; "absolute truth-value" is an 
absolutization of theoretical truth and 
leads to antinomy in RICKERT'S own system, 
135; 

if a special value is torn out 

LIFE AND WORLD VIEW {140 }

of the meaning-coherence and set by itself, 
it becomes meaningless; if it shouldnot become meaningless, the postulate ofthe self-sufficiency of theoretical thoughtis reduced to absurdity, and it is provedthat in theoretical thought we cannotfind the Archimedean point; the test ofthe transcendental basic Idea reveals the 
concept "value RICKERT to be, ruledby a supra-philosophical position withrespect to the Archê and meaning totality; 
an Idea of reason has been hypostatized 
as a self-sufficient value; AUGUSTMEssEes defence of the philosophy ofvalues, 136; 

the root of the axiologicalmetaphysical theory is the Humanisticpersonality ideal that gained the ascendency 
over the science ideal after a longstruggle; the proclamation of the self-
sufficiency of philosophic thought signifies 
the withdrawal of that thought fromChrist as the new Root of our cosmos,
137 ; 

LITT reckons the value idea as suchto belong to the domain of a life andworld view; yet he defends the neutralitypostulate by an appeal to the pretendedself-guarantee of "theoretical truth"; thisself-guarantee he considers to be not demonstrable 
theoretically; truth cannot bereferred to something that is not truth;
any one attempting to demonstrate thisself-guarantee theoretically is a relativist,
according to LITT; relativism in any formis internally contradictory, 138; 

LITT alsoidentifies truth with correctness; self-sufficient 
truth, he says, exclusively holdsgood in correlation to the "cogito"; hedoes not hypostatize theoretical verityas an Idea or value apart from subjectivity; 
absolute truth only holds in and fortheoretical thought; this is self-contradiction 
incarnate, 139; 

the "cogito" is absolute, 
"pure" thought which cannot bea Gegenstand of thought; the full concrete 
ego and all temporal-spatial realityis the objective antipole of the transcendental 
"I think", 140; 

the correlation between 
truth and the transcendental cogito 
saves this philosophy from relativism, 
according to LITT at least; criticism 
of LITT'S view : he relativizes the fulness 
of meaning of truth to mere theoretical 
truth and starts from the tacit acseptance 
of the self-sufficiency of theoretical 
thought, 141; 

his "unconditioned"
transcendental cogito, 142; 

FICHTE, KANTand LITT; in the antithetic relation oftheoretical thought he conceives of the"I-think" as the antipode to "Gegenstdndlichkeit", 
143; 

he determines the selfhood 
by "pure thought", i.e. by dialectical 
logic, the "self-refutation" of scepticism 
; the question as to whether the logical 
principia are set aside by God andthe angels implies that God and the angels 
have to think in a cosmic temporalfashion, 144 ; 

Greek irrationalistic sophistic 
scepticism ; the self-refutation ofscepticism; LITT'S relativism is sceptical 

and antinomic; his view of the "transcendental 
cogito"; reality is only in theabsolutized individuality; his "Erkenntniskorrelation" 
and "Gegebenheitskorrelation"; 
the "pure thinking subject" is itself 
the "universally valid" and the origin 
of all universal validity, 145; 

LITT'S"theoretical universal ,validity" *replacesthe cosmic order; there arises a dialectical 
tension between universal validityand individuality; between philosophyand a life and world view; individualityis lawless; dialectical thought has to recognize 
its other in the irrationality oflife; it has to understand its dialecticalunity-in-the-opposition with the life andword view as a normless "impressionof life", both are dialectical emanationsfrom the same ego which lives in the relativistically 
undermined Humanisticideal of personality, 146; 

the self-refutation 
of scepticism is that of the neutrality 
postulate as well; but this self-refutation 
cannot of itself lead us to the positiveknowledge of truth; LITT inclines to theirrationalist philosophy of life, 147; 

wedo not recognize a dialectical unity ofphilosophy and a life and world view;
their deeper unity is found in the religious 
basic motive; philosophy has togive a theoretical account of a life andworld-view; it should attain to criticalselfreflection on its transcendental basic 
Idea; it can never be religiously neutral,
neither can a life and world view; LITT 
interprets philosophy and a view of life 
as personal confessions of the individualstruggle between person and cosmos;
philosophy must surmount the contentsof such confessions, 148; 

his life andworld view is a secularized one; he cannot 
claim for it "universal validity" and"absolute truth", nor "theoretical neutrality"; 
his hypostatization of "pure"
dialectical truth serves to release human 
personality from any norm of truth;
hence the conflict against the "universally 
valid norms and values" of rationalism 
and semi-rationalism; RICKERT'S theory of life and world views is not neutral;
he stops half-way on the road to irrationalism; 
by his schematism he falsifies themeaning of every life and world view thatrejects his own religious starting point; aCalvinistic life and world view cannot be 
classed as "theistic", based on the choiceof the "value of holiness" to which as 
subjective commitment "piety" answers,
149; 

the theoretical concept of truth depends 
on the transcendental basic Idea:
HOBBES' nominalist view of truth; ARISTOTLE'S 
realistic conception; HOBBES callstruth and falsehood only attributes oflanguage; truth consists in the immanentagreement of concepts with each otheron the basis of conventional definitions;
HOBBES' opinion; ARISTOTLE'S; KANT'S;
HUME'S; DESCARTES'; HEGEL'S; LITT'S; theconsequence of the neutrality postulate 

{141} LIFE AND WORLD VIEW 

would have to be the allocation of the 
concept of truth to a personal choice ofa life-and-world-view; Immanence philosophy 
recognizes no norm of truth aboveits transcendental basic Idea; the dogmaof the autonomy of theoretical reasonhands truth over to the subjective commitment 
of the apostate personality, 150;

the distinction between theoretical and 
a-theoretical judgments; only the formerare accorded the universal validity oftruth by LITT and RICKERT ; this distinction 
goes back to KANT'S dualism betweentheoretical knowledge and a priori rational 
faith; the distinction is untenable;
in the judgments: "this rose is beautiful",
and "this action is immoral" there is an 
appeal to a universally valid standard ofaesthetic and moral valuation respectively, 
151; the denial of this fact affects themeaning of aesthetic and moral judgments 
as such and cuts through the coherence 
among the logical, aesthetic, andmoral law-spheres, inclusive of the logical 
principles; REMBRANDT'S "Night-Watch"
and aesthetic valuation; such valuationis subjected to a norm defining its meaning; 
• the Night-Watch is the objectiverealization of an individual subjectiveaesthetic conception, 152; non-theoreticaljudgments are non-"gegenstAndlich";
theoretical judgments are formed in theGegenstand relation and subject to thenorm of theoretical truth; non-theoreticaljudgments, i.e., the so-called "practical"
judgments, are not a-logical, but only non"
gegenstandlich" and subjected to thenorm of pre-theoretical truth which possesses 
universal validity as well as thenorm of theoretical truth; all temporaltruth points to the fulness of meaning ofverity given in the religious meaning totality 
of the cosmos in relation to theOrigin; verity does not admit of any limitation 
as to its fulness of meaning, 153;
LITT'S distinction between theoretical and 
"weltanschauliche" truth and his self-
refuting interpretation of this distinction: 
truth is merely the integral consistency 
of a thinker's personal views andits agreement with his actual behaviourin life, 154; but if there is no universallyvalid truth about the meaning of the cosmos, 
I can give no subjective "interpretation 
of life", for I can interpret onlywhat I can judge of truly; LITT makes"universally valid theoretical truth" thejudge as to essence, meaning, and limitsof "weltanschauliche" truth; he holds 
that judgments of the life and world-
views are situated "beyond truth andfalsity"; theoretical thought must not dominate 
the life and world view of the 
sovereign personality, 155; but LITT'Sview, if consistently thought out, annihilates 
the foundations of theoretical 
thought, and reaches the pole of completeself refutation; the concept of an "absolute 
merely theoretical truth" is intern


ally contradictory; philosophic thoughtis dependent on the religious basic motive 
of the thinker's ego; philosophy hasto clarify a life and world view, 156; thelatter is not a system; but in every suchview there is left a residue of living immediacy 
which escapes theoretical concepts; 
it is focused in the full concretereality, though it is not lost in faith andfeeling; theoretical, systematic thoughtcannot be so focused; a system speaksout of a distance preserved by scientificabstraction in opposition to life; a lifeand world view bears a continuouslyopen character to each concrete situation; 
the radical Christian view of science 
was born in' the midst of a concrete situation; 
Dr. A. KUYPER ; the attitude of 
the early Christians, 157; the ideal of personality 
reacted to the rationalism of theEnlightenment; science was now requiredto be neutral with respect to a life andworld view; the development of such aview is constantly found in immediatecontact with concrete situations in the 
fulness of life; Christian philosophy isnot an elaboration of a Christian life and 
world view; the meaning of the concept"universal validity"; in the dogmaticcadre of a pretended "unconditioned purethought" his "universal validity" conceptwas a "standard of truth"; KANT definedit as: independence of "empirical subjectivity", 
and "valid for the transcendental 
consciousness, 158; the judgment"the sun heats the stone" is one of perception, 
but if I say : "the sun causes theheat of the stone" I pronounce a judgment 
of experience which is universallyvalid; judgments of perception are onlysubjectively valid, 159; in the phiL ofthe cosmonomic Idea universal validityis the agreement of a judgment withthe divine law for the cosmos in its 
modal diversity, inter-modal coherence,
and fulness of meaning; such validityrests on the universal validity of thestructural laws of human experience(universal, because elevated above all individual 
subjectivity) ; the judging subject 
is subjected to laws not originatingin a so-called "transcendental-logical subject"; 
the judging subject can come intoconflict with the laws; the laws of theoretical 
thought do not hold "an sich" butonly in the cosmic coherence and in dependence 
on the religious radical unity 
of the divine law; universal validity inheres 
in every judgment to which assentought to be given by any one; "I do notbelieve in God" cannot be universallyvalid; it is subjective, restricted to theindividual ego, 160; judgments of naïveexperience like "this rose which standson my table is red" claims concrete truthand universal validity; the latter dependson the structural laws of pre-theoreticalexperience; there are structural differ


ences between judgments as regards their 


 

LIGHT WAVES 142 

universal validity; a judgment of per- foundational; it depends on the Idea;

ception is not merely valid in the con- Idea is limiting concept, 486; the aspects

crete here and now of the sensory per- are incapable of seclusion; error of pher

ception; if it were, it would be merely nomenology; its danger to Christianity;

subjective; the structural laws of tem- it penetrates to an a-priori level of phil.

poral reality, and therefore of naïve ex- thought; it does not "leave religion

perience, regulate the subject-object-re- alone", 487; phenomenological reduction

lations in the latter and guarantee the defined; different schools; SCHELER'S as-

plastic structure of the experience of sertion of the adequacy of "Wesens


things also with respect to its subjective- schau", 488.

objective sensory and logical aspects; 
. 

KANT'S view falsifies naïve experience, LIMITING PROFIT THEORY, II, gave a psy


161; the criterion of universal validity of chological circumscription of the econo


judgments concerning supra-theoretical finical principle, 122 (note), 123. 

states of affairs and the unconditional LINDEN TREE, III, in naive experience, 54;

validity of the religious law of concen


its structural type; its environment, 632;

tration of human experience; the univer- its objective function of faith, 633.

sal validity of religious judgments, 162;

the "transcendental consciousness" is hy- LINGUAL ASPECT, I, when I let a person go

postatized theoretical thought; in it truth first who is ranked higher in the social 

is made dependent on the really general scale, I am intuitively aware of the tem-

apostasy of thought in immanence philo- poral aspect of symbolic significance, 33.

sophy; the concept "normal conscious- -- II, and historical, legal, etc. space, 65;

ness" is not identical with the "norm of lingual economy, 66; linguistic denotaconsciousness"; 
LITT explains the great lions of fundamental analogical concepts,

diversity of life and world views by call- 55-71; number, space, economy, com


ing them "individual impressions of life", mand, 55-71; objective sensory pheno


163; but philosophic and special scienti- mena are symbols of physical states of 

fic theories are no less divided among affairs; linguistic economy is an antici


themselves; in theoretical thought it is pation; deictic and mimic gestures showimpossible to eliminate the individuality some lingual economy; primitive and ci-
of a thinker; the attempt to do so is a vilized languages; Aktionsarten and As-
remnant of the rationalistic view of pects; flexion, 126; internal and chrono


science prevalent in the Enlightenment; logical time indications; artifical languafocused 
in the full temporal reality we ges and economy of speech; scientific

direct our religious vision of totality to- language; juridical anticipations in lanwards 
the reality of life in its concrete guage; univocality, 127; juridical sense 
structure, in our life and world view; of linguistic expression is a juridical an-
neither life and world view, nor philoso- ticipation, so is univocality; a deepeningphy can be understood individualistic- of language; there is no juridical antici


ally; they have a social origin; a life view pation in primitive languages and no aesis 
ex-origine the common conviction of a thetical or economic anticipation, 140; 
human community bound together by a the historical aspect of language, 194,

central religious motive; philosophy, too, 197; the nuclear meaning of this aspect is 
issues from such a common religious that of symbolic signification; VON Hum-

basic motive, 164; in philosophy as well BOLDT'S "Innere Sprachform"; PAUL'S 
as in a life and world view there may Prinzipien; the latter are psycho-physical

occur social prejudices due to the limit- in character; his positivism; languageation of the views prevailing in a social formation is a historical process, 222; 
environment (class- and racial prejudi- historical memorial symbols; the histor


ces, those of a church group, etc.) ; philo- ical element is retrocipatory; modernsophic thought may be stimulated by a phonology, phonemes; phonetics; HUS-
life and world view, and the latter may SERL'S "pure grammar", and "pure" sign-
be clarified by philosophy, 165. ifications are logical, not lingually quali-
LIGHT WAVES, I, are not real, according fied, 224 ; HUSSERL has broken the sub


ject-object-relation in language; sign and

to E. MACH, 213; reality of light waves, 

signification; interindividual under


558. 
standing; the Diltheyans protested; the

—, III, RUSSELL'S theory, 25. 

"vivo" and the historical stream of ex-
LIMITS TO CONCEPT FORMATION & DEFINI- perience, 225; expression; the meaningTION, II, law sphere cannot be grasped in intended; the signifying act has a linguala purely logical way; nucleus of a modal- modus; HUSSERL identifies act and moity 
cannot be further analysed; we can dus; the formative moment in the lingualform an Idea of the nucleus; pheno- sign adapts the meaning to cultural demenology; 
its rigid "eidos"; an "absolute velopment; lingual reference through sub-
essential structure"; Sache an sich, 485; jective intention and signifying; conceptranscendental 
Idea of a modal function tual and emotional components of mean


.,

approaches the limit of the aspect only; mg; HUSSERL'S logical meaning kernel; 
a concept is anterior to an Idea and only the "feeling tone" and its intentional re



 

14 3LITT, THEODOR 

ference, 226; they must be interpretedfrom the semasiological subject-object-relation 
and retain their lingual character;
OGDEN and RICHARDS and their psychologism, 
227; cultural and lingual symbols,
285; symbolic expression as a criterionof art in CONDILLAC ; CASSIRER'S criticism, 
348; the objectification of the symbolicaspect; of post-lingual anticipations; conventional, 
unconventional, explicit, implicit, 
abstract symbols; aesthetical anticipations, 
381; the structure of a symbolical 
subject-object-relation; the beauty ofa landscape symbolized; social symbols;
cult and prayer, 382.
—, III, objective sensory phenomena aresymbols referring to the pre-sensory aspect 
of energy (i.e. the physical), 37; theimportant role of symbolical anticipationsin sensory impressions: they evoke aname, 38; RIEHL calls sensations signs;
OCCAM'S distinction between arbitrary andnatural signs, 45, 46; sensory phenomenaas symbols, 46; naïve experience andnames, 51, 57; cultural function precedeslingual function in human development,
78; symbolically qualified things, 110,111; literature, 123; intuitive and symbolic 
knowledge, 144, 145; on books, scores,
etc., 150-153; symbolical social mediation, 
243, 250-253, 272; why in languagethere is a difference between motherlyand maternal, fatherly and paternal, 292. 

LINGUAL SIGN, II, (HUSSERL) a word sign


ifies via its signification, 225, and the

human act, 226. 

LINGUISTIC ECONOMY, II, 66. 

LIST DER VERNUNFT, II, in HEGEL, 280. 

LITERATURE, III, in Poetry the aestheticalimagination may seek expression in pregnant 
metaphors which have no other rolethan evoking a visionary picture of nature, 
68 ; a work of literary art, a drama,
etc., have an inconstant individualitystructure relying on the art of performance; 
in books, etc., they are symbolically 
signified for preservation and lateractualization, 110-116; a work of literary 
art has a cultural foundation and anaesthetic qualification, 123. 

LITT, THEODOR, I, 

Einleitung in die Philosophic, 78, 80, 81,

82, 125, 139, 141, 154. 
—, I, defends the neutrality-postulate withrespect to philosophy, 14, 15; seeks hisArchimedean point in the "pure reflection" 
of theoretical thought on its ownactivity; he introduces a dialectical identity 
of the "thinking ego" ("pure thoughtin its self-reflection") and the "concreteego" (as a real individual "totality" of allits physical-psychical functions" in spaceand time"), 77; "in the unity of thethinking I and the concrete I, the formergains the mastery"; the "dialectical identity" 
is intended in a transcendental-

logical Sense; only • in "pure thought'does the "concrete ego" come to itselfthe "concrete ego" does not transcend"pure thought"; the theoretic relating of 
the modal diversity to its integral root 
has become impossible to LITT; therefor e 
he introduces a dialectical unity to relate 
the diversity to the two antithetic motiyes of his religious ground motive of 
nature and freedom, 78; his dialectica 1 
unity and identity of the "concrete" andthe "transcendental-logical" ego is i n 
keeping with FICHTE and HEGEL, but disagrees fundamentally from KANT, 79; it isa masked transcendental basic Idea, 80; 
he cannot and does not explain how the"pure thinking ego" and the "concreteego" (as the Gegenstand) can be one andthe same; but he intends not merely alogical but a real identity; he holds thatby elevating itself to the abstract function 
of pure thought the ego has reached.
the ultimate limit of its inner possibilities, 
81; his dialectical-metaphysical logicism, 
82; the difference between philosophical 
and "objective" scientificthought and LITT'S view of the "thinking" 
and the "concrete ego"; his "purethinking ego" could not be detached fromthe Gegenstand-relation; there is a fatalconfusion in his view of "object" and"Gegenstand" and of the really "naïve"
and the theoretical attitude of thought, 
86; the concept of the pure self-reflectionof theoretical thought lacks the tendencytowards the Origin, 91; LITT criticizes 
RICKERT, 124; he considers "value" to be 
a-theoretical, and the foundation of theoretical 
truth in a value is to be rejected;
in philosophy not a single valuation maybe either one of the determining factorsor even the decisive factor"; his view of 
life-and-world-views; but "if valuations 
are incorporated in philosophy", the subject 
has not sacrificed its concretely personal 
relation to the totality of reality tothe striving after pure knowledge", 125;
if "universal validity" is required for alife and world view, there appears to be"a lack of logical integrity", 126; a lifeand world view is nothing but an "individual 
impression of life" arising in contact 
with the conception of experiencedreality formed by the community inwhich a man lives; common convictions; 
community conceptions: the image worldof myths and dogmas of religion and thepopular outlook on life; this view of 
LITT'S agrees with GEORG SIMMEL'S, 127;
his criticism of RICKERT, 138; he identifies 
theoretical truth with theoretical correctness; 
theoretical truth is absolute and. 
selfsufficient exclusively in and for theoretical 
thought; this is self-contradictory;
and relativistic, 139; in all biological,
psychological and anthropological 
thought the actual "I think" remains hidden; 
it can never be made into a Gegen


tand of thought; philosophical thought 


 

LITT, THEODOR 144 

is directed to self-reflection; it shouldset in the light the subjective antipole ofall objective reality; it demonstrates howthe validity of truth (in objectivizingspecial scientific judgments) depends onthe validity of the pronouncements of reflective 
thought; the absolute validity oftruth is bound to the thought relation,
but this is not saying that truth is limitedto real thinking beings; this validity isrestricted to the "cogito", the "purethought" that "springs back" again andagain into the counter position to the"Gegenstand thought of"; this "thought"
is no longer an aspect of concrete temporal 
reality, it is the transcendental subject 
of thought, universally valid itself,
and inherent in mere thought as such(Denken schlechthin) ; all spatial andtemporal reality and the full concrete egois (in the epistemological relation) the"objective antipole" of this transcendental"I think", 140; truth is here not deducedfrom something else; there is a strictcorrelation between transcendental truth 
and cogito; critique of LITT's conception:
the fulness of meaning of verity is relativized 
to mere theoretical truth; and if 
the transcendental cogito was as self sufficient 
and absolute as theoretical truth 
is said to be, they would be identical;
LITT's view stands and falls with the supposed 
absoluteness and selfsufficiency ofphilosophical thought, 141; his "absolutetruth requires theoretical logical determination 
by philosophic thought to be "purely 
theoretical"; philosophic thoughtreceives its determination from absolute 
truth; this determination is logically undetermined 
to the highest degree; thefirst pitfall in LITT's demonstration is theunconditional "transcendental cogito";
but this cogito is not the selfhood, onlyits logical function; FICHTE'S absolute andthinking egos, 142; LITT has not noticedthe antinomy of "unconditioned thought";
"theoretical truth" is dissolved into a 
speculative hypostatization of thought;
the actual I-ness has vanished; conceptualization 
and knowledge becomeimpossible; the second pitfall is the opposition 
of transcendental thought andfull reality; in the Gegenstand relationLITT supposes that "full reality" springsback into the "Gegenstandlichkeit", 143;
thus he ignores the temporal meaning coherence; 
the self-refutation of scepticism; 
logical thought in its subjectivity isnecessarily subjected to the logical laws,
in casu — the "principium contradictionis"; 
the principle is not absolute andunconditioned, but of a cosmic-temporalcharacter, 144 ; LITT'S concept of a selfsufficient theoretical truth is ultimatelyrelativistic and antinomic, it recognizesno norm dominating the absolutized"transcendental-logical subject", in thedatum correlation he only sees reality inthe absolutized individuality of the "con


crete ego", the absolute irrational thatcan be objectivized only in the correlation 
of knowledge and conceived by the"transcendental-logical ego" in universally 
valid thought forms; the "purethinking subject" is not subject to a law,
but is itself the "universally valid" andthe origin of all universal validity, 145;
there is a dialectical tension between philosophy 
and a life and world view; philosophy 
has to understand the latter asits other, in a dialectical unity-in-theopposition 
with such a view as a norm-
less individual "impression of life", 146;
he inclines towards the irrationalist philosophy 
of life, 147; his view is akin toHEGEL'S "pan-logism", oriented to the irrationalistic 
turn in Humanistic ideal of 
personality in Romanticism; LITT'S viewis an irrationalist logicism, oriented historically; 
he considers life and worldviews as bound "in a dialectical unity"
with philosophy, 148; he cannot claim"universal validity" and "absolute truth"
for his outlook on every life and worldview, nor "theoretical neutrality", 149;
he distinguishes theoretical from a-theoretical 
judgments and denies universalvalidity to the latter; this goes back toKANT'S dualism, 151; his distinction 
might make sense if he did not deny all"weltanschauliche" truth; the truth of a 
view of life and the world can only bethe integral consistency of a thinker'spersonal confession with his actual behaviour, 
154 ; universally valid truth.
(theoretical truth) is the judge as to essence, 
meaning, and limits of the truthof a life and world view, whose judgments 
are situated "beyond truth and falsity"; 
theoretical thought must not dominate 
the life and world view of the 

sovereign personality, 155; as life andworld views are so various, they must bemere "personal impressions of life";
judgments of theoretical thought are onlyuniversally true; LITT ignores the dividedness 
among scientific and philosophictheories, 163. 
—, II, on meaning, 31; historical streamof experience and language 225; logicalintegrity; his crypto religious attitude ofthought, 492.
—, III, 
Individuum and Gemeinschaft, 248, 295.
—, III, dialectical-phenomenological sociologist; 
tries to overcome the dilemma

between individualism and universalism;
sociology is a philosophy of culture, furnishes 
the methodical and metaphysicalfoundations of the Geisteswissenschaften 
(socio-cultural sciences), 248; the individual 
experiencing ego is a spiritualcentre; in the communal bond this vitalcentre lives with other egos; LITT combines 
dialectical reflexive thought withthe phenomenological analysis of essences; 
science is the self-transilluminationof the human mind; the moments of a 


 

14 5LOCKE, JOHN 

social whole are interlaced in dialectical 
tensions social meaning is timeless; theegos' psychical experience is united withit in symbols •Which possess a trans-personal 
character; the ego monad; its interweaving 
of past and present perspectives;
its intertwinement of corresponding experiences 
of other I-monads, 250; reciprocity 
of perspectives is realized in symbols; 
social interwovenness, 251; of theclosed sphere; its coherence with thesystem of symbolical expressive formsnecessary for mutual comprehension; theconjugal bond disqualifies the partnersto separate the meaning content of thiscontact from this one momentary vitalrelation ; in the closed sphere the symbolbecomes objective, transpersonal, constant; 
the closed sphere can thus expand,
252; and embrace an unlimited number 
of persons, becoming a closed sphere ofthe second degree; Direct spiritual contact 
is limited to very narrow spheres;
(of the first degree) ; the means of socialmediation; it lends unity and continuityto the social whole; the Gesamterlebnis,
253; the experience and actions of allthe members are incorporated in the indivisible 
unity of a social totality; a Gemeinschaft 
has a structural unity of interwoveness 
guaranteed by social mediationand centred in individual physico-psychical 
personality; a totality without anI-hood, without a personality of its own,
254 ; the individual personality is only 
constituted in the social totality of a temporal 
Gemeinschaft; and there is a finaland highest community encompassing allother relationships as its parts; this viewis universalistic; there is no authority inLITT'S closed sphere, because he ignoresnormative aspects explicitly, 255; to sociology, 
he says, only the meaningfuland the meaningless count; (natural aspects 
are meaningless here) ; his phenomenological 
prejudice; he confuses thelawside with the subject-side of socialreality, 256; criticism of his "closedsphere" (cf. sub voce Gemeinschaft, p.
257), 257; his universalistic conceptionof the "final or highest social unity" evenembraces enmity or conflict; the relationbetween such a "final unity" and its constituent 
parts is identical with the relation 
between the individual ego and the"closed sphere of the first degree"; thismust lead to the concept of a supra individual 
ego of some "Gesamtperson", 
which LITT rejects, 258; he ends in afunctionalistic universalism of a historicist 
type, 259; criticism of LITT'S "soziale 
Vermittlung" concept; he excludesthe organization from his concept of Gemeinschaft 
(community), 260; his dialectical 
phenomenological method; hischarge of "spatial mode of thought"; hisuniversalist levelling of differences, 262;
his "closed sphere", 271; he intentionallyeliminated the normative viewpoint; his 

idea of "soetal restriction" is cryptonormative, 
272; --psychic interlacernéntsbetween 'family members are not a separate 
department; he rejects the hypostatization 
of a community to a "spiritualorganism or super personality"; socialacts are inferred from the interlacements 
among individual egos, 295; his monadological 
universalist, denies the religioustranscendence of human personality, 296;
his refutation of the organological viewof human communities is only partlyadequate; he holds that a community interweaves 
the individual I-tresses of its 
members ("monadological universal


ism"), 297. 

LIVING CELL, III, a living cell is the lastindependent viable unity of a living masswhose reality is not directly accessibleto naïve experience, 102; a living organism 
is a typically biotically qualified individuality 
structure functioning withinan enkaptic whole; a living body doesnot coalesce with its "living organism"
717; living albumen in KOLZOFF'S conceptions, 
721; "living protein", protein combinations 
are physically determined instructure, 727 ; "living matter" according

to DRIESCH, 742. 

LIvIUS, TITUS, III, 

Rerum Rom. ab urbe condita, 486. 

LOBSTERS, III, 774. 

LOCKE, JOHN, I, 
Essay concerning Human Understanding,
224, 263, 305, 530. 
—, I, criticized the Humanistic metaphysics of nature, 203 ; an undoubted Nominalist, 
he still speaks of "eternal relationsbetween the Ideas"; the ethical and ma


thematical Ideas are creations of thought,
224; "outer world" of objective sensations, 
"inner world" of subjective opera' 
tions of the mind; reflection or "internalsense"; the understanding borrows all"ideas" from them; parallel with DESCARTES' 
dualism of "extensio" and "cogitatio"; behind experience there is supposed 
to be a material substance and a spiritual 
one; they are held to be unknowable, 
263; LOCKE undermines HOBBES' monistic materialism; sensation and reflection 
are not of equal rank; the operationsof the mijid are perceived only when themind is stimulated by sensations of the`outer" world; Cartesian "innate ideas"
are rejected; the understanding owes allof its content to the simple or elementaryrepresentations (Ideas) given in sensa-
tion and reflection; mathematicalthought, even, is: not purely logical;
simple sensible and spiritual impressionsare passively received by the mind;
Idews, however, are complex, 264 ; ideas 
are freely formed by the understanding

out of the combinations of simple ones;
their number is , irifinite, simple ideas,
e.g., pain, pleasure, joy, grief, etc., force, 

 

LOCKE, JOHN 146 

causality, unity, reality; — complex ideascomprise member, space, infinity, identity, 
power, substance; L. did not complete 
the psychologizing of scientificthought; he held science (mathematical)
to be the mainstay of the science-ideal;
his view is antinomic, 265; his psychological 
dualism is gradually transformedinto radical dualism between psychicexperience and creative thought; then hecame into conflict with his absolutized 
psychological starting point; he dissolvesthe world of experience into atomisticpsychical elements; they do not cohere,
but relate to the unknown bearer, "substance"; 
they are like the letters of the alphabet 
and capable of being joined together 
arbitrarily in "reflexion"; from thisit follows that no scientific knowledge ofempirical reality is possible; but the necessary 
coherence between concepts required 
in science does not originate inthe psychical impressions; between the"Ideas" there are necessary relations elevated 
above the sensory impressions andhaving an eternal constancy, 266; truescience is only concerned with this necessary 
connection of concepts; the understanding 
creates the necessary relationsbetween Ideas and forms "archetypes"; inthe experience of reality a triangle hasthe same sum of its angles as does theuniversal triangle in the mathematicalconcept; the same thing holds for "moralIdeas"; exact proofs are as possible inethics as in mathematics; both furnish us 
with a-priori; knowledge, infallible, true,
and certain, 267; thus the science ideal isgiven primacy; human personality canonly maintain its freedom of action byobeying mathematical thought; but "sovereign 
reason" refused to accept theCartesian "innate ideas", 268; LOCKEgranted to psychology the central task ofexplaining the origin and limits of humanknowledge and of critically examiningthe validity of its foundations; the dogmatic 
acceptance of innate ideas endangered 
the sovereignty of thought; thepsychological Archê of mathematicalthought must be traced; he refused to"swallow" principles with a blind implicit 
faith; he limited scientific knowledgeto the sphere of the non-real; he distinguished 
empirical facts from necessaryrelations between concepts (like HOBBES) ,269; HUME was to adopt this distinction,
too; LOCKE maintained that mathematicaland moral judgments are synthetical; hethen introduced a new faculty of cognition, 
the intuition of the "cogito"; thisintuition was the basis of all mathematical 
proof (demonstratio) ; thought mustalways remain joined to psychical sensations 
if it is to lead to knowledge; thecontinuity and infinity of space and timeare beyond sensory perception; he capitulates 
to the science ideal; physics andbiology are entirely dependent on sensi


ble perception and cannot be mathematically 
demonstrated, 270; here was thebeginning of critical self-reflection on theroot of the science-ideal; and of a reaction 
against the rationalism of the "Enlightenment" 
•' L. rejected the Cartesiandeduction of "Sum res cogitans" from"Cogito ergo sum"; he denied to mathematical 
thought the right to identify itselfwith the "sovereign personality" as theroot of the science-ideal; the rejected thetheory that the will was a mode of mathematical 
thought; the mathematicalscience ideal was emancipated from arationalistic metaphysics of nature; theinsight was possible that the root of reality 
is not to be discovered by science;
the science ideal must have its fundamentals 
in the personality ideal, 271;
HUME had outgrown the Enlightenment;
he reduced the metaphysical conceptionsof nature and human personality to absurdity, 
272; he found room for moralfreedom and responsibility in the powerof man "to suspend his desires"; the careof ourselves that we do not mistake imaginary 
for real happiness is the necessary 
foundation of our liberty; LOCKE isindeterministic, 305; he opposed HOBBES'absolutist doctrine, but remained a genuine 
figure of the Enlightenment in hisoptimistic faith that the domination ofmathematical thought was the best guarantee 
of the freedom of personality; thefree individual remained the central pointof the civil State; he construed the transition 
from the natural state to the civil 
state by means of the Social Contract; thecitizens guaranteed their inalienablerights of freedom and private propertyby an organized power according to acontract; the civil state is no more than

a company with limited liability; this isthe constitutional state of the old liberalism, 
318. 
—, II, together with NEWTON he dominated 
the thought of the times of the En


ligtenment, 350; his conception of innatehuman rights pertaining to natural lawbecame a guiding motive, but was a subjective 
theory that could not be positivized 
in the legal order, 357; WOLFF'S andLOCKE'S rationalism penetrated into thecodifications of the times, 358; L. formulated 
the classical-liberal idea of the law 
state, 360; innate rights; this theory isdestructive to the recognition of positivelaw, 395; theory of personality rights

stems from innate human rights, 413.
—, III, his doctrine of secondary qualities, 
39; his idea of the body politic construed 
the state as a political association 
whose sovereign authority is bound to 
the aim of protecting the innate natural 
rights of man to life, freedom and property; 
he thought the salus publica the 
highest law of the state, 237; his idea of 
the law state, 426, 427; of public interest, 
442; he distinguishes between State and 


 

147LOGICAL ASPECT 

Society, the latter being the system of freemarket relations, 452; the State is for the 
protection of the innate human rights,
esp. that of property, 457; freedom andlife were subsumed under the right ofproperty, 458. 

LOEB, III, 
Tribal Initiation and Secret Societies, 


365. 
III, secret societies have one common 
root, viz., the initiation rites of boys,

366. 
LOGIC, I, a semi-Platonic mathematical 
method of logic in PETRUS RAMUS, 198.
—, II, transcendental and formal logic inKANT, 15; logic historically explained,
195; logic as a science, 462; pure logicand pure axiology distinguished by SCHELER, 
545; cf. s.v. Logical Aspect, II. 

LOGICAL ALPHABET, I, Of RAYMUNDUS 

LuLLus, 245. 

LOGICAL ASPECT, I, in a closed state this 
aspect lacks anticipatory moments; viz.
in the pre-theoretical attitude of thought;
but in the theoretical attitude anticipatory 
moments find expression in the inner 
connection with the historical, linguistic, 
economic and later aspects, 29;
time discloses a logical modal sense inthe logical aspect; logical simultaneityand the order of prius and posterius is asmuch a modal aspect of time as the physical; 
the theoretical concept joins inlogical simultaneity the analysed characteristics 
of that which it defines in subjection 
to the principles of identity andcontradiction expressing the analyticaltemporal order of simultaneity in thesense of logical implication and exclusion; 
logical movement of thought follows 
the order of prius and posterius; thismovement has duration in the real act of 
thought when we draw a syllogistic inference 
in theoretical logical form; in thelogical order of succession the formerstages do not disappear because the inference 
implies its premises; in mathematical 
movement the former stages disappear 
in the order of succession of itsmoments, 30; logical order is normative,
physical order is not; cosmic time doesnot offer a concentration point servingas a point of departure for philosophy,
not even in the logical aspect, 31; thelogical aspect of our act of thought isthat of analytical distinction in the sense 
of setting apart what is given together;
logical analysis would have nothing todistinguish apart from a previously givencosmic diversity of meaning, 39; thisconcept enables HUSSERL to formulatedifferent purely logical propositions anddefinitions, 73, 74. 
—, II, transcendental and formal logic inKANT, 15; logical contradiction and antinomy, 
46, 47; Greek and Scholastic logic 

and analogical concepts, 55; symboliclogic; logistic; its dangers; logical unityof scientific language, 59; logical space,
63; logical economy, 66; logical command, 
69; logical command is not primitive; 
the way it is acquired, 69; logical distinction 
and distinctiveness; the nucleusof the logical aspect; numerical analogy,
. 
is analytical unity in plurality in a concept; 
logical unification; the unifying 
process; the logical norms of identityand contradiction; unity, multiplicityand totality are founded in number, 80;
counting is not the origin of number butimplies logical distinction; logical plurality 
is analogical, a retrocipation to number, 
81; theoretical movement of thought,
94, 95; meaning-kernel is analyticaldistinction; retrocipations : logical apperception 
and perception; LEIBNIZ on this;
identity and diversity; the life of thought;
principle of sufficient ground is a physical 
retrocipation; J. STUART MILL'S theoryof conditio sine qua non,118,119; groundand conclusion; this is a logical and not 
a physical relation; the logical process ofconcluding is a retrocipation to movement; 
analytical space, 120; logical anticipations 
are only found in the deepenedmeaning of theoretical thought : logicalcontrol (historical anticipation) ; logicalsymbolism; symbolic logic; logical economy; in ARITOTLE, PLATO and WILLIAMOF OCCAM, 122; MACH ; AVENARIUS ; W. 
JAMES; and pragmatic absolutization of 
logical economy; logical economy is not 
an application of the general economicprinciple embracing the ideal of science,
123; analytical economy pre-supposes thenorms of identity, contradiction, and sufficient 
ground; and it deepens theirmeaning; misuse of this logical economyin jurisprudence and legal technique,
124; logical economy and the principleof sufficient ground, 125; the method of 
defining things by their genus proximumand differentia specifica was introducedby SOCRATES, PLATO and ARISTOTLE, 132;
economy of thought is an economic anticipation; 
indirect; and in deepened theoretical 
thought; it is systematic and showslogical control (historical anticipation);
biologistic views of MACH and AVENARIUS ; 
OSWALD SPENGLER'S misinterpretation,
175; logical symbolism; logical harmony;
. 
justification of theoretical judgment anticipates 
the legal aspect; KANT'S verdict,
176; the relation of the "whole and its 
parts" is not purely logical, 454 ; its numerical 
analogy; the ideas of continuousanalytical extension and juxtaposition,
are retrocipatory; movement of thought;
prius and posterius; are kinematic analogies, 
455; the science of logic; this notion 
is a seeming paradox, 462; the analytical aspect cannot be its own Gegenstand, 
but it is the I-ness who is operating 
theoretically, 463; "formal logic" is. 
an antinomy if it is conceived as "pure 


 

LOGICAL CALCULUS 148 

analysis"; it is formalized logic; and in
it logical individuality and all total structures 
of individuality. have been eliminated; 
in the theoretical attitude the nonlogical 
is analytically encompassed by
the logical categories; logical sphere sovereignty 
and sphere universality; Christian 
logic, 464; what it means, 465; intuition 
is the bottom layer of the logical
function, 473. 


LOGICAL CALCULUS, II, in KANT, WHITEHEAD, 
452. 


LOGICAL CREATION MOTIVE, I, in HEINRICH 
RICKERT'S thought, 14 ; in modern Humanistic 
thought; in DESCARTES ; LEIBNIZ;
HOBBES, 197, 203; a particular method in
LEIBNIZ, 245; in PLATO, 247, 248 (note);
the logical origin principle of creative
mathematical thought, 407. 


LOGICAL ECONOMY, I, in positivism, 110;
in ERNST MACH'S view, 558. 
—, II, is analytical; in ARISTOTLE'S criticism 
of the Platonic Ideas; 122, 123; its 
analytical qualification is ignored by
MACH and AVENARIUS ; it presupposes the
transcendental conditions of knowledge,
according to KANT, 123, 124, 125, 176. 


LOGICAL EXACTITUDE, I, of mathematics 
explained by HUME in terms of psychology, 
293. 


LOGICAL FORMALIZING, I, Of the totality
concept, 73. 


LOGICAL FUNCTION, I, cannot be Gegen
stand, only its modal structure, 40; in
apostasy, 100. 


LOGICAL GROUND, I, is distinguished from
ground of being, in CRUSIUS, and in KANT,
335; cf. s.v. Logical Aspect, II, 118 ff. 


LOGICAL LAWS, I, have been psychologized
in HUME, 278, 279; cf. s.v. Logical Aspect,
II, 118-120. 


LOGICAL NECESSITY, II, is contrasted with 
intuitive certainly by VOLKELT, 475, 476. 


LOGICAL PRINCIPLES, I, in LITT, 144 ; cf. 


s.v. Logical Aspect, II, 46, 47, 80, 118, 124. 
LOGICAL SPACE, II, 120. 
LOGICAL THOUGHT, I, does not transcend 
the meaning diversity, 17. 
LOGICAL UNITY, I, in MAIMON, 409. 
LOGICISM, I, Of PARMENIDES was refuted 


by the Sophists, 19. 
LOGISTIC, II, and modern mathematics; 


Symbolic logic; and its basic concepts;
logical calculus, 452. 
LOGOLOGY, II, of PAUL HOFFMANN, 29, 30. 
LOGOS-THEORY, I, in the Alexandrian 


School denatured the Biblical motive of 


creation; was speculative; 177. 
LOUMAN, A. F. DE SAVORNIN, III, 
De Rechtsbevoegdheid der Kerken, 690. 


—, III, the "visible" church is not a society, 
but an institution; it posses esaninternal spiritual legal sphere of ifs ownentirely .apart . from civil law; civil juridical 
rules relating to associations cannever be applied here; if a baptismalmember refuses to pay the ecclesiastictax the Church cannot at all call in the 
aid of a civil judge, 690. 

LONELINESS,. INNER, III, WEBER'S idea of a 
Calvinist's "inner loneliness", 247. 

LOSCHMIDT, II, and the number "n", 425. 

LOTZE, HERMANN, II, 

-II, his cosmonomic Idea, 593. 
Leb
en and Lebenskraft, 735. 
—, III, on MULLER's theory of specificenergy of the sense organs, 41. 

LOUVRE, THE, III, its colonnade, 142. 

LOVE, II, modal; and religious love, 144,149; as sensory, inclination, in K4NT, 150;
in CALVIN'S view; love and social convention, 
152; according to AALDERS, 154; andjustice, 161.

— III, religious love is the fulfilment ofall temporal meaning, 71; love in thehuman family between parents and children 
reflects the bond of love between the 
heavenly father and his human children,
269; its biotic foundation in the familybond gives it an added intensity, 270;
love and sin, 271; parental love, according 
to VIERKANDT, 293; love guides thecare of the bio-physical existence of the
members of a family, 301; KANT'S crudedefinition of married love; free love, in 
SCHLEGEL, 317, 318; love is called a sandyground as a basis for marriage, 332; loveof country depends on the political structure, 
471; love is subjective in the State'speople, 472; love is counterbalanced byinternational love of one's neighbouramong the nations, 476. 

LOVE AND JUSTICE, II, are antitheticallyopposed in E. BRUNNER, 157-159. 

LOVE UNION, III, marriage is essentially alove union, 307. 

LOWIE, R. H., III, 
Primitive Society, 332, 338, 341, 342, 353,354, 355, 357, 359. 
—, III, refuted the constructive evolutionist 
theory of the rise and developmentof the human family, 331; sexual communism 
(cf. "group marriage"), insteadof individual marriage, is nowhere to befound at present and the evidence of itsearly occurrence must be rejected as insufficient; 
the bilateral family of husband 
and wife and children is a universal 
unit of human social -life, 332; LOWIEfollows BoAs, 333; his criticism of economic 
explanations, 336; marriage and family 
are the centre of society among eventhe simplest cultures, whereas the latterlack the sib and the clan,338; pirra-ura isa question of concubinage, 341; he warns 


149 MAIMON, SALOMON 


against overestimating popular juridicalconceptions of marriage, 342; on the sibor clan; his error of seeking the basis ofthe sib or clan in the biotic aspect, 353;
but LowiE proved that the 'claim of com


, 

mon descent on the part of the sibmates

rests on a fiction; there is often a mythi


cal conception of common descent, i.e.,

a totem, 354 ; siblings belong to the same

generation; the law of exogamy, 355; sibs

are extremely changeable units, 357;

adoption is a very important feature of a

sib; the adopted child is incorporated in

the husband's or in the wife's sib, 359. 

LUCINDE, III, by SCHLEGEL, embodied the 
Romantic ideal of free love, 318. 

LULLUS, RAYMUNDUS, I, conceived the ideaof a logical alphabet, 245. 

LUSCHAU, III, 

VOlker, Sprachen, Rassen, 495. 

LUTHER, MARTIN, I, LUTHER'S spiritualisticdistinction between LAW and GOSPEL, 511; 
his Occamist Nominalism; he opposestemporal ordinances to Evangelical freedom, 
separates faith from science; although 
he opposed Aristotelism as well 
as ERASMUS, he was influenced by Ecii-
HART and the Augustinian Franciscanspirit; his nominalistic dualistic view of

.

the Church; in this dualism was impliedhis subsequently abandoned distinctionbetween official and, 512, personal morality; 
his dualistic attitude towardsscientific thought rested on a prejudiceconcerning the relation between faithand natural reason, 513; LUTHER did not 
escape falling into a spiritualistic antino


mianism, 519.

—, II, his dualistic scheme of nature and 

grace, 157, 159; he was a leader, 243.

—, III,
Luthers Werke (Braunschweig, 1892),


514, 545;
Vom Papstum zu Rom wider den hoggeriihmten 
Romanisten zu Leipzig, 514.
—, III, agape, eros, and original sin; he


gave love primacy in marriage, but ascribed 
sexual pleasure to original sin, 314;
he rejected celibacy and the monastic
vow of chastity; but rema ined dependent
on the Roman views of marriage as a
"less perfect state", 315; the relation between 
the ecclesia visibilis and ecclesia 
invisibilis according to LUTHER, 512 ; his
dualism favoured the formation of sectarian 
conventicles because of his hypostatization 
of the faith aspect of the
temporal institution to the super-natural
order; congregatio fidelium, 513; the
peasant revolt induced him to turn to the
Elector of Saxony to give the Church an
external organization and to institute visitation, 
514 ; LUTHER'S idea of giving the
congregation the right to elect Church officers 
and to maintain doctrinal discipline
is not of fundamental importance, 515;
the Evangelical princes are to render a 


service of love in the Church and not to 

have dominion; he did not properly un


derstand the juridical aspect of their service, 
545. 

LYCIANS, III, the ancient Lycians had matriarchy, 
331. 

M 

MACCHIAVELLI, I, displayed a tension between 
pessimism and optimism in com


bining virtue and necessity, 217.
—, III, influenced by POLYBIUS, 231; histheory of the "raison d'etat" appealed toby the adherents of the theory of the

power State, 399. 

MACH, ERNST, I, founder of Neo-Positivism, 
whose centre was the Vienna School,
expected a more adequate approach toreality from modern natural science; formulas 
and concepts of physics are meresymbols, 213; his purely technical conception 
of the Humanistic Science-ideal,
556; his own and OSTWALD9S oppositionto the acceptance of real atoms and lightwaves, and their attempt to resolve physical 
causality into a purely mathematicalconcept of function, depends on theirpositivist sensualistic standpoint in philosophy, 
557; a mathematically formulated 
theory is correct if it explains inthe simplest way possible the phenomenaknown up till the present time by bringing 
them in a functional coherence; this

is the principle of logical economy, 558.

—, II, the term "principle of economy",
66, 123; biologistic interpretation of lo


gical economy, 175. 
MACRO- AND MICROCOSM, III, in PLATO, 207. 
MAGIC, II, FRAZER denies that magic be


longs to "religion", i.e., to a cult in themodal meaning of faith, 312; he holdsthat every cult is preceded by a period ofmagic; magic is directed to the impersonal 
forces of nature, and does not striveafter the propitiation of the deity, butaims at dominating nature; the discoveryof the inefficacy of magic leads to thefeeling of the power of the invisible, andfrom this feeling arises the worship ofthe personified forces of nature, anddeath; later on to polytheism, and then

to monotheism, 313. 

EXTENSIVE MAGNITUDE, II, as a complexanticipation of space in the irrationalfunction of number within the series of 

the "real numbers", 170. 

MAIER, HEINRICH, I, 
Philipp. Melanchton als Philosoph, 515. 


MAIMON, SALOMON, I, 
Versuch fiber die Transzendentalphiloso


phie, 405, 407;
'Ober die Progressen der Philosophie, 406.
he introduced into KANT's episte



 

MAIMONIDES 150 

uiology LEIBNIZ' doctrine of the "petites 
perceptions", eliminated the concept 
"Ding an sich"; his method to have the 
"matter" of experience originate from 
the transcendental consciousness is an 
apostasy from KANT's transcendental motive; 
KANT's philosophy had started critical 
self-reflection on the personality 
ideal, MAIMON dropped it, 404 ; MAIMON 
wants to overcome the antinomy of the 
Cricital form-matter schema; he reduced 
"sensory experience" to the creative consciousness 
as purely theoretical; the matter 
of knowledge is produced unconsciously 
in the consciousness; it is to be 
understood as the "transcendental differential" 
of clear transcendental-logical 
thought; "Ding an sich" becomes a theoretical 
limiting concept; oriented to the 
continuity postulate of the science ideal; 
M.'s basic problem is that of the universal 
a priori forms of the "transcendental 
consciousness" and the particular matter, 
405; MAIMON tried to reconcile mathematical 
idealism with Critical transcendentalism; 
to the Idea of the Divine Understanding 
any Critique of pure Reason 
must be reduced; this was a regression to 
dogmatism; MAIMON tries to give KANT'S 
matter of consciousness a mathematical 
basis; the understanding asks after the 
origin of the sensory impressions of the 
Gegenstand, 406; KANT'S Idea or noumenon 
becomes a mathematical differential 
concept as the foundation of KANT'S sensory 
matter of consciousness; the Idea 
knows no other arche but creative mathematical 
thought, 407; he tries to clarify 
the relation of the particular to the universal 
by means of his new conception 
of the Idea as "differential of consciousness'; 
the modal particularity of meaning 
must be reduced to its origin, according 
to a logical principle of creation; the 
problem of specification is set in the 
frame of a cosmonomic Idea; he starts 
with the specification of the formal logical 
concepts into the special concepts 
of mathematics; he refers space as "apriori 
form of intuition" to its logical 
origin; then the problem broadens to that 
of the origin of all "real" thought in universally 
valid synthetic judgments with 
a special sense; his principle of determinability, 
408; this expresses the Idea 
of logical domination of the manifold in 
the special Gegenstdnde of thought, not 
to be derived from merely analytical 
principles; the principle of determinability 
becomes the origin principle of all 
particular judgments of knowledge, in 
which thought becomes "thinking of 
being", and all being becomes "being of 
thought"; three ways to combine a plurality 
of objects of consciousness into a 
logical unity; the elements are inter-independent; 
then thought remains formal; 
the elements are inter-dependent; cause 
and effect in a judgment of causality, 409; 

in the mathematical style of thinking, e.g., 
thought becomes thought of reality; the 
predicate cannot be thought without the 
subject; empirical judgments are synthetic 
but do not hang together systematically 
according to the principle of determinability; 
gold is a complex sense 
perception ; the reason of its qualities 
occurring together is hidden; here is 
MAImoN's critical scepticism, 410; he 
ends in scepticism with respect to KANT'S 
a priori principles of experience; he only 
acknowledges as valid the logicized mathematics 
and the transcendental philosophy 
as science of the synthetic origin 
of the pure forms of consciousness; his 
continuity postulate of the science ideal 
halts before the boundary of sensory 
phenomena, 411; M.'s dilemma with respect 
to the "Ideas": they are either to be 
taken in LEIBNIZ' sense, or as mere fictions 
of phantasy in HUME'S sense; later 
on LEIBNIZ' speculative Idea of God lost 
its significance to MAIMON, the Ideas tend 
to be fictitious; he sharply separated 
reason and sensibility; his transcendental 
basic Idea lacks unity in its Archimedean 
point, 412; MAIMON influenced FICHTE, 

427. 
—, II, denied that KANT'S synthetical 
judgments could be a priori applied to 
the sensory matter of experience, 449. 
MAIMONIDES, I, sought to synthesize the 
Old Testament and Aristotelianism, 173. 


MAINE, SUMMER, III, on the evolution from 
status to contract, 178. 


MAJORITY PRINCIPLE, III, rejected by 
ARISTOTLE, 211. 


MALAN, G. H. T., II, 
De Eerste (Getals-)kring van Dooyeweerd, 
84, 85, 89. 
—, II, starts from the "Gegenstandstheo 
rie" of A.MEINONG; he holds that number 
pre-supposes sensory perceptible pre-
numeral sets of discrete objects, 84 ; he 
interprets BERTRAND RUSSELL; accuses 
DOOYEWEERD of hypostatizing a quantative 
mode of being "number"; MALAN'S original 
objects with number, 84; numbers are 
his "objects" of the third stage; "prenumeral 
sets", 85. 


MALBERG, CARRE DE, III, 
Contribution a la thêorie gênêrale de 
l'Etat, 407. 


MALEBRANCHE, I, his idea concerning a 
"visio omnium rerum in Deo", 525. 
—, II, strongly influenced SCHELER'S 
phenomenology, 589. 


MALINOWSKY, II, contradicts CASSIRER'S 
assertion that in a primitive community 
the individuality of its members is totally 
.absorbed, 320. 
—, 
Crime and Custom in Savage Society, 371. 



 

15 1 MANUS MARITI IN JUS CIVILE 

—, III, legal, moral, social and faith rulesare not interwoven into an undifferentiated 
unity in primitive societies; theyhave differentiated categories of norms;
he also criticizes the current view that 
primitive societies do not possess an ideaof "propriety" (Sitte), 371. 

MAN, I, he whose ego expresses itself in

the coherence of all its temporal modal

functions, was created as the expression

of God's image, 4; man transcends the

temporal coherence in his selfhood, but

within this coherence he exists in a 

status of being universally bound to time,

together with all creatures that are fitted

with him in the same temporal order, 24;

as an individual totality of functions in

RICKERT'S thought, 129; according to

NIETSCHE, man is a "phantastic animal,

not yet fixed", 211; may be an end in

himself only in the subject-object rela


tion, 377; was created as a "homo nou


menon'_' 2 not as a "phenomenon", accord


ing to KANT, 380. 

, III, is a microcosm in PLATO, 207 ; his 

hierarchical structure of the three parts

of the soul; individual man is a kind of 

state ruled by reason, 230 ; the body of

man is the vehicle of the soul; this is an 

objectivistic conception in PLATO, 778. 

MANA, II, the divine mana is also named 
orenda, wakonda, manitu, dema; the 
mana-idea possesses a peculiar fluidity;
in it the natural and the super-natural, 
the personal and the impersonal aremerged; its counterpart is taboo; the disintegration 
of the sense of personal identity 
in mana and totemism, 316; is elevated 
above the familiar every-day sphereof life which can be conceived by common 
sense; it is personified in mythicalfigures embodied in visible things: plants,
animals, men, and also in unfamiliar or 
huge objects, regarded as the masks ofthe mysterious mana, 317. 

MANA-BELIEF, III, in totemistic clans, 356. 

MANGOLD, H., III, he gave rise to an entirely 
new embryo by transplanting apiece of the blastopore of a gastrula intothe tissue of another embryo, 752. 

MANKIND, IDEA OF, II, the categorical im


perative of KANT'S philosophy demandsrespect for the Idea of mankind, 149. 

MANKIND, III, the fall of mankind, 69; and 
love, 71; mankind is not enclosed in atemporal kingdom of individual beings,
87, 89; racial differences, 89; is not a 
temporal community, 163 ; the Biblicalrevelation, 168; the Stoic conception andthat of HUGO GROTIUS, 169; mankind is a 
central religious community, 170; thereligious solidarity of mankind, 196. 

MANNHEIM, KARL, I, sociology of thought,

165. 
MANNHEIM, KARL, III, on the sociology ofthought, 289. 

MANORIAL COMMUNITIES, III, villae, do 
maines; they are undifferentiated organized communities, 367. 

MAN'S POSITION IN THE WORLD, III, this i S 
a question of anthropology; it can onlybe dealt with after we have gained insight into the transcendental conditionof philosophic thought and into the different dimensions of the temporal horizon with its modal and individualitystructures; existentialism seeks an imme 
diate approach to the innermost sphereof man's temporal existence to interprethe I-ness in its situation in the world 
from the supposedly most fundamentalstrata of human existence of concern 
care, dread, i.e., its "Existentialen"; BINS 
WANGER replaces HEIDEGGER'S "dread" by"love" (the meeting between I and thou)
this seems to assume a trustworthy Christian 
meaning; this existentialistic trendis not interested in structural investigations 
like ours, 781; it pretends it canpenetrate into its subject matter by animmediate "encounter"; "encounter" as 
the genuine inner knowledge method isopposed to "experience" as affording"objectifying outer knowledge"; Christianneo-scholasticists think this existentialist 
anthropology more "Biblical" than rationalism 
and idealism; this is another attempt 
at accommodation; SOREN KIER


KEGAARD considered existentialism to be 

separated from the Divine Revelation inJesus Christ by an unbridgeable gulf; theultimate and central questions cannot beanswered by philosophy in an autonomous 
way; they are religious; they areanswered in the Divine Word Revelation; 
Christian theologians and philosophersjoin existentialism and thereby reject theradical transcendental critique of philosophic 
thought; it is wrong to expect somuch from philosophic anthropology;
the question about man's temporal existential 
form implies a series of primordialproblems; man as such has no qualifyingfunction, but transcends all temporalstructures; man is not a "rational-moral 
being"; he is the creaturely centre of thewhole earthly cosmos; he has an eternaldestination in the fulness of his individual 
personality, 783; in temporal humanexistence we are confronted with an extremely 
intricate system of enkapticstructural interlacements which pre-suppose 
a comprehensive series of individuality 
structures bound within an enkaptic

structural whole; the question about "whois man?" is unaswerable from the immanence 
standpoint, 784. 

MANSION, S., III, 
La premiere doctrine de la substance, 16. 


MANUS MARITI IN JUS CIVILE, III, the old 
Roman conception, 325. 


 

MARBLE152 

MARBLE, III, its structure; its function ina sculpture; a phenotype of an originalgenotype of inorganic matter, 119; itsstructure, 124, 125, 126. 

MARBLE SCULPTURE, III, its enkapsis, 111. 

MARCHAL, II,
Gegenstand und: Wesender Wirtschaftg=
wissenschaft, 123. 


MARCK, SIEGFRIED, III,
Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff in


der Rechtsphilosophie, 255, 259, 401, 408.
—, III, he holds that THEODOR LITT has
produced "a new type of social universalism 
in contrast to the old dogmatic and
ontological version", 255; he rejects GIERKE'S 
distinction between inner corporative 
and inter-individual law (Sozialrecht
and Individualrecht), 259; he is oriented
to LITT'S dialectical sociology; he capitu


lates to the dualism of sein and sollen;
but rejects the dialectical solution of
Hegelianism; he remains dialectical phenomenological, 
401; he opposes organization 
to social organism, 408. 


MARCKS, ERICH, III,
Gaspard von Coligny, 521.
—, III, interprets CALVIN'S idea of Church
government as the expression of the sovereignty 
of the congregation, 521. 


MARITAIN, I, a French Neo-Thomist 
thinker, 524. 


MARETT, III, an adherent of BOAS, 333. 


MARKET, FRE1, III, and competition, 661. 

MARKET EQUILIBRIUM, II, and the mechanical 
analogies of price-movement gave
the mechanistic conceptions of pure economics 
a firm basis in the opinion of
economists influenced by the classical


Idea of mathesis universalis, 344. 
MARLET, MICHAEL FR. J., S.J., III,


Grundlinien der Kalvinistischen Philosophie 
der Gesetzidee als Christicher Transcendentalphilosophie, 
6, 15, 73.
—, III, interprets the substance concept
as a structure of being; its relation to the
accidentalia, 16; he objects to the rejection 
of the substance concept; and says
that in the struggle against MICHAEL SERVET 
CALVIN exaggerated God's transcendence 
at the expense of man's being, accentuating 
God's immanence at the expense 
of man's creaturely activity, 72;
on the philosophy of the Cosmonomic


Idea, 73. 
MARRIAGE, III, conjugal relations remain


separate from family relations; bi-unity
in marriage; polygamy means a plurality
of marriages; the harem is an enkapsis;
the joint or extended family, polygamous
or not; patriarchial agnatic kinship; the
Roman family, 305; the Roman family excluded 
polygamy; the termination of the
marriage bond,306; marriage and family;
radical and geno types; sexual union for 


the propagation of the race; marriage asa legal institution; love has primacy, 307;
Scholastic view considered love •as a 
changeable feeling instrumental to propagation; 
civil and canon law regulationshave a formal and external character,
308; the structure of the conjugal community 
subjects its partners to its institutional 
law, not to their arbitrary discretion, 
309; this law requires constantvital realization of the conjugal structure;
permanent anti-normative behaviour destroys 
the internal union, but does not dissolve 
marriage as a civil (tribal, or ecclesiastical) 
institution, 310; canon law andcivil law may be in conflict with eachother; the social form of marriage ismaintained; divorce; Christ and the Pharisees, 
311; misuse of the New Testament;
the Thomistic theory of the bona matrimonii; 
marriage as a natural law institution; 
this view favoured the idea of the 
primacy of the legal institution; canonlaw jurists and Roman Catholic philosophers 
elevate marriage as a divine and anatural law institution to a "sacrament",
312; marriage is meant for the propagation 
of the human race according to Tho-
mists like CATHREIN, VON SCHERER, HoE-
GEN, 313; agape, eros, in LUTHER; Scholastic 
Protestant ethics; LUTHER'S greatCatechism gives love the primacy in marriage; 
AUGUSTINUS considered sexualpleasure as due to sin; LUTHER ascribedthe sexual eros to the corruption of human 
nature, 314 ; the pre-Thomistic viewof marriage as a sacrament served tosanctify the supposed sinful sexual eroticbasis through "the means of grace of theChurch"; marriage was a "less perfectstate"; later Lutheranism considered itas the juridical order of sexual intercourse 
with the positive duty of procreation; 
Reformed ethics was taintedwith Scholasticism, 315; the rationalisticEnlightenment; its view of married loveas a "blind passion" was individualistic;
the methodist WHITEFIELD boasted that in 
his proposal of marriage there had beenno question of love "that foolish passion";
this was rationalistic utilitarian puritanism; 
the genetic juridical form of themarriage bond was absolutized in theHumanistic doctrine of natural raw; marriage 
became the right to use each other'sbody; but until the Enlightenment marriage 
was held to be a permanent unionwhich could not be dissolved by mutualagreement; a contract giving rise to jurain re was already found in Canon Law,
316; but it concerned marriage in thestate of becoming, the matrimonium infieri (not in esse) ; its causa was procreation; 
its essence was found in thetraditio corporum; KANT'S view; he relates 
marriage exclusively to subjectivesexual enjoyment; his crude definition;
Romantic view of free love versus marriage 
as an institution, 317; in this con



 

153 MARX, KARL 

ception nature was said to be dialectically 
united with freedom without anynormative commitment; the aestheticist 
morality of men of genius; SCHLEGEL'S"Lucinde" embodied the Romantic ideal 
of free love; FICHTE'S actualistic view of 
sexual love was incompatible with the institutional 
character of the marriage community, 
ignored its external civil juridical 
aspect as well as its internal juridical 
side; HEGEL held the essence of 
marriage to be a juridical moral kind oflove, 318; Roman Catholic recognitionof the primacy of love; the new tendency: 
the Encyclical Casti Connubii; HILDEBRAND'S 
view, 319, 320; HILNEBRAND ; older 
Roman Catholic conceptions: CATHREIN 
; THOMAS AQUINAS, 321; the Encyclical 
"Casti Cunibii"; it compares veryfavourably with E. BRUNNER'S conceptionof love as a "sandy ground"; marriage isintentionally adapted to the family relationship; 
and deepend by it; the self-
hoods of the marriage partners are forall eternity interwoven with the new rootof life, Christ Jesus; this is the religiousfulness of meaning of marriage; they belong 
to each other as children of oneFather in Christ; in a temporal sensethey belong to each other as if they didnot; temporal ties are perishable, 322;
the religious union should find expression 
in the temporal; in a family the conjugal 
bi-unity has been expanded in aunity in plurality; the personality of themarriage partners in its temporal existence 
finds fuller expression in theirunion, and acquires a wider and deeperperspective in the multi-unitary bond ofthe family; THOMAS says that posterity isessential to the marital bond; this is an 
error; childless marriages are genuinemarriages; THOMAS' view is contradictory, 
323 ; married love sanctified inChrist justifies the sexual consummationof marriage; temperance and chastity;
marital authority; its external juridicalfunction, 324 ; the old Roman manus mariti 
in ius civile; the Roman legal concept 
of the agnatic patrician familia asconcerned with an undifferentiated societal 
relationship, viz. the domestic community 
of the pater familias with its enkaptically 
interwoven structures; manusmarriage; its disappearance; a husband'sjus vitae ac necis with respect to his wifein Roman law; a husband's authority leadsbut does not dominate; male and femaleare equivalent, though not equal ; maritalauthority and normal emotional life; female 
emotional life wants to find support 
and guidance in the husband, 325;
the question of normal male and femalefeeling; cultural influences; the normative 
structural principle, 326; effeminacy 
in men; authority in the juridicalaesthetical and social function of marriage; 
no autocracy; marriage is not astate in miniature; the co-responsibility 

of the wife; and civil law; the civil judgeshould not be the supreme power of decision 
here, 327; the female lead in marriage 
is a disharmony; the aesthetic function 
in marriage; social and lingual formsof intercourse in marriage, 328 ; maritalauthority is biotically founded; activeand passive roles in sexual intercourse;
ARISTOTLE'S notions about the genesis of 
woman; the wife was held to be essentially 
imperfect; THOMAS AQUINAS callsher: "mas occasionatus"; "aliquid viri";
not "civis simpliciter"; marital authority,
however, is a divine ordinance, 329; ethnological 
research should start from thestructural principle of marriage when investigating 
marriage relations in primitive 
tribes; facts can only be conceivedin their structural meaning; "empirical"
norms; "ideal types", are useless; MAXWEBER; matriarchy in evolutionism; thesocialist theories of ENGELS and BEBEL ; 
were based on L. H. MORGAN'S hypotheses; 
matriarchy discussed by J. J.
BACHOVEN ; he derived marriage frompromiscuous sexual intercourse; matriarchy 
among the Lycians of Antiquity;
BACHOVEN'S explanation ; women inventedagriculture; then came patriarchy; L.
MORGAN elaborated this theme; the refutation 
of this theory, 331; about matriarchy 
and the Kulturkreislehre, 332-339;
other abnormal external forms of marriage 
and family: levirate, sororate,
brother-polyandry, the pirra-urra-rela


tion; FRAZER'S theory of "group-marriage", 
339; his explanation of levirate;
levirate and sororate are forms of "preferential 
marriages"; rare occurrence ofpolyandry; and then only brother polyandry; 
only the first born marries onewoman; polyandry is usually foundamong peoples that lived, or still live, inmatriarchy; matriarchy and patriarchywere mixed; the right of primo-geniture;
THURSTON pointed to the aim of polyandry; 
polyandry among the ancient Babylonians 
: URUCAGINA OF LAGASCH boasted 
of having abolished the practice, 340; po.lyandry 
is a sanctioned juridical proprietary 
share in the wife; pirra-ura is anexternal enkapsis of the marriage bondwith abnormal sexual relations, 341. 

MARSILIUS OF PADUA, I, he was an Averroistic 
Nominalist, 188; the general will,
in which every citizen encounters hisown will, cannot do any injustice to anyone: volenti non fit injuria, 323.
—, III, the Averroist nominalistic individualist 
view of the state as grounded inthe general will of united individuals,
224 ; his theory of the social contract,
232; state absolutism, mitigated by intermediary 
autonomous corporations between 
citizen and state, 236. 

MARX, KARL, I, transformed HEGEL'S dialectic 
into historical materialism; the 
ideological super structure of society was_ 


MARXISM 


explained in terms of a reflection of theeconomic mode of production; Marxismwas united with Darwinism, but theystill believed in a final developmentalgoal outside historical relativity, 210.
—, III, 
Per Historische Materialismus, 456. 
—, III, mechanized the idea of "organization", 
406; his Hegelianism; privateand public law will vanish after the socialist 
revolution, 455; the united world-
proletariat; historical materialism; thefuture State, 456. 

MARXISM, I, originated from HEGEL'S dialectic, 
210.
—, II, rightly assumes that there is a historical-
economic sub-structure of aesthetic 
life, justice, morals, and faith; but itseparates this conception from the cosmic 
order of aspects and assumes it canexplain the aesthetic, juridical, moral andfaith phenomena in terms of economics, 

293. 
MASS-MAN, III, the totalitarian state sacrifices 
individual man, and appeals to thespiritually uprooted mass-man, 397;
mass-man and fashion, 592. 

MASS-PRODUCTION, III, and bad taste, 139. 

MASUR, GERHARD, II, 
Ranke's Begriff der Weltgeschichte, 269,


282. 
—, II, on RANKE and the disintegration
of the realm of values at the end of the 
nineteenth century, 282. 
MATERIA, II, signata vel individualis, andthe immortal soul, 419. 
,

MATERIA PRIMA, I, is the force of tne Leibnizian 
monads, 231. 

MATERIAL CRITERION OF UNLAWFULNESS, 
III, was formulated by the Dutch Supreme 
Court; it cannot be explained bythe contractual theory, 686. 

MATERIALISM, I, in HOBBES, 122. 

MATHEMATICAL CONCEPTS, I, are natural 
and usual, but useless and incomprehensible 
fictions to HUME, 285. 

MATHEMATICAL SCIENCE IDEAL, I, was undermined 
by PETER BAYLE, 260. 

MATHEMATICS, I, criticized by DAVIDHUME, 280, 28i, 283, 284, 285; creates its 
own Gegenstand; and metaphysics followdifferent methods; mathematical thought

remains bound to sensory experience;
KANT, 336, 337.

—, II, formalized geometry, 63 ; geometry 
of measure and geometry of position;
analytic and projective geometry; DESCARTES' 
analytic geometry, 103 ; PONCELET'S 
projective geometry; correlationbetween two spatial figures; the imaginary 
figure; imaginary points of intersection; 
transformation; comparison withimaginary number; principle of progres


154 

sion, 104 ; radical axis; anticipation ofmovement; theory of CAYLEY and KLEINis antinomous, 105; mathesis universalis, 
337 ff.; DIDEROT on mathematics; its modal 
sphere-sovereignty; "pure mathematics"; 
logical and symbolical disclosure;
economy of mathematical thought; lateranticipatory spheres opened, 339; CANTOR'S 
"set"-theory; transfinite numberscriticized by H. WEYL, etc. ; biotic anticipatory 
sphere in number and space;
MEYER'S view, 340; "pure mathematics",
341; its prejudices; social and juridicalanticipations in the mathematical aspect,
342; natural law; the jural sphere treated'
"more geometrico"; atomistic mechanistic 
view of the State; other communities; 
contractual constructions, 342; mathesis 
universalis in "pure" economics; prices,
SCHREIER'S theory of law, 343, 344;
EUCKEN'S analysis; the cause of the trouble 
in economic theory; mathesis universalis 
and aesthetics, 345; HUSSERL'S and 
HILBERT'S views, 452. 

MATHEMATICS, PURE, I, and philosophy; isnot a priori in the sense that it can proceed 
from arbitrary maxims, 549; is notconfronted with reality in its typical individuality 
structures, 554. 

MATHESIS, I, Mathesis pura et mathesisapplicata in KANT, 344. 

MATHESIS UNIVERSALIS, I, HUSSERL tried 
to rejuvinate this idea, 213 ; in LEIBNIZ,

229; in DESCARTES, 529. 
—, II, the Humanistic Idea of mathesis 
universalis and the social and juridicalanticipatory spheres of the mathematicalaspect, 342; its seeming success in pureeconomics, especially in the theory ofprices; the one-sided mechanistic and logical 
orientation of this Idea has prevented 
pure economics from analyzing thecomplicated structure of the mechanicalanalogies in economics, 344 ; and music,
in DESCARTES, 346. 

MATING, III, in animal life, compared withhuman marriage, 324. 

MATRIARCHY, III, among the ancient Lycians; 
socialist theories based on MORGAN'S 
hypothesis, 331-339; matriarchyis connected with the rise of agriculture,
338; is alien to the internal domain of 
marriage and family, 339. 

MATRIX OF LIVING MATTER, III, is substan


tial, in WOLTERECK'S conception, 23, 24;
his term "bio-molecule", 725 (note) ;
germ-plasm, idio plasm, reserve plasm,
751; the "matrix" produces itself if needbe; inductive components; enzymes, hormones, 
"protein combinations"; "organizers", 
genes, 752. 

MATTER, I, is only potentiality in ARISTOTLE, 
26; is the metaphysical principleof imperfection and potentiality, 67; does 


155 MELANCHTON, PH. 

not owe its origin to the deity, in ARISTOTLE, 
182. 

MATTER, II, viewed as a filling up ofmathematical space; in classical physics;

NATORP on energy as a substance of occurrence, 
95; moving matter as a fillingup of space is exclusively oriented to thesensory aspect of experience; this latterappeals to our pure intuition of movement; 
matter determines physical space,
101; the idea of matter as a filling up ofspace is antinomous, 102; NICOLAI HARTMANN'S 
layers of being and his opinionthat "matter" as a lower layer would becompletely "transformed" by life, 111. 
—, III, according to AUGUST BRUNNER, inthe material sphere the cultural object isthe prototype of a "substance", 6; matter

is opposed to form in Greek metaphysics,
and is the principle of becoming and decay; 
matter is never "ousia"; it becomesactual by assuming a form in an individual 
thing, in ARISTOTLE'S metaphysics;
the matter motive is given the primacyby ANAXAGORAS, 7; matter is void ofbeing, in PLATO, the me on, 8; ARISTOTLE 
conceives of geometrical forms as of "intelligible 
matter", 8; eidos is used in twosenses, 9; ousia synthetos, in ARISTOTLE, 
10; matter is the principle of individuality 
in THOMAS AQUINAS, 16,17; matter andmind are logical structures of relationsbetween events, in B. RUSSELL, 21; NEWTON'S 
"material units", 23 ; material substance, 
in DESCARTES, 27; secondary and 

primary qualities of matter, 37; HUSSERL'S

"regions" of the "material sphere", 54;
"living" and "dead" matter, in DRIESCH, 
742; in chemistry matter is a system of
equilibrium between protons, neutrons,


and electrons, 760. 


MATTER-MOTIVE, I, had the primacy in
Ionian philosophy, 66; in ANAXIMANDER;
this motive qualifies ANAXIMENES' materialism, 
122. 


MAUSZ, HUBERT ET, II, 
Esquisse d'une thêorie genêrale de la


magie, 317. 
MAXWELL, III, his electro-magnetic theo


ry, 706. 


MEAD, MARGARITE, III, 

An Investigation of the Thought of Primitive 
Children, with Special Preference

to Animism, 34. 
MEANING, I, the universal 'character ofreferring and expressing proper to ourentire created cosmos; meaning is thebeing of all that is created and the nature 
even of our selfhood, 4; it constantlypoints without and beyond itself towardan Origin which is itself no longer meaning, 
10; meaning and being; in STOKER; 
and in RICKERT, 97; meaning connectsreality and value, according to RICKERT,

132. 
—, II, modal diversity of meaning; mean11 


ing coherence, 3, 4; analysis and synthesis 
of meaning; logical and cosmic diversity, 
5; the law of refraction of cosmictime, 6; the criterion of an aspect is itsgeneral meaning; a functional modalityof the religious fulness of meaning, 7;
meaning and reality, 25, 26; "nature" ismeaningless in FICHTE; neo-Kantianism;
meaning and signification in HUSSERL; 
HUSSERL identifies them; he also identifies 
meaning with the pure Act in itsnoetic and its noematic aspect, 27 ; meaning 
is "the intentional content of an Act ofconsciousness in HUSSERL'S phenomenology; 
noema and Gegenstand, and meaning,
28; PAUL HOFMANN'S subjectivism, 29; hislogology;DOOYEWEERD'S view : meaning assuch is the convergence of all temporalaspects into the religious root, 30; distinction 
between reality and meaning is rejected; 
can a burning house be meaning?
everything that exists does so in somestructure of meaning; meaning is thecreaturely mode of being under the law,
31; is sinful reality "meaning"? the relation 
of dependence on God is not annihilated 
by depraved creation ; sin is notmere privation, it reveals apostate powerderived from the creation; Gratia communis 
and meaning, 33; the religious value 
of the modal criterion ; specificsphere-sovereignty, 36; meaning-compo


nents of a word, 226. 

MEANING-IDEALISM, I, Of RICKERT, 97. 

MEANING-TOTALITY, I, philosophic self-reflection 
requires being directed towardthe Archê of our seflhood as well as of 
the meaning-totality, 11; the ego is theinner concentration point where all theaspects meet, converging into the unityof direction towards the Archê; themeaning totality or fulness of meaningis the necessary transcendent centre of

the mutually cohering aspects, 16. 

MECHANICS, DEVELOPMENTAL, III, in W. 

Roux, 752, 761. 

MEDIEVAL GERMAN STATE, III, VON BELOW'S 

studies, 439 (note). 

MEDIEVAL JURIDICAL INTERLACEMENTS, III, 

mark ordinances; those for weddings,

funerals, poor relief, the Church; craftguilds; guild ban, 672. 

MEDIEVAL OBJECTS, III, castles, 146 ; attire,

147. 
MEINONG, II, his "Gegenstandstheorie"
and MALAN'S critique of the first modal

law-sphere, 83. 

MENZEL, ADOLF, II, on PROTAGORAS' theory

of cultural development, 263. 


MEKKES, J. P. A., III, 
Proeve eener critische Beschouwing der
Humanistische Rechtsstaatstheorieen, 426. 


MELANCHTON, 'PH., I, LEIBNIZ was educated 
in the Scholastic philosophy of ME



 

MENDELSSOHN 156 

LANCHTON, 226; he undertook the task of 
establishing a relation between the Reformation 
and modern science but relapsed 
into Scholasticism ; his influencewas detrimental to the development of atruly Reformed philosophy; he dominated 
Protestant universities up to the Enlightenment; 
he grew up in a circle ofGerman Humanists, admired AGRICOLA, 
enjoyed the friendship of ERASMUS andWILLIBALD PIRKHEIMER, 513 ; his inaugural 
address was only expressive of hisphilological Humanism ; his academic re-.
formation remained within the Scholastic 
encyclopaedia, inspired as he was byERASMUS and AGRICOLA; the latter aimed 
at an accommodation of the Ilumanistic 
personality ideal to a supposedly"simple,
Biblical Christianity"; but they reallyhumanized the radical Christian doctrine 
moralistically, 514 ; MELANCHTON opposedonly speculative realistic metaphysicswith its "universalia", "formalitates", its 
theory of the infinite, etc.; he retainedthe Nominalistic dialectic; REUCHLIN and 
ERASMUS broke with MELANCHTON ; in 

1536 he brought about a definitive synthesis 
between Lutheran faith and a nominalistically 
interpreted Aristotelian 
philosophy.

--, III,

Loci (Corpus doctrinae Lips., 1561), 515;
Unterricht der Visitatoren, 545. 

MENDEL$SOHN, I, developed CRUSIUS' distinctions 
further, 340. 

MEN'S SOCIETIES, III, in primitive tribes; 
arise from a reaction to matriarchy, 357,363-365; and the dichotomy of the sexes, 

365. 
MENZEL, A., III,
Griechische Staatssoziologie, 205, 219, 
380;


Beitrdge zur Geschichte der Staatslehre, 
206; 
Der Staatsgedanke des Faschismus, 415, 
421, 431.


—, III, he denies that ARISTOTLE'S view 
of the State has no internal structural 
limitation, 380 (note) ; MUSSOLINI appealed 
to the tradition of ancient Rome, 415; 
moral power of the State in an international 
sense; military power and war are the
supreme court of justice of the nations, 


421. 
MERCANTILISM, II, the Humanistic view of 
natural law was united with economic 

individualism and was expanded in a
mercantilistic spirit as long as it turned
into state-absolutism, 360. 


MERCIER DE LA RIVIERE, III, his demo-
liberal ideology suggests that public opinion 
rules, 492. 


MESSER, AUGUST, I, 
Deutsche Wertphilosophieder Gegenwart, 
136.


—, I, only 'a "realism of values" such as 


PLATO'S doctrine of Ideas rests on hypostatization, 
136. 
—, II, 
Psychologie, 483, 484.
—, II, pre-theoretical attention is rigidly
bound to psychical factors, 483; his psycological 
explanation of attention, 484 
(note). 


METABOLISM, III, in a living organism, 61,62 ; it happens through ferments, 730. 

METAPHORS, III, should evoke a visionarypicture of nature, in poetry, 68 ff. 

METAPHYSICS, I, rationalistic metaphysics deifies thought, 13; (rationalistic)
arche and Arehimedean point remain distinct; 
the arche is the Intellectus Archetypus, 
20; metaphysics and natural theology 
are impossible on OCCAM'S standpoint, 
67; speculative metaphysics resultsfrom the failure to recognize the limitsof philosophic thought, 93 ; metaphysicsof nature criticized by BERKELEY, 203.
—, II, ancient and medieval, 9-14, 15; 
of knowledge; N. HARTMANN, 19; idealistic 
metaphysics absolutizes the rationalfunction; N. HARTMANN has no sense of 
the transcendence of the selfhood, 20; 
Greek and Scholastic metaphysics, 21;
HEIDEGGER attacks ancient and modern 
metaphysics, 22; being as the ultimateidea of reason in immanence metaphysics; in post-Kantian freedom Idealism;
the deity is actual pure form in ARISTOTLE; 
divine creative mathematical thoughtwas the true ground of being in pre-kantian Humanistic metaphysics; PLATO'Sgenesis eis ousian, 26; antinomies in speculative 
metaphysics, 35; Thomistic proofsof the existence of God, 39; the speculative 
concept "cause" is an absolutization,
41; the four cosmological ideas of reason,
43; KANT'S controversy with speculativemetaphysics, 44; the metaphysical conception 
is unbiblical; in Thomism it isrelated to God, 52; Thomistic "objectivequalities", 53; Greek and Scholastic metaphysics 
and analogical concepts, 55;
PARMENIDES identified "true being" withlogical thought, 56; the metaph. doctrineof the analogia entis, 57; transcendentaldeterminations and distinctions of 
"being" are analogical; a vicious circle;
its cause, 58; the Scholastic principiumindividuationis, 417; individuality inGreek metaph. as an apeiron, a guilt, 418;
individuality in Nominalism; Realism;
ARISTOTLE'S form -matter scheme; THOMAS 
AQUINAS ; formae separatae and the human 
soul, 419; in pre-Kantian metaph.
the Gegenstand of theoretic thought is thesubjective reality of a substance independent 
of human experience, 467; speculative 
metaph. separates phenomenon fromnoumenon; also in phenomenology; inpositivism; in KANT, 539; the meaning ofthe word a-priori, 542; the doctrine ofthe substantial essential forms was to 


157 MODERN HUMANISTIC PHILOSOPHY 


account for the plastic horizon of expe


.

rience, 558; rational metaphysics of DESCARTES 
and LEIBNIZ, 584. 
—, III, on substance, noumenon and phenomenon, 
4; its substance concept is
rooted in an absolutization of the theoretical 
antithesis, 7; noumenal thing opposed 
to sensible things which are capable 
of generation and liable to destruction, 
9; substance (ousia) is the primary
category of being, the foundation of all
accidental categories, of an exclusively
intelligible character, a thing in itself,
not sensorily perceptible; its sensibility
is vested in human sensibility; its qualities 
are accidents, qualitates occultae; the
real meaning of the Aristotelian "ousia";
it is thought of as a synolon, i.e. a whole,
ousia synthetos, 10. 


METHEXIS, II, in PLATO; the phenomenon
shares in the true Being (ousia) ; the doctrine 
of temporal, changeable reality as a
genesis eis ousian, 26. 


METZGER, A., I, 


Phdnomenologie und Metaphysik, 203. 


METZGER, W., I, 
Gesellschaft, Recht und Staat in der Ethik 
des Deutschen Idealismus, 465. 


MEYER, AD., II, 

Die organische Wirklichkeit und ihre
Ideologien, 340.
—, II, a holistic biologist, 340, 341.
—, III, 
Logik der Morphologie, 80. 
-, III, his holism ; his concept "vitules", 
647, 722. 


MEYERHOF, 0., III, 


Die Naturwissenschaften, 644. 


MICHELS, R., III, 
Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der
modernen Demokratie, 605. 


MICRO- AND MACROCOSM, I, in the Renaissance, 
199. 
—, II, in SCHELER, 588, 589; pre-Socratics; 
PLATO; the Stoa; PHILO; Neo-Platofists; 
medieval Scholasticism, 592; the 
Renaissance; man is not a micro-cosm, 
593; naive experience does not know of
a cosmos as a "personal world", 594. 


MicRo-cosh, I, is human personality, reflecting 
infinite nature, according to G.
BRUNO, 199, 200. 


MICRO-PHYSICS, I, destroyed scientific
determinism, 212. 


MILITARY POWER, III, organized military
power has an anticipatory structure, 422. 


MILL, J. STUART, II, 
System of Logic, 119.
—, II, logical causality identified with
physical, 119; conditio sine qua non, 119. 


MIMOSA PUDICA, III, its leaves; the mim, 
pud. is an insectivorous plant, 645 (note). 


MIND, I, according to HUME "mind" is notthe theatre for "impressions" but consistsof nothing but "perceptions", 295, 296. 

MINERAL FORMATIONS, III, of protozoa andprotophytes, Si. 0 2-formations (radiola


ria), 724. 
MINING INDUSTRY, III, a free association,


574. 
MIRACLES, II, and Divine Providence were 
rejected by the Enlightenment, 352. 

MISSIONARIS, II, the isolating walls ofpartition (between primitive people andthe world of a higher culture) must bebroken, if there is to be any normativedynamics; very often it is the power ofthe sword that sets the opening-processgoing; but also peaceful powers like thatof Christian missionaries, 260. 

MITTEIS, H., III, 

Lehnrecht und Staatsgewalt, 440. 

MIXTUM, III, a mixtum is a new "substance" 
according to P. HOENEN, 707; hisneo-Thomistic conception : the virtualand the potential presence of the elements; 
the unity of an. extended "substance" 
does not exclude a diversity of

properties, 708. 
MNEMISM, III, of E. HERING, 733 (note). 
MNEMOSYNE, II, is idle in primitive cul


tures, 285. 

MODAL DIVERSITY, I, is the expression ofa totality of signification, 16. 

MODAL NUCLEUS, II, if nucleus, retrocipations 
and anticipations of a meaning modus 
have been found, there is no sense ina further analysis, 485. 

MODAL AND STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCE, III, 
in the case of undifferentiated and differentiated 
communities, 348. 

MODAL UNIVERSALITY, II, counterpart of

sphere sovereignty; the apparent success

of absolutizations and the various "-isms"; 

DAVID HUME'S universe of the imagina


tion, 331; truth in this conception, his

view is self-refuting; so is KANT'S, 332;

divine irony in all kinds of "-isms" in

the history of philosophy, 333 ; sphere

universality and world order; and the

Christian religion; the naive attitude;

dualism of belief and thought; nature

and grace, 334 ; the openingprocess and

modal sphere universality; the influence

of sin; the harmony of a perfect work of

art; the "spiritualization" of the material

sides in such an artifact; sin as a dis


concerting resistance, 335; 

MODERATION, II, and justice developed

under the guidance of popular faith in

Greece, 320, 321 (note). 

MODERN HUMANISTIC PHILOSOPHY, I, the 
boundaries between the theoretic and the 


MODERN HUMANISTIC PHILOSOPHY 158 

pre-theoretic attitude have been wiped Academy at Florence; the Erfurt Humaout 
gradually, so that the Humanist is nist MUTIANUS RUFUS, 189 ; the ambiguityunable to account for his cosmonomic of the Humanistic freedom motive; thisidea in philosophy, 169; the ilumaiiist motive calls forth the motive of domina-
life and world view from the outset pro- ting nature, leading to the religious selfclaimed the autonomy of human reason; surrender to autonomous science, 190;
there was a dogmatic reliance on theore- they are the results of the Humanistictical thought until the modern crisis; out secularization of the Christian motives ofof the crisis was born modern existen- creation and Christian freedom; moderntialism; in ancient and medieval philoso- man rejects "supernatural powers"; reliphy 
there was a balance between philo- gion must concentrate on man ; DESCARsophy 
and a life and world view; modern TES', KANT'S, and ROUSSEAU'S ideas of a 
Humanistic phil. has no such counter personal deity, 191; the ambiguity of thepoise; the Humanistic view of life and nature motive, 192; it leads to a deter-
the world was invaded by philosophy, ministic theoretical view of reality; thethe naïve and the theoretical attitude mathematical physical method of sciencewere equalized and the sense of religious becomes the model of scientific investicommitment 
was undermined; modern gation; all phenomena are ordered in aexistentialism sharply criticizes this im- causal series; a structureless view ofpersonal attitude of philosophic reflect- reality, 193 ; modern man thinks he canion; to the Enlightenment science was the rediscover himself in the endless (CUSAcrown-
witness of reason; the Humanism NUS, BRUNO) ; the limited is the metaphyof 
Renaissance times was still conscious sical evil in LEIBNIZ, 194 ; the principlesof real religious motives; in the 18th cen- of Humanistic philosophical thought retury 
Humanistic philosophy was popu- ceived their first clear formulation in thelarized and the religious awareness faded system of DESCARTES, 195; he founded allaway; there was no impulse towards re- knowledge in self-consciousness; thisligious selfconsciousness in the pre-theo- "cogito" implicitly proclaimed the soverretical 
attitude, but belief in the impar- eignty of mathematical thought, whichtiality and infallibility of theoretical he deified in his Idea of God, 196; ana-
thought, 170; the notion of the irreplace- lytical geometry became DESCARTES' me-
able significance of the naïve attitude to- thodological model of all systematicward reality was lost; the Humanistic philosophy; thought produces its ownlife and world view had become a theo- foundation in a supposed logical processry; the Sturm and Drang in German of creation; this motive of logical crea-
Romanticism were reactions in the part tion is modern and Humanistic, 197; theof the personalityideal; but the reaction cosmic temporal coherence of the aspects

-

left the lower classes unaffected; the in- is replaced by the mathematical-logicalfluence of popular scientific writings, of continuity in the movement of thought,
"belles lettres" , and propaganda during 200; modern natural science turnedthe Enlightenment; the French Revolu- away from the Aristotelian-Thomistic subtion; 
socialism; as mass movements, 171; stance-concept and wished to grasp thethe simple Christian calmly retained his functional coherence of physical phenopious 
certainty against all errors of theo- mena with the concept of function in maretical 
thought; Dr. KUYPER'S work in the thematically formulated natural laws; itNetherlands; his struggle with the en- discarded the Ptolemaic-Aristotelian view-
lightened liberalism of the 19th century; of the universe, the Aristotelian "qualitathe 
KANT-renaissance of the XX century; tes occultae", 201; the new "substance"the 
undermining influence of historicism concept is the hypostatized concept ofand relativism; historicistic philosophy of function; LEIBNIZ' definition; it had a 
life; a new view of life and the world Nominalistic background; NICOLAUS OFmanifest in syndicalism and fascism, 172; ORESME formulated the new concept ofthe "Moderni" based themselves on the law of motion in full mathematical 
PETRUS HISPANUS' Parva Logicalia; DUNS precision; he anticipated COPERNICUS,
SCOTUS and WILLIAM OF OCCAM contribu- and invented analytical geometry beforeted to the dethronement of Thomism, DESCARTES; the functionalistic conception184-188; the process of secularization of reality is rooted in a Nominalistic traof 
late medieval Nominalism was intro- dition; up to KANT the "substance" ofduced by JOHN OF JANDUN and MARSILIUS nature was conceived as a "Ding an sich";
OF PADUA, 188; the collapse of the medie- DESCARTES' definition (and that of Joval 
ecclesiastically unified culture; the HANNES DAMASCENUS) of "substance",
rise of national States; large-scale in- 202; SUAREZ on the substance, compareddustry and business; early capitalism; with DESCARTES; the criterion of truth isexpanded credit; new sea-routes; India supposed to be in thought itself with theand America; the Crusades and the pro- "more geometrico" attained clearnesscess of individualization and differentia- and distinctness of concepts; this thoughttion; neo-Platonic and mystic-theosophy has logically creating sovereignty; thetinged "universal theism"; GEORGIUS GE- Humanistic metaphysics of nature col-
MISTHOS PLETHON, father of the Platonic lapsed under the critique of BERKELEY, 


159 MODERN HUMANISTIC PHILOSOPHY 


HUME and KANT; the mathematical concept 
of function became the commondenominator of all the aspects of reality;
reason employs the method of continuityas the sceptre of its absolute sovereignty,
203; the lex continui in LEIBNIZ and inNeoKantians, 204 ; the continuity postulate 
opposes the subjection of philosophical 
thought to the cosmic temporalorder originating in the Divine plan ofcreation; the postulate has led philosophy 
into a maze of antinomies, 204 ; thenaturalistic science-ideal must reveal a 
fundamental antinomy in the basic structure 
of the Humanistic transcendental 
basic Idea, 204 ; there will be a time whenthe Humanistic personality-ideal falls, aprey to this science-ideal; the Idea ofunconditional and sovereign freedom ofthe personality will prove to be an illusion; 
transcendental-idealism supposesthat since KANT and FICHTE the fundamental 
antinomy between the scienceand the personality ideal has been solved; 
the "cogito" opened the way to self-
reflection; all scientific syntheses dependon the transcendental logical function ofthe ego who is never a Gegenstand; butthis "transcendental cogito" is also antinomous, 
205; the Humanistic classical 
science-ideal was a primitive kind ofnaturalism insofar as they wanted tocomprehend actual thought in a naturalscientific manner; the natural scientific 
method was expanded over the total actof thinking; Kantian idealism acceptsonly a cosmic determinateness of theempirical act of thought in a naturalscientific causal sense; Humanistic philosophy 
is placed before an inexorabledilemma between science and personality; 
the freedom of the personality possesses 
the same tendency of continuityas the science ideal, 206; the philosophyof the Enlightenment had conceived thefreedom and the personality ideal in arationalistic individualistic sense, and 
even KANT had done so; after them itwas attempted to synthesize nature andfreedom dialectically, and freedom andpersonality received an irrationalisticand universalistic form; there arose a 
new mode of thought, viz., the historicalone, elevated to a new science-ideal; ahistoricistic vision of reality also permeated 
the view of nature, 207; historicismundermined both the classical Humanistic 
science ideal and its personality ideal;
the dialectical basic motive led to a spiritual 
uprooting; "natural history" became 
the basis of human cultural history;
SCHELLING'S nature philosophy, the developmental 
process from inert matter tothe living organism (from mechanicalnecessity to creative freedom) ; the dialectical 
union of necessity and freedom;
Volksgeist, and the awakening of thehistorical consciousness; HEGEL'S dialectical 
logicizing of the historical process, 

208; as a dialectical unfolding of the Absolute 
Idea in the objective spirit, 208; itwas impossible to conceive history inHegelian a priori thought forms; man'screative freedom was thus lost; positivistic 
sociology and COMTE'S law of thethree stages, 209 ; the third stage embodies 
the classical science ideal and its 
domination motive in a positivistic formand is elevated to the standard and goalof the historical process; it is the oldfaith in the freeing power of science; itproclaimed itself to be a new religion,
"un nouveau christianisme"; in themiddle of last century the dogma of evolution 
spread from biology to all othersciences; the classical deterministic 
science ideal was revived; it acceptedthe primacy of the nature motive; HEGEL'S 
idealistic dialectic was transformed 
into Marxist sociology and its historicalmaterialism, united with Darwinism;
there was still belief in a final goal ofdevelopment outside historical relativity;
the spiritual uprooting became manifestin NIETSCHE'S gospel of the super-man,
210; he was influenced by Romanticismand Idealism, later by Darwinian evolutionism; 
finally he developed a religionof power based on DARWIN and historicism; 
man is an animal not yet "fixed",
but not bound to static instincts and his 
"Umwelt"; his anthropology; man overestimates 
his own importance; man is a"phantastic animal" positing ideologies;
science enables man to kill his gods;
history is merely a struggle for power"
"Wille zur Macht" is the only escape fromnihilism; super-man; blond beast; thetransvaluation of all values established on 
the ruins of Christian and Humanistic 
ideologies; the ideals of science and ofpersonality are both rejected; science hasmere pragmatic value; no faith in scientific 
truth or in the Idea of humanity, 211;
he introduced the process of religiousdecay into Humanistic philosophy; Neo-
Kantianism tried to check naturalistic 
positivism; historicism turned away fromevolutionism; the difference between natural 
science and cultural science claimed 
attention; but the role of Neo-Kantianismwas at an end with the rise of national 
socialism; German neo-Hegelianism interpreted 
HEGEL in a relativistic senseand soon became a docile instrument of 
the HITLER regime, 212; the twentiethcentury development of microphysics,
destroyed natural scientific determinism;
quantum mechanics, 212; neo-positivismof the Vienna school (MACH) viewed theformulas and concepts of physics as conventional 
symbols, but not as truth; EDMUND 
HUSSERL tried to rejuvinate the Ideaof mathesis universalis; his "eideticmethod"; tried to found logic on thedirect intuition of essences (Wesensschau) 
; his phenomenology and DESCARTES' 
cogito and KANT'S practical reality 


 

MODERN HUMANISTIC PHILOSOPHY

of the Idea of freedom; the "epoche";
transcendental Ego-logy; the transcendental 
phenomenological consciousnessbecomes an "uninterested observer"; his 
science of the "essences", 213; the abyssof nothingness behind the absolutizedtranscendental theoretical consciousness;
the second phenomenological trend wasirrationalistic in origin, and establishedby DILTHEY ; assimilated by HEIDEGGER'Sphilosophy of existenie; SOREN KIERKEGAARD'S 
existential thought opposed Hegelianism; 
since NIETSCHE there arose astrongly variegated philosophy of life,
depreciating the science ideal as well asthe Humanistic freedom idealism; "cogito" 
replaced by "vivo", the absolute Ideaby the "stream of life"; depth psychologydealt the death blow to the personalityideal; FREUD'S mechanistic view of theunconscious, dethroning Humanisticethics and religion; SPENGLER'S Untergang 
des Abendlandes; HEIDEGGER'S Sein 
und Zeit; SARTRE'S "1'Etre et le Mant"
are representative of the attitude of decline 
in Humanistic philosophy; historicism 
allows modern man only the insight 
into the meaninglessness of hisexistential freedom in the face of nature 
in which he is "thrown", a "freedom todeath", a "nothingness", 214 ; Humanismin decay lost its monopolistic position;
there is a chaotic struggle for leadershipin the future of Western culture, requiring 
a transcendental critique of theoretical 
thought, 215; the critical separationbetween understanding and sensibility,
universal form and individuality, formand matter of experience, understandingand reason, had to be overcome afterKANT ; the freedom motive was increasingly 
recognized as the root of the Humanistic 
life and world-view; it calledinto play its inner postulate of continuity;
KANT'S theoretical reason elevated above 
the limits of sense experience, became anew dialectical logic, as a true "organ"
of freedom idealism; nature and reasonshould be thought together dialectically;
the classical science ideal was pushedback and subjected to the personalityideal, 403; antinomy was now sanctionedas a transition to a higher synthesis, 404;
in KANT'S dualistic world picture thescience and the personality ideal remainthe recognized antinomic factors; FICHTEchanges this antinomy into a contradiction 
within the personality ideal itself,
viz., that between free activity (spontaneity) 
and bondage to the lower nature,
or between Idea and sense; this bondageto sensory nature cannot be cancelledwithout dissolving the personality idealinto an empty abstraction; with the hypostatization 
of the moral norm this antinomy 
must be retained, 450; the titanicactivity motive of the "Sturm und Drang",
its voluntaristic tendency, its glorification 
of the "activity of Genius"; its ar


160 

tistic expression in the "ego-drama"; enthusiasm 
and optimism of the "Deed"; itsbond with ROUSSEAU'S "natural formingof life", but its absolutization of the subjective 
individuality; it culminates in itsdemand for subjective ethical freedom;
an irrationalistic type of the Humanisticpersonality-ideal, 453; but the Sturm undDrang could never free itself from thedeterministic rationalism of the science-
ideal; its irrationalist Idea of Humanity,
HERDER, KLOPSTOCK, 454; the method of 
empathy to understand every individuality, 
455; FICHTE'S philosophy of life andfeeling, 413-455; especially pp. 456, 457,458-462; SCHILLER'S Aesthetic Idealism;
the "Beautiful Soul"; the "morality ofgenius" in early Romanticism; NIETSCHE'S 
development, 465; the irrationalistphilosophy of life; BERGSON ; the rationalist 
types of Humanistic philosophy makethe concept of the subject a function ofthe concept of the law in a special modalsense; thus the subject is dissolved intothe law; on the other hand the irrationalist 
types reduce the "true" order to afunction of individual subjectivity, 466;
KANT'S formulation : "the true autos discovers 
itself only in the nomos", concerns 
the Humanistic personality ideal;
the Irrationalistic version would be: "the 
nomos is a reflex of the absolutely individual 
autos"; rationalism and irrationalism 
are polar contrasts; absolutized individuality 
and law display an antinomic 
inner tension, so that the Early Romantics, 
e.g., HAMANN, developed a dialecticalconception of reality; logical contradiction 
has an absolute reality here ; DILTHEY'Sirrationalistic historical philosophy of lifeled to modern dialectical phenomenology;
HUSSERL'S phenomenology is rationalistic,
however; not irrationalistic, 466; the 
dialectical trait of irrationalism shows 
that irrationalistic philosophy is rootedin the absolutized theoretical attitude of 
thought; the sanctioning of a theoreticalantinomy manifests the subjective attitude 
of thought to be directed against thecosmic order and the basic logical lawsfunctioning in this order; this attitude isa component part of sinful reality insofaras its anti-normative meaning is determined 
by the cosmic order and its logical 
norms; it implies the negation of thelaw side of reality; but subjectivity without 
an order can have no existence and 
no meaning; there are as many types ofIrrationalism possible as there are nonlogical 
aspects of temporal reality, 467;
irrationalistic types of Humanistic philosophy 
concentrate their attention uponthe science of history; KANT'S Transcendental 
critique of teleological judgmenthad cleared the way for a philosophy ofhistory oriented to the personality-ideal,
to a certain extent at least, 468; KANT'Steleological view of historical development 
in his "Vom ewigen Frieden"; HER



161 MONTESQUIEU, CH, DE SECONDAT 

DER'S "Ideen zur Philosophie der Ge-MODERN SOCIETY, II, is not a "social 
schichte der Menschheit", introduced the whole", 204 (note). 
method of empathy and sympathy into

MOELIA, T. S. G., II,

the study of historical contexts in their

Het primitieve denken in de moderne

incomparable individuality; SCHELLING'S

Organological Idealism equipped thewetenschap, 330.

--, III,

Historical School with its philosophy of

Het primitieve denken in de moderne

the originally unconscious growth of cul


wetenschap, 33.

ture from the "Volksgeist"; the post-
Napoleonic spirit of the Restoration fa-MOLECULES, I, reality of molecules, 559voured the rise of the historical mode of 

(note).

thought; as also did the rise of sociology---, III, have a more complicatedin the early part of the 19th century;structure than atoms; the functionalthis sociology led to the invasion ofschema x, y, z, t, 101; atoms are em-
Darwinistic evolutionism in historical braced by the molecule as the minimumscience, 469; FICHTE'S contribution to the form-totality, viz., a typically orderedmethodology of historical thought; Neo-physico-spatial figure or configuration

Kantian epistemology of historicalwhich is the foundation of the physicothought; 
Neo-Kantian epistemology ofchemical function of the whole, e.g.,
historical thought; RICKERT and MAXwater, 701, 702; a molecule is not anWEBER, 470; the development of Huma-aggregate, 705; molecules, atoms, crystalnistic philosophic thought into appar-lattices, in P. HOENEN, 707 ; a molecule isently diametrically opposed systems isa typically qualified enkaptic form-total


due to the internal dialectic of the same ity embracing three different structures,
religious basic motive, viz., that of nature710, 711.
and freedom; its root is the motive of 
freedom, which evokes the opposite mo-MOLLUSC, III, the ontic structure of the 
tive of the domination of nature; this shell of a mollusc compared with that ofroot remained hidden under the pri-sawn wood, 130. 
macy of the science ideal up till the rise

MOMMSEN, THEODOR, III,

of transcendental philosophy; the latter

Abriss des rOmischen Staatsrechts, 369,

was the first trend that penetrated to thefoundation of the science-ideal, viz., the 370. 

ideal of sovereign personality; FICHTE--, III, on the possibility of forming cor-
was the first to recognize it openly; KANTporations during the Roman Republic,
was still dualistic, 499; Humanistic self-234; on Roman curiae, 369, 370. 
reflection remained at no higher level

MONADS, I, in G. BRUNO, 199, 200; in LEIB-

than its Idea of the sovereign free per-

NIZ are differential numbers (229) filling

sonality, which it identified with the re-

the noumenal cosmos as animate beings

ligious root of the cosmos; its search for

in gapless dengity, each reflecting the

the transcendent root in particular norm-

entire universe, 230; the roots of reality,

ative aspects leads to absolutizations; in

249.
HEGEL free personality became a dialect


—, II, TnoELTscH appeals to the Leib


ical self-unfolding of the all-embracing

nizian idea of the monad and retains an

metaphysical "Idea"; HEGEL identified

unprovable faith in the coherence of his-

philosophic thought with divine thought;

torical development with the "absolute"

he tries to solve the religious antinomy

in the concurrence of the factual and the

in his basic motive by theoretical dial-

ideal, 205; HUSSERL identifies metaphy


ectic, like SCHELLING did in "absolute 

sical problems with "religious questions";

thought"; HEGEL abandoned the critical

he treats these questions on the basis of

transcendental attitude of Humanistic 

an intuitive eidetical insight into their

thought; if this critical attitude is pre-

transcendental constitution by the trans-
. 

served, it implies the absolutizing of

cendental inter-subjectivity of the egos. 

theoretical thought; FICHTE'S critical mo


or the phenomenological "monads", 545.

ralism; Humanistic philosophy lacks in


—, III, LEIBNIZ' metaphysical "concen


sight into the final transcendental deter


tration points of force", 70; biological

mination of philosophic thought; if it

monads, 772.

concentrates on the Archimedian point, itfocuses on some hypostatized function of MONOGAMY, III, the numerical relations 
personal existence, not on the religiousin a human family, 302.
root, 500; Confrontation of Humanistic 

MONOTHEISM, II, as the last stage of de-

Philosophy with Christian philosophical

velopment from magic via nature wor


thought, 501--508. 

ship and polytheism, to monotheism, ac-

MODERN!, I, based themselves on PETRUS cording to FRAZER, 313.
HISPANUS' Parva Logica, 184-188. 

MONTESQUIEU, CH. DE SECONDAT, II, his 
MODERN MECHANIST BIOLOGY, III, identi-political idea of development; history isfied with a machine theory by DRIESCH,an account of the history of various

734. States, 350. 

 

MORAL ASPECT

—, III, his "trias politica", 428; to himthe State is the whole of society, 452. 

MORAL ASPECT, I, its position in the series, 
3, 5; the aspect of the temporal relationships of love as differentiated moreprecisely by the typical structures oftemporal society as conjugal love, loveof parents and children, love of countrysocial love of one's fellow-man, etc.;
KANT mentions the "disposition of theheart" as the criterion of his "Gesinnungsethik", 
but this disposition is actually 
of a central-religious character;
KANT absolutizes morality, 49; the moralgoal in LEIBNIZ is rational self-determination, 
252; HUTCHESON'S conception, 310,338; in the Sturm and Drang philosophythey demanded moral freedom, 453.
—, II, moral control, 71; juridical guilt;
good faith; good morals; equity; aremoral anticipations in the juridical aspect, 
not found in primitive society; difference 
between law and morality; KANT'Sview: heteronomy versus autonomy, 141;
KANT'S pure "moral will"; AUSTIN and

FELIX SOMLO; morality versus compulsion; 
the prevailing view of the moraland the juridical aspect; is there a moralsphere?, 142; BUBER'S "I—thou" versusimpersonal relations; this theory deformsthe structure of human experience; theworld in the Humanistic Science-ideal is 
"nature", an absolutized abstraction ; themeeting of I—thou is religious, not simply 
ethical, 143; modal and religious love;
Scholasticism distinguished natural andsupra-natural ethics; the Aristotelian virtues: 
love, faith, and hope are supra natural; 
natural reason versus supernaturalrevelation, 144; entelechy; eudaemOnia;
golden mean; training; form-matter inARISTOTLE ; virtue; the good; dianoeticalvirtues; theoretical and practical thought;
ethical meaning of virtue; control ofpassion is cultural, not ethical, 145; suchcontrol may serve crime; ARISTOTLE'Sview of ethics, the due mean was derivedfrom the Pythagoraen peras; limiting theapeiron, 146; human character is thedisposition of the inner act-life; the human 
body; HEYMANS' view; and moralfeeling, 147; good and evil in an ethicalsense are indefinable; guilt, good faith,
good morals, equity, are anticipatory; notretrocipatory, 148; religious love and moral 
love; KANT'S "Gesinnungsethik"; autosand ,nomos; categorical imperative; theIdea of mankind, 149, , an order of peace;
the radical evil; duty; moral feeling-drivesand pathology, 150; KANT separates lawand morality; THOMASIUS' distinction,
151; moral love and its retrocipations;
Eros; CALVIN'S view of morality; love andsocial conventions, moral anticipations insocial conventions;.152; frugaUty directedby love towards our neighbour is anticipation 
of economy ,to morality; the aesthetic 
Eros is an aesthetic anticipation to 

162 

love; PLATo's Symposion; Eros and Agape, 
according to Existentialism, 153; aesthetic 
love of the creation ; W. J. AALdersdistinguishes ethical from religious love;
he splits up the Decalogue; religious loveis unilateral; ethical love is bilateral,154;
we love God in our neighbour, i.e. inGod's image, 155; AALDERS was influenced 
by MARTIN BUBER; AALDERS distinguishedreligion from the sphere of creation; thisis unbiblical, 155; the central commandment 
is not a norm ; BRUNNER confuses 
ethical and religious love; his definitionof Christian ethics, 156; he opposes loveto justice; LUTHER'S scheme of nature 
and grace, 157; BRUNNER absolutizes temporal 
love; love implies communal andinter-individual relations, 158; BRUNNER 
opposes love to legality, i.e., he condemns 
rationalistic metaphysics in theScholasticism of the 19th century, and 
KANT ; the I-thou relation; LUTHER on 
the Divine ordinances; his dialecticalthought; perfect justice in the religiousfulness of love, 159; moral love and 
Agape; rational foundation of love; itsfeeling substratum; love as a duty; itsdirection through faith to the love ofChrist; juridical analogy of temporal love;
proportion; the "I-thou"-relation to Godimplies I-we to our neighbour; moral loveand self denial, 160; differentiation inmoral love according to the social structures 
of individuality; equality of proportion 
in moral love is a retrocipation toeconomy and to the juridical aspect; harmony 
in love's duties is an aesthetic retrocipation; 
CALVIN on justice and love,
161 (note) ; thou shalt not kill, does notexpress retribution ; VICTOR CATHREIN'S 
error; the sentence of death; the shootingsoldier; intolerable tensions .because ofmoral love and legal duty, 162; ethics is

a historical growth, 207, 208; variableethical norms, 241; moral anticipationsin the cultural aspect; the Cultural Eros,
291; and in the juridical aspect, 407. 

MORAL CONTROL, II, this is an analogicalmodal term, 71. 

MORAL FACULTY, I, sought in the moralsentiment by HUME, SHAFTESBURY, etc.,

338. 
MORALISM, I, of KANT, 123. 

MORALITY, I, is opposed to legality by

KANT, 376. 
—, II, and decent behaviour in civil law,


are ethical anticipations, 407, 408. 

MORALITY IN COMMUNITIES, III, is lowerin more extensive communities than in 
those of a more intensive character, 195. 

MORALITY OF GENIUS, I, in Romanticism,

465. 
MORGAN, DE, II, 

Formal Logic, 436. 


 

16 3Musm 

—, II, evolutionistic ethnologist; pre-history, 
270; on the copula to be, 436. 


MORGAN, C. LLOYD, III, 
Emergent Evolution, 84 (note).
—, III, his genetical analysis of the germ
cells of DROSOPHILA; chromosome maps;
genes are fitted in a linear ordering of
the chromatin particles of a chromosome,
755; he adheres to "emergent evolutionism", 
762. 


MORGAN, LEWIS H., III, on matriarchy;
the six stages of the development of the
human family, 331; the consanguineous
family; group marriage, 339. 


MORPHE, II, or the essential form of material 
substances, is the teleological cause
of the development of matter, 10.
—, III, or vital form, in GURVITCH, 744. 


MORTGAGE, II, an objectified right may
become the object of an other right, e.g.,
the right of mortgage, 409. 


MORPHOLOGICAL TYPES, III, according to
WOLTERECK ; suspensoid, motoroid, basoid 
types, 777. 


MOTOROID TYPES, III, peridinidiae, diatoms, 
radiolaria, 778. 


MOUNTAIN, A., III, is an enkaptic natural
totality; so is a poly-cellular plant, or
animal, 702. 


MOVEMENT, I, in ARISTOTLE motion is a 
striving of matter after form, and from
potentiality to actuality; it is a flowing
plurality of earlier and later without unity
and without actual being; the psyche can
give it unity, 25 ; ALBERT THE GREAT ascribed 
to the movement of things, independent 
of the human soul, a form and 
structure of its own, in the numerus 
formalis; THOMAS AQUINAS and P. HOENEN


,

follow AUGUSTINUS, 26 ; the theoretical 
logical movement of thought follows theanalytical order of prius and posterius asbeing subjected to the principle of sufficient 
ground; this movement of thoughtis compared with mathematical movement, 
(note) 30; NICOLAUS OF ORESMEformulated the law of motion, 202; HOBBES 
called space a subjective "phantasmarei existentis", movement a phantasmamotus; movement is a modus of filled 
space in DESCARTES, 223; LEIBNIZ logifiedmovement, 236. 
—, II, in ARISTOTLE, 39; movement is continuous 
flowing; the differential is an

anticipation, 93; movement of theoreticalthought is a retrocipation ; phoronomy inlogistic thought, 94 ; logical movement isretrocipatory; KANT and NEWTON on movement 
as occurring in space, 95; ARISTOTLE 
clearly realized the analogical character 
of the concept fnovement; ancientIonian view an Divine Movement; kinematic 
movement; absolute time, 97, 98; 
movement is not a change of place; but aflowing space in the temporal succession 

of its moments; founded in static space;
flowing extension is a spatial analogy implying 
direction ; it cannot be the nucleus
of physics, 98; physical movement is restricted 
to mechanics; GALILEI'S principle 
of inertia; movement is pre-sensory;
sensory perception is founded in the
original intuition of movement, 99; GALILEI'S 
kinematics, 100; actual continuity in
the aspect of movement, 105; biotic
movement, 109; biotic movement is intensive 
and qualitative development;
original movement approaches the modal
meaning of life in its biotic anticipations 
through the intermediary of
energy; energy movement, cause and effect 
(operation), 110; the movement of
thought in the process of concluding,
120, 384. 


MULLEM, J. P. VAN, II, 
Analogon des Levens, 51. 
—, II, he thought the order of the aspects
to be a gratuitious assertion ; his "arrangement 
of classes of knowledge"; he is a
neo-Kantian; later on he acknowledged
his misunderstanding, 51. 


MULLER, JOHANNES, III, changed LOCKE'S
"secondary qualities" into physiological
events, 39. 


MULLER, K., III, 
Ueber die Anfdnge der Konsistorialverfassung, 
515. 


MULLER, MAX, II, mana belief; the henotheistic 
feature in primitive nature belief,


317. 
MULTIPLE PROPORTION, III, the law of multiple 
proportions according to DALTON,

704. 
MULTIPLICITY, II, the numeral analogy in 
the logical modus is the analytical unityand multiplicity, inherent in every analytical 
relation and in every concept; aconcept is a synthesis noêmatoon, 80. 

MUNCH, FRITZ, II, the formation of nature 
and society related to ideas is culture,

204. 
—, III, 
Kultur and Recht, 372. 
—, III, he considers primitive people tobe outside of history, 372; they have social, 
but not historical life; the maintenance 
of the species started the development 
of the "social moment", the formation 
of a community; there arises tribalsolidarity; a popular consciousness; embracing 
a unity of all possible norms;
one day the unity is broken because ofthe fall of the tribal authority; then societal 
differentiation is started and his-
tory begips, 373. 
MUNDUS INTELLIGIBILIS, I, in KANT, 349. 

usic, II, DESCARTES' "Regulae ad direc-M 
tionem ingenii" extends the Idea of mathesis 
universalis to music, 346. 


 

MUSCLE

—, III, musical tone sensations, 43; musicas an art, 110. 

MUSCLE, III, enkapsis of histo systems ina muscle; it displays internal unityworking in all its individual parts, 635;
muscle cells, 772. 

MUSSOLINI, III,
Dottrina fascista, 414, 421;


My Thought on Militarism, 421.

, III, "To fascism the cosmos is not thematerial world in which man is led by alaw of nature; ...Fascism is a mental attitude 
born out of the general reaction ofour century to the superficial and mate


rialistic positivism of the 19th century",
414; the fascist State is a will to power

and dominion; the nation is created bythe State; he rejected the German notionof "community of blood"; a myth is anoble enthusiasm and need not be a reality; 
our myth is the great nation, 415;
absolutizes military power; his march onRome; war is the supreme court of justice 
of the nations, 421. 

MUSSOLINI'S MARCH ON ROME, III, 421. 

MUTATIONS, III, in animals,. 94. 

MUTIANUS RUFUS, I, the Erfurt Humanist, 

189. 
MYSTICISM, I, in ARISTOTLE'S metaphysics,
72; mitigates LEIBNIZ' rationalism, 308(note). 

MYTH, II, of HESIOD, 320, 321; fiction, 
magic, faith, 325, 326; PLATO's, DESCARTES', 
LEIBNIZ', KANT'S, HUME'S myth ofdeterministic nature and creative human 
freedom, 327. 
—, III, naïve experience is not impervious 
to mythological aberrations, 29. 

MYTHICAL CONSCIOUSNESS, II, in the 
Egyptian texts of the pyramids we pre


sumably find the oldest historical documents 
of a gradual rise of mythical self-
consciousness to the normative juridicaland moral functions of the personality,
324, the hybrid character of the mythicalconsciousness, 326. 

MYTHOLOGICAL MYSTIFICATIONS, II, in 
TROELTSCH, as the result of his historistic 
prejudice, 355 ff. 

MYTHOLOGY, II, the personal gods of Ho-
MER are the first national gods of theGreeks and as such the creators of the 

Helenic consciousness, 321. 

NAGEL, III, says that MOLLER'S theory ofthe specific energy of the sense organsis based on experiments made on the"chorda tympani", 43. 

NAGELI, III, his concept : "Miscellen", 722. 

164 

NAIVE ATTITUDE, II, in the pre-theoretical(i.e. the naïve) attitude a Christian oughtto experience the relation between theChristian religion and temporal reality;
he cannot fall back into the nominalistic 
dualism between faith and thought, andbetween nature and grace, if in the theoretical 
attitude he has seen the universal


ity of the lawspheres, 334. 

NAIVE EXPERIENCE, I, reality in naive experience 
confronted with theoretical analysis, 
3; in the naive, pre-theoretical attitude 
of experience we have an integral,
immediate experience of cosmic time inthe uninterrupted coherence of all itsmodal aspects and in concentric relatedness 
to the selfhood; an example is : looking 
at the clock to know the time; themodal aspects are not explicitly experienced 
as such, but implicitly and conjointly, 
34 ; the naive attitude lacks an intentional 
antithetic structure; our logicalfunction remains entirely accommodatedto the continuous coherence of cosmic 
time; we grasp reality in its typical totalstructures of individual things and concrete 
events; naive concept formation isnot directed to the modal aspects but towards 
things and concrete events, 41; itis concerned with individual totalities,
not with abstract relations, e.g., of number 
or space, energy effects as such, butwith things countable, spatial and subjected 
to physico-chemical changes; thelogical aspect is conceived as an inherent 
and implicit component of concrete reality 
itself; the subject-object relation isthe pre-supposition of the integral character 
of naïve experience; objectivefunctions and qualities are unreflectinglyascribed to things and events in modalaspects in which it is impossible forthem to appear as subjects; thus water isexperienced as a necessary means forlife, etc.; a bird's nest is an object of life; 
a rose has objective beauty; the subject-
object relation is grasped as a structuralrelation of reality itself; the sensory colour 
red is ascribed to a rose, not in relation 
to my or your perception, but tothat of anybody, 42; we experience reality 
in the total and integral coherence ofits aspects, leaving the typical total structures 
intact; naive exp. is not a theoryabout reality; not an "uncritical realism",
43 ; naive experience is exclusively concerned 
with the typical total structuresof individuality and does not explicitlydistinguish aspects, 82; every philosophic 
view of empirical reality ought tobe confronted with the datum of naive 
experience; this datum must be converted 
by philosophy into a fundamentalproblem; it should analyse the typicalstructures of individuality which alsoconstitute a philosophic problem; modern 
science breaks up the naive concept 
of a thing in order to gain know



165 NAIVE EXPERIENCE 


ledge of the functional coherence of thephenomena within a special modal aspect, 
83; the fundamental deficiency oftheoretical thought in comparison Withnaive experience; temporal reality doesnot give itself "gegenstdndlich"; naiveexper. has an integral vision of the whole,
and, if rooted in the Christian religion,
naive exp. has the radical, integral viewof reality concentrically conceived in itsroot and in its relation to the Origin, 84;
philosophy, special science, and naiveexperience, 85; in HUME, 289; it is not atheory, but explainable in terms of anatural impulse of feeling, in HUME, 290;
a view of "common sense", "the vulgar

view", based on sensory impressions, 291,292; naive exp. and natural science werenot fundamentally different in HUME andKANT, 297; naive exp. is identified withfeeling, by JACOBI, 458.
—, II, is fundamentally misrepresentedfor the benefit of the "Satz des Bewusztseins". 
The Humanistic conception of ex


periential reality tyrannizes science bymeans of the Humanistic prejudice, 538.
—, III, maintains the identity of a thingin all its changes within the limits of athing's plastic structure, 3; but cannotaccount for such identity; metaphysicsturns away from what is strictly given innaive experience, 4; ARISTOTLE'S primarysubstance is foreign to the naive exp. ofa thing, 10; RUSSELL'S identification ofthing and substance, 19, 21; and of naiveexp. with an ontological theory of "naïve 
realism", RUSSELL'S "refutation" of naiveexp.; he reduces naïve exp. to sense-impressions 
like HUME did, and appeals tothe laws of perspective, 22; his "perspective"-
argument, 25 ; the modern mathematical 
logical concept of function andthe plastic horizon of human experience,
26; HUME acknowledged that naïve exp.
cannot be a theory of reality; naive thing-
hood and epistemological Gegenstand inKANT, 27; of the identity of a thing misinterpreted 
by KANT; various attempts toexplain away the identical thinghood ofnaive exp., 28; naive exp. is not impervious 
to mythological aberrations; in theBiblical naive attitude the transcendent 
religious dimension of the experientialhorizon is opened to the light of DivineRevelation ; the I-we, and the We-Thourelation, 
29; a true Christian is not exemptfrom the solidarity of the fall into sin,
and knows the impersonal attitude, thedread of nothingess in a so-called existential 
isolation; when his heart is opento the Divine Word-Revelation he experiences 
things as meaning pointingbeyond and above itself to the true Origin; 
the Biblical attitude is not theology,
30; even concepts originating from modern 
science change their meaning andassume a concrete and practical sensewhen assimilated by us to commonthought, 31; the plastic and the theore


tical horizon have their historical aspect;
social praxis forms naïve experiencewhich pre-supposes a sufficient development 
of the act structure of human exist;
ence and practical acquaintance with thethings of common life, 31; essential to itis the subject-object-relation; is the naiveattitude compatible with animism andmagic?, 32; RUSSELL'S opinion refuted;
infantile and pre-experiental thought isprovisionably unable to conceive subj.obj. 
relations; and animistic myth or metaphysics; 
animistic metaphysics hasnothing to do with the naive attitude, 33;
the sacral sphere of primitive belief doesnot affect the typical structure of thenaive attitude; primitive animism andmagic may re-appear in the naive attitude 
of modern Western cultured peopleas forms of superstition; causality is notfunctionally experienced but as a concrete 
fact in an emotionally strikingevent; the reason why superstitions donot prevent the opening of our experiential 
horizon ; the representation or copytheory of naive realism, 34 ; in the latterperceiving is like taking a photo; WINDELBAND'S 
theory; the internal contradictionin his view is that common exp. is callednaive and at the same time rooted in an 
epistemological theory to be refuted bythe "critical" analysis of knowledge, 35;
our consciousness in the naive attitude 
is systatic; the refutation of naive exp. isbased on the unreliability of sensory perception 
as to "objective" reality; objective 
is here intended as verifiable by natural 
science; formerly the subjectivity ofthe secondary qualities was an argumentagainst naive experience; BERNARD BAVINK, 
36 ; THEODOR HEARING ; colours refer 
to electro-magnetic waves of whichthey are the symbols; physics has to restrict 
itself to formulae denoting the physical 
functions, but such formulae do notexhaust the objective contents of humanexperience, 37; in the naive attitude weaccept objective sensory qualities in theconcrete context of our plastic horizon,
we do not identify them with our subjective 
impressions; sensory perceptionis not pre-ponderant in our naive exp.;
perception is strongly anticipating incharacter; espec. symbolical anticipations; 
the structure of this experienceand its degrees of clarity; its practicaltendency; the subj.-object relation, 38;
naive exp. does not know about "Dingean sich", nor of a reality in itself opposed 
to consciousness, 46; naive exper.
is incompatible with critical realism andwith critical idealism, 47; RIEHL'S view,
48; in NATORP naive experience is lodgedin the vestibule of mathematical logicism,
52; naive exp. has an implicit awarenessof the modal structural coherence of the 
functions of a tree, e.g., 59 ; philosophycannot replace naive experience, 66;
force is a particularly strong manifesta



 

NAIVE AND THEORETICAL THOUGHT 

tion of energy in naive exp., and not theessence of a picture, table, etc., 70 inthe macro world of naive exp. our plastichorizon has three radical types of individuality 
structure of a prelogical qualification, 
matter, plants, animals; mostborder cases belong to the micro world,
83-85; a living cell is not directlyaccessible to naive exp., 102; naive exp.
and Divine Revelation, 128; PLATO'Sinterest in the "trivial"; modern thoughtis indifferent to chairs, lamps, tables,
etc., as such, 129; the routine view ofmodern daily life is not naive exp., because 
it is content with names and with 
a very superficial knowledge of whatthese names mean; phenomenology bypasses 
such verbalism in Fits "intuition ofessences", 145. 

NAIVE AND THEORETICAL THOUGHT, II, VON 
JHERING argues that the juristic conception 
of the res or of personality is merelyan artificial expansion of the naturalnaive concept of a thing or a person respectively; 
but the modal legal conceptsof object and subject cannot be artificialexpansions of the natural idea of a thingsince they only refer to modal functions,
not to things, 125 (note). 

NAMES, III, evoked by the symbolical anticipations 
in sensory impressions, 38;
and naive experience, 51, 57, 145. 

NAPOLEON I, II, and the battle of Water


loo, 231. 

NATIONAL, III, national honour, in international 
intercourse; its transcendentalmeaning, 485; David and the Ammonites,
486; national solidarity, binds country,
government and ,nation, 493; is revealedin the anticipatory spheres of the psychical 
sphere; its enkapsis with inter


national relations, 494. 

NATIONAL CHURCH, III, this idea is a deformation; 
its recognition of infant baptism; 
it may influence the whole nationaccording to E. E. BRUNNER, 540. 

NATIONAL COMMUNITY, I, is an individual 
historical totality in FICHTE; "the truehistorical reality that has an earthly

eternity", 493, 494. 

NATIONAL INDIVIDUALITY, II, RANKE saw 
that national individuality does not begin 
to unfold until the historical development 
has been opened ana includes thenations in a larger dynamic cultural co


herence, 276, 277. 

NATIONALITY, III, HERDER'S view, 467; 
GURVITCH and the Historical School, 468,

469; VON JHERING, 470. 

NATIONAL SOCIALISM, GERMAN, III, its racial 
theory and its background, 414; was

folk-minded, 415. 

166 

NATORP, I, out of the correlation of abstracting 
and combining, the continuityof the movement of thought gives rise tothe continuity-postulate, 204. 

, II, 
Die logischen Grundlagen der exaktenWissenschaften, 91, 92, 95, 171, 172, 173,

386. 
—, II, he logifies number and space, 91;
his view of matter as a substance of occurrence 
filling space,95 (note) ; of multidimensional 
or complex numbers; "Dimension 
iiberhaupt" is a modal shift ofmeaning serving to derive imaginarynumbers from the relation of isolation 
and unification, 172; Dimension iiberhaupt, 
173.
1119 
Die logischen Grundlagen der exaktenWissenschaften, 35, 51, 52.
—, III, held ARISTOTLE'S Xth book of Metaphysics 
to be non-authentic, 13; our imagination 
gives a kind of reflection ofthings (the copy theory), 35; his caricature 
of naive experience; he holds thatthe things given beforehand are synthesesof primitive understanding, far frompure or correct, 51; the naive exp. of athing is lodged in the vestibule of mathe


matical logicism by NATORP and inexact,

52. 
NATURAL ASPECT, III, of the State, can . only be understood in a normative juridically 
qualified individuality structure,

and not merely functionally, 493. 

NATURAL BEAUTY, III, and the observer's 
task of deepening his own natural aes


thetic vision, 114. 

NATURAL FAMILY, III, the cognatic "extended 
family", 180; the typical foundation 
of the family in the biotic aspect ofreality; the communal tie between parents 
and children is genetic, groundedin a blood relation of an extremely immediate 
kind; human procreation is notentirely biotic or functional ; but has abiotic substratum; human blood-relationship 
is not qualified biotically; ARISTOTLE'S 
and THomAs' views, 267; the universality 
view of the marriage and familybond; in what sense there is universality; 
the differentiating process leaves theinner structure intact and concerns onlythe positive forms of actual transitorysocietal relationships, 268; the undifferentiated 
household was never identical 
with the actual natural family-relationship; 
the natural family is not a rudiment 
of a former historical phase; it is anormative bond of love based on the natural 
ties of blood between parents andchildren; the reflection of the bond oflove between the Heavenly Father an'dHis human children; this love is not themeaningfulness of love in the corpusChristi, but is temporal modal; foundedin the biotical aspect, qualified by the 


 

167NATURAL FAMILY 

typical moral love between parents andchildren, 269; its biotic foundation is notdetrimental to the purity of its morallove but gives it intensity; this love cannot 
be matched by any other moral relation 
except the conjugal bond; the moralaspect coheres with all other modal aspects; 
family love cannot be reduced toan instinctive feeling of sympathy, 270;
such feeling must be opened in the anticipatory 
direction by the moral bond;
the love principle has not been affectedby sin; sin affects subjective positivizations; 
family unity is normative; itsrealization is defective; LITT'S error,
271; the moral qualification of parentalauthority; the latter has the intimacy ofthe bond of love by its natural bioticfoundation; the divine fifth commandment 
is not at all in conflict with the intimacy 
of family love, education in thefamily sphere is irreplaceable, 274 ; theinternal legal relations of the family; theparental competence has an internal func


, 

tion, and an external function in civillaw; parental discipline compared withthat of magistrates; difference betweenpenal and disciplinary law; the competence 
to punish; parental discipline hasa penal character in accordance with thestructure of the family, 275; its pedagogical 
nature; it is accommodated to thestage of the child's development; childrenhave a right to receive their livelihoodfrom their parents as a proof of theirlove, 276; juridical relations within a family, 
277 ; aesthetical aspect of family relations; 
aesthetical anticipation in juridical 
relations, 283 ; disharmony is asubjective anti-normative realization offamily relations; beauty of family lifeis not artistic; it implies authority andsubordination, 284; social and lingualfunctions; economic function; feelingtone within the family; the social tone;
respect for parents; politeness and helpfulness; 
formality nor disrespect towardsparents; tenderness; social respect is notidentical with moral respect; they areinterwoven, 285; cultural aspect of family 
life; education; the parents' formativepower and the cultural stage of development 
of society; undifferentiated culturalspheres; modern society; home education 
in the early years; support of psychology 
and pedagogy, 286; school andfamily; the moral bonds among teachersand pupils are typically determined bythe instructional community, 287; different 
schools, 287 ; communal sense in thehome and in later life; communal notionsin the family are pre-theoretical and directly 
founded in the life of feeling; suchcommunal thought is guided by familylove; it implies parental authority; lateron in puberty parental thought should bejustified by arguments, 288; the internalcommunal sphere of thought must beaccommodated to the development of the 

adolescents; social prejudices; historicalposition of the family's milieu; pre-logical 
functions of family life; they are directed 
by family love; i.e. their anticipatory 
spheres are opened; the naturalisticconception : a reflex of biotic relations;
reciprocity within the group is viewedas a biological necessity; but in this conception 
the opened anticipatory spheresof pre-psychical functions are unawarestaken for the closed functions; ALFREDVIERKANDT on reciprocity, 290 ; what istaken for granted in his theory, 291; thebiotic bonds of blood between parentsand children cannot be separated fromtheir moral qualification; motherly loveof foster children; they do not belong tothe family proper, 292; absence or weakness 
of communal family feeling is contrary 
to the inner vital law of the family;
such feeling is opened by the moral function 
into tenderness, 293; souvenirs inthe subject-object relation ; pretium affectionis; 
psychical interlacements;
authority andrespect, 294; the internalaffective relations between parents andchildren are actually interwoven with agreat many other feelings: national feeling, 
that of social standing, ecclesiasticalcummunal feeling, etc., 295; a family relationship 
does not have a mystical biotic 
corporeal organism apart from thatof its members; but in the biotic aspectof their individual existences there are 
structural communal relations interweaving 
the members of a family, 299; theserelations function in a moral anticipatingway, 300; the family has typical chemical-
physical and spatial aspects; its originlies in the female ovarian cell fecundated 
by the male sperm; the care of the biophysical 
aspects is guided by love; leftto instinctive natural impulses a humanbeing would die; the spatial centre of thehome, 301; the feeling for home; souvenirs 
suggest spatial nearness of the othermembers of the family; the family unityimplies a typical unity in multiplicity inthe numeral aspect: bi-unity is expandedinto multi-unity in normative freedom ofaction, 302; the family relationship functions 
in faith; the father is the priest;
but the family is not qualified as a typical 
faith communion; but it is the temporal 
expression of the religious meaningfulness 
of human communion inChrist in His relation to the Divine Father 
as the Son; its moral function doesnot terminate a family's opening process;
its anticipatory spheres are opened byfaith in the transcendental direction;
faith does not obliterate a family's moraldestination, but refers it to the HeavenlyFather; a family implies a certain simultaneity 
in the internal interweavings ofits members; when both parents havedied the family-bond as such is broken,
304; the typical conjugal relations remain 
separate from the family commun



 

NATURAL FORCES168 

-

ity; the bi-unity of husband and wife depends 
on their personal individuality;
polygamy means as many marriages asthe husband has wives; the harem isonly enkaptically interwoven with themarriage bond; it is unnatural; marriageis impaired by it; polygamy gives rise tothe relationship of a "joint, or extendedfamily", a strongly patriarchal-agnatickinship, 305.; but such an extended family 
is not necessarily polygamic, theRoman family excluded polygamy in itsextended patriarchal character; this typeof family is not a natural community;
death of a marriage partner and re-marriage 
of the surviving partner, and parental 
authority; the original marriagehas then ceased to exist; marriage andfamily are intertwined enkaptically, 306;
they are of the same radical type, but ofdifferent genotypes; the institutionalsexual union of husband and wife is serviceable 
for the propagation of the human 
race; marriage is the "germ-cell" ofthe family relationship; marriage is alsoa legal institution; but it is qualified as alove union; love is not subordinate, 307;
but has primacy; Scholastic view of marriage 
as a legal institution for the propagation 
of the human race; conjugal lovewas considered as variable feeling, a mereinstrument for propagation; civil andcanon law contain regulations which haveOnly a formal and external character;
the Scholastic view is unbiblical and untenable, 
308; the institutional conjugalcommunity is not dependent for its structure 
on the subjective arbitrary discretion 
of the partners; they are subjectedto its institutional law; its continuous 
identity is not exclusively found on itslawside, 309; their unity in duality shouldbe realized in a constant subjective vitalunion; a constant anti-normative attitude 
destroys the possibility of realizing theinternal bond of marriage; but in its external 
relations in society the marriageis not dissolved; it is a civil institution, 
still; civil or tribal law alone can dissolve 
it, 310; or in Roman Catholic countries 
canon law can; canon and civil law 
may be in conflict in this respect; thesocial form of marriage is maintained;
divorce problems; the Pharisees andChrist, 311; deriving legal norms fromthe New Testament is a relapse into legalism; 
the Thomistic view; the theory ofthe bona matrimonii; marriage as a natural 
law institution, 312; agape, erosand original sin in LUTHER; influence ofThomistic natural law conception onProtestant ethics, 314, 315; the contractual 
view in canon law and in Humanistic 
natural law, 316, 317; marriage as alove union in post-Kantian German Idealism; 
"free love", 317, 318; Roman Catholic 
reaction; the primacy of love; the encyclical 
CASTI connubii, 319, 320; seefurther under "marriage" 306-342; Kul


turkreislehre, 333-41; natural conjugal 
family; kinship community and marriageare biotically founded and morally qualified, 
342; a joint family is not bioticallyfounded; kinship is unorganized; legesbarbarum of Germanic tribes, 343 (cf.
Cognate family). 

NATURAL FORCES, II, are deified in apostate 
faith, 132. 

NATURAL HISTORY, II, this term explained,
196, 229; RICKERT first adopted it, butgave it up later on, 230 (note). 

NATURAL LAW, I, in early Christian philosophy, 
182; and the body politic, inThomism; criticized by HUME, 311; rejected 
by CALVIN, 519. 
—, II, FELIX SOMLO, 142; from GRonus 
to ROUSSEAU, KANT and the young FICHTEexplained the indirect arithmetical retrocipations 
in the jural sphere by imputingan original mathematical meaning tothem in the nominalistic doctrine of "natural 
law", the "mos geometricus"; theytried to construe the State, the juridicalperson and the legal order out of their"mathematical elements", 167; the Humanistic 
doctrine of natural law was tied 
down to an atomistic-mechanistic way ofthought; the state became a totality of

individuals instituted by means of contracts, 
342 ; the ideals of natural law ofthe Enlightenment were meta-historical,
guided by the faith in the science idealand that of personality in its rationalisticindividualistic form, 356, 357; the theme 
of innate human rights was conceived byJOHN LOCKE, then expanded in the theoryof the rights of men and citizens by Rous-
SEAU, and the French Revolution; the conception 
of absolute rights of the individual 
is in conflict with the fundamental 
structure of any positive legal order because 
every right is by nature relative,
357; in HOBBES, 403; the theory of personality 
rights tries to make the personality 
as such into an object of subjectiverights; and is inherited from LOCKE is 
and CHR. WOLFF'S views of innate human 

rights, 413.
—, III, and the view of HUGO GROTIUS, 
169; and the State, in ARISTOTLE, 223; in 
Stoicism; the legal order with its external 
tonos was grounded in the lex naturalis, 
228, 229; but did not permit essential 
subordination in Stoicism, 231; the 
Humanistic view of natural law, 232;

here the State is the centre of a corporative 
unity; fiction theory; contract theory; 
HOBBES, 235; the mathematical science 
ideal and natural law; the state is an all-
embracing societal relationship in HOBBES 
and RousSEAU : State-absolutism;
sometimes non-political organizations
were granted freedom on the basis of


natural law, 236. 
NATURA NATURANS, I, is God, in G. BRUNO, 


199. 

 

169NEO-KANTIANS 

NATURA NATURATA, I, in G. BRUNO iS the 
self-development of God, 199. 

NATURA PRAEAMBULA GRATIAE, I, in Thomism, 
66. 

NATURAL POWERS, II, the fear of the powers 
of nature is at the basis of primitivefaith, 297. 

NATURAL REASON, I, in Thomism, 36; depreciated 
by OCCAM, 67 ; is autonomousin THOMAS AQUINAS, 179. 

NATURAL SCIENCE, I, modern mathematical 
natural science founded by GALILEO, etc.,
193, 201. 

NATURAL SCIENTIFIC METHODS, I, expanded 
over the total act of thinking in modern 
Humanistic Philosophy, 206. 

NATURAL THEOLOGY, I, rejected by OCCAM,
67; in KANT, 338; destroyed by KANT'SKritik d. r. Vernunft, 372; an audacious 
curiosity of human reason according toCALVIN, 517. 

NATURE, I, has nothing divine, in KANT,
67; is immeasurable to modern man, 192; 
is a teleological, living whole, in LEONARDO 
DA VINCI; deified by LORENZOVALLA, 198; is the "mundus sensibilis" in 
KANT, 347; must be subsumed by KANTunder the freedom of reason, 386; in 
FICHTE, is the reasonable ethical appearance 
of God, 475; is considered to be 
"rational" in its deepest foundation by

B. BAVINK, 560 (note).
—, II, the true ground of being is no
longer mathematic thought in KANT; inFICHTE nature is phenomenon, meaningless 
in itself, the material for doing ourduty, 27; nature assumes meaning throughvalue, in Neo-Kantian thought, 27; nosynthesis of reality and value by theAkt-Sinn, 27 ; nature and value, 201; N. 
as the spirit that is coming into existence, 
in SCHELLING'S philosophy, 278;
Nature and freedom, their synthesis andunity according to VON SAVIGNY, 278;
Christian thought should reject thedualism of Nature and Grace, 334. 
—, III, there is no style in nature, 121;
PROTAGORAS depreciated nature, 199. 

NATURE AND FREEDOM, I, this motive is the 
religious background to the Humanisticideal of science and personality, 36; inKANT, 62; in the Modern Humanistic life 
and world view, 63, 187, 190; FICHTE attempted 
their synthesis in the historicalfield; the indeterminate concept is "freeforce"; "dead nature" is governed bymathematical-mechanical laws; freedom 
is alive and ruled by the autonomousmoral law, 487; this motive evoked apparently 
diametrically opposed systemsof thought, 499. 

NATURE AND GRACE, I, the Thomistic conception 
of the autonomy of the naturalisratio has its background in the Scholasticbasic motive of nature and grace; in the 

proper use of natural reason philosophycan never contradict the supernaturaltruths of grace in the Church-doctrine;
the Aristotelian metaphysics and view ofnature are accommodated to the ecclesiastical 
dogma, 36; in Roman-Catholicism, 
63, 65; Thomism, 72, 180, 181, 183; 
these motives got separated in Humanism187; in LEIBNIZ, 190; Grace is the sphereof clear and distinct thought in LEIBNIZnature is the sphere that lacks freedom,
226; this motive operated in Lutheranismwhich BRUNNER tried to accommodate to 
CALVIN'S view of the law, 520. 
—, III, according to ROBBERS, 73 ; in EMILBRUNNER, 403. 

NATURE PHILOSOPHY, I, Of SCHELLING, 

208. 
NAYAR CASTE, III, in India; they are matriarchal, 
341. 

NAZIONAL SOZIALISMUS, II, old Germanic 
traits in it, 274. 

NAZI-IDEOLOGY, III, was irrational and 
historicistic, 414. 

NEANDERTHAL-MAN, II, his culture is a 
subject of so-called pre-history, not a historical 
subject proper, 265. 

NEANT, LE, I, in SARTRE, 53. 

NEMESIUS, III, 
De natura hom., 227. 


NEO-HEGELIANISM, I, in Germany, 212. 
—, II, history is the creation of the "objective 
Mind"; transpersonal reason (Vernunft) 
infolding itself in time, 213; Ju-
LIUS BINDER'S view on systematic juridical 
science and the science of legal history; 
both have the same Gegenstand,

213. 
NEO-KANTIANS, I, some Neo-Kantians dis 
tinguish between a critical and a geneticmethod of thought, which terminology isconfusing, 9; RICKERT, 14, 15; on the self-
sufficiency of philosophic thought "within 
its own field", 20, 22 (note), 23; theyoppose "Being" tot "Validity", "reality" to"value"; RICKERT reserves the term 
"meaning" exclusively for "culture" as asubjective relating of reality to values, 76;
they were anti-metaphysical; but elevated the lex continui to the basic law of 
philosophical thought; NATORP'S conceptof the continuity postulate, 204 ; Neo-Kantians supposed they could correct KANT 
by abolishing his limitation of the sovereignty 
of theoretical thought to sensoryphenomena; they extended the logicizedideal of knowledge to the normativeworld; thus they violated the typicalstructure of KANT'S transcendental basic 
idea, 356; the Neo-Kantians take up MAIMON'S 
Idea as the logical origin principlethat knows no other arch& but creative 
mathematical thought; KANT'S categoriesmust be derived from their logical origin 


 

NEO-PLATONISM 170 

in a dynamic process of creation, theyapplied LEIBNIZ' continuity postulate toKantian categories, 407; in the principleof determinability thought becomes"thinking of being" and all being becomes 
"being. of thought"; reality canhold as reality only insofar as it is derived 
from a logical origin, 409.
—, II, their theory of law and KANT'Sform-matter schema; provinces of knowledge: 
logical, social, moral; they have 
recourse to ARISTOTLE'S logic with its"genus proximum et differentia specifica", 
14 ; they deviate from KANT;
STAMMLER'S views, 16; KELSEN'S "ReineRechtslehre"; his conception of KANT'Scategories, 17; the logically continuousorder of the various sciences created bylogical processes, 49; J. P. VAN MULLEM;
GARLAND; NICOLAI HARTMANN, 51; physicalphenomena and space, 95; the facts ofhistory are related to values; their viewof individuality and history,194; RICKERTon individual causality, 254; FICHTE'Sphilosophy of history combined withKANT'S critical formalism; individualitysubsumed under the subjective teleologicalviewpoint leads to formalism; teleologyof cultural sciences, 421; individuality isthe me on; meaning-individuality is onlycultural: the form of thought is conceivedapart from the meaning coherence, thesubject-side of the juridical law-sphere isreduced to the law-side, which is misinterpreted 
in a formalistic way, 422. 

NEO-PLATONISM, I, its descending progression 
of degrees of reality, 178.

—, III, and metaphysical ideas, 189. 

NEO-POSITIVISM, I, proceeding from ERNSTMACH, 213. 

NEO-SCHOLASTICISM, I, of BOUTROUX, 525.
—, II, SCHELER'S Idea of God and that of 
person are neo-Scholastic speculativemetaphysics, 590, 591.
—, III, AUGUST BRUNNER; substance is human 
personality in its concrete unity andidentity; in the material levels of beingthe selfhood in its concerning (Sorge)
struggle for possession seeks permanentthings to rely on ; a substance is a fixedthing with a certain permanency, 5;
MANSION and MARLET on the concept"substance", 16; Neo-Scholasticism is influenced 
by some ideas of LEIBNIZ' monadology; 
it is spiritualistic; irrationalistic;
conceives of the essence of things as voli


tional energy, the impulse of action; amodern irrationalistic reaction againstthe scientialist view of the world; natural 
science is said to be a controlling attitude 
furnishing only external knowledge; 
the "living" attitude penetrates tothe internal essence which is love and 
a longing for completion, 71; the difference 
between neo-Scholasticism and the 
phil. of the Cosmonomic Idea is the latter's 
rejection of any accommodation of 

Greek or Humanistic motives to the Christian 
faith, 74. 

NEO-VITALISM, III, of DRIESCH, 647. 

NEURATH, 0., II, on unified science, 59. 

NEUROSIS, COMPULSIVE, II, FREUD "explains 
faith" as a universally human compulsive 
neurosis-originating from the infantile 
"Oedipus-complex". The father,
admired and feared, is the primitiveimage of every form of deity, 313. 

NEUTRALITY-POSTULATE, I, in immanence 
philosophy it is often maintained that the"objectivity" and "universal validity" ofphilosophy and its scientific characterwill be endangered if philosophy were tobind itself to religious or "weltanschauliche" 
convictions, 14 ; this is the so-
called "neutrality-postulate", defended byRICKERT, 15; under the influence of thepersonality-ideal the neutrality-postulateis a means to avoid self-reflection as to 
the transcendental basic Idea of a philosophic 
system; it originates from KANT'Sdistinction between theoretical and practical 
reason and his attempt to emancipate 
the free and autonomous personalityfrom the tyranny of the science-ideal;
this postulate is of a religious origin;
RICKERT'S defence of this postulate, 129,

134. 
—, II, KANT suggests that his critique ofknowledge has been composed apart fromany religious attitude and is quite unprejudiced 
as the product of "pure theo


retical reflection", 493. 

NEUTRAL STATE, III, the State is neverneutral; its modal revelational principleassumes a political type of individuality;
outside the Word-Revelation this prin


ciple turns into a law of sin, 503. 
NEWTON, I, laid the foundations of mo


dern mathematical natural science, 193,201; his "absolute mathematical time" 
refuted by D. HUME, 286; tempus quodaequabiliter fluit, 328; KANT struggledwith the proud structure of NEWTON'Ssystem of natural science, 330; KANTpointed metaphysics to the method ofmathematical physics formulated byNEWTON, 336; his pronouncement: "hypotheses 
non fingo", 337; KANT defendedNEWTON'S and EULER'S doctrine of "absolute 
pure space" — which was termed"sensorium Dei" —, in a writing of theyear 1768, 342; KANT accepted NEWTON'S

view of corporeal things filling space,
348; N.'s view of the compatibility ofmechanism and Divine teleology in nature, 
398.
—, II, movement in space, 95; "absolute"
space, 95; space is a metaphysical entity:
sensorium Dei, 96, 97; NEWTON'S mathematical 
time is kinematical, 100; his principles 
of natural science and VOLTAIRE'S 
view of historical development, 268, 269;
dominated the Enlightenment together 


 

171NOMINALISM 

with LOCKE, 350; NEWTON'S empirical
method applied to history, 352. 
—, III, the constants of modern physics
have nothing to do with NEWTON'S rigid
"material units", or substances, 23; his 
concept of force and that of LEIBNIZ' monadology; 
STOKER'S use of this concept;
its influence on SCHELER, on French 
spiritualistic neo-Scholasticism, 70. 


NIEBUHR, REINHOLD, I, 
The Principle of Ethics, 521;
Nature and Destiny of Man, 521 (note).


III, 
ROmische Geschichte, 369. 

NICOLAUS OF ORESME, I, formulated the 
new concept of the law of motion ; andanticipated COPERNICUS' discovery; andinvented the method of analytical geometry 
before DESCARTES, 202. 

NIETSCHE, I, 
Genealogie der Sitten, 125.
—, I, on life and world views; his philosophy 
of life sets philosophy the task ofdetermining the practical "ordering ofvalues according to rank"• philosophersare called "commanders and law-givers";
philosophy is the "art of living", 125; hisgospel of the super-man, 210; first a Romantic 
Idealist, later a Darwinian evolutionist; 
developed the religion of power;
man an animal not yet fixed, overestimating 
his own importance; a "phantas-
tic animal" with ideologies; he killed hisgods; history a struggle for power; the"Will to Power"; super-man; blond beast; 
transvaluation Of all values; science has 
only pragmatic value; no faith in scientific 
truth or in the Idea of humanity,
211; since a new development of thenatural-science-ideal under DARWIN'S influence 
pervaded the "historical mode ofthought", the irrationalistic turn in Humanistic 
freedom-idealism led to a dialectical 
struggle between the two basicfactors of the Humanistic transcendental 
basic Idea; NIETSCHE'S final phase marksthe beginning of the religious uprootingof modern thought; this was the result ofthe dialectical self-destruction of Humanism 
in radical Historicism; NIETSCHE'S 
first period was romantic-aesthetic, 
influenced by SCHOPENHAUER andRICHARD WAGNER; his second phase waspositivistic, 465; the biological ideal getsthe upperhand; in his last period, thatof the culture-philosophy of the "Superman", 
the science-ideal has been entirelydepreciated; science is a biological meansin the struggle for life, without any truth-
value, 466.
—, II, on good and evil in an ethical

sense, 148. 

NIZOLIUS, MARIUS, I, his extreme nominalistic 
sensualism conceived the universalia 
as mere collectives comprehending allthe individual things implied in them; aconcept is an abbreviated summation of 

many sensorily perceived individualswhich are signified by a common name;
this conception does not do justice to theHumanistic science ideal with its creation 
motive, 244. 

NOAH, III, the Divine covenant with 
NOAH, and the State, 423. 

NODAL POINTS, III, of enkaptic interlacement 
are the positive forms given tothese interlacements, 664. 

NOEMA, II, in HUSSERL; every noema has a 
content, viz. its meaning, i.e. the intendedas such, 28. 

NOEMATICAL CONTENTS, II, of the intentional 
acts of consciousness in the intuition 
of the essence (Wesensanschauung), 544. 

NOETIC AND NOEMATIC, II, in HUSSERL 
"meaning" becomes identical with the"Reine Aktwesen" both as regards itssubjective noetic and its objective noematic 
aspect, 27. 

NOMINALISM, I, of OCCAM, 66; of THOMAS 
HOBBES, 150; of the 14th century turnedagainst realistic Scholasticism, 183-185;
was related to Augustinian thoughtthrough the Franciscans, 186; disruptedthe Christian and the pagan motives ofScholasticism, 187; was secularized in the 
later Middle Ages by JOHN OF JANDUN and 
MARSILIUS OF PADUA, 188; of DESCARTES, 
222; of LEIBNIZ was moderate; in LOCKE, 
224, 225; of HOBBES was radical, 225; its 
theory of natural law cannot ascribe ontological 
reality to the State, 311; Occamist 
nominalism of LUTHER, 512. 
—, II, universalia post rem; noumenonand phenomenon; concept is symbol of aset of individual things, 387 ; OCCAM : universalia 
are exclusively intentional; theyare symbolic terms (termini) signifyingthings; an intentional concept is almostidentical with the actus intelligendi; innominalism and in realism the subject-
object relation is detached from themeaning coherence; as the merely intended 
content of thought; ARISTOTLE'Stheory leads to the copy doctrine; both inTHOMAS and OCCAM; OCCAM: supponerepro; universalia are no mere fictions, butimages (imago), symbolical copies ofthings, but no substantial essential forms;
Scholastic error about the Gegenstand oftheor. thought, 388; intentional objectand Gegenstand are identified, 389; thenominalistic separation between faith 
and reason, 564 ; is impossible and rests 
on the hypostatization of synthetical 
thought, 565. 
-, III, in RIEHL, 45; and sociological individualism, 
183 ; OTHMAR SPANN'S view 
of universalism and individualism errs 
in two respects; not all nominalism is individualistic; 
modern irrationalistic nominalism 
is universalistic in sociology; sois the nominalistic Stoa in an under cur



 

Nomos

rent; sociology is based on ontology; therealistic metaphysical theories of ARISTOTLE 
and THOMAS AQUINAS are universalistic; 
rationalist individualist nominalism 
denies the metaphysical foundationof social relationships, 222; PLATO'S Glaucon 
in his Politeia considered only theindividual sensory thing is real and enclosed 
within itself, the individual personprecedes every societal relationship; thestate as an aggregate of individuals;
Sophists and Cynics denied social life,
223; nominalistic theories are functionalistic; 
e.g. a community is based onpsychical interaction between individuals; 
or on a legal contract; ARISTOTLE'S"social impulse" was transformed intonaturalistic or idealistic functionalism; 
the Stoic appetitus socialis; Averroistnominalism of JOHN OF JANDUN and 
MARSILIUS OF PADUA, 224. 

NoMos, I, only has meaning in correlation 
with the subject-side of the cosmos,

96. 
NORMS, II, a norm is a rational standard 
founded in the logical manner of distinction 
; the central commandment of love 
is not a norm, 156 (note) ; according toWINDELBAND, the logical, aesthetic, andethical norms have an absolute character, 
elevated above time and not subject totemporal change, 239; but the truth isthat logical, aesthetical and ethicalnorms, etc., are neither absolute, nor invariable, 
240, 241. 

NORMOLOGICAL THEORY, III, Of KELSEN ; 

the State as a logical system of legal 
norms, 387; of JELLINEK ; his view resulted 
in the theoretical negation of theState and of law, 432, 433. 

NOTHINGNESS, I, idolatrous absolutization 
is necessarily directed to the specialityof meaning, which is thereby dissociatedfrom its temporal coherence, and consequently 
becomes meaningless and void;
the fall into sin is a privatio, a negation,
a nothingness, 63. 

NOTHINGNESS (DAS NIGHTS), II, in HEIDEGGER 
in its awareness of the nothingness 
of its Being; Dasein turns in uponitself and reflects on its freedom in order 
to project its finite existence, revealing 
it in its inner essence in the movement 
of historical time, 22, 23. 

NOUMENON, I, is the transcendent realm 
in which the ideas ofJ free autonomous 
will and God have "practical reality", inKANT'S thought, 90 ; in KANT, is a self-
sufficient metaphysical reality, but itavenges itself by logical formalism inethics, 357. 
—, II, in KANT'S dualistic cosmonomic 
Idea the realm of experience (of nature)
is separated from that of super-sensoryfreedom; the realm of the understandingis restricted to the phenomenon; the 

172 

practical realm of reason bears on thesuper sensory sphere of the absolutenormative noumenon, 43; in KANT the 
theoretical Idea refers to the transcendent 
root of reality in a theoreticallytranscendental sense; this root is the 
Idea of the Homo noumenon, 44 ; KANT's 
idea of the homo noumenon is a theoretical 
idea, based on synthetical abstraction, 
187 (note) ; PLATO split up realityinto an independent noumenon and amaterial phenomenon, 387; KANT sharplyopposes phenomena to noumena, showingthat he holds to the absolute transcen-
, 
dence of the practical Ideas above thetemporal world, 523. 

Nous, I, the human nous has become the 
carnal mind, through sin, 100; the Divinenous is actus purus and pure Form, firsttranscendent cause, unmoved mover and 
final end of the cosmos in ARISTOTLE,122; 
or the divine mind, in PLATO, 248. 
—, II, the actual nous, i.e., the actual 
reason, cannot become matter because it 
is the Arch& of all delimitation of meaning, 
in ARISTOTLE, 11. 

NOVALIS, I, laws are absolutely oppositeto morality; they are the complement ofdefective natures and entities, (note) 465. 

NUCLEUS, III, of an atom; determines the 
place of an element in the periodicalsystem, and its physico-chemically qualified 
geno-type, 699; of a living cell;
bears the heredity factors, and is thevital centre of the cell, 722. 

NUMERICAL ASPECT, I, the + and — order 
of numbers is a modal aspect of time, andin temporal reality it is continually related 
to factual duration; the + and — 
directions express a numerial order oftime determining the place and value ofeach of the numbers; KANT made number 
originate from a schematizing of the logical 
category of quantity in time; HAMILTON 
defined arithmetic as the science 
of pure time or order in progression;
intuitionalistic mathematics makes numbers 
originate from a synthesis of theoriginal intuition of time and the original 
ideas of one and addition, 32 (notes) ;
LEIBNIZ held that number as a sum of 
static units is the metaphysical basic Ideaof the cosmos; later he gave this up andheld that a discrete element is only afunction of the mathematical principle ofprogression, and number itself is thesimplest instance of the general relationof thought; his mathematics is logicistic,
229; the differential number anticipatesthe modal meaning of phoronomic movement, 
236; according to HUME, number isa fiction, 287. 

NUMBER, II, rational, irrational, and complex 
numbers pre-suppose the "natural"
numbers; the nuclear meaning of numberis discrete quantity disclosed in the se



173 OCCAM, WILLIAM OF 


ries principle of numerical time-order inthe plus and minus directions, 79; Ibis-
SELL introduces the class concept to deduce 
number from the extension of the 
concept of class, 83; irrational and differential 
functions of number are not actual 
numbers. They are only complicatedrelations between natural integers; mathematics 
is dependent on the characterof the natural numbers, 88; Neo-Kantians 
logicize space and number exhaustively,

91. 
NUMBER, IRRATIONAL AND DIFFERENTIAL 
FUNCTIONS. OF, II, anticipate originalspace and movement, 87. 

NUMERUS FORMALIS, I, in AUGUSTINUS; in 
ALBERTUS MAGNUS, 26. 

0 

OBEDIENCE, II, the legal duty of obediencedoes not function in a juridical subjectobject-
relation in which it is the objectof a legal duty and of a correspondingright. Obedience as such is only subjective 
behaviour in conformity to legal 
norms, 410. 

OBJECT, I, a bird's nest is a biotic object,
42; and Gegenstand confused by LITT, 86.
—, II, MALAN calls numbers "objects ofthe third stage whose species are onlysets of things", 85; intentional object inScholasticism; object in modern thoughtis that to which our mental activity inthought or volition is directed, 367; sinceKANT Object and Gegenstand have beenidentified, 368 ; cognitive or volitional object, 
369; object functions implied in aspatial picture, 373; object as the intentional 
contents of a concept and a representation; 
universalia post rem arethe essential forms abstracted by logicalaphaeresis; they only have esse intentionale 
or esse objective in moderate Realism, 
387; object is identified with "substance" 
in Scholastic realism; with Gegenstand; 
the transcendentalia, 388, 389; temporal 
reality has an object-side; an intentional 
logical concept is not identical withan object; reflexive concepts; object islatent until subject opens it, 389; the prelogical 
aspects become logically thinkable 
objectively only; definition of logical 
objectivity; the logical systasis; objectification 
is restricted to the logicalretrocipatory spheres; geisteswissenschdftlichen 
Methoden, 390; unfree nature 
is an object in HEGEL, 397; the object 
of a right, 408; formal and materialobject, 439; subjective, intentional, andmaterial object, PFANDER, 440. 

OBJECTIFICATION, II, psychical objectification 
is bound to the retrocipatory structure 
of the feeling-aspect, 373; that ofpre-biotic functions, 374 ; that of post-

psychical object functions in feeling, 376;
juridical objectification, 406. 

OBJECTIFYING THOUGHT, II, according toRomanticism and HEGEL the socio-cultural 
sciences (Geisteswissenschaften)
are required to detach themselves completely 
from the spatial, objectifying wayof thought customary in the naturalsciences, 390. 

OBJECTIVE, I, the laws of the "objective"
in Immanence philosophy, 110. 
—, II, the Gegenstand is identified withthe universally valid and "objective" ofexperience, in KANT'S theory, 467. 

OBJECTIVE MIND, II, in HEGEL; history isthe temporal mode of development of spiritual 
reality, 194 ; in it the ObjectiveMind immanently unfolds its infinitewealth of meaning; each individual phenomenon 
in history is a particular figureor shape adopted by that mind in itsdialectical course through history, 195;
in HEGEL'S dialectical Idea of development; 
the "Volksgeister" as the true subjects 
of world history have become manifestations 
of the "Objective Mind", 279. 

OBJECTIVE NATURAL THINGS, III, formed 
or produced by animals, 107. 

OBJECTIVE REALITY, III, in Immanence 
philosophy "objective" means : verifiableby natural science, 36; the object functions 
of a tree, 57, 58. 

OBJECTIVE SPIRIT, II, in history, according 
to German historical Idealism; ashaper of history is a leader in a historical 
group-function; he is forced along thepaths of historical continuity by the power 
of tradition (objective spirit), 245. 

OBJECTUM INTENTIONALE, II, the sensoryfunction of imagination produces itsphantasms in merely intentional objectivity, 
entirely apart from the sensory objectivity 
of real things, 425. 
--III, is bound to the plastic horizon,

116. 
OBRIGKEITSSTAAT, III, GIERKE'S discussion, 
435. 
OCCAM, WILLIAM OF, I, the inner dialectic 
of the motive of nature and grace drove-Scholasticism in the 14th century fromthe Thomistic pseudo synthesis (Naturapraeambula gratiae) to the Occamist antithesis 
(no point of contact between nature 
and grace) ; OCCAM was the leaderof the Nominalistic Scholasticism of the 
14th century, 66; "natural reason" has 
become entirely tarnished; there is no 
place for metaphysics or natural theology, 
although the autonomy of naturalreason is maintained to the utmost; thegrace motive retains primacy, but not inthe Thomistic synthetical hierarchicalsense, 67; he turned against the Thomisticcompromise between Christian and pa



 

OCCASIONAL' STS 174 

gan thought, 183; his nominalism was OPENING-PROCESS, I, discloses the tempo-
based on an extremely nominalistic con- ral character of the cosmic order; anticiception 
of the "potestas Dei absoluta" patory moments are developed coheringand denied that the "universal concepts with later aspects; the opening-processof thought" have a "fundamentum in re; has temporal duration, 29, 30.
OCCAM opposed logical thought to reality --, II, other names; closed structures;
itself and held that the sources of know- juridical, 181; primitive legal sphere isledge are only found in sensory percept- closed, 182; its retrocipations in the cloion 
and logical understanding; univer- sed state; feeling as a closed aspect, 183;
salia are taken to be merely "signs" closed physical aspect; and juridical as-
standing for a plurality of things but pect; how opened, 184; limiting funchaving 
no reality in or before things; tions of number, of logical feeling; ofuniversalia are conceptus or intentiones juridical guilt, etc.; unlawfulness, jurid.
animae formed by the understanding; causality and imputation, 185; "higherthey are copies of things and have a me- feelings" deepen the retrocipations inrely subjective value; OCCAM depreciates feeling; sensory perception refined toscience; faith is bound to the Bible and human sensibility, 186; in the Idea phil.
to the Church tradition; the Bible is a thought is directed to the root and to thelaw book, 184; he assigned primacy to origin of all meaning, 188; anticipatorythe will, 185; OCCAM changed the Augus- spheres can open only after retrocipatorytinian primacy of the will in a radically spheres have been disclosed, 188; pre-
irrationalistic manner; the essence of God logical spheres and normative anticipais 
pure form; God's potestas absoluta re- tions; a guiding function must first opensembled the unpredictable Greek anang- its own anticip. spheres; opening-processkê; he abstracted God's Will from the starts in the cultural sphere, but is gui-
Fulness of His holy Being and conceived ded by faith; but faith has no anticipa,
of his Sovereign Power as an orderless tions, 189; a provisional resting point intyranny; thus God's Will was placed un- history, 190; historical sphere is nodalder the lex; with reference to ethical and point in opening-process in the transcenreligious 
laws God's Power became "ar- dental direction, 191; in the historical asbitrariness", 
187 ; LEIBNIZ' contempora- pect and its superstrata the opening-prories 
were more radically Nominalistic cess may have started whereas logicalthan OCCAM, 225; OCCAM had disrupted thought is still unopened; Carolingianthe Christian faith from Aristotelian Renaissance; a real state requires an ope-

metaphysics, 260 (note). ned cultural function; science starts after—, II, the opening of culture; why the historicalSumma totius logicae ad Adamum, 388. aspect is the nodal point of meaning dis-, 
II, economy of thought, 123 ; univer- closure, 191; the expression of the founsalia 
have an intentional existence, are dational direction of time in the transcensymbols; 
concept and actus intelligendi; dental direction, 192; opening-processhis copy theory; supponere pro; termin-: and sphere universality, 335; sin and theism; Gegenstand, 388. opening-process; positivization of strut


, III, distinguishes arbitrary from na- tural principles, 335; sin affects the lawtural 
signs; misinterprets the objective side of the opening-process; paper de-
logical aspect of a thing, 45. trees in the French Revolution, 336;

logic of facts; the eschatological perspec-
OCCASIONALISTS, I, attempted a synthesis five in the Christian Idea of cultural de-
between Cartesianism and other systems velopment, 337; the guidance of faith inof thought, 223. the opening-process of mathematics; ma 
OCCUPATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, III, are thesis universalis; DESCARTES, 337; LEIB-

very important; they show a spirit of NIZ ; physics; the deepening of matherna


community and solidarity, 603. tical thought; in how far the idea of

mathesis universalis was useful; absoluti-
OEDIPUS COMPLEX, II, and religion in zation of mathematics by LEIBNIZ ; lex 
FREUD, 312, 313. continui, 338 ; rigidity of mathem. Idea 

 by DIDEROT ; pure mathematics,

OGBURN, W. F. AND MEYER F. MIMKOFF, III, 
III,III, 

339; various attempts to mathematicizeA Handbook of Sociology, 305. other sciences : biology, physics, 341; sociology, 
juridical theory; Bus SERL ;

OGDEN, C. K. AND I. A. RICHARDS, II, 

The Meaning of Meaning, 227. SCHREIER, 342; the so-called socio-cultural 
sciences, 343; biology and society, 
OLYMPIAN GODS, I, were personified cul- 344; when can the opening-process start;

tural powers, 62. the contribution of the Enlightenment to

the disclosure of Western civilization, 
OLYMPIANS, II, are the personal gods of 356; positivization of individualizingHOMER; the first national gods of the norm in the Enlightenment; normativeGreeks; they are the universal, celestial principles of sociality, economy, justice,
gods, bound neither to a specific logality, morals and faith in an anticipatory in-
nor to a particular place of worship, 321. dividualistic way; LOCKE'S theory of in



175 ORGANIZED COMMUNITIES 

nate human rights, 357 ; the Enlighten-cess and sphere-sovereignty, 61, 62; the
ment had to create new forms of culture; genetic process of human life and the


its natural law view; rights of man;opening-relation, 78; the opening of the
world-citizenship borrowed from thelingual function of a book by any reader
Stoa; a world organization of the churchwho can understand it; this opening is
rejected for a humanistic humanity; usepreceded by the actualization when we


of Reformation ideas; process of disclo-pick it up, turn the pages, and read, 152. 
sure becomes secular in direction ; ratio-OPPENHEIMER, FR., III,
nalistic-individualistic-utilitarian codifi-System der Soziologie, 159, 166.
cations; CHR. WOLFF and JOHN LOCKE, —, III, society; life, 166; a secondary im


358; juridical principles positivized inmortal substance, 167.
the Humanistic rationalistic sense, free-


OPPENHEIM, P. (and CARL G. HEMPEL),

dom of contract principle positivized at

III,

an early period, the doctrine of justa

Der Typusbegriff im Lichte der neuen

causa in Canon Law; HUGO DE GROOT : 

Logik, 81.

pacta sunt servanda; HOBBES' theory of
natural law; rejects Thomistic justumOPTIMISM, I, of the Enlightenment; in
pretium ; justitia commutativa et distribu-LEIBNIZ, 253.
tiva, laughed to scorn; constitutional and—, II, cultural optimism is unacceptable,
civil law reduced to a formalistic con-262; ROUSSEAU'S later optimism, 270.
tractual principle; private law too, 359;


ORDER OF SUCCESSION OF THE ASPECTS, II,

opening of economic relations; Law-State 

is not recognized in Humanistic philoso


in LOCKE ; liberalism; classical economics; 

phy, 49; architectonic differentiation,

guilds abolished, 360; one-sided opening

75 ff.

of economic relations; atropy of communal 
relations, 361; homo economicus; ORDERED PHYSICO-SPATIAL FIGURE, III, 
bourgeous "Christian" callousnous; exces-WOLTERECK'S concept, 701, 702. 
sive power of science and technique; noORDNUNG, III, an undefined concept in
cultural economy; revolution, 362; reac-EMIL BRUNNER, 538, 540.
tion Romanticism ; Restoration ; Socialism; 


ORDNUNGSLEHRE, III, DRIESCH'S "Ord-

Communism; disharmony in opening


nungslehre" is influenced by KANT'S

process becomes antinomy in Humanistic

epistemology, 737.

thought; science and personality; but suchdisharmony is a defect in the process ofORGANISM, I, a natural organism must bedisclosure through sin, 362 ; process of dis-related to itself as cause and effect, in 
closure is bound to history and guided byKANT'S view, 394. 
faith; the Christian idea of historical de-

ORGANIZATION, III, renders a community

velopment is not guided by the optimistic

independent of the lease of life of its

faith in progress — nor by the pessimism

members, 180; of an economic business

of Historism, but by the struggle between

and of the State, in KELSEN, 386; in HEL-

the civitas Dei and the civitas terrena, 

LER, 407; organization versus organism;

363; our univocal criterion to distinguish

SCHELLING; FICHTE; MARX; GIERKE ; Posi


between primitive and disclosed cultural

tivism, 406, 407; TONNIES ; MARCK ; DARM-

spheres; apostate guidance by apostate

STAEDTER, 408; the lawstate is then an or-

faith leads to disharmony on the law-side

ganism, the power State is an organiza


side and misery on the subject-side; apo


tion, 409; MARX mechanized the idea of

static movements have an historical task; 

organization, 455, 456; the organization of

Historism rejected; philosophical or

voluntary associations to counteract 19th

theological speculations rejected in the

century destructive individualism, 596.

periodizing of history, 364 ; Christianshave to struggle for the power of culturalORGANIZED COMMUNITIES, III, industrial 

formation, 364 ; the struggle is notauthoritarian organization ; associatoryagainst our fellowmen but against theand authoritarian organizations; their en-
spirit of darkness, 365.kapsis; an industrial organized community—, III, the possibility of the internalis most often authoritarian and indirectlyopening-process in a tree is an insolublecompulsory, 191, 192; the canonist con-
problem, 66; disharmonious opening,ception of organized communties as per142; 
this process does not abolish thesonae fictae; Roman jurists consideredoriginal foundation of the State, 419; thecollectivities of persons or of things asopening and individualizing process is auniversitas; person to them was the in-
rationalizing progress, 594. dividual subject of private law; the "uni

versitas" is merely a juridical construc-
OPENING-RELATION, III, in the individual-tion according to INNOCENTIUS IV; PEity 
structure of a linden-tree, 58; the roleTRUCCIUS SENENSIUS, JOHANNES ANDREAE, 

of the qualifying function in this pro-on the universitas as not real; this is not 
cess; internal and external structural co-yet nominalism, 233; the unity of the hierherence 
of modal functions, 59, 60; ex-archical Roman Church in the view of the 
ternal teleology and internal destination;Canonists, s.v.; the fiction theory, s.v.,
entelechy in ARISTOTLE, 60; opening pro-234, 235; natural law and state absolu



 

ORGANIZERS

tiSM ; HOBBES, ROUSSEAU, 236; the contract 
was considered as the only foundation 
of the internal authoritative structure 
of every organized community; external 
division of communities accordingto their various goals; the state is a societas 
inaequalis; non-political organizations 
are societates aequales; the liberalist 
view; LOCKE; CHR. WOLFF, 237; 
questions raised by considering the unityof an organized community; universalismcontra individualism, 238; OTHMAR 
SPANN'S misconceptions; modern individualistic 
trends do not construe organized 
communities out of autarchical individuals; 
they recognize social interactions 
as constituents of individual life; 
this is functionalistic individualism; the 
formal school of sociology; SIMMEL, V.
WIESE ; GEORG JELLINEK ; JULIUS BINDER; 
ARISTOTLE viewed individual man as a 
metaphysical substance but his sociologyis universalistic, 239; in a general senseindividualism construes organized communities 
out of its "elementary constituents"; 
universalism tries to derive the 
"parts" from the coherence of the whole,
240; does a communal whole as such 
have its own life of feeling and thought,
distinct from that of its members? the 
"popular mind", "the communal soul",
"collective conscience"; are they the result 
of the social interactions between individuals?, 
295; a community has a subjective 
continuity and identity regulatedby its structural principle; it is a typicalstructure of man's own temporal socialexistence; its continuity can only be realized 
in the communal structure of the 
relevant functions of its members; the 
internal structure of the whole continues 
to actualize itself in the feelings andthoughts of the existing members in anindividual way; in an organized community 
this continuous identity extendsbeyond the individual temporal existences 
of the members; and depends on their 
inner act-life; a community in time hasno I-ness; comparison with the life of aplant, 296; the tertium comparationiswas the starting point for the organological 
theories of human communities;
LITT'S argument against it is not quiteadequate; a temporal human communityis not an organic natural being, nor anorganically articulated super-person; itdoes not interweave the central I-nesses 
of its members, for each of them transcends 
all temporal relationships, 297;
communal structures are secondary andtemporal; depending on human actualization 
; in a temporal community the I-
ness expresses itself in its supra temporal 
religious communion with other egos;
community feeling, thought, etc. is feeling, 
etc., of humans in the unity of societal 
relationships; this unity is guaranteed 
by the internal structural principle,

i.e. a law, 298; temporal communities 
176 

have no "substance" and no I-ness; but in 
comparison with one another they havean inner subjective unity, 299; a community 
is said to rank higher in proportionto the good determining its scope and tothe depth of its point of union in humanpersonality, according to D. VON HILDE 
BRAND, 320. 

ORGANIZERS, III, are inductive, non-livingmaterial components influencing livingcells, 723. 

ORGANOLOGICAL THEORY, III, Of communities 
; their starting point; TH. LITT's 
reasoning against them is not quite adequate, 
297; in HEGEL, 433. 

ORGANOLOGICAL VIEW, II, of history underthe influence of SCHELLING and the Historical 
School, led to quietism — intensified 
by the Lutheran view of the Law —
the organol. view of history penetratedto the conception of history propoundedFR. JULIUS STAHL, 249-250. 

ORIGIN, I, neither the historian, nor the 
philosopher can say anything about theorigin of the world, for there is no origin, 
FICHTE, 483. 

ORPHISM, I, and religious revivals, 67.
—, II, in Greek philosophy which continued 
to be in contact with mythology,

321. 
OSIRIS, II, was the god of the dead and
became the judge of good and evil, 324. 

OSTROGORSKI, M., III, 
La democratie et l'organisation des parties 
politiques, 605, 606. 


OSTWALD, III, compares ordinary catalysts 
with a mechanical lubricant, 731. 


OTTO, RUDOLPH, I, characterizes religion
as experience of the "tremendum", 58.
---, II, his modern irrationalistic-idealistic 
and transcendental-psychologistic
view of faith as a religious a priori, 300. 


OURANIC ELEMENTS, II, in PARMENIDES, 56. 

OURANIC THOUGHT, I, of the ouranic religion 
of nature, 533. 

OuSIA, I, or substance, is the hypostatizedtheoretical activity of thought in its logical 
aspect, 44.
—, II, ousia and hylê in ARISTOTLE, 9.
—, III, the metaphysical supra temporalousia or substance in ARISTOTLE, 4, 8, 9; 
its accidents; a noumenon, 10; an anti-
nomic concept; the whole and its parts,
12; this concept is Scholastic, 65, 67; theimmortal spiritual substance, 89; the physical 
concept substance in KANT, 100; artefacts 
are not substances in ARISTOTLE, 
126, 127; life as an immortal substance, 

167. 
OTHER-WORLDLINESS, I, rejected in theRenaissance, 199. 


177 PERAS AND APEIRON 


OUTER AND INNER EXPERIENCE, I, distinguished 
by LOCKE, 263. 

OVERVOORDE, J. C. and J. G. CH. JOOSTING, 

III, 

De Gilden van Utrecht tot 1528, 478, 479. 
—, III, on the sources of law relating tothe Utrecht guilds up to 1528, 675. 

PANTHEISM, I, in BRUNO, 199. 

PANUNZIO, S., III, 
Allgemeine Theorie des fascistischen
Staates, 431. 


PAPPENHEIM, VON, III, 
De alt-ddnischen Schutzgilden, 673.
--, III, attacked WILDA'S thesis on the 
craft guilds, 673. 


PARAPLASMATIC MATERIAL PARTICLES, III, 
WOLTERECK'S view, 724. 

PARENTAL AUTHORITY, III, in civil law, 

281. 
PARMENIDES, I, his logicism refuted bythe Sophists, 19; the eternal divine formof being has no coming into being norpassing away and is enclosed in the idealstatic form of a spatial sphere; this viewis antinomous, 31 ; PARMENIDES' didactic 
poem sharply opposes theoria and pistis, 
knowledge to doxa (uncertain opinion), 
35; he thought he could base an entiremetaphysical doctrine of being on thelogical or analytical unity-and-identity,

79. 
—, II, hypostatizes the analytical relationof identity expressed in the copula "tobe"; the "eternal Being" is spherical andheld together by Anangkê (fate) and Dike(justice, or order) ; Ouranic and Olympian 
thoughts, 56; Dike and world order,
and being, 132; Dike reacts against everyultra vires, 134. 
—, III, on becoming and change; identifies 
thinking and being, 5; being has aspherical form, 7. 
PARTY DISCIPLINE, III, should not be overstrained, 
616. 

PARTY AND STATE, III, there is an enkapsisof party and State, especially at electionsand in the formation of a cabinet, 619. 

PARTY SYSTEM, THE U.S.A., III, has contributed 
to the unification and the homogeneity 
of the population, 623. 

PARVA GLANDULA, I, in DESCARTES, 219. 

PASCH, II, on the convergent infinite series; 
Zahlstrecke; number is continuous,

91. 
PASJOEKANIS, III, civil and penal law arebound to commodity exchange and the 

principle of equivalency; the communistdistribution according to needs; the Statehas to protect the exchange relations;
State and law are forms of "civil society"; 
they should be transformed into socialist 
law; "economical law", 459. 

PASSIONS, II, emotions should not be 
identified with "affects", nor with "passions"; 
affects are psychic types of movement, 
116, 117; the control of our sensory 
passions and affects is a cultural,
not an ethical function of the will, 145. 

PATRIA POTESTAS, II, in ancient Rome; in 

a domestic undifferentiated community;

this power was at the same time an of


fice, and a subjective right of property

implying the legal faculty to sell the

children under it, 411. 

• 
PATRIARCHY, III, was later than matriarchy, 
331. 

PATRIMONIAL THEORY OF THE STATE, III, 
of v. HALLER, 477; GROEN'S view, 478. 

PATRISTIC THOUGHT, I, its various motives, 
173. 

PAUL, ST., I, without the law there is no 
sin; and there is a law of sin, 63; human 
thought (nous) has become the "carnalmind" (nous tes sarkos), 100. 

PAUL, H., II, 

Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte, 222. 

PAVLOV, II, his experiments with animals,
viz. with dogs, concerning the secretionof spittle under the direction of psychical 
associations, 184. 

PEARSON, KARL, III, defended the right ofthe "Aryan race" to expel the "inferiorraces", 496. 

PEASANT REVOLT, III, in Germany, induced 
LUTHER to appeal to the secularGovernment in matters of ecclesiastical 
organization, 514. 

PERAS, I, in PLATO, is the natural law setting 
a limit to the apeiron, and the formless 
stream of becoming receives thecharacter of a becoming to being, 113.
—, III, and the material world, in PLATO, 

11. 
PERAS AND APEIRON, II, PLATO'S idea of 
Being synthesized positive and negativeBeing, the on and the me on, and theprinciples of form and matter; all genesis 
is a becoming to a form of being expressing 
the Divine Idea of the good and thebeautiful (KALOKAGATHON) ; the Eleatic 
determinations of Being by unity andverity were completed by those of beautyand goodness, and the dialectical Idea ofBeing embraced peras and apeiron, thedistinction of form and matter, 57; the 
Pythagorean idea of peras limiting theapeiron supplies the rational measure of 


 

PERCEPTION 178 

the due mean between two bad extremes 
in the subjective ethos, 146. 

PERCEPTION I, is wholly passive in KANT,
90; material unconscious perceptionspass into consciousness, but confused representations 
pass to the distinct andclear apperceptions of the limited spiritual 
monads, in LEIBNIZ, 234. 
—, II, perception, representation, remembrance, 
volition, etc., are concrete human 
acts which cannot be enclosed in a modal 
aspect of reality but have only amodal function in the psychical lawsphere, 372.
—, III, its anticipations, 38; the necessary 
relation between stimulus and sensation, 
44 ; in empiricist psychology, 104,

105. 
PERCEPTION OF SPACE, II, the objectivesensory space of perception functions inthe modus of emotional sensibility, 372;
but for our subjective feeling of extensionwe could not perceive any objective sensory 
image of space; the space of sight,
of touch, of hearing have different structures; 
they function in structural coherence 
with each other; and are organically 
connected; the projective opticspace and the tactile image, 373. 

PERFECTIBILITY, II, the perfectibility ofman was an article of faith of the Enlightenment, 
and also of J. F. HERDER'SIdeen zur Philosophie der Geschichte,

272. 
PERFECT SOCIETY, THE, III, in the sphereof grace it is the Church; in that of nature 
it is the State, according to THOMASAQUINAS, 220. 

PERIDINIDIAE, III, 772. 

PERIODS IN HISTORY, II, the temporalcourse of history expresses the strugglebetween the Civitas Dei and the civitas 
terrena; any division of history into periods 
should depend on the actual courseof historical development, and is boundto the provisional phase of history inwhich the historian himself lives, 295. 

PERRAULT, CLAUDE, III, his colonnade at 
the Louvre; disregard of the bound character 
of architectural style for the sakeof monumentality, 142. 

PERSIAN WARS, III, of Athens, 210. 

PERSONAL GOD, I, in DESCARTES, ROUSSEAUand KANT, 191. 

PERSONA FICTA, III, the Canonists conceive 
of organized communities as fictitious 
persons, 233 ; in the Humanistictheory of natural law; HOBBES, 235. 

PERSONALITY, I, its freedom is guaranteedby the domination of mathematicalthought in LOCKE, 318.
—, II, in primitive culture man does notrealize that he transcends the things of 

nature. His sense of being a personality
is diffuse, dispersed; he even incorporates 
personality in animals, plants or lifeless 
objects, 296; becomes diffuse in restrictive 
apostatic faith, 316.
—, III, BOETHIUS' definition adopted by
THOMAS AQUINAS ; the substance concept,
6; its typology in psychology; W. STERN;
HEMPEL and OPPENHEIM, 81. 


PERSONALITY-IDEAL, I, in the Humanistic 
transcendental Idea, 198, 294-296, 302, 
313; in KANT, is a function of feeling, 334,
341, 351, 384, 463; cf.s.v. FICHTE, MAINON, 
Irrationalism. 


PERSPECTIVE OF EXPERIENCE, SUBJECTIVE, 
II, is restored to us in the faithful acceptance 
of Divine Revelation with all our 
heart; it enables us to grasp reality again
perspectively in the light of Truth, 563. 


PERSPECTIVE OF TRUTH, II, the a priori
structure of truth bears on the horizon 
of human experience; its full richness
is only conceivable theoretically in the
Christian Idea of Verity; this Idea is directed 
to the fulness of meaning of Truth
and has the same perspective character
as the experiential horizon, 571. 


PESSIMISM, I, in MACCHIAVELLI, 217; in
HOBBES, 253. 
—, II, 262; ROUSSEAU, 271. 


PESSIMISM, MARXIAN, III, in F. TONNIES, 


186. 
PETITES PERCEPTIONS, I, in LEIBNIZ, 251; 
this Leibnizian doctrine was introduced 
into Kantian epistemology by MAIMON,

404. 
PETRACZICKY, II, the attributive-imperative 
function of law, 134. 

PFAFF, CHRISTOPH MATTHAEUS, III, 
founded the theory of the collegial systemof Church government, 517. 

PFANDER, ALEXANDER, II, 
Der philosophische Kritizismus, 439;
Logik, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 448,


488. 
—, II, he objected to KANT'S distinction
between analytical and synthetical judgments, 
438; analytical judgments concern
the subject, synthetical judgments concern 
the object of a concept; PFANDER
distinguishes between subjective, intentional 
(or formal) Object and the "Gegenstand 
an sich" (material object) ; Attributionsurteil, 
440. 

PHANTASM, II, a phantasm is an originaltype of individuality in sensory phantasyin its restrictive function, and also in 
animal psychical life; it is not typicallyfounded in the biotic function, for the 
sensory imagination produces a phantasmin merely intentional objectivity, 425. 

PHANTASY, III, the productive phantasyof an artist is founded in the sensory 


179 PHILOSOPHIA PERENNIS 


function of the imagination; the act-structure; 
a phantasy object has an intentionalcharacter; a phantasm is the product ofour imagination; aesthetic phantasms areintentional visionary objects, 115. 

PHENOMENOLOGICAL ATTITUDE, I, the absolute 
"ego" is opposed to the world, 52.
—, II, is absolutized by HUSSERL, and isinternally antinomous, 489. 

PHENOMENOLOGICAL INTUITION, II, of the 
essence; if theoretical insight could fullyrealize the eidos of a modal aspect, as theresult of an adequate intuition of itsessence, it should grasp the fulness andthe totality of its meaning adequately; itshould not merely refer to this meaningintentionally, but possess the latter as animmanent datum of the phenomenological 
consciousness. But then the modal 
meaning as such would have been cancelled. 
For such a condition can only berealized in the transcendent identity ofall temporal modal meaning, 486; thephenomenological "identity", however,
remains enclosed in the horizon of a particular 
aspect; it is philosophical, theoretical, 
and requires the analyticalepochê, 487. 

PHENOMENOLOGICAL ONTOLOGY, I, of Nico-
LAI HARTMANN, 35. 

PHENOMENOLOGICAL SCHOOLS, II, HUSSERL, 
PFANDER, SCHELER, N. HARTMANN, HEIDEGGER, 
HOFFMANN, each starts from a 
different cosmological Idea, 488. 

PHENOMENOLOGICAL SUBJECT, II, in HUSSERL, 
is the phenomenological ego, inwhich the "universal Logos of all thinkable 
being" is found immanent in theconstitutive possibilities of the phenomenological 
subject or ego and the transcendental 
inter-subjectivity of the egos,

543. 
PHENOMENOLOGY, I, with FRANZ BRENTANO 
phenomenology posited the intentionalrelatedness of every act of consciousnessto a "Gegenstand"; it could not dissociateits theoretical attitude from the Gegenstand 
relation; BRENTANO and HUSSERL 
ascribe to feeling an intentional relationto a "Gegenstand"; (e.g. al melody) ; theabsolute "cogito" (i.e. the absolute transcendental 
consciousness) is opposed tothe "world" as its intentional "Gegenstand"; 
the intentional anti-thetical attitude 
of theoretical thought is present inthe phenomenological attitude itself;
SCHELER considers the Gegenstand relation 
as the most formal category of thelogical aspect of mind (Geist), 52.
—, II, EDMUND HUSSERL; his "regions"
defined; and KANT'S categories, 17; onSinn and Bedeutung in HUSSERL, 27; thephenomenologist's intuitive gaze is directed 
to the intentional acts of his consciousness; 
then meaning is identical 

with the relation of the ego to the Gegenstand, 
27; absolute consciousness; 
epoche; destruction of the world; noema, . 
Gegenstand, meaning,28; HUSSERL'S objective 
"meaning", PAUL HOFFMANN'S subjective 
"meaning"; meaning is the oppositeof "thing"; the pure I; Erleben, 29; HOFFMAN'S 
Logology, 30; unprejudiced analyses 
of the states of affairs in a religioussense is impossible; two conceptions ofthe theoretical epoche; phenomenologicalepoche, 73; reduction and Wesensschau,
486-488; the phenomenological attitude,
486, is that of P. HOFFMANN, 488; rooted 
in a deeper level of the a priori than themerely immanent transcendental horizonof human consciousness, 489; this attitude 
is contrary to the truth; HUSSERL;
fundamental thesis : the transcendental 
ego is absolute, a super-human being, theultimate origin of all meaning; the adequate 
intuition of essence; this attitudelacks critical self-reflection ; the attemptto investigate human selfhood theoretically; 
phenomenological reduction, 489;
phenomenology has to construe theforms of all thinkable worlds in the cadre 
of all thinkable forms of being (543) incorrelation with the constitutive a prioriof the intentional acts creating this worldas the Gegenstand; its knowledge isfounded in a radical and universal self-
reflection of the ego on its acts and theirpossibilities; this a priori is rational; theWesensanschauung is an intuition of thelogical eidos; the noetical and noematicalcontents of the intentional acts; its universal 
concrete ontology or concrete Logic 
of being, 544; it ascribes infallibilityto the intuition of the essence, 597.
—, III, SCHELER'S phenomenology fails togive an insight into the plastic horizonof naïve experience, 53, 70; modern phenomenology 
demands more than an impersonal 
merely symbolical knowledge ofthings, 145; LITT'S phenomenologicalanalysis of essences, 251; of social communities, 
254, 255, 256, 259, 261. 

PHENOMENON AND NOUMENON, II, in Immanence 
philosophy, 50; phenomena arerelated to the sensory perceptive function; 
noumena are accessible only totheoretical thought; KANT'S view of noumenon 
and phenomenon, 430. 

PHILo, II, the contrast between a microcosm 
and a macrocosm, handled bySCHELER, originated in the pre-Socraticphilosophy of nature; PLATO, the Stoa,
PHILO, and Neo-Platonism handed it 
down to medieval Scholasticism, 592. 

PHILOSOPHERS, I, approach the gods, 35;
are commanders and law-givers inNIETSCHE, 125; in PLATO, III, 168. 

PHILOSOPHIA PERENNIS, I, its definition, 
117; is an idea that is required by the religious 
transcendental basic Idea of philosophy, 
118; in LEIBNIZ, 224. 


 

PHILOSOPHIA PRIMA 

PHILOSOPHIA PRIMA, II, in realistic Scholasticism 
the transcendental concepts of 
the "philosophia prima" become objects 
of the actus intelligendi, 389. 

PHILOSOPHICAL JUDGMENTS, I, are not to 
be identified with subjective supra-theoretical 
prejudices, 115. 

PHILOSOPHY, I, Philosophy is theoretical 
thought directed to the totality of meaning, 
4; philosophical thinking is an actual 
activity and only at the expense of 
this actuality can it be abstracted from 
the thinking self; this abstraction is necessary 
for formulating the concept of 
philosophical thought, but even in this 
act of conceptual determination it is the 
self that is actually doing the work, 5; 
the supposed reduction of the selfhood 
(in philosophy) to an immanent, subjective 
pole of thought, 6; philosophical 
thought has no selfhood as mere thought, 
i.e., "reines Denken", 7; its genetic tendency 
towards the Archê, 9; so-called 
"critical" philosophy regards one or 
more of our cognitive functions as independent, 
i.e., apart from all further 
possible determinedness and elevates 
these functions to the a-priori Origin of 
our knowable cosmos, 10; phil. thought 
cannot withdraw itself from its tendency 
toward the origin ; philosophic thought 
is restless; because our ego is restless; 
the unrest is transmitted from the selfhood 
to all temporal functions in which 

the ego is actually operative; the twofold 
pre-supposition of philosophic 
thought: an Archimedean point, and a 
choice of position in the face of the 
Archê, 11; philosophy intends to give us 
a theoretical insight into the coherence 
of our temporal world as an intermodal 
coherence of meaning. Philosophic 
thought is bound to this coherence, 24; 
the theoretical attitude of thought arises 
only in a theoretical abstraction, so that 
theoretical reason cannot be considered 
as an uproblernatic datum, 40; dogmatic 
theory of knowledge identified the subject-
object relation with the antithetic 
Gegenstand relation and misinterpreted 
naïve experience as a "copy theory" 
which had to be refuted, 43; the various 
"-isms" in the theoretical vision of reality 
are due to absolutizations, 46; the 
problem of the basic denominator for the 
theoretical comparison and distinction of 
the modal aspects, 47; starting-point of 
theoretical synthesis in the Kantian Critique 
of knowledge, 49; and critical self-
reflection, 51; religion cannot be a theoretical 
"Gegenstand", 58; the transcendental 
basic Idea of philosophy, cf. sub-
voce, 68-70; theoretical and supra- theoretical 
judgments, 70; analogia entis, cf. 
sub-voce, 71; the philosophical Idea of 
totality, 73; the Origin and the continuity 
principle in COHEN's philosophy, 74, 75; 
the masking of the transcendental basic 

180 

Idea ill ThEODOR LITT, 77, 78, 79; LITT'S 
dialectical Idea of unity and identity, 80,81; the theoretical character of the transcendental 
basic Idea and its relation to 
naïve experience, 82; philosophy, special 
science, and naive experience, 83, 84;
philosophy has to grasp in the view oftotality the different modal aspects setasunder by theoretic thought and thus toaccount for both naïve experience andspecial science; the analysis of the modalaspects must precede that of the typicalstructures of individual totality; specialscience can neither have an autonomous 
conception of the modal structures of thedifferent aspects, nor of the typicalstructures of individual totality; with thestructure of a special aspect there is expressed 
the inter-modal coherence ofcosmic time order; the aspect requires atranscendental idea of its coherence with 
other aspects and of the radical unity ofall aspects; special sciences are pointed 
to the examination of the functional coherence 
and typical character of transitory 
phenomena within a special aspect; 
special scientific concepts must be 
made a philosophic problem; EINSTEIN'S 
concepts of time and space; in them 
their special synthetic meanings in connection 
with other sciences remain hidden; 
philosophy can elucidate them, 85; 
"reflexive" versus "objective" thought in 
recent philosophy; reflexive thought is 
introverted to the transcendental logicalsubject of pure thinking", it is opposedto "objective" thought, ("gegenstandliches 
Denken"), in modern Immanence 
philosophy; "objective thought" is that 
of special science, it is "naïve", lost in 
its "objets"; the ego of "reflexive thought" 
can never be a "Gegenstand" ; cf. s.v. THEODOR 
LITT; object and Gegenstand are confused 
in these statements; in philosophy, 
however, we assume the antithetic attitude 
as well as in science, but we focus 
phil. towards the totality and unity in 
the root of temporal meaning; the transcendental 
basic Idea is the hypothesis of 
philosophic thought, 86; the problem of 
the possibility of inter-modal synthesis 
occurs in phil. as well as in science; phil. 
is confronted with the fundamental problems 
concerning the relation of origin, 
totality, modal diversity and inter-modal 
coherence; it encounters its own limits 
within cosmic time; these limits can only 
be accounted for in the concentric direction 
of theoretic thought to its supra-
theoretic pre-suppositions; truly reflexive 
thought is characterized by criticalselfreflection as to the transcendental 
basic Idea of philosophy in which itpoints beyond and above itself to its owna priori conditions; reflexive thoughtdoes not transcend all structural limits 
because of their belonging to the "gegenstandliche" 
world; this notion leads tothe illusory sovereignty and autonomy of 


 

181PHILOSOPHY 

philos. reflection; it is based on the identification 
of "Gegenstand" and "temporalreality"; the limits of phil. thought transcend 
the Gegenstand relation; phil.
thought is determined and limited by itsbeing bound to its intentional and to itsontical structure in cosmic time, 87 ; we 
can reflect critically on the limits of phil.
thought only because in our selfhood wetranscend them; the pre-supposita ofphilosophy are infinitely more than Idea;
the religious pre-supposition of philosophy 
is of a transcendent nature; thechoice of the Archimedean point crossesthe boundary line of the temporal coherence 
of our world; but philosophy itselfremains within this boundary line because 
it is possible only by virtue of thetemporal order; transcendent and transcendental 
are no alternatives, but the 
latter pre-supposes the former; this is theoriginal critical meaning of transcendental 
thought, 88; KANT'S opinion concerning 
the transcendental Ideas; he does notaccept them in their tri-unity as the realhypothesis . of his "critical" philosophy;
and restricts their significance to a purely 
formal one: they have a mere regulative 
systematic function ; here he hasbecome aware of the unbridgeable antithesis 
in the basic motive of nature and 
freedom, 89; he accepted the synthesisbetween natural necessity and freedomin his epistemology, but rejected it in hisethics; he could not account for the possibility 
of the synthesis between the logical 
and the sensory function of consciousness; 
this was due to his fundamental 
dualism in his religious basicmotive; FICHTE'S first edition of the 
"Wissenschaftslehre" made "practicalfreedom" the hypothesis of his theoretical 
epistemology and introduced a dialectical 
logic to bridge the Kantian gulfbetween epistemology and ethics; inFICHTE'S conception of the basic Idea ofHumanism the postUlate of continuity 
broke through the Kantian boundariesset to the theoretical use of the transcendental 
Idea of freedom; in KANT'S "dialectic 
of pure reason" the transcendentalIdeas point to a transcendent realm ofthe "noumenon"; thought sets limits totheoretical thought, except for the bondwith sensory perception; the transcendental 
Idea of freedom is dialectically related 
to the category of causality and isthe hypothesis of KANT'S transcendentallogic, 90; this same Idea obtains "practical 
reality" for "reasonable belief" inthe Krit. d. pr. Vern.; the essential function 
of the transcendental Idea is that of 
the hypothesis pointing beyond the limitsof theoretical thought; it reveals KANT'Stranscendental motive; in Neo-Kantian 
logicistic idealism this motive fadesaway in the postulate of logical purityand continuity in the system of knowledge; 
to COHEN the transcendental idea 

is the "selfconsciousness of the (logical)
concept", but it does not point towards atranscendent sphere; LITT'S conceptionof the pure self-reflection of theoreticalthought and EDMUND HUSSERL'S "egology" 
exclude limits set to the "transcendental 
cogito" and deny the ego's transcendence 
in respect to transcendentalthought and consciousness; the basic,
Idea of phil. is only a subjective hypothesis 
and must not dominate truth in a 
relativistic way, for it is accountable toan ultimate judge, 91; philosophy in itstranscendental direction to the totalityand the Origin remains bound to cosmictime and the cosmic order; failure to appreciate 
this limit leads to speculativemetaphysics which seeks the absoluteand supra-temporal within the temporalorder; absolutizations and speculativemetaphysics; the position that modallaws have absolute universal validity evenfor God is speculative; PLATO'S Ideas;
modern absolute "values"; "truths in 
themselves; "absolute consciousness" in 
HUSSERL; the "immortal soul" doctrine; 
the hypostatization of the non-sensorypsychical, logical and post logical functions 
of mental acts (Geist), in a rationalistic 
or an irrationalistic sense, 92; the 
absolutized realm of meaning becomesArchê, conceived of as "being", non-substantial 
actuality, "validity", in its subject- 
or its cosmonomic side; CALVIN'Sverdict: "God is not subject to the laws,
but not arbitrary"; strikes at the root ofmetaphysical speculations; the origin, ofthe term "cosmonomic idea", 93; Dr. H. 
G. STOKER'S objection to it; and Dr. PHILIP 
KOHNSTAMM'S; reasons for maintaining 
the term, 94 ; comparison with theterm: the Idea of creation; objections tothis term; the cosmonomic Idea gives expression 
to the limiting character of thebasic transcendental Idea; SOCRATES on 
the nomos as limitation, 95; the cosmic 
nomos has meaning only in correlationwith the subject-side of the cosmos; theIdea of the subject points toward the factual 
side of reality (totality, diversity,
coherence) ; the philosophy of the cosmonomic 
Idea is not an "idealism of 
meaning", (STOKER), 96; RICKERT'S mean-
ing-Idealism distinguishes between meaning 
(Sinn) and reality; the latter hasmeaning ascribed to it by means of reference 
to values (Wertbeziehung) ;
RICKERT'S reality is psycho-physical only;
meaning cannot live, act, move, butliving, action, motion are meaning notcoming to rest in themselves; God's Beingis not meaning; the meaning-totalitytranscends philosophic thought and hasits correlate in the Being of the Archê;
the modal concepts of laws and of subject 
and object in the sciences depend onthe cosmonomic Idea, 97; in the logicistic 
trend in pure mathematics; the "continuous" 
series of real numbers is based 


 

PHILOSOPHY 182 

on a logicist-rationalist cosmonomic Idea., 
mechanist biology depends on the classical 
deterministic Humanist science 
ideal; the Neo-Kantian "reine Rechtslehre" 
of HANS KELSEN depends on a 
dualistic cosmonomic Idea (nature and 
freedom) ; the rationalists reduce the subject 
side of reality to the nomos-side; 
functionalistic biology and juridical 
science do not know of typical structural-
individuality laws, 98; the Archimedean 
point of philosophy is chosen in the new 
root of mankind in Christ, in which by 
regeneration we have part in our re-born 
selfhood; the totality of meaning of our 
temporal cosmos is in Christ, with respect 
to His human nature as the root of 
the re-born human race; in Christ the 
heart bows under the lex as the universal 
boundary between the Being of God and 
the meaning of His creation; theological 
objections to this theme answered, 99; 
the transcendent totality of meaning of 
the cosmos is no eidos in the speculative 
Platonic sense, no being set by itself, but 
remains in the ex-sistential mode of 
meaning; sin is the revolt against the 
Sovereign of our cosmos; it is apostasy, 
the absolutizing of meaning to the level 
of God's Being; the fall permeated all 
temporal meaning aspects, also the logical 
one; the logical function in apostasy; 
ST. PAUL'S word about the carnal 
mind; the laws of thought are not affected 
by sin, 100; only the subjective 
activity subjected to these laws; the contents 
of the cosmonomic Idea concern 
the Archê, subjection to God's sovereignty 
requiring love and service of God on 
the part of man, through Christ, in the 
observance of the sphere-sovereignty of 
the various divine laws regulating the 
temporal world; the symbol of the sunlight 
refracted by a prism into the seven 
colours of the spectrum, 101; the sphere 
sovereignty of the modal laws, 102; the 
disregard of this state of affairs on the 
immanence standpoint owing to absolutizations 
: psychologism, historism ; dualistic 
starting-points; is the Christian starting-
point an absolutized religious meaning?, 
103 ; Christian religion is the connection 
between the meaning of creation 
and the Being of the Arche; religion is 
not identical with the function of faith; 
RICKERT acknowledges this fact; sphere-
sovereignty as a philosophical basic 
problem, 104; and the intermodal coherence; 
the aspects have a cosmonomic 
structure; all temporal structures of reality 
are laws founded in the cosmic order 
and are principles of temporal potentiality; 
as realizations of laws they have 
duration and actuality as transitory factual 
structures; potentiality resides in 
the factual subject-side, its principle in 
the cosmonomic side of reality; cosmic 
time and the refraction of meaning; 
STOKER and KOHNSTAMM, 105; the fulness 

of meaning is not actually given and cannot 
be actually given in time; the meaning 
of cosmic time (in its correlation of 
order and duration) is to be successive 
refraction of meaning into coherent modal 
aspects; in the religious fulness of 
meaning love, wisdom, justice, power, 
beauty, etc. coincide in a radical unity; 
cosmic time can only be approached in 
a limiting concept; such a concept is necessarily 
discontinuous; the relativity of 
the logical function is not of a logical, 
but of a cosmonomic temporal character, 
106; the elimination of cosmic time order 
in KANT'S Kritik der reinen Vernunft; 
KANT'S hypostatization of "theoretical 
reason" as self-sufficient Archimedean 
point; the question about the possibility 
of philosophy pushed into the background; 
KANT'S "Copernican revolution" 
concerned epistemology; it proves the 
impossibility of a truly critical Critique 
of theor. reason apart from a transcendental 
insight into the cosmic time-order; 
KANT'S "Prolegomena zu einer jeden kiinftigen 
Metaphysik": (this system) sets at 
its foundation nothing as "given" except 
"reason"; but this reason is a product of 
theoretical abstraction !, 107; the lex of 
the cosmos originates from God's holy 
creative sovereignty and is the boundary 
between the Being of the Arch& and the 
meaning of everything created as "subject", 
i.e., subjected to a law; the subject-
side implies the object-side; in immanence 
philosophy the subject becomes 
sovereign, 108; as a "substance" (noumenon) 
or in a transcendental logical or 
phenomenological sense; KANT : the subject 
is only epistemological, and as such 
Arch& or form of the theoretical laws of 
nature; the "transcendental subject" is 

lawgiver of nature; the pre-psychical aspects 
dissolved into a synthesis of logical 
and sensory functions of consciousness; 
their structural laws became a-priori 
transcendental forms of (theoretical) understanding 
and of subjective sensibility; 
numbers, spatial figures, energy effects; 
in his "practical" philosophy KANT makes 
the metaphysical subject (homo noumenon) 
the autonomous lawgiver for moral 
life; his polar opposition between laws of 
nature and norms; the subject on the Immanence 
standpoint is epistemological 
and ethical; things and events are considered 
only as objects; the proclamation 
of the "critical" "Satz des Bewustseins", 
109; the subject as "transcendental" or as 
"ideal" subject is the autonomous lawgiver; 
classical rationalism reduces the 
subject to a complex of causal relations; 
the laws are "the objective"; the empirical 
subject is "object", identified with 
"Gegenstand" of the "transcendental subject 
of thought"; in modern "realistic" 
positivism the lex is a scientific judgment 
of probability, an "autonomous" product 
of science by which to order the "facts" 


 

183PHYSIOCRATS 

by way of a "logical economy"; rationalists 
dissolve individual subjectivity into auniversally valid order of laws originating 
from sovereign reason; irrationalistics 
consider the "theoretical order" as 
a pragmatical falsification of true reality;
the latter in its creative subjective individuality 
is not bound to universallyvalid laws and mocks at all "concepts ofthought", 110; prophetic philosophy,
according to JASPERS, 125; phil. has toclarify a life and world view, 156. 

PHILOSOPHY OF FEELING, I, Of JACOBI, 451. 

PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, I, is given theological 
preference by SENECA, 539. 

PHONEMES, II, in modern phonology theexpressive articulated speech sounds(phonemes) are understood from themeaning-structure of language itself, 224. 

PHRATRIA, III, in the Greek polis, 369, 371. 

PHYLAE, III, in ancient Greece, cf. s.v. 
Ancient Greece, 369. 

PHYLON, III, in biology, 80. 

PHYSICO-CHEMICAL PROCESSES, II, are undirected 
in a closed state, 184. 

PHYSICAL ASPECT, II, Classical physics;
its view of matter, 95; in mechanics 
there is movement, but physics is alwaysconcerned with functions of energy,
which implies cause and effect; acceleration 
is a physical concept; inertia is a

kinematical concept, not a physical one,
99; "moving matter" is a physical concept; 
so are: fields of gravitation, protons, 
etc.; physical events have an objective 
sensory aspect, 100; theory of relativity; 
physical space is determined bymatter; quantum theory, 101; electromagnetic 
fields, quanta, photons, electrons, 
neutrons, protons, eetc., becomemainfest in real events that have an objective 
sensory aspect, 108; physico-chemical 
energy in biotic phenomena anticipates 
life; organic unity directs physical 
anticipatory potencies, 110; NICOLA'HARTMANN holds that matter is completelytransformed by life; this is an error, 110,111; in physical-chemical processes thereis a closed state, and an opened condition; 
these processes are deepened inliving organisms and animals; also in human 
beings; PAVLOV'S experiments withanimals, 184.
—, III, ARISTOTLE was confronted with 
the question about the metaphysical primary 
substance and not merely the physical 
sensible Gegenstand, 13, 14 ; RUSSELLthinks that modern physics has destroyedthe naive conception of things; GALILEIand NEWTON and the classical physicsview of substance filling up space; timeas the fourth dimension of world space, 
19; energy has replaced matter; the curious 
facts of interval and quantum; Rus-

SELL'S "events"; his "rhythms"; physicaland mental, 20; WHITEHEAD'S events and 
permanent objects, 21; the constants of 
modern physics and NEWTON'S "material 
units", 23; RUSSELL'S concept of structure; 
he identifies psychological timewith physical, 24 ; his theory of lightwaves, 25; he identifies the physico-psychical 
world with the whole of empiricalreality, 26; the metaphysical "substance"
since DESCARTES is the modal coherence 
between physical phenomena, 27 ; KANTon our naive experience of the identityof a thing: the physical concept of quantitatively 
constant matter, the Gegenstandof natural scientific thought, 28; the doctrine 
of secondary qualities; B. BAVINK,
36; sensory colour and physics, 37; thephysical system in a linden tree, 56;
force, essence, energy, 70, 71; atoms, molecules; 
radio activity; the visibility of a 
body depends on light waves, 99; wave 
mechanics; corpuscles; `'Yellen pakete;
classical mechanics; KANT on matter; 
substance; primary typical operationalquanta are not "substantial"; the temporal 
unity of an individual whole is notmodal in character; radio activity cannotbe influenced by external functional factors; 
chemical "elements"; electrons, 
protons, neutrons, deuterons, mesons,
viewed physically have mass and charge,
100; an atom possesses a veritable individuality 
structure in the radical type ofphysically qualified totalities; the structure 
of molecules and that of crystals are

more complicated; enkaptic structuralwholes; the functional schema x, y, z, t;
the metaphysical reconstructions of theexploded substance concept in neo-Thomism; 
in EDDINGTON'S "world-substance" 
in his psycho-monism after the manner 
of HEYMANS ; mathematical forms are 
supposed to be "spiritual"; PLANCK'S"Wirkungsquantum" -h- has no modalmathematical meaning, however, 101;
structure of atoms, 105, 106. 

PHYSICO-PSYCHICAL WORLD, II, in Immanence 
phil. we find the form-matterscheme; the disruption of the integralempirical reality into a noumenon and aphenomenon; the reduction of this reality 
to a merely physico-psychical world,

50. 
PHYSICS, I, is the science of constant and 
recurrent features of existence in FICHTE, 

482; has eliminated the naive view of 
reality, 559; is held to be philosophically 
neutral by B. BAVINK; modern physicsand its epistemological pre-suppositions,

562. 
PHYSIOCRATS, II, Economic individualism 
took the leadership of the ideas of theEnlightenment and attained to theoreticalreflection in the economic theories of the 
physiocrats and the school of classical 

economists, 361. 


 

PIRKHEIMER, WILLIBALD 184 

PIRKHEIMER, WILLIBALD, I , a friend of 
MELANCHTON'S, 513. 

PIRRA-URA RELATION, III, an external form 
of marriage, 339; a kind of concubinage;
an external enkapsis with abnormalsexual relations; in primitive Indiansocieties, 341. 

PLANCK, MAX, III, his quantum theory

706. 
PLANETS, III, with their satellites; solar 
system; spherical groups of stars, galaxy,

651. 
PLANKS, III, are semi-manufactured material 
used as the material foundation of 
furniture, 131, 132. 

PLANTS, III, are typically biotic subjects,
267; the continuity of the life of a plantextends beyond the span of the alwayschanging individual cells, 296; and canonly be actualized in the coherence ofthese cells; the plant possesses no morelife of its own than a human communitydoes outside of the structural relation between 
its members, 297; plants have notbeen proved to possess feeling, 645; theydo not form an enkaptic whole with theirenvironment, but may form a correlativeenkapsis, 698. 

PLASTIC HORIZON, III, SCHELER'S phenomenology 
cannot give an insight into thishorizon, 53, 70. 

PLATE, III, his concept "germ-plasm" or 
"idioplasm", 732. 

PLATO, I, 

Phaedo, 31; 
Parmenides, 31; 
Politeia, 248;
Timaeus, 510. 
--, I, eidê and immortal soul are supratemporal and immobile; PARMENIDES' absolutization 
of space is antinomous, 31;
only philosophers approach the race ofgods, 35 ; the law is a limitation of subjectivity, 
95; PLATO'S transcendental basicIdea is conceived in an objective idealistic 
sense, 247; in the Politeia the eidê 
seem to originate from the Idea of thegood, and the deity as demiurge is the 
origin of the eidos (e.g. of a couch: 

ty ), but this is not a divine creation 
of the phenomenal world; the nous [divine 
mind], is only the origin of the eternal 
forms, never that of matter; in the 
later dialogues the conception of the di


vine nous as the origin of the eternalforms [eidê] is abandoned, 248 (note);
theoretical reason is distinguished frompractical reason, 535.

II, 
Phaedo, 9; 
Parmenides, 9, 13, 56, 103;
Sophistes, 9, 56;
Politikos, 9, 263; 
Timaeus, 10, 263; 
Philebus, 10, 57, 146; 

Politeia, 10; 
Critias, 263; 
Symposion, 153.
—, II, his form-matter scheme, 9, 10, 13; 
methexis principle (participation) ; hisdoctrine of genesis eis ousian, 26; spatialsimultaneity is a modus of time, 103; analytical 
economy, 122; concept formationby means of genus proximum and differentia 
specifica, 132; Pythagorean "peras"
and "apeiron", 146; Eros in PLATO'S Symposion, 
153; the "Golden Age of mankind", 
263; his ethics started from popular 
morality, 321. 
—, III, 
Timaeus, 8; 
Philebus, 11; 
Politeia, 200, 207, 223, 230, 232;
Crito, 206; 
The Laws, 207; 
Phaedo, 168. 
—, III, introduced the dialectical Idea of 
being to synthesize "form and matter";
dialectical logic; the ideal sphere oftranscendent eidê; peras and the material 
world, 11; cf. "atoms"; the philosopher 
has a higher value than the goodcitizen, 168; the polis is all-inclusive;
PLATO'S inconsistent universalism; the 
State structure is determined by a normative 
principle; its deformation is due toAnangke, the matter principle; opposedby Reason ; three ranks in Greek societyand PLATO'S psychology; justice relatedto the central Idea of the good ; dialectical 
tension between the polis as a public

order, and conjugal and family communities, 
200; the State is a mesokosm, individual 
man a mikrokosm; the universe 
a makrokosm; three ranks in the 
State: wise rulers, military, and labourrank; an order of justice for harmoniouscooperation; his scheme of governmentin The Laws; law combines the monarchical 
and democratic principles to a unityin a well-balanced constitution ; government 
ensures the unity of the polis as anall-inclusive whole, 207; GLAUCON'S nominalistic 
individualism in the dialoguePoliteia, 223; the legend of the aureumsaeculum, 229 ; PLATO called the hierarchical 
structure of the three parts of thesoul "the state in man"; he founded the 
relation of authority and subordination inthe metaphysical order; and on the principle 
of the inequality of men; he justified 
slavery; authority and subordinationwere essential to every composite organism; 
individual man is a kind of State 
ruled by reason, 230; he blames the Sophists 
for their contract theory of theState, 232; the State is the whole of 
human society; a supra temporal metaphysical 
idea is its essence, 380; the ideaof justice and the power of the sword,
381 ; KALLIKLES' super-man opposed byPLATO'S justice ruled State; PLATO'S totalitarianism; 
the polis had unlimited competence; 
the religious origin of this view, 


 

185 POLYANDRY 

and the dialectical tension with justice,Science et Hypothese, 483.398; he defends State education, aboli-—, II, criticizes CANTOR'S "set"-theory,
shed marriage, in the public interest,340; his views of analysis and insight; he442; the universe as a macrocosm is a refutes the idea of "pure analysis", 483.
living being, an autozooion ; man is a

POINT, I, a mathematical point 'without

microcosm; the State as a mesocosm con-

any extension must be an absurdity to

nects these two and embraces all societal 

HUME, 285.

relations as its component parts, arranging 
them according to the idea of justice--, II, a spatial point pre-supposes thein its concentric relation to the idea of modus of continuous extension; the no-
goodness; the world soul has a worldtion of a "continuum of points" is anti-
reason, just as the human soul has humannomous; points have only a dependentreason, 628; the temporal world is a to-objective existence in the spatial subjecttality; 
PLATO is universalistic, 629; PLATO'S object relation, 385.
Philebus hands down SOCRATES' idea of 

POINT OF CONTACT BETWEEN NATURE AND

a teleological world order, 633; it served

GRACE, I, denied by KARL BARTH ; in EMIL

as the foundation of the physic() teleo-

BRUNNER; in Thomism; its denial in Oc


logical proof of the existence of God; it

camism, 66.

generally implied a technical-culturalview of nature, which suited the Greek POLAK, LEO, II, 
conception of God as the Demiurge, theDe zin der Vergelding, 130.
Divine Architect, who moulds matter af-—, II, on retribution ; recompense orter a free project or technical plan, 634;punishment are deserved, 130; wage is

P. viewed the body as a vehicle an oche-price, not the indebted recompense ofma, of the soul; an objectivistic concep-labour; equivalence and proportion; Vertion, 
778. gelding en Vergoeding; Dike, 131. 
PLAY-DRIVE, I, the aesthetic play-drive re-POLARITY OF FEELINGS, II, feelings haveveals the fulness of human personality in polarity, they are distinguished fromSCHILLER, 463. sensations and representations; also from

Erlebnisse, 116.

PLEASURE, I, is a general term for very

different feelings, in HUME, 309. Pous, III, in PROTAGORAS, is a communal 
whole whose laws express the general

PLENGE, III, 

opinion, 199; Polis in ARISTOTLE, 201—

Drie Vorlesungen fiber Organisations


206; in PLATO, it is an all-inclusive com


lehre, 405. 

munity; PLATO'S inconsistent universal-
PLESSIS, Professor Du, III, his deposition, ism; anangkê and the deformation of the

685. State; three ranks in society; dialecticaltension between the polis and the family,
PLETHON ( GEORGIUS GEMISTHOS) , I, and 

200, 207; the Greek polis gave rise to a

the Florentine Academy, 189. 

dialectical tension with the idea of jus-
PLURIFORMITY, III, of churches cannot tice, 398. 
justify fundamental deviations from the

POLITICAL PARTY, III, the meanings of the

Divine Word Revelation, 542; pluriform


word "political", 611; the party bond is

ity may be the result of external varia


not theoretical ; a party requires a total

bility types of organization of the

view of the State and its policy; its inner

Church, 559. 

divergences in practical politics: conser-
PLUTARCHUS, II, uses the term antinomy, vative versus progressive, 612; its leading

37. function is not some political faith, 613;
—, III, but the party is qualified by the moralDe Stoic. rep. 2, 228;function, 614, 615; parties and a dictato-
Alex. M. fort. I, 6, 229.rial elite, 617; its genetic form, 619; is—,III, PLUTARCHUS says that ZENO'S Po-enkaptically interwoven with the Stateliteia was favourable to a world kingdominstitutions; its genetic and its existentialunder a common law, 229. form, 605; a party is not a faction, 606;
parties are indispensible in a free coun-
COSMIC PNEUMA, III, in Stoic theory; co-try, awakening the public spirit; KELSEN'S

hesion in inorganic nature; physis inview, 607, 608; separate Christian partiesplants; psyche in living beings; logos in are not always necessary; the party'sman; this logos is the product of the evo-foundation; its unity, 609; variability ty


lution from perceptions and representa-pes of party, 611.
tions, 226. 

POLITICAL PLURALISM, III, DUGUIT is an

POEM, III, is an imaginative totality, aes-adherent of this trend; it means "econothetically 
qualified, 111. mic monism", 465. 

POETRY, III, as an art, 110. PoLos, III, a sophist; radical individualist, 
199.

POINCARE, HENRI, II, 
La Valeur de la Science, 483; POLYANDRY, III, an external form of mar



 

POLYBIUS 186 

riage, 339; according to the "Kulturkreislehre"; 
it was intended to prevent the
splitting up of the family property, according 
to THURSTON ; it existed among
the ancient Babylonians, 340; and among
the Indian Nayar caste; original polyandry 
was strictly monogamous, and not a
matrimonial form, only sanctioned among
the Todas; juridical proprietary share in
the wife, 340, 341. 


POLYBIUS, III, authority rests on the right
of the strongest; a sophistic view, influenced 
MACCHIAVELLI, 231. 


POLYTHEISM, I, in the restriction of 
philosophical autonomy to theoretical
thought, 21.
-, II, considered by FRAZER as an earlier 
stage of a cult leading to monotheism,
313; the aesthetic humanizing of Greek
polytheism since HOMER and HESIOD ; HESIOD'S 
theogony, 320; in Greece was undetermined 
by the transcendental direction
of faith to deified theoretical thought, 321. 


POMPONIUS, II, and the Stoic construction 
of the universitas, 392, 


POMPONIUS, III, 4, 30 D. 41, 3. 


PONCELET, S., II, 
Traitê des proprietes de figures, 104.
-, II, carried out LEIBNIZ' programme of
analysis situs, 104. 


PONTY, MERLEAU, III, "experienced con 
porality" belongs to a supposed "pre-objective" 
experiential field, 779; he characterizes 
human corporality as a blind
adherence to the pre-objectve world, 780. 


POPE, ALEXANDER, II, On NEWTON, 350. 

POPE AND EMPEROR, III, their struggle inthe Middle Ages, 217. 

POSIDONIUS, I, has theological preferencefor theoretical philosophy of nature, 539.
-, III, SENECA says that he has borrowedthe idea of an uncorrupted natural statefrom POSIDONIUS, 229 (note). 

POSITIVE LAW, II, was conceived bySTAMMLER as a historical-economic material 
in the "legal form of thought", 208,

209. 
-, III, as the "general will"; volenti non
fit inuria, in KANT, 232. 
POSITIVISM, I, in positivistic historicism,
COMTE, 210. 

-, II, on culture, 200; its struggle withthe rationalistic theory of natural law,

239. 
-, III, COMTE, 164. 
POSITIVISTIC VIEWS OF THE STATE, III, ST. 
SIMON, AUG. COMTE, 452-455. 

POSITIVIZATION, II, of post-logical laws,
237, 238, 240, 241. 
-, III, social forms are positivizations ofstructural principles; their historicalfoundation and relative constancy; they 

must be distinguished from factual relationships, 
172, 173; social forms are thenodal points of the complicated interlacements 
between positivized structuraltypes, genetic positivized structural types,
genetic and existential social forms, 174, 
175 

POSSESSION, II, its difference from property, 
404. 

POSSIBILITY, II, in KANT 512, 513, 530. 

POTENTIA, III, the constant substance of 
the form, IN DRIESCH, 741. 

POTENTIALITY, I, and actuality in ARISTOTLE, 
26; is found in matter, in Thomism, 
72; temporal potentiality residesin the subject-side, and has the cosmonomic 
side for its principle, 105.
---, II, the dynamei on, in ARISTOTLE, 9. 

POTESTAS DEI, I, in OCCAM'S view, resembles 
the Greek Anangke, 186. 

POWER, I, NIETSCHE'S religion of power,

211. 
-, II, is a modus, not a thing, 68; different 
kinds of power: political, ecclesiastical, 
logical command, 69; faith power isan analogical concept, 71.
-, III, the power of the State is half demonic, 
according to EMIL BRUNNER, 402;
power is an irrational product of historywith its hidden god, 404 ; the power Stateis an organization; the law State is anorganism, according to DARMSTAEDTER, 
409; political power and its components,

416. 
POWER OF ENJOYMENT, II, this theory was
carried to absurdity by THON, 403. 


POWER OF JUDGMENT, I, (Urteilskraft) is
the link between Understanding and Reason, 
387; its "as-if" attitude, 388. 


PRAAG, LEON VAN, III, 
Rechtspraak en voornaamste literatuur
betr. de Wet op de Recht. Org., 682. 


PRACTICAL IDEAS, II, are transcendent 
above the temporal world, in KANT, 523. 


PRACTICAL REASON, I, was separated from
the Humanistic science ideal by PETER
BAYLE, 260; is the basis of theoretical 
reason, in FICHTE, 437, 438, 439; cf. S.V. 
KANT. 
-, II, HEIDEGGER holds that the productive 
imagination also functions as the root
of practical reason in KANT'S system, 520. 


PRAETOR, III, his task in private common


law, 450. 
PRAGMATIC METHOD, II, of historical 
science, was psychological analysis, supposed 
to be free of theological or metaphysical 
speculation, 352. 


PRANTL, III, 
Geschichte der Logik, 7. 


PRAXITELES, III, his Hermes and Dionysus, 
110-127; an intentional visionary 


187 PRINCIPIUM RATIONIS SUFFICIENTIS 

object represented in a real thing, 115,

116. 
PRECOCITY, II, disapproved of in classicist 
aesthetics, 347. 
PREDISPOSITION, III, of full grown organic

forms, in WEISMANN'S theory, 771. 
PRE-HISTORY, II, is not history, 265, 270. 

PRE-HISTORIC HUMANITY, III, according tothe school of the doctrine of cultural 
circles (Kulturkreislehre), 333. 

PREISER, II, 

Das Rationalprinzip in der Wirtschaftand Wirtschaftspolitik, 123. 

PREUSSICHES LANDRECHT, II, projected bythe Wolffian jurists SUAREZ and KLEIN, 
displayed an individualistic and utilitarian 
tendency, 358. 

PRIESTLY, I, association psychology, 264. 

PRIMA CAUSA, II, God as "prima causa" is 
an antinomous concept of speculativephilosophy, 41. 

PRIMACY OF THE WILL, I, in AUGUSTINUS, 

185. 
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES, I, this 

distinction is rejected by HUME, 291. 

PRIMARY CULTURES, III, their existence, 
posited by the Kulturkreislehre is deniedby LOWIE, 354. 

PRIMARY RACES, III, their existence is denied 
by FRANZ BOAS, 495. 

PRIMITIVE COMMUNAL CONSCIOUSNESS, II, 

in a totemistic community the individuality 
of the members is not effaced; CASSIRER'S 
view is only acceptable with respect 
to the pistic aspect of primitive social 
life, 320. 

PRIMITIVE CULTURES, III, may show historical 
coherences, 333; their order of 
succession, 337. 

PRIMITIVE FAITH, II, looks like a diseased 
mental state, 310. 

PRIMITIVE JURAL ORDER, I, in a closed primitive 
jural order the anticipatory connection 
with morality is absent, 29. 

PRIMITIVE JURIDICAL SYMBOLS, II, On the 

inert substratum of primitive thought alljuridical acts are still tied down to thesensory symbol. Only then can they beunderstood by the primitive mind, 183. 

PRIMITIVE LANGUAGES, II, they often havean extremely rich vocabulary, but theylack the capacity to express abstract andgeneral relations and states of affairs,

126. 
PRIMITIVE MAN, III, LEVY-BRUHL On prim.
man; the sacral sphere, 33, 34. 

PRIMITIVE RETRIBUTION, II, there is a 
scarce indication that in primitive so


ciety accident and intention are distinguished 
from each other; but as a rulecriminal law is based on the principle ofresponsibility for the factual consequences 
of a deed, 182. 

PRIMITIVE SOCIAL FORMS, III, shut peopleoff in a kind of exclusive symbiosis, 581. 

PRIMITIVE SOCIETY, II, retribution ; juridical 
causality, 182; intercourse; hostis, ex-
lex; do ut des; formalism in contract 
making; sensory symbolism; the wer,
183; primitive expressions of modalmeaning are formalistic; primitive customary 
law is called ewa; only in theIdea can philosophy be directed to thereligious root and the Divine Origin, 188;
primitive society is closed; its authorities; 
how such a society may be opened,
259; differentiation and integration processes, 
260; primitive culture, 266; individuality 
in primitive society, 273;
primitive man's diffuse personality, 296;
closed fath function, 297. 
—, III, the primitive mind, according toLEVY-BRUHL, 33 ; the primitive norm inan undifferentiated societal relationship;
and the interwoven norms; the sense of 
propriety, 371; primitive soc. is considered 
to be outside of history by FR.
MUNCH, 372,373; the primitive legal orderis of a penal type; that of differentiatedsocieties is of the contractual type, 460. 

PRIMITIVE TECHNIQUE, II, it lacks techni


cal economy, 67. 
PRIMITIVE THOUGHT, II, this thought is
held to be pre-logical by LEVY-BRUHL;
the collective representations are regulated 
by the law of participation, indifferent 
to contradiction, 329. 


PRIMO GENITURE, III, in an undifferentiated 
organized community, 340, 351. 


PRINCIPIA, II, as modal norms require human 
formation for their further specification, 
237, 238. 


PRINCIPIUM INDIVIDUATIONIS, I, in FICHTE, 
461; in FicHTE's final phase it is history,


490. 
--, II, the substantial form in ARISTOTLE 
is a theoretical abstraction and a universal, 
but is individualized, 12; this problem 
of realistic Scholasticism is insoluble 
and internally contradictory; it is occasioned 
by the form-matter scheme whichprevents the insight into the radical individual 
concentration of temporal reality 
in the human I-ness, 417; the substantial 
form of a natural being, as such, lacksindividuality and must be combined withmatter into a "synolon" ( T068 'V/ ), in 
ARISTOTLE; THOMAS AQUINAS seeks the 
principium individuationis in a materiasignata eel individualis, 419. 
PRINCIPIUM RATIONIS SUFFICIENTIS, II, logical 
causality has undoubted correspondence 
with a genuine form of analytical 


 

PRIVATE PROPERTY 188 

relation, 511; causality has an analogicalcharacter, it is necessarily qualified bythe analytical nucleus of the logical aspect; 
as an analytical law of every logical 
conclusion it is the principium rationis 
sufficieutis, 512. 

PRIVATE PROPERTY, III, Will come to an 
end, 457; is theft, according to PROUDHON,

458. 
PROGRESS, II, the Idea of progress inPROTAGORAS in his Prometheus myth;
PLATO'S idea in Timaeus, Criterias and 
Politikos. The modern Idea of progress isnaturalistic, 263; VOLTAIRE'S and MONTESQUIE'S 
idea of progress, 350. 

PROGRESSION, II, the principle of progression 
and LEIBNIZ' programme of an "analysis 
situs", 104; in the Euclidean view ofthe infinitely distant point in which twoparallel lines intersect, 105. 

PROHIBITION, III, of a political party maygive rise to underground activity, 619. 

PROLETARIAT, III, the united world proletariat 
in MARX, 456. 

PROMETHEUS-MOTIVE,- I, in KLOPSTOCK, 

454. 
PROMETHEUS, II, PROTAGORAS' Prometheus 
myth and the idea of progress, 263. 

PROMISCUITY THEORY, III, and matriara 
chy, 332. 

PROPHYTA, III, 108, 773. 

PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD, I, rejected 
by KANT, 335.
—, II, in Aristotelian Thomism, starting
from the concept of causality, 39. 


PROPHETIC PHILOSOPHY, I, of KARL JASPERS, 
125. 

PROPHETISM, I, rejected by RICKERT inphilosophy, 133. 

PROTAGORAS, II, defended the idea of the 
ascending line of cultural development,
263; his Prometheus myth, 263.

, III, depreciated nature and the ancient 
gentilitial and tribal organizations,
as unstable social products of nature lacking 
law and morality; legal and ethicalnorms can only originate from the nomosof the polis, not from nature; the polis isa communal whole whose laws expressthe general opinion of the democraticcommunity and impose themselves on the 
citizens irrespective of their individualopinion, 199. 

PROTEINS, III, containing amino-acids andother prosthetical groups that can besplit off from albumenoids, can be composed 
synthetically, 727. 

PROTOMERIES, III, hypothetical "bio-molecules" 
in WOLTERECK'S theory, 643 ; HEIDENHAIN'S 
concept, 722. 

PROTONS, ETC.,II, fields of gravitation, electro 
magnetic fields, quanta, photons, electrons, 
neutrons, protons, etc. are not sensory, 
although the real events in whichthey manifest themselves, have an objective 
sensory aspect, 100. 

PROTOZOA, III, are psychically qualified,
85-87, 107, 108; their nuclei are the potential 
centres of new cell-bodies; polynucleur-
protozoa; cell-division in meta,
zoa, 721; their psychically qualified reac;
tion displays a physico-chemical and abiotic aspect, 766; their total form is anexpression of the total system of the cell,
770; the separate cell-form is an elementary 
total expression of a typical structural 
whole, 771, 773. 

PROUDHON, 

"L'antinomie ne se rêsout pas", 65.

—, III, property is theft, 458. 

PROUST, III, the law of constant propor


tions, 704. 
PROVIDENCE, II, the Historical School and 
the normative conception of historicaldevelopment. FR. J. STAHL on the secondarily 
normative character of God's guidance 
in history; providence is a hiddenlaw in history, 232. 

PROVIDENTIAL PLAN, I, is hidden from 

man, 174. 

PRZYWARA, ERICH, I, 

Thomas oder Hegel, 327. 

PSYCHE, I, is the form of the material 
body, in ARISTOTLE, 26. 

PSYCHE AND PSYCHOID, III, in DRIESCH, 

23, 24, 736. 
PSYCHICAL ANALYSIS, II, must explainhistorical phenomena, according to thePhil. of the Enlightenment, 350, 351; thisanalysis must be carried out acc. to themethods of natural science, 352. 

PSYCHICAL ASPECT, I, absolutized byHUME, 302. 

—, II, sensory multiplicity is a numericalretrocipation; also perceived by animals;
the objective sensory image of movementrequires a perceptible reference and appeals 
to our pure intuition of movement,
it is founded in the intermodal cosmic 
order; the objective psychical aspectsof physical events, 100; the soul is not theGegenstand of psychology; psyche; theBiblical word soul in the sense of religious 
centre; feeling is the meaning kernel 
of psychical phenomena; feeling, volition, 
knowing in modern psychology;
faculty psychol.; TETENS ; KANT, 111;
feeling is implied in every Erlebnis; universality 
of feeling; feeling erroneouslytaken for the origin of the other classesof Erlebnisse; Erlebnis is intentionality;
DREVER'S definition; acts are not aspects,
but function in all aspects; dogmaticdichotomy of body and soul; its modern 


1g9 PSYCHICAL INTERLACEMENTS 

version in MAX SCHELER; Geist and Gegenstand; 
genetic development in a child,
112; - empathy, 113; animal psychology;
psychology examines concrete phenomena 
within individuality structures, in sofar as they (114) express themselves infeeling, and its anticipations e.g.; certainty 
in faith; universality within thepsychical sphere; acts have social andindividual manifestations and a psychological 
aspect; psychologism ; there is nopsycho-physical ego; nor a psychicalcentre of Erlebnisse; self-feeling, self-
respect etc. are emotional and concentrated 
to the self, 115; feelings have polarity, 
etc.; a feeling is not an Erlebnis;
sensations refer to objective qualities ofthings; pleasure and pain; indifference;
interest; retrocipations in feeling; therestrictive state of feeling in animals;
higher feelings; sensibility; life of feeling; 
association, polarity, etc.; emotions;
affects, 116; passions; sensory space;
sensory multiplicity of impressions, 118;
psychological description of economy,
123; spatial analogies in psychicalsphere; sensory perceptible space is anobjective retrocipation in the feeling aspect; 
the feeling of extension is subjective; 
subject-object relation; tactile, optic 
space is three dimensional, 168; sensory 
dimensionality; its indirect reference 
to original spatial dimensions; howare sensory images of motion in spacepossible?, 168; modal retrocipations infeeling interpenetrate intensively in themeaning-coherence of feeling; bioticspace and motion interpenetrate; sensibility 
and organic structure; organic development 
and space and number, 169;
anticipation can only be complex; directly 
and indirectly anticipating meanings,
170; feeling of justice; as indirect 
juridical anticipation in the psychicalaspect, 176; not a feeling of revenge,
implies logical feeling; social feeling;
moral feeling; moral insanity; feelingof justice only in disclosed state;
Greek kalokagathon; primitive tribal feeling 
of what is permissable and what isnot, 177; feeling of justice is bound upwith cultural feeling; primitive feelingsvery insufficiently differentiated; as ina child; a child's emotional life: little 
differentiation; WERNER and KROH ; axiological 
differentiation of feeling dependson culture, 178; feeling of justice pre-supposes 
that of symbolism, sociality, economy, 
things asethetical, historical anticipation 
starts from the opened historicalsphere; but refers forward to the ultimate 
sphere of faith, 179; there is nozero point in the dynamis of a sphere,
180; the closed structure of feeling inanimals; psychological differentiation depends 
on organic difference; animal "intellect" 
rests on deliberate presentimentof causal and teleological relations, 184;
human feeling is deepened into logical feel


ing by the analytical function; logicalfeeling is a limiting function of feeling,
185; will, striving, desiring, 244; the submissive 
instinct and psychial influence,
247; psychology as a means to interprethistory, 350, 352; perception; representation, 
remembrance, are acts; coherence 
between perception of extension and animage of space, 372; emotional sensibility,
visual, tactile, auditory space; their association 
is based on organic coherence;
objective picture of space, its impliedretrocipations, 373 ; no psychological empiricism; 
the sensory image refers to actual 
pre-psychical subject functions; butnot so in hallucinations, in the imagination, 
or in dreams; in memory images theactual reference is reproductive; noawareness of identity on the part of thesubject, 375.
—, III, classificatory method comparedwith typological method in psychologyand psychiatry, 81; animal psychology 
has shown that animal behaviour differs 
radically from vegetative reactions tophysiological stimuli; the psychical aspect, 85; embraces animal and humanemotional sensations; an animal's behaviour 
is psychically qualified; its psycho-.
motor structure and the absence of a cellulose 
membrane in the cells of the animal's 
body, 86; the sensory aspect of atree presents itself in an objective macroscopic 
image in which its numerical, spatial, 
kinematic, physico-chemical and biotic 
functions are objectified in relation to

our sensory perceptive function, 98; empiricist 
psychology erroneously resolvedthe sensory total image of a tree intofunctionally distinct impressions onlysubjectively associated by our functionof perception; the subject functions of atree are objectified in our perceptual.
image, 104, 105; the living model an artist 
uses evokes the ideal harmonious sensory 
shape in his productive fantasy, 113;
the productive aesthetic fantasy isfounded in the sensory function of ourimagination exhibiting a productive objectifying 
function; a visual fantasm; thisfantasm is not related to pre-psychicalsubj. or obj. functions of actually existingthings but it is the objective sensory aspect 
of a product of our imagination, andas such a merely intentional visionaryobject, 115; the representational objectivity 
of the sensory image of a marblestatue, 120; PLATO'S view of the structureof the soul as the "state in man"; ARISTOTLE'S 
view; the passions ought to beruled by reason, 230; the Stoics calledreason "hegernonikon", 231; Roman Catholic 
theories of conjugal love and sexualappetite; on "spiritual knowledge" and"spiritual love", 321. 

PSYCHICAL INTERLACEMENTS, III, between 
the members of a family, of a nation, ofa social class, 294, 295. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL EMPIRICISM 

PSYCHOLOGICAL EMPIRICISM, II, reduces 
the biotic subject-object-relation to sensory 
impressions, 374, 375. 

PSYCHOLOGY, I, mechanistic ps. in HARTLEY, 
264; in LocKE is atomistic, 266; it 
has to explain the origin and the limits 
of human knowledge, 269; idealist ps. of 
BERKELEY resolved nature into sensory 
impressions: esse est percipi, 274; HUME'S 
psychology, 303, 304 ; metaphysical psychology 
holds as basic theses: the substantiality, 
immateriality, simplicity, immortality 
and personality of the thinking 
ego, 366.
-, II, BAYLE applied psychology to the 
science of history, 353. 

PSYCHOLOGY OF PLANTS, III, and BAVINK'S 
pan-psychical principle of continuity, 

641. 
PSYCHO-MONISM, I, of HEYMANS, 103. 

PUBLIC LAW, III, identified with civil 
law, by KANT, 427 ; is correlated with private 
common law, 446; in the Carolingian 
State; the Roman Republic; CLovis' 
lex Salica; jus gentium; jus naturale, 447; 
public and private law in Rome, 449. 

PUBLIC LEGAL INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 
III, and natural community, 180; of industrial 
life, is not a "natural community"; 
the error of the Protestant League 
of Trade Unions in the Netherlands, 598. 

PUBLIC OPINION, III, according to H. HEL


LER ; contains the eternal essential principles 
of justice, in HEGEL ; influences the 
political will of the nation; it transcends 
different parties, 490, 491; it may be misled; 
in MERCIER DE LA RIVIERE'S demo-
liberal ideology; RATZENHOFER'S naturalistic 
psychological explanation, 492. 

PUCHTA, II, 
Cursus der Institutionen, 397. 
-, II, the historical school of jurisprudence, 
138, 277; historical development 
from nature to freedom, and their deeper 
identity, 278 ; theory of Subjective Right, 


397. 
-, III, of the Historical School, 670. 
PUFENDORFF, I, with HOBBES and GROTIUS 
conceived of the social contract in a 
formal sense, 319. 
-, II, on subjective rights, 395.


III, the social contract state comprises 
an agreement concerning the form ofgovernment, 236. 

PURITANISM, III, and marriage, 316. 
PURPOSEFUL UNITY, III, an organized community 
is a purposeful unity in a sociopsychical 
sense, according to JELLINEK, 

432. 
PYGMEAN CULTURE, III, Pygmies have monogamy, 
332 ; W. SCHMIDT'S conception 
criticized, 333. 

PYRRHONISM, I, in CROUZA'S version, and 
in HUME, 275. 

190 

PYTHAGORAS, II, dikê binds the world, 

132. 
PYTHAGOREANS, II, and others have stressed 
the fact that retribution is the meaning 
of justice, 132. 

PYTHAGOREANISM, II, in PLATO, 9. 

-III, the void is the flowing air, 8. 
Q 

QUALIFYING FUNCTION, III, is not a Subjective 
purpose, 143, 146, 425, 432. 

QUALITATES OCCULTAE, I, rejected in modern 
science, 201. 

QUALITATIVE DIFFERENCE, I, is quantified 
in LEIBNIZ according to their degree of 
clarity, 233. 

QUALITIES, I, objective qualities of things 
in naive experience, 43 ; primary and secondary, 
in LocKE, discarded by BERKELEY, 
274. 

QUANTUM MECHANICS, I, in physics, 212. 
-, II, many typical numbers in nature 
are only to be explained from their anticipatory 
coherence with typical physical 
and chemical relations, e.g., the typical 
constant -h- in quantum mechanics, 425.
-, III, RUTHERFORD'S exploded conception 
that an atom is a kind of solar system, 
706. 

QUANTUM THEORY, I, in modern physics, 

557. 
-, II, the classical view of the continuous 
character of physical space doesnot completely agree with the modern 
quantum-theory of energy, 101. 
QUATERNIAN CALCULUS, II, the imaginary 
function of number found recognition 
through GRASZMANN'S "Ausdehnungslehre"
in close connection with HAMILTON'S quaternian 
calculus, 171, 174. 


QUIETISM, II, in V. STAHL'S view of God's 
guidance in history, 249. 


QUINTILIANUS, III, 
Instit. orat., 3, 6. - 7. 
--, III, was the first writer who used the 
term "substance", 7. 


QUIRITES, III, in ancient Rome, 370. 

R 

RACIAL PROBLEM, III, primary or natural 
races, 495; ROSENBERG ; CHAMBERLAIN; 
PEARSON ; GUNTHER ; WOLFF, 496; racial 
differences, and education; South Africa, 
497 

• 

RADICAL EVIL, I, KANT'S pessimism, 347; 

is the tendency to subject the will to sen


sory inclinations, 385. 

-, II, in KANT'S philosophy, 150. 


191 RECIPROCITY OF PERSPECTIVES 


RADICAL TYPES, III, of individuality innaïve experience; matter, plants, animals,
83-85; of products of human formation,
like music, literature, etc., as secondaryradical types, 122. 

RADIO ACTIVITY, I, in modern physics,

557. 
—, III, is not influenced by external functional 
factors, 100; the duration of the 
existence of a radio-active element is indep'endent 
of its free or bound condition,
704. 
RADIOLARIA, III, 107, 108; their SiO 2 formations, 
724; and mineral formations, 730. 

RADLOFF, III, the Kirghiz formed "auls",
a kind of "joint family", an interlacementof different structures, under the authorithy 
of a patriarch, 351. 

RAMUS, PETRUS, I, developed a semi-Platonic 
mathematical method in logic, inwhich "invention" played the main part,

198. 
RANKE, II, 
Weltgeschichte, 281.
--, II, national individuality only beginsto unfold in an opened historical development, 
276, 277; RANKE'S idea of development 
derives from HEGEL; he restrictedhistory to Asia Minor and the Occident;
history starts when there are written documents; 
he synthesized Lutheran beliefin Providence with the modern idea of 
humanity, 281; he absolutized the domi


nators of Western culture, 282; his .pupil

J. BURCKHARDT, 282. 
RATIONAL ANIMAL, III , is man, in theStoic-Aristotelian view, 217. 

RATIONALISM, I, absolutizes the law-side of 
time, 28; reduces the subject-side of reality 
to the law-side, 98. 

RATIONALISTS, I, think that ethical norms 
can be proven a priori and "more geometrico"; 
HumE's criticism, 309. 

RATZEL, III, he tries to prove that thespread of similar elements of culture isdue to emigration and derivation; he remained 
entangled in the environment-
theory, 333; a quotation from RATZEL by

W. SCHMIDT proves that this theory showsa lack of historical insight, 335; he callspolitical geography "geopolitics", 500. 
RATZENHOFER, III, 
Wesen and Zweck der Politik, 492.
--, III, his naturalistic psychological explanation 
of public opinion, 492. 


RAUBER, I, SCHILLER'S Rauber, 453. 


RAVAISSON, I, developed neo-scholastic,
thought in an increasingly anti-rationaliistic 
sense, 525. 


REACTION, II, historical reaction, 237. 


READING BOOK, A, III, contains the intentional 
conception of its author; variabi


lity types; a cultural foundation and asymbolic qualification, 151. 

REALISM, II, Scholastic realism is sometimes 
called conceptual realism ; universalia 
ante rem and in re; AUGUSTINUS and 
ARISTOTLE; Divine Logos doctrine; metaphysical 
eidos (essence) gives matter itsform; PLATO'S extreme realism; Scholastic 
formae separatae split up reality intonoumenon and phenomenon, 387; intentio 
and the intended objective contents;
copy theory of concepts; erroneous viewof the Gegenstand, 388; Gegenstand andsubstance are identified; the transcendentalia; 
philosophia prima; the objectsof the actus intelligendi, 389; realismversus nominalism, 386, 387, 419. 

REALISM, CRITICAL, III, of AL. RIEHL, 46. 

REALITY, I, in RICKERT, 97. 

— II, as a category in KANT; but possibility 
and necessity can be thought of inevery meaning modus; reality can neverbe modal, 551. 
REALITY AND MEANING, II, that which 
makes reality into meaning lies beyondthe limit of time; meaning is "ex origine"
the convergence of all temporal aspectsof existence into one supertemporal focus, 
which is the religious root of creation, 
30. 

REALITY OF A THING, THE, III, iS a continuous 
process of realization, 109. 

REALLASTEN, II, in Germanic Law a jusin re may be vested in an immovable insuch a way that it is independent of theparticular person entitled to it, and remains 
valid even when he is temporarilylacking; this is instanced by the so-
called "Reallasten" of Germanic Law. 

408. 
REAL RIGHTS, II, the will-power theoristsidentified jus in re with absolute rights,

398. 
REASON, I, alone can never be a motive 
to any action of the will, 306; in HUMEreason is the slave of passion, 307.
—, II, Vernunft, nous, ratio, 11, 18, 19, 
20, 21, 22, 23, 26; KANT'S idea of reason, 
42; the idea of reason in rationalistic 
metaphysics is antinomic, 43; reason andunderstanding, 43; natural reason andnatural ethics, 144; reason and faith; the 
act of thinking includes its faith aspects,

564. 
REASON OF STATE, III, MACCHIAVELLI'S 
theory, 399. 

REASON, PURE, I, in KANT, is never related 
to "Gegenstande", but only to the a prioriconcepts of "Gegenstande", 364. 

REASONABLE BELIEF, I, in KAN'T, 91, 339,350, 363, 364, 372, 383, 385. 

RECIPROCITY OF PERSPECTIVES, III, of the 
ego with other egos, in LITT; they are 


 

RECOMPENSE AND PUNISHMENT 

realized by means of symbols, 250, 251;
this reciprocity is a biological necessity 
according to A. VIERKANDT, 290, 291. 


RECOMPENSE AND PUNISHMENT, II, in Po-
LAK'S view, 130. 


REDEMPTION, I, in Christ abrogates the
antithesis between sin and creation, 523. 


REFLECTION, I, in HUME, is in image of
sensation, 282. 


REFLEXIVE PERMISSION, II, and subjective
right in VON JHERING, 404. 


REFLEXIVE THOUGHT, I, and objective
thought, in recent philosophy, 86; and
critical self-reflection, 87. 


REFORMATION, THE, I, took over the Scholastic 
motive of nature and grace, 188,
511, 512, 514. 


REFRACTION, I, of the meaning totality by
cosmic time, 101, 105.
—, II, law of refraction of cosmic time, 6. 


REGALIA, II, medieval regalia were considered 
as res in commercio, 410. 


REGENERATION, II, reverses the direction 
of the faith function, 311. 


REGENERATIVE PHENOMENA, III, and 
DRIESCH'S experiments, 646. 


REGIONS, II, the delimitation of the phenomenological 
"regions" in EDMUND HUSSERL, 
17; material regions of being delimited 
by material "synthetical categories" 
in HUSSERL, 454. 
--, III, in HUSSERL, and the thing-struc


ture, 54. 


REGIUS, I, the innate ideas are present at


birth; his polemic with DESCARTES, 222. 
REHM, III, 
Geschichte der Staatsrechtswissenschaft,


211. 
—, III, On PLATO and ARISTOTLEtS SOCi0logy, 
206; he overlooked the kernel of
AR.'S view of democracy, 211. 
REICHENAU, E., III, 
Protozoa, 721, 773. 

REICKE, E., II, 
Lose Blatter aus Kant's Nachlass, 438. 
--, II, Published a note given by KANT,


438. 
REINES DENKEN, I, or philosophical 
thought as "mere thought", has as such


no actual selfhood, 7. 


REINGKINK, TH., III, and Church government; 
the episcopal system, 516. 


REINHARDT, II, 
Das PersOnlichkeitsrecht in der geltende
Rechtsordnung, 413. 


REINHOLD, I, a disciple Of KANT, gave the
doctrine of the affection of the subjective
sensibility by the mysterious "Ding an
Sich" such a gross form as to expose its 


192 

inherent antinomy sharply; this "Affizierung" 
was, according to REINHOLD, acausal process, 413. 

REINKE, JOH., III, 
Ueber Deformation von Pflanzen durch 
aussere Einfliisse, 647. 


RELATIVISM, I, in LITT, 138. 
—, III, with respect to the Church institution, 
in EMIL BRUNNER, 542. 


RELATIVITY, II, incongruity between relativity 
and physical continuous space,

101. 
RELIGION, I, the fundamental dependenceof ,human selfknowledge on the knowledge 
of God has its inner ground in theessence of religion as the central sphereof our created nature, 55; it is the innate 
impulse of the human selfhood to directitself toward the true or a pretended absolute 
Origin of all temporal diversity ofmeaning, which it finds focused concentrically 
in itself; to the formal transcendental 
character of this description theconcrete immediacy of religious experience 
remains strange; in theoreticalthought we can only arrive at a transcendental 
idea; the function of such an 
idea; religion transcends all modal aspects, 
faith included; religion is not atall a temporal phenomenon manifestwithin the temporal structure of humanact-life, 57; it can be approximated onlyin the concentric direction of our consciousness, 
not in the divergent one, not 
as a "Gegenstand"; religion cannot bedescribed "phenomenologically" or "psychologically"; 
it is not the experience ofthe "tremendum (RUDOLPH OTTO) ;• it is 
the ex-sistent condition in which the 
ego is bound to its true or pretended firmground; veritable religion is absolute self-
surrender, 58; true self knowledge discovers 
the ex-sistent character of the 
self also in the fact that the ego is boundwith other egos in a religious community;
the I-ness lives in the spiritual community 
of the we, which is directed to theDivine Thou; the central command of 
love is of a religious and not of a moralcharacter; in this Command the neighbour 
is a member of the religious community 
of mankind in its central relationship 
to God Who created man after Hisimage, 60; a religious community is maintained 
by a common spirit which as adynamis is active in the concentrationpoint of human existence; it works 
through a basic motive, whose forms arehistorically determined, but whose central 
meaning transcends historical form-
giving; since the Fall and the promise ofthe coming Redeemer, there are two central 
main springs operative in the humanheart, viz., the Holy Ghost and the spiritof apostasy from the true God, 61; inWestern thought the apostate spirit hasdisclosed itself in tw,o central motives, 


 

193RENAISSANCE 

61; pre-Homeric religion of life was anature religion; the classical-Greek motive 
(since ARISTOTLE) of form and matter; 
the Olympians were cultural gods;
and the Humanistic motive of nature and 
freedom, 62; the Humanistic motive took 
its rise from the religion of the free autonomous 
human personality and that ofmodern science evoked by it, and directed 
to the domination of nature; the 
Christian motive of creation, fall, and redemption; 
the Scholastic motive of nature 
and grace was introduced by Roman-
Catholicism and directed to a religious 
synthesis between the Christianand the other motives; the fall into sin is 
a privatio, a negation, a nothingness; butthe central dynamis of the spirit of apostasy 
is no "nothing"; it springs from thecreation and cannot operate beyond thelimits in which it is bound to the divine 
order of meaning; the dynamis of sin canunfold itself only in subjection to thereligious concentration law of humanexistence; without the law there is no 
sin, and there is a law of sin; but sin has 
no real power in itself, independent ofcreation, 63 ; idolatrous motives conceal 
themselves in a religious antithesis, forthe absolutizing of relative meanings evokes 
their correlata; these motives are 
composed of two religious antithetic motives 
driving human action and thoughtcontinually in opposite directions; the 
resulting religious dialectic is quite different 
from the antithetical gegenstandrelation 
of theoretic thought, 64 ; the Roman-
Catholic theological dialectic of nature 
and grace was taken over by Protestant 
Scholasticism; it aimed at a synthesis 
of the Aristotelian view of nature 
with the central motive of the Word-Revelation; 
but it lends itself as well to a 
combination of the motive of the Word 
Revelation with the Humanistic motive 
of nature and freedom; then the Christian 
motive loses its radical and integralcharacter; the Scholastic vision does not 
assign a central place to the Biblical revelation 
about the human heart as the 
radix of temporal existence; Thomismcould proclaim the autonomy of naturalreason in the "natural sphere" of knowledge; 
the dialectic tension between nature 
and grace hides the inner dialectic 
of the Greek and the Humanistic motives; 
in Scholastic anthropology thiscomponent is expressed in the dichotomyof body and 65 soul; Scholastics wasswayed from the Thomistic "natura praearnbula 
gratiae to the Occamist denial ofany contact between nature and grace(WILLIAM OF OCCAM) the same polar tension 
in "dialectical theology" betweenKARL BARTH and EMIL BRUNNER, 66; 
ROUSSEAU'S religion of feeling, 67; cf. subvoce Transcendental Basic Motive; — the 
central basic motive of the Christian religion 
is the motive of creation, the fall 

into sin, and the redemption throughJesus Christ in communion, with the 
Holy Ghost; God is the absolute and integral 
Origin, the Creator of the "earthlyworld" concentrated in man, and of the 
world of the angels, 173; there is nooriginal power which is opposed to Him;
in His creation there is no expression ofa dualistic principle of origin; man hasbeen created by God according to Hisimage in man's heart participating in thereligious community of mankind; thecreation implies a world plan; Divineprovidence is concerned with the lawside and with the factual side of the creation; 
the providential plan concerningthe factual side is hidden from man; sin 
can only be understood in veritable radical 
self knowledge, as the fruit of Biblical 
Revelation, 174 ; Sin is apostasy fromGod; it involves the root of existence and 
the whole temporal cosmos; it does notstand in a dialectical relation to the creation; 
the redemption in Christ is also radical; 
sin is propitiated by Him; gratiacommunis, 175; KANT'S religion remainswithin the boundaries of mere reason, 

384. 
—, II, nature religions, 263 (and note) ;
faith and religion identified; erroneously,
303; religion and magic; WESTERMARCK ; 
FRAZER'S definition; FREUD, 312; CASSIRER, 
321; Egyptian religion, 324 ; HUSSERL'S
idea of religion, 544. 
RELIGION OF FEELING, I, in ROUSSEAU, 67. 

RELIGIOUS FULNESS OF MEANING, I, love, 

wisdom, justice, power, beauty, etc., coincide 
in this fulness, 106. 

RELIGIOUS HORIZON, III, the temporal andthe religious horizon of experience, 68;
the imago Dei, 69; religious love is thefulfilment of all temporal meaning, 71;
the I-ness is the spiritual centre, of human 
existence, 88. 

RELIGIOUS ROOT OF THE STATE, III, faith 
points to this Root, 500; State andChurch, 501. 

RELIGIOUS SPHERE, THE, I, is pre-functional, 
the concentration point of the rootof our existence, 31. 

REMBRANDT, II, Nightwatch, 423. 

REMEMBRANCE, II, is an act, 372. 

RENAISSANCE, I, at the time of the Renaissance 
Humanism was completelyaware of its real religious motive, but inthe 18th century this notion faded away,
170; Romanticism was as aristocratic in 
character as the Renaissance had been,
171; the Renaissance began as a spiritualHumanistic movement when the medieval 
ecclesiastically unified culture hadcollapsed, 173; in Italy, especially, theRenaissance took the side of the ancient 
world view; it re-discovered Greek and 
Roman Culture and gave up synthesis 


 

RENARD, G.194 

philosophy, 189; in the Renaissance theBiblical motives were secularized, 190; 
the Faustian domination; the personality-
ideal was permeated with an unquenchable 
thirst for temporal life and a Faustian 
desire to subject the world to itself;
the Renaissance secularized the Christian 
idea of regeneration, 191; this "renascimento" 
and the "uomo universale"_, LEO 
VINCI,

BATTISTA ALBERTI; LEONARDO DA VINCI, 
192; its secularized motive of regeneration, 
193; the Renaissance did not explicitly 
develop the model of modernnatural scientific thought, although it contained 
such a tendency; it also inclinedtowards the infinite in which modern 
man thinks he can rediscover himself in 
his boundless impulse of activity, 194;
Stoic and Epicurean motives in Renaissance 
thought; DA VINCI; VALLA; thethirst after infinite nature and its mysteries 
was manifest in Renaissance painting 
and poetry; the Faustian passion todominate nature was revealed in a flourishing 
alchemy; PETRUS RAMUS' logic,
198 ; BRUNO'S pantheism, his dithyrambicglorification of nature's infinity and thehuman microcosmic monad; natura naturata 
and natura naturans; the rejectionof a "Jenseits", 199; the Renaissance 
ascribed the mathematical conception ofnatural phenomena to PLATO and DEMOCRITUS, 
200. 

RENARD, G., III, 
La thêorie de l'institution, Essai d'ontologie 
juridique, 384. 


RENASCIMENTO, I, and the "uomo universale" 
of the Renaissance, 192. 

REPRESENTATIONS, I, are "synthetic Concepts" 
of empirical "Gegenstande" inKANT, 53. 

REPRESENTATION, II, is an act, 372. 

REPRESENTATIONAL RELATION, III, the 
naive experience of a thing is not thatof a copy or representation of such athing (Abbild-relation), 34-38, 44-47;
RICKERT'S view of the copy theorie 49—
51; SCHELER, 53; HUSSERL, 54. 

REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM, III, CALVIN did 
not introduce this system into the Church,
nor the idea of the sovereignty of theCongregation, 545-549. 

Rés, II, the Roman conception of theres in a juridical sense, 393. 

Res PUBLICA, III, the State is a res publi


ca, 412. 

RESTLESSNESS, I, of phil. thought, and ofour ego, is transmitted to all temporalfunctions in which the ego is operative,

11. 
RESTORATION, II, of the 19th century was

conservative, 233; and reaction, 362. 
RESTRICTIVE STATE OF FEELING, II, is found 
in animals, 117. 

RETRIBUTION, II, is to be taken in bonam 
partem as well as in malam partem, 130: 
and economic life, 131, 132; and love; 
retribution acts against excessive manifestations 
of altruism; is not a feeling-
drive, 134; ARISTOTLE'S arithmetical and 
geometrical proportions in retribution, 
135; economic, aesthetic, social retrocipations 
in the juridical aspect, 135, 136: 
the expression of the modal meaning 
of retribution in a primitive legal order, 
182; in primitive society the legal 
subjectivity of man and the validity area 
of the norms are still rigidly bound up 
with the unopened aspect of social inter 

: 

course restricted to the members of the 
tribe, in psychical life, 168, 183, 184; logical 
substratum of juridical aspect, 182,183 ; biotic retrocipations in primitive 
culture, 270; juridical retrocipations, 405. 

REUCHLIN, I, a friend of MELANCHTON'S, 
513; R. was disappointed when MELANCHTON 
broke with the ideals of Humanism,

515. 
REUTER AND HART, III, 

Introduction to Sociology, 177. 

REVELATION, I, is the synthesis of irrationality 
and originality — FICHTE


492. 
--, II, appeals to ourselves in the root of
our existence, 52; general and particular.
306; are universally intended, 307; natural 
revelation, 308; and common grace,
309; the principle of Divine R. in the
order of creation, 323. 
REvEsz, G., II, 
Het psychologisch ruimteprobleem, 373. 


REVOLUTION, III, Christian revolution and 
Stoicism, 169; revolution can only succeed 
when its leaders collar the military
power, 421. 


RHIZOPODA, III, mineral formations in 
their protoplasm, 108, 774. 

RHUMBLER, III, 
Das Lebensproblem, 733;
Das Protoplasma als physikalisches System, 
733. 


RICHTER, OTTO, III, 
Gust. Theod. Fechner, Eine Auswahl aus 
seinen Schriften, 629-631. 


RICKERT, HEINRICH, I, 
System der Philosophie, 22, 23, 120, 121,


129, 151;
Wissenschaftliche Philosophie and Weltanschauung, 
23, 129;
Grundprobleme der Philosophie, 129,130, 133, 134; 
—, I, theoretical philos. thought first demolishes 
everything a-theoretical, leavinga chaotic material of consciousness, which 
is to be ordered in the creative forms of 
philos. thought, 14 he defends the neutrality 
postulate with respect to philosophy, 
14, 15; his statement: "if we are 


195 RICKERT, HEINRICH 

able to determine the boundaries of orients itself to the historical life of cul 

thought through thinking, we must beture to track down the multiplicity of the

able, too, to exceed these limits", is con-values; philosophy must reunite the

tradictory on the immanence standpoint;worlds of "natural reality" and of "va


he distinguishes "heterological" fromlues"; this unity can be immediately ex


"hetereological-monological thought"; butperienced when we are not thinking,
it leads to antinomy, 22, 23; he observes,131; there is a third realm serving as acorrectly, "as soon as we are beyondconnecting link between reality and va


thought, we do not know anything", butlues; viz. that of meaning; meaning is

fails to appreciate the transcendence ofconstituted in the valuating act of the

our selfhood; the non-scientific attitudesubject, but is not itself value, but relates

towards the world must not claim uni-reality to values; it joins these two in a

versal validity for all; then it can holdhigher synthetic unity; value is meaning

its own by the side of scientific philoso-of a transcendent, timeless, and absolute

phy; the latter makes the entire man alsocharacter; meaning is "immanent mean-

its object and transcends man himself,ing"; reality is the object of the transcen


23; as a Neo-Kantian RICKERT opposesdental epistemological subject; in the

being to validity, reality to value; theserealm of values there is no subjectivity at

concepts are not modally defined; he re-all; culture is reality to -which values

serves "meaning" for "culture" as a sub-cling; philosophy must work with an

jective relating of "reality" to "values","open" system, 132; such a system is

.

76; his meaning-idealism distinguishesonly a formal order of "the stages of va


meaning (Sinn) from reality; the latterlue"; philosophy must not be "propheis 
only viewed in its abstract sense of thetism"; nor a view of life and the world;
psycho-physical aspects, 97; his classi-the latter must be included in theoretical

fication of the "life-and-world-views" is inquiry; the object of philosophy is theoriented to the Neo-Kantian philosophytotality of the cosmos inclusive of the

of values; he distinguishes intellectual-subject (the whole man and his relationism, aestheticism, mysticism, moralism,to the cosmos) ; philosophy necessarilyeudemonism, eroticism, theism, polythe-becomes a theory of the total meaning ofism, 121; his classification is a confusinglife, 133; the pitfall in RICKERT'S neutrali


schematism, 122; it is construed apartty view lies concealed in his a-priorifrom the religious basic motives of Wes-identification of "truth" with theoreticaltern thought and interprets ancient andcorrectness, and in his a-priori supposi


medieval thinkers after the pattern of thetion that such truth is an "absolute" "va


modern Humanistic motive of nature and lue", "timelessly valid", "resting in it-

freedom, 123; his view of the difference 

self", 134; this view is antinomous on

between philosophy and a life view, 124;RICKERT'S own standpoint, 135; the testhis "Wissenschaftliche Philosophie andof the transcendental basic Idea applied

Weltanschauung is aimed at modern exis


to RICKERT'S philosophy, 136, 137;

tence-philosophy (HEIDEGGER, JASPERS,

RICKERT'S view of Calvinism, 149; the

etc.), which opposes existential thinking

judgment "Truth is the highest value" is

to RICKERT'S purely theoretical; he tries tonot theoretical but proceeds from a life

demonstrate that the cosmic totality must

and world view; theoretical judgments

remain hidden from the total man, who isare oriented to a (theoretical) value; in

an individual complex of functions, 129;

the judgment "this rose is beautiful" the

philosophy must separate the cosmos intoaesthetic attitude is abandoned for thetwo spheres : temporal-spatial (sensorily

theoretical judgment about "the aesthetic

perceptible) nature reality and timeless

value", 151; he distinguishes theoretical

values having absolute validity; impera-from practical philosophy, 530.
tives and norms are not the business of —, II,
philosophy; the concept of a normativeKulturwissenschaft and Naturwissen


science is internally contradictory; spe-schaft, 207;

cial science studies what is "mere reality"

Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen

and immanent as "given reality", theBegriffsbildung, 207, 421;

"psycho-physical"; reality is also a theo-

Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie,

retical form, a category of thought, which207, 208;
itself is not real, but has "validity", 130;--, II, on culture, nature, value, 201; cul


the theoretical Idea of the totality of rea-ture is "natural reality to which valueslity, viewed by KANT as an infinite task cling", 204;qualifies historical science

for thought, has value-character; "totalityas individualizing; cultural life filled withof reality" is a problem of epistemology;meaning, 207; reality bears meaning; allphilosophy must be a theory of valuesnormativity is reduced to the cultural de-
directed to the "Voll-endung" (fulfil-nominator, 208; his concept of transcenment) 
toward the totality and includesdental logical historical forms of know-
the universe of values in its horizon; itledge, 209; his distinction between syste


must strive after a system of values; andmatical and individualizing sciences, isalso investigate the a-theoretical values,antinomic, 213, 217; at first he used thesuch as morality, beauty, holiness; it term "natural history" but he gave it up 


 

RIEHL, ALOIS 196 

later on because he believed that the historical 
viewpoint cannot include an individualizing 
view of nature, 230; and
KUYPERS, 243; individual causality; causal 
equation or inequivalence; individuality 
as such is an apeiron, not a norm
as RICKERT thinks, 254 ; his error, 275; individuality 
originates from the matter
of experience; the genuine individual
science is related to values by cultural
science, 421; individuality is empirical
uniqueness related to values; natural
science method is blind to values and 


works in a generalizing way; individuality 
forced into the form-matter scheme,
421; individuality is a sensory me on in
Neo-Kantianism; meaning-indiv. in the
general notion of culture only, 422. 
—,


Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis, 49, 50;
System der Philosophie, 51;
Kant als Philosoph der modernen Kultur,


428. 
—, III, his criticism of RIEHL'S "Critical 
realism"; epistemology should not include 
a problem in its pre-suppositions;
RICKERT starts from the "Satz der Immanenz"; 
his objection made against RIEHLis also valid for RICKERT'S own transcendental 
idealistic epistemology; he qualifies 
naive exper. as "a complex of vagueand rash opinions", 49; he identifies theabstract sensory aspect with the integralwhole of empirical reality; he rejects thecopy theory; speaks of a pre-theoreticalErleben of the unity of value and reality;
his Sinn-Begriff; his "naive realism" isKantian phenomenal nature, 50; his notion 
of Erleben is: concept-less, irrational, 
nameless, a unity of two theoretically
construed worlds, corresponding to the
dualism of nature and freedom, 51; his
copy theory of naive experience, 49-51;
of a work of art as a sensory perceptual
thing related to aesthetic value, 113; So-
ROKIN tries to solve the totality problem
of sociology from the standpoint of H. 
RICKERT'S philosophy, 162; and DARMSTAEDTER'S 
sociology, 409; KANT held the
State to be "power"; this statement of
RICKERT'S must be restricted to interna


tional relations, 428. 


RIEHL, ALOIS, I, 
Der philosophischen Kritizismus, 268,
281, 340. 
—, I, holds that there is no antinomy in
LOCKE'S system, 268 (note) ; R. holds that


HUME had unwavering faith in mathematics 
as the foundation of all science; he
misunderstands HumE's conception of
mathematical certainty; RIEHL says that
HUME never meant to dispute the universal 
validity of "pure geometry", and that
HUME only attacked the possibility, presumed 
by geometry, of dividing space to
infinity, some further arguments of
RIEHL'S on this subject, 281; his interpretation 
confronted with HumE's state


ments about "pure geometry", 285; in the
third period of his development KANT was
very close to HUME'S scepticism, 340. 
—, II, 
Der philosophische Kritizismus, 80, 373,
439, 519.


—, II, his involuntary admission of thenumerical analogy in logical unity, multiplicity, 
etc., 80; association based on theconnection between the organs of sightand touch, 373; his paraphrase of KANT'Sobservation on judgments, 439; thoughtand intuition are originally united intheir common subject of consciousness(= the cogito) ; he denies any essentialdifference between cognitive (experiential) 
and logical concepts; but he doesnot realize KANT'S aporia, 519. 
—, III,
Der Philosophische Kritizismus, 39, 43,44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49.
—, III, points out that the "bond betweenthe objective and the subjective world"
would be broken if MDLLER's theory ofthe specific energy of the sense organswere true, 42; he holds that it is impossible 
'to found a law on one single unexplained 
exception, 43; there is a necessaryrelation between stimulus and sensation;
RIEHL ignores the subject-object-relation,
44 ; he gives a Nominalistic interpretationof the relation between sensory perceptsand things perceived; he distinguishesarbitrary from natural signs, like OccAm,
45; his Kantianism, 47; his critical realism; 
his rehabilitation of the sensoryaspect of human experience, 47 ; 'things

and our consciousness form one totality
of reality; this thesis is an improvement
on Kantianism, but not wholly satisfac


tory, 48. 


RIEKER, K., III, 
Grundsatze reformierter Kirchenverfas


sung, 520, 521, 544, 545, 546, 547.
—, III, refutes the political interpretation
of CALVIN'S system of Church government,
as if 'the elders were representatives of
the congregation in the modern sense of
representation, 521; he says that the conception 
of "governmental power" as ser-. 
vice is of Reformed origin, 544; RIEKER
says that Church government was conceived 
by LUTHER as dominion in a juridical 
sense; this is an error, 545; the elders 
are representatives of the congregation 
insofar as they are its ministering
organs according to their office; they are


no mandatories of a popular will above
them, 546, 547; an individual Church-
member has a right to examine if the
orders and arrangements of the ecclesiastical 
office bearers are in accordance 
with the Word of God and has to obey
insofar as such is the case, 547. 


RIEMANN, II, the second founder of the
theory of mathematical functions; and in


tuition, 484. 



 

197ROMANTICISM 

RIGHT, SUBJECTIVE, II, in THOMASIUS, HOB 
BES, PUTENDORFF, my Own right is all thathas not been forbidden me; in GROTIUS it 
is all that other juridical subjects in relation 
to me are forced to respect on account 
of the legal order, 395 ; KANT excludes 
purpose from the concept of subjective 
right, 396; according to VON SAVIGNYand PUCHTA a subjective right is essentially 
the particular will-power of the individual, 
397; confusion between subjective 
right and juridical competence onaccount of the elimination of the subjectobject-
relation, 398; in THON'S conception, 
397, 400; in DUGUIT'S view, 399; and 
competence; and object, 402; and reflexpermission; VON JHERING sought the difference 
in the legal protection (the actionin a material sense); this is wrong, 404;
a juridical object is nothing but a modalfunction and is determined by the modalfunction of the juridical subject-objectrelation, 
405; the person of the King cannot 
have a private right to the king's office, 
410.

—, III, THOMAS AQUINAS recognizes subjective 
natural rights of individual man;
a subj. right is a social function according 
to DUGUIT, 460. 

RIGHTS, I, of man; of the citizen, 321. 
—, II, might is not right, 241; innate human 
rights in LOCKE, 350, 357, 95; WOLFF,
413; personality- and property-rights,
392, 413; Roman ius in re, 392; rights to

rights, 394; HUGO GROTIUS, 395,

—, III, inalienable rights of man wereopposed to the absolute sovereignity ofthe State without denying such sovereignty, 
399; they are denied by LEON DUGUIT, 

460. 
RIGHTS, INALIENABLE, I, and the publicinterest, in WOLFF, 321. 

RIGHTS, INNATE NATURAL, I, in ROUSSEAU, 

318. 
RIGHT, PERSONAL, II, (jura in personam),
was held to be the volitive control over a 
person in consequence of a particularpersonal legal relation, in the opinion ofthe will-theorists, 398. 

RIGHTS, PERSONALITY, II, the idea of a 
subjective right to personality is absurd,

413. 
RIGHTS, PUBLIC, II, modal subject-objectrelations 
may be objectified in the law-
sphere in which they function; in thejuridical lawsphere rights may becomeobjects of other rights; can a competenceimplying juridical authority over personsbe made into the object of a subjectiveright, 409, 410. 

RIGHTS, SUBJECTIVE, II, considered apartfrom interest, by the Historical School ofjurisprudence; in SCHLOSSMANN; in thewill-power theory, 397 ; its definition in 

KIERULFF; the concept subjective right
was abandoned by H. KELSEN, 399; the
element of interest was eliminated, 403. 


RITA, II, the astronomical world order 
was identified with retributive justice in
the old-Indian conception of Rita explained 
in the Veda, 133; a moral motive
is found in the Vedic conception of the
gods Varouna and Mitza, as the guardians
of the Rita, the astronomical world-order 
which is at the same time the moral and 
the juridical order, 324. 


RITTER, P. H., III, 
Schets eener Critische Geschiedenis van 
het Substantiebegrip in de Nieuwere Wijsbegeerte, 
28.
—, III, we experience the qualities of a
thing but the thing itself is not given in
experience; it is put there by us; his
view of substance, 28. 


RIVERS, W. H. R., III, 
The Todas, 341. 
—, III, polyandry among the Todas; its
origin, 341. 


ROBBERS, III, 
De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee in gesprek
met het Thomisme, 73. 
—, III, maintains that the Idea of analogical 
being is the neo-scholastic basic
motive; and that the motive of nature 
and grace is secondary; this is an error,


73. 
ROBERTSON, II, followed VOLTAIRE'S view 
of history, 350. 

ROBINSON CRUSOE, III, is a fancied case, 
and has no force as an argument, 655. 

ROB SON, W. A., III, 
Justice and Administrative Law, 681. 


ROMAN EMPIRE, HOLY, III, was supposed
to embrace all spiritual and secular relationships, 
217; its foundation was laid by
AUGUSTINUS' De Civitate Dei, 510. 


ROMAN FAMILY, THE, III, excluded polygamy, 
306. 


ROMAN JURISTS (CLASSICAL), II, On Subjective 
right, 392. 


ROMAN LAW, II, actio popularis; the interdicts 
of Roman law of possession, 404. 


ROMAN "THING" CONCEPT, THE, II, in a 
juridical sense, 392; the res; the jus in 
re. , 393. 


ROMANTICISM, I, was aristocratic; a reaction 
to the science ideal, 171; in NIET-
scHE's first period, 465.
—, II, the term : natural history, 229; in
VON STAHL'S view of history, 233 ; its
quietism and its conception of God's
guidance, 248; under the guidance of the
ideas of Romanticism the Restoration followed 
a seemingly historical, but in reali



 

HOME, ANCIENT198 

ty a reactionary policy, evoking the re
sistance of 19th century Liberalism, 362 


ROME, ANCIENT, III, the undifferentiated 
structure of the genies; the curiae; curiae
are "gentilitial societies" and agrarian,
land property communities; Roman citizenship, 
369; quirites, 370. 


ROSE, A., I, a rose does not feel or think 
or engage in aesthetic valuation as a subject; 
but in the naïve attitude we ascribe
to it objective qualities of colour and
odour, logical characteristics, cultural
qualities and objective beauty, 42.
—, II, a rose is a logical objective systasis, 
450. 


ROSENBERG, ALFRED, III, 
Der Mythus des XX. Jahrhunderts, 496.
--, III, his "cultural philosophy" based
on the distinction between inferior and 
superior races; he glorifies the "Nordic
or Aryan" race; it became the accepted
"philosophical" justification of HITLER'S
inhuman anti-semitic policy, 496. 


ROUSSEAU, J. J., I, 
Discours sur les sciences el les arts, 313, 
314;
Discours sur l'origine de rinegalite parmi
les hommes, 314; 
Oeuvres II, 314, 315;
Du Contract Social, Ou Principes du Droit
Politique, 315, 319, 320, 321, 322;
Emile, 316. 
—, I, he depreciated the ideal of science 


and ascribed primacy to the freedom mo 

tive which is the main spring of his religion 
of feeling, 67 ; the Idea of a personalGod was a requirement of religious feeling 
to ROUSSEAU, 191; in R.'s work he tension 
between the science and the personality 
ideal reached a crisis; he openlydisavowed the science-ideal in favour of 
the recognition of human personality asa moral aim in itself; freed from the burden 
of science we may learn true virtuefrom the principles inscribed in the heartof everybody; 0, virtue, sublime knowledge 
of simple souls ! ; he called Humanistic 
thought to self-reflection; not thoughtbut the consciousness of freedom and the 
feeling of moral power prove the spiritual 
character of the human soul, 314;
human thought is a higher level of theanimal associations of sensory Ideas; allvalue of human personality is concentrated 
in the feeling of freedom; the mathematical 
pattern of thought served todefend the natural rights of human personality 
in the face of HOBBES'S Leviathan 
; the "general will" only is directedto the common good; in it each of usbrings into the community his personand all his power that we may receiveevery member as an indivisible part ofthe whole; personal freedom is absorbedby the principle of majority, 315; HOBBES'and RousSEAU'S State-Leviathan, mathematically 
construed, respects no limits, 

devours free personality in all its spheresof life; the "volonte generale" had a normative 
sense; Leviathan with its headcut off on the frontispiece of R.'s "Contrat 
Social"! the accent was shifted to the 
personality ideal in ROUSSEAU in contradistinction 
to the senice-ideal of the Enlightenment; 
feeling became the true seatof the Humanistic personality-ideal; R.
attacked the rationalistic view of religionof the Enlightenment; his religion of sentiment 
condemned the French Encyclopedists 
and NEWTON; religion is seated inthe "heart"; abstract science must not encroach 
upon the holy contents of humanfeeling, 317; he combated the rationalistic 
associational psychology "without asoul"; he got estranged from the materialistic 
Encyclopedists as well as from hisearlier friend and protector DAVID HUME,
whose associational psychology was stilldominated by the ideal of science; Western 
culture had all its spheres dominated 
by sovereign science; ROUSSEAU turnedto the dream of a natural state of innocence 
and happiness; this state revivedthe Stoic "Golden Age"; his optimism;
with respect to the original goodness ofhuman nature; his pessimism with regard 
to culture, 317 ; the free personalitywill build a new culture, founded in thedivine value of personality; the naturalstate of freedom and equality is not hisideal; a higher destiny calls humanity tothe civil state; natural freedom must be 

elevated to normative freedom; innate 

natural rights must become the inalienable 
rights of the citizens; the social contract, 
318; to give up one's liberty is togive up one's quality of man, the rightsof humanity, even one's duties; the wordsslavery and right are mutually exclusive;
the fundamental problem is the guaranteeing 
of the sovereign freedom of thepersonality; for this purpose a form ofassociation must be sought, 319; the inalienable 
right of freedom is maintainedin the inalienable sovereignty of thepeople; the sovereign will of the peopleis the "general will", not the "will ofall"; the general will must be directed tothe general interest; it is incompatiblewith the existence of private associations;
he appeals to PLATO'S "Ideal State"; public 
law does not recognize any counterpoise in private spheres of association;
the "Social Contract" is the only juridicalbasis for all the rights of the citizens;
this means unbridled absolutism of the 
legislator; R. saw there was inner tensionbetween the "general will" and individual freedom, 320 ; the mutual relationship 
between the natural rights of manand the rights of the citizen; every individual 
transfers only as much of hisnatural power, his possessions, and freedom, 
as is required for the "commongood"; natural rights are private rights;
the absolute equality of all the citizens 


199 RUSSELL, BERTRAND 


as such; no special privileges can begranted, 321; with respect to the publicinterest every citizen has equal rights;
ROUSSEAU'S concept of statute law; itdiffers from that of the so-called "material 
concept of statute law" of the German 
school of LABAND ; R. holds that a 
genuine public statute (loi) can never regulate 
a particular interest, 322; but inthe civil state human rights have changedtheir ground of validity, viz, the socialcontract; the juridical source of privateand public rights is one and the same;
so that private rights can only exist bythe grace of the general will; the sovereign 
people alone judges of the demandsof the public interest; the general will inwhich every citizen encounters his ownwill, cannot do any injustice to anyone:
volenti non fit injuria; to ROUSSEAU it is 
the mathematical science ideal that is to 
guarantee the value of personality; "theymust be forced to be free", 323; R. was 
impatient of every revolution, 324 ; his proclamation 
of the freedom of human personality 
from its subjection to sciencehad a deep influence on KANT, 332; especially 
R.'s "Discours sur les sciences etles arts", 333; ROUSSEAU'S influence led 
KANT to emancipate the science-idealfrom metaphysics, 340; about the year1770 KANT adhered to the sentimental 
ethics and religion defended by ROUSSEAUand English psychologism, 346.
—, II, mathematical explanation of legal

numerical analogies in validity sphere,
167; his pessimistic view of culture;
his natural law theory; culture leadsmankind to a higher condition of freedom; 
the normative goal of culture, 270.
--, III, 
Discours de l'inêgalite, 458.
—, III, an adherent of the social contract 
theory and of State absolutism, 236; hisnatural law-construction of the Leviathan 
State; he wants to destroy all privateassociations, 442; the salus publica; thegeneral will; absolute State power, 443;
in his early period ROUSSEAU held thatthe State was only founded for the protection 
of property; property arises fromsanctioning the crime of forceful seizure;
the State is the source of class struggle,

458. 
ROUTINE VIEW, III, the routine view of 
daily life in modern times is not naiveexperience, 144, 145. 

Roux, WILHELM, III, 
Ueber die bei der Vererbung von Variationen 
anzunehmenden Vorgange, 761.


III, mechanistic biology, 733 ; he isthe founder of "developmental mechanics" 
and showed the existence of "organizers" 
in the living cell-body; theyexercise a determining influence on thedevelopment of an embryo, 752; his criticism 
of WOLTERECK'S "bio substance", 761. 

RUSSELL, BERTRAND, II, 
Russell and Whitehead, Principia Mathematica, 
78, 82, 83, 436, 452. 
—, II, tried to deduce number from the 
class-concept, 82, 83; the antinomy inhis theory, 83 ; is interpreted by G. T.
MALAN, 84 ; Criticizes Cantor's Set-Theory, 
340; on the meaning of the copula to 
be, 436; his purely analytical deductionof the concept-"whole"; pieces and moments, 
457. 
—, III, 
The Analysis of Matter, 18, 19, 20, 21,22, 23; 
Principia Mathematica, 21, 24, 32, 33.
—, III, the words "substance" and "thing"
express the emotion of recognition ; the 
motor habit in speech; general names aredifferent from proper names; identity ofname is taken to indicate identity of substance, 
18; the conception of substantialidentity in language, common sense, andin metaphysics; on the concept "thing"; 
a substance is a series of physical occurrences; 
this view is based on the generaltheory of relativity; his error is the identification 
of the Greek metaphysical substance 
with that of classical mechanistic 
physics (GALILEI, NEWTON), 19; interval 
and quantum; rhythms; the discontinuousprocess of nature; a percept; events; thedifference between physical and mental 
is unreal, 20; matter and mind are logicalstructures of relations between events; a 
thing is a group of events; criticizesWHITEHEAD'S view saying that the eventsof a group cannot be considered as aspects 
of the group, 21; RUSSELL'S error isthe identification of naive experience andthe theoretical Gegenstand relation; hetries to refute the "common sense" view, 
a.o., with an appeal to the laws of perspective, 
22; later he refers to commonsense arguments to make his "causal 
theory plausable", 23; misinterprets naiveexperience; his concepts of structure as"what we can express by mathematical 
logic"; it is the foundation of arithmetic;
identified with the notion : relation — 
number; logical properties include all 
those which can be expressed in mathematical 
terms; psychological time of perception 
is the same as physical time; 
the similarity of structure between percepts 
and groups of events, 24 ; semi-similar 
systems; different percepts need 
not have exactly similar stimuli; (the actof perception has different modal aspectssays D.) ; RUSSELL'S argument rests on apetitio principii; his theory illustrated

by considering a light-wave, 25 ; he replaces 
the real data of experience by abstract 
elements of a psycho-physicalworld, 26; animism and magic and common 
sense according to RUSSELL, 32; he 
thinks primitive animism due to defectiveobservation; but primitives are generallyexcellent observers in a practical sense, 


RUSSIAN STATE, THE 200 
33; his explanation of substance and interpretation as essentially theoretical; 
thing, 35. the Historical School, 138; VON SAVIGNY 
RUSSIAN STATE, THE, III, has not become dceipdt nioont oafg Rreoem wanit hL atwhe i na tGtaecrkm aonni ct hceo urne-- 
a Communist society, nor a syndicalistic tries, nor did PUCHTA, 234, 277; nature 
organization *in DUGUIT'S sense; LENIN, and freedom, their synthesis in historical 
STALIN, 464. development, and their deeper unity; he 
RUTHERFORD, III, his classical mechanistic took over KANT'S moralism, 278; this idea 
atom model, 706. carried through in the theory of law, 278; 
the jurist's activity at a higher stage; legislation; 
a conservative nationalistic idea of 
S the Volksgeist, 279; SAVIGNY and PUCHTA 
on subjective right as the particular will 
SACKMANN, II, VOLTAIRE, 269. power of the individual apart from the 
interest served by it, 397; personal and 
SACRAL SPHERE, THE, III, among primi- real rights; personal right is control over 
tive men, 33, 34. a person; jus in re identified with absolute 
right, 398; confusion between sub- 
Geschichte der Volkswirtschaftslehre, 
SALIN, E., II, jective right and competence (= author- 
292. ' 
ity over persons) • subjective right mer- 
—, II, points to a reversion of meaning ged into juridical law, 398. 
in WEBER'S Sociology of Religion, 293. SCALES; HAIRS; FEATHERS, III, as objective 
SALUS PUBLICA SUPREMA LEX ESTO, I, in formations, 774. 
WOLFF, 321. SCEPTICISM, I, was stopped by DESCARTES 
SALUS PUBLICA, III, as the highest law of in his "cogito", 12 ; its self-refutation, 144, 
the State according to LOCKE, 442-445; 147; Greek Sophistic scepticism, 145; rein 
KANT; its limits; raison d'Etat; WOLFF; futed by AUGUSTINUS and by DESCARTES, 
HOBBES; ROUSSEAU; LOCKE; KANT; the Li- 196; Pyrrhonic scepticism tended to deny 
berals; totalitarianism; PLATO; FICHTE; any criterion of truth, 275; of HUME and 
ARISTOTLE; HUGO GROTIUS, 442; PFUFEN- KANT, 340. 
DOFF; ARISTOTLE; WOLFF, 443; the inte- SCHELER, MAX, I, 
rest of the State is a sufficient quiet and Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos, 
safe life, 444; and distributive justice; P. 51, 52; 
DUEZ, 445. Per Formalismus in der Ethik und die 
SANCHEZ, THOMAS, III, Spanish canonist; materiale Wertethik, 111. 
marriage is the traditio corporum, 317. —, I, human personality is "a monarchSARCOMA, 
III, an organic disease, 647. iecvaelr ayr truarnng etamkeenst t ohfe alecatsd o"n; eh oe fo wvehrilcoho kats 
SARTRE, I, the transcendent character of the ego and 
Le neant against l'etre, 53. conceives of the ego as an immanent 
—, III, has a subjectivistic view of man's centre of its acts only, so that its radical 
corporality, 779. unity disappears, 51; the human mind 
—WSA,iS jISs, EbsNeug, epFeEprRotDese IvNsa AtnhN daDet, zIte,h ne rtiej dis, 5a2n6 i.n ner con- elmcxoaigansikt ceoeanpslcp iaeon nstietdos ieaptls sf"e;ylG fct hhteoegic etGahnlees a gt"asewpnnedosctr"atl dsnt h"doe f br phuehtula yemtvsiioaeonnnnection 
between the philosophy of the is the most formal category of the logical 
BCLoOsNmDoEnLo, m526ic. Idea and that of MAURICE oafs ptheec ts uofb mjeicnt da n(Gd etihset) ,s e5l2f;h othoed cionn icrerpat- 
SATZ DES BEWUSZTSEINS, I, in Immanence tionalist phenomenology; the selfhood is 
Philosophy, 109. not a substance in the Kantian sense, but 
—, II, definition, 536; its pernicious ef- "pure actuality"; as such it is transcenfects: 
juridical person; causality; will; dent to the cosmos as "world of things", 
juridical volition, 537; "psycho-physical"; 111; sociology of thought, 165; his found- 
"forms of thought"; super-temporal ideas; ation of philosophy, 543, 544. 
naïve experience misrepresented; posi- II, 
tivistic views; phenomenological concep- Phdnomenologie und Erkenntnistheorie, 
tions, 538. 488, 597; 
SCAoUuSrSs UdRe Eli, nFg. uDiEst, iIqI,u e genêrale, 224. mDDeearrte FFriooarrlemm Waalleiisrsmtmeutuhssi ki ni,n 5d 4de5re, r E5 E4th6t,ih k5i,4k 57 u,8 5n57,d 05 ;d8i6e, 
SAVIGNY, VON, II, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591; 
System des heutigen rOmischen Rechts, Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos, 
397, 398; 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 597. 
Zeitschrift fiir Geschichtslehre, Rechts- II, his version of the metaphysical diwissenschaft, 
1815, Band I, 278. chotomy of body and soul, 112; his view 
—, II, and PUCHTA, considered juridical of an adequate Wesensschau, 488; dis

 

201SCHELLING 

tinguishes between pure logic and pureaxiology, through the influence of DILTHEY 
; the contents of the emotional acts 
of valuation; the a-priori is the whole ofall the units of signification and sentences 
given in an immediate intuition oftheir essence; the origin of the differences 
between essences is in the things inwhich they appear as universal or individual; 
feelings also have their own apriori content, 545; the a-priori is pureand immediate experience; the a-posteriori 
is dependent on the senses, 546; only 
in the coalescence of the intended anthe given can we become aware of thecontent of phenomenal experience, 570;
his view of the absolutely individual character 
of truth; he accuses Neo-Kantianism 
of subjectivism : its totality of thecosmos is only a subjective idea; the cosmos 
has not actually been given us, 585;
he individualizes and personalizes Hus-
SERL'S transcendental consciousness, 587; 
truth is held to be individual; his viewof cosmic reality; microcosm and macrocosm; 
the personal correlate of themacrocosm, 588; the idea of God; everyunity of the world without an essentialregression to a personal God is a contradictory 
hypothesis; MALEBRANCHE influenced 
this period of SCHELER; God'sconcrete revelation can only make usexperience the Idea of God; from this hefinds his way to an inter-individualessential community of persons foundedin their communion with God as the 
correlate of the macrocosm; all "othercommunities of a moral or juridicalcharacter" have this possible communion 
with the personal God for theirfoundation, 589; his idea of God and thatof "person" are neo-Scholastic metaphysical; 
God is the "Person of all persons"
and subject to the same "essential phenomenological 
law-conformities"; the essential 
individuality of a human personality 
must be distinguished from an in-
individual "I-ness" which pre-supposes a"thou", a "body", and an "outer world";
personality is hypostatized above its "I-
ness"; object and Gegenstand are identified; 
this is neo-Scholasticism, 590; in thefinal stage of his thought SCHELER abandoned the Christian religion; individuality 
is the absolute pre-requisite in the"concrete essential structure" of human 
experience, i.e. in the transcendental horizon 
of experience, which is at the sametime the transcendent religious horizonto SCHELER'S metaphysics, which is anirrationalistic standpoint; thus individuality 
is ultimately elevated above the law,
cf. BLONDEL, 591; his Idea of God is a deusex machina to pave the way to a macro-
cosmic experience and avoid solipsism;
he shows affinity with LIEBNIZ' "verites"
eternelles"; he speaks of all "possibleworlds" and "all possible personalities",
and in so doing he tries to hypostatize the 

theoretical transcendental horizon of our 
human experience of reality; his Idea of
a phenomenological possibility of the being
of God as the "person of all persons" is
nothing but a manifestation of human hybris; 
the contrast between a micro and


a macro-cosm is unserviceable in Christian 
philosophy, it can be traced back to
to Greek philosophy, PHILo, etc. and it
passed into medieval Scholasticism, 592;
and Humanism; according to SCHELER
man is the personal correlate of an absolutely 
individual cosmos; his idea of
God, 593; and the societal structure of
the individuality of human experience,
594 ; his "intuition of the essence" gives
us the essence in an a-symbolical way,
595; the actual datum of what is intended
in the immediate evidence of intuition is 
above the contrast true-false; SPINOZA'S
dictum quoted : "truth is its own criterion 
and that of falsehood"; an inquiry
after a criterion is only meaningful if the
matter has not been given itself but only
its symbol, 597.


—, III, 
Lehre von den drie Tatsachen, 53;
Introduction to the collective Work : Versuche 
zu einer Soziologie des Wissens,


289. 
—, III, his view of the copy theory ofnaïve experience; he protests against theviews that consider natural things in ournaïve experience as the products of atheoretical synthesis; but he gets no further 
than a somewhat impressionistic
image of the plastic horizon, 53 ; he thinks
that all the objects given in natural observation 
are given as singular and individual 
"Gegenstande"; but this is an abstraction, 
54 ; he transformed some ideas
of LEIBNIZ' monadology in an irrationalistic 
dynamical sense; NEWTON'S influence


on SCHELER, 70. 


SCHELLING, I, 
Vorlesungen fiber die Methode des academischen 
Studiums, 471. 
—, I, his speculative nature philosophy;
mechanical necessity and creative freedom; 
their dialectial union; Volksgeist;
historical consciousness; in a work 
of art the tension between necessity
and freedom is reconciled ultimately,


208 the development in the conception
of the Idea continues its course in dialectical 
tension, also in SCHELLING, 329; aesthetic 
irrationalism, the morality of genius, 
"the beautiful soul", dug itself a
wide channel in the most recent philosophy 
of life by way of SCHELLING, 465;
SCHELLING'S organological Idealism provided 
the equipment for the view of the
Historical School with its doctrine of the 
unconscious growth of culture, 469; he
became the leader against formalistic
transcendental Idealism; the "intellectual
intuition" comprehends the absolute totality 
of meaning by a single all-embra



 

SCHELTEMA, H. W.

.sing glance; SCHELLING appeals to a method 
of genius for scientific insight, 471;
by a speculative method of an intuitive
grasp of the absolute, all attention is
drawn to the individual disclosure of the 
"Spirit", of the "Idea", 472.
—, II, 
System des transzendentalen Idealismus,


278. 
—, II, his idea of a hidden law of Providence 
as the foundation of history and
giving its coherence; his transcendental
Idealism, 232; his romantic Idealism; nature 
as the "werdender Geist"; nature and 
history are at bottom identical, 278; he
aimed at a new aesthetical culture as the 
goal of history, 278; his Humanistic cosmonomic 
Idea, 593.
—, III, organological view of a "Gemeinschaft" 
adopted by 'NINNIES, 186; his concept 
of "spiritual organism" influenced.
the German Historical School, e.g. GIERKE, 
TONNIEs, 245; his use of the term 
"organism", 406; his idea of totality and
that of HANS DRIESCH, 748, 749. 
SCHELTEMA, H. W., III, 
Beschouwingen over de vooronderstelingen 
van ons denken over recht en staat,


383. 
SCHERER, R. VON, III, 

Handbuch des Kirchenrechtes, 313. 

SCHICHTENTHEORIE, II, of NIC. HARTMANN, 
19. 
—, III, of NICOLAI HARTMANN influenced 

WOLTERECK, 762. 

SCHILLER, I, 

Die Rduber, 453; 

Kallias Letters to KOrner, 1793, 463. 
—, I, his modern Humanist aestheticism 

was ruled by the motive of nature andfreedom, 123; his "Riiuber" says: the lawhas not yet formed a single great man,
but freedom has, 452; his aesthetic Humanism 
is the embodiment of the irrationalistic 
and aesthetic conception ofthe personality ideal within the formallimits of transcendental Idealism, in the 
Idea of the "Beautiful Soul"; the basic 
denominator of the modal aspect is shifted 
to the aesthetic aspect viewed exclusively 
from its individual subject-side;
"beauty is freedom in appearance" (phenomenon) 
; the fulness of human personality 
and of the cosmos becomes evidentin the aesthetic play-drive; man is reallyman when he is playing, when the conflict 
in him between sensuous nature and 
rational moral freedom is silent; KANT'Srigorous morality holds only for immature 
man; but in the "Beautiful Soul" 

(463) nature is so much ennobled thatit does good out of natural impulse; thisrefined stage is the fruit of education,
464; in SCHILLER'S more mature periodaesthetic irrationalism was still held 
within the limits of transcendental Idealism, 
465. 
202 

--, II, his doctrine, 278; the reconciliation 
of mind and sensibility, of freedom
and nature, in fine art; this aesthetic Idea 
was to replace KANT'S moralistic homo
noumenon, 278. 


SC HILLING, III, 
Naturrecht und Staat nach die Lehre der 
alten Kirche, 230, 424. 
—, III, his misrepresentation of the Stoic
theory of the uncorrupted natural state,
230; his interpretation of the Stoic and
patristic theories of the State and of absolute 
natural law, 424. 


SCHLEGEL, FRIEDRICH, III, 
Lucinde, 318. 
—, III, his Romantic ideal of free love in 
its high-minded harmony of sexual sensuality 
and spiritual surrender, 318. 


SCHLEIERMACHER, II, 
Dial., 443. 


SCHLICK, M., II, 
criticized MACH and AVENARIUS for having
ignored the analytical qualification of the
principle of logical economy, 123. 


SCHLOSSMANN, II, 
Subjective rights, 397. 


SCHMALENBACH, HERMANN, I, 
Leibniz, 229. 
—, I, wrongly sought the root of LEIBNIZ'S
arithmeticism in "Calvinistic religiosity",


229. 
--, III, shares TROELTSCH'S and WEBER'S 
views concerning the individualistic character 
of Calvinism, 247. 
SCHMITT, CARL, III, 
Verfassungslehre, 383;
Nazionalsozialismus und Rechtsstaat, 431. 
--, III, expressed the relativistic destruction 
of the entire ideology of the State
founded in the Humanistic faith in reason; 
his view of statute law, 383. 


SCHMITT, FRANCIS O., III, 
Erforschung der Feinstruktur tierischer
Gewebe mit Hilfe der ROntgenstraleninterferenz-
Methoden, 726. 
--, irradiation of nervous tissue, 726. 


SCHMIDT, P. W., II, 
Die geheime Jugendweihe eines australischen 
ITrstamms, 317. 


SCHMIDT, RICHARD, III, 
.Allgemeine Staatslehre, 382.
—, III, "modern political theory emancipates 
itself from the speculative view; it
leaves alone the metaphysical question
about the Idea of the State and restricts 
itself to the empirical world", 382. 


SCHMIDT, W., III, 
Die Stellung der PygmaenvOlker in der
Entwicklungsgeschichte der Menschheit,
331, 332, 333; 
VOlker und Kulturen, 334, 338, 341, 357, 
361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366. 
--, III, refuted the evolutionist theory of 



203 SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 

marriage, 331; among pygmean peoplesmonogamy is the rule; pygmies are amongthe oldest extant representatives of thehuman race, 332; matriarchy in FurtherIndia, Malay and North-America, 338;
matriarchy and polyandry among the In'
dian -Nayar castle, 341; secret men's societies 
as a reaction against matriarchalorganization, 349; the sib chieftain embodies 
the magic power of the clan; thefamily bond has the leading role also intotemistic clans; clan mates refuse tofight each other in case of an inter-clanwar, 
. 357; among the andamanese theweapons of excited men are sometimestaken away, 361; division of labour isadapted to the difference between manand woman, 362; boys are forbidden toobey their mothers; men's societies wereoriginally aristocratically organized associations, 
363; they impose secrecy ontheir members at the peril of their lives;
"Vehmgerichte"; cruelty at initiation;
ancestor worship; skull cult and feasts,
364 ; men's clubs are : resistance organizations to woman, rule: in matriarchal cultures; 
the political structure takes thelead in men's clubs, 365; men's unionsare a political reaction in the old matriarchal 
culture; their divergent forms aredenaturations; at the culmination of theirpower these unions were a "state withinthe state"; a secret power opposing thelegal power of the chief and his council;
they deprived the latter of their powerand made propaganda outside of theirown sib; they opposed European influence 
and guarded their tradition; laterthey submitted to the faith and cult struc


ture implied in them; or they became

differentiated organizations, 366. 

SCHOLASTICISM, II, Augustinian, 9; in 
HUSSERL'S method, 17; the ens realissimum; 
the highest of the transcendentalia,
20; on being, 20, 21 ; AUGUSTINUS, THOMAS, 
DUNS SCOTUS, AVICENNA, ALBERTUS MAGNUS, 
21; universal determinations of 
being, 21; on analogical concepts, 55; onthe faculty of imagination, 514, . 515; ALBERT 
OF SAXONY, SUAREZ, on the a priori,

542. 
SCHOOL, THE, III, a school is a differentiated 
organized community of a typicaltuitionary character; historically foundedand morally qualified; the moral function 
is typically focussed on the formativeness 
of the community; comradeshipamong pupils; mutual attachment between 
masters and pupils; educationaldifferentiation is determined by the instructional 
tasks of the different schools,
287; they prepare for functions in freesociety and in .State and Church; ancientand modern state education rejected; thecommunal sense acquired in the familycircle is the deepest temporal sounding-

board to which any other education to acommunal sense has to appeal, 288. 

SCHOOL-LIFE, III, moral bonds amongtachers and pupils; different types ofschool, 287. 

SCHOONENBERG, P., S.J., III,

Een gesprek met de Wijsbegeerte der

Wetsidee, 73. 

SCHOPENHAUER, I, his treatise concerningthe fourfold root of the principle of sufficient 
ground is practically a faithful reproduction 
of CRUSIUS' schema, 340; influenced 
NIETSCHE'S first period, 465.
—, II, his cosmonomic Idea, 593. 

SCHREIER, FRITZ, II, 

Grundbegriffe undGrundformen des 
Rechts, 343.
—, II, his pure theory of Law; only yielded 
in eidetic juridical logic, 342; hisfour fundamental legal concepts; legaltheory turned into mathematics, 342; ajuridical norm is an exact law, on a levelwith the laws of mathematics, 343. 

SCHULTHESS-RECHBERG, III, 

Luther, Zwingli, und Calvin in ihren An


sichten fiber das Verhaltnis von Staat 

und kirche, 518. 

SCHULZE, GOTTLIEB ERNST, I, was oriented 
to HUME's psychologistic criticism andattacked REINHOLD'S theory, 413. 

SCHURTZ, H., III, 

Alterklassen und Mfinnerbiinde, 363, 365.
the origin of men's societiesamong primitive tribes is the "dichotomy

of the sexes"; this view is refuted, 365. 

SCIENCE, I, depreciated by ROUSSEAU, 67;
special science in RICKERT, 130. 
—, III, as the self-transillumination of

the human mind, according to LITT, 249,250; and culture; and the State, 488, 489;

science as an integrating factor, a concrete 
social phenomenon; science is logically 
qualified, 592, 594; and materiallydifferentiated, 597. 

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY, I, the philosophy 
of a special science examines the philosophical 
pre-suppositions of this sciencein the light of a total theoretical vision oftemporal reality, which vision is ruledby the transcendental basic Idea and thebasic motive; the supposed independenceof special science with regard to philosophy; 
its historical arguments, 545; Modern 
Humanism recognizes this claim toindependence on the part of specialscience; HANS DRIESCH opposes this view,
546; epistemology being orientated to the"Factum" (or the "Fieri", as the Neo-
Kantians say) there is no possibility ofindependent philosophical critique ofmethod and constructions in mathematical 
natural science; philosophy does notguide but it follows special science; thelatter is taken to be neutral, 547; RICKERT 
and LITT; the need of an integral empirical 
method in philosophic investigations; 
no science is able to investigate a 


SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 204 

specific modal aspect "with closed shut- turn theory reduced NEWTON'S physicalters" toward all the other modalities, 548; conception to 'a mere marginal instance;
philosophic and scientific thought in ma- PLANCK, HEISENBERG; radio activity;
thematics and its problems; "pure ma- MACH and OSWALD oppose the acceptancethematics", 549; mathematics is not a of real atoms and light waves and try"fait accompli", not a "factum"; a theo- to resolve the physical concept of cauretical 
scientist will maintain, perhaps, sality into a purely mathematical conceptthat he only works with technical con- of function, because of their positivistcepts 
and methods not implying philoso- sensualistic standpoint in philosophy,
phical or religious pre-suppositions, 550; 557; the principle of logical economy inbut behind such concepts and methods the positivist and empirico-critical senseare hidden very positive philosophical of MACH and AVENARIUS is not the onlypostulates; e.g. the principle of "logical criterion in physics; the discussion abouteconomy" and fictions not corresponding causality (PLANCK, v. LAUE, LENARD, andto the "states of affairs", 551; behind the SCHRODINGER, HEISENBERG, JORDAN), 558;
so-called "non-philosophical" positivist science pre-supposes a theorical view ofstandpoint is hidden a philosophical view reality; B. BAVINK holds natural scienceof reality which cannot be neutral with to be autonomous with respect to philosorespect 
to faith and religion; the mask of phy; he overlooks that physics has elimineutrality 
and the mischief done by the nated the naïve view of reality, 559; intechnical pragmatic conception of scien- BAVINK'S view the physical world is optific 
thought; difference between the con- posed to human thought as "a world incept of an individuality structure and the itself"; he considers "nature" to be "ra-
modal concept of function; in a modal tional" in its deepest foundation; this isaspect we can distinguish the general like "critical realism", 560; but physicalfunctional coherence of individual func- reality cannot be comprehended aparttions of things, events, social relations, from a subjective insight into the mutualetc., 552; structural differences are only relation and coherence of the modalitiesto be understood in terms of typical in- within the cosmic temporal order; phydividuality 
structures; examples taken sical phenomena have an objective ana-
from the jural modus, and from the phy- logon in the sensory ones, they must besical aspect, 553; a tree, an animal, an subjectively interpreted in scientificatom, a molecule, a cell, have physical- thought and thereby logically opened; 
chemical functions but other functions the experimental method is one of isolaas 
well: they are typical individuality tion and abstraction; it is pointed to the

structures, 554; under the influence of the solution of theoretical questions whichpositivistic view of the task of science the scientist himself has raised and for-
and in keeping with the continuity postu- mulated, 561; modern physics rests onlate, the concept of function was used to epistemological pre-suppositions that_
eradicate the modal diversity, and the have been generally accepted since thetypical structures of individuality were days of GALILEO and NEWTON ; but theyerased; e.g. in "pure theory of law", and imply a purely quantitative and function"
pure economics" modal functional and alistic view of reality which became thetypical structural views are confused; the content of the Humanistic rationalisticAustrian School of economics; KELSEN'S science-ideal; the appeal to "reality" inReine Rechtslehre, 555; the absolutization scientific investigations is never freeof the functionalist viewpoint is not neu- from a philosophical and religious pretral 
with respect to philosophy or to reli- judice; RANKE said that historical sciencegion, but is the fruit of a Nominalist view has only to establish how the events haveOf science; the positivist school of ERNST really happened; but the word "really" 
MACH; and of the Vienna School; is ambiguous: in historical science we do 
DRIESCH'S "conception" of "organic life" not grasp an event in its full reality, onlyas an "entelechy"; WOLTERECK'S concep- in a particular aspect, 562 ; it pre-suption 
of organic life as a material living poses a theoretical view of reality of asubstance (matrix) with an outer _mate- philosophical character; Historicism; therial constellation and an inner side of Historical School; the view of the State 
life experience; are examples of the ille- in which the latter is identified with itsgitimate introduction of a specific strut- historical aspect of power, 563 ; biologytural concept of individuality as a func- offers many examples of a functionalistictional one; in modern times psychology view of reality; evolutionism; holism;
and the cultural sciences have reacted mechanists and neo-vitalists; DRIESCH 
against the complete domination of the denied that organic life can be reducedfunctionalistic science-ideal, mainly from to a physical-chemical constellation ofthe irrationalistic antipode; empirical matter, and proclaimed it to be a realityscience depends on the typical structures in itself, an immaterial entelechy; thisof individuality, 556; twentieth century was an "immaterial substance" and thephysics abandoned its classic functional- result of a new absolutization; holismistic concept of causality, matter, physi- wanted to conquer DRIESCH'S dualism bycal space and time; relativity and quan- a conception of structural totality; but 


205 SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 


holism fell back on a functionalism that 
construed the whole of a living organismby levelling its different aspects; anyspecial science has to solve the problemconcerning the limits of its field of research 
and the modal structure of this 
aspect; empirical phenomena have asmany modal aspects as human experience 
has; only the theoretical Gegenstand 
relation gives rise to fundamentaldivisions of the non-logical fields and tothe philosophical problems implied; inthe empirical phenomena the inter-modalcoherence is realized and the typicalstructures of individuality can only bestudied in their empirical realization;
philosophy can, therefore, not ignore theresults of special scientific research, 565;
philosophy cannot be restricted to theproblems implied in the special sciences,
since it has also to give an account of thedata of naïve experience; Christian philosophy 
and science should mutually penetrate; 
the modern Humanistic division 
between science and philosophy cannotbe maintained, 566. 

SCOTUS, JOHN DUNS, I, 
De Rerum Principio, 186;
Opus Oxioniense, 186.
—, I, a more consistent realist than THo-
MAS, held to the primacy of the will; hisdoctrine of the potestas Dei absoluta, 185;
this potestas absoluta was distinguishedfrom the postestas Dei ordinata andbound to the unity of God's holy being

(essence) ; the lex aeterna originates inthis Essence; absolute truth and goodness 
are grounded in the Divine Being;
this potestas cannot have any Nominalistic 
purport, 186.
—, II, 
Quaestiones sup. Metaph., I, IV, q. 1., ---


21. 
—, II, on being, 21. 
SCRIPTURES, THE, II, Reveal God's act of 
creation; appeal to our religious root ofexistence; tell us about man's place inthe cosmos; the fall into sin, redemption, 
52. 

SCULPTURE, III, its structure, 111 ff.; it is 
an enkapsis, 111; its objective implicitlyintended vital function, 117; ARISTOTLE'S 
failure to account for its reality, 126; asculptor has to open the natural structureof the material, 126. 

SEA-HOG'S EGGS, III, DRIESCH'S experiments, 
735, 753. 

SECONDARY QUALITIES, III, these qualitieswere adduced as an argument to refutenaïve experience, 36, 37; in LOCKE; MULLER'S 
specific energies of the sense organs, 
39. 

SECONDARY RADICAL TYPES, III, of art, 110. 

SECRET MEN'S SOCIETIES, III, the so-called 
"Mannerbunde"; are under the leading of 

a political structure; the skull-cult; initiation 
rites for boys, according to LOEB;
ancestor worship; Vehmgerichte; crueltyat initiation, 363-366. 

SECTARIAN CONVENTICLES, III, were favoured 
by LUTHER'S theory of the Church,

513. 
SECTION. II, "section" in the system ofrational numbers is the "irrational" function 
of number, which can never be 
counted off in finite values in accordance 
with the Archimedean principle, 90. 

SECTS, III, in TROELTSCH and WEBER sects 
are viewed as independent sociological 
types, 527, 528, 529, 530; they nearly 
always arise through the fault of theChurch, according to KUYPER, 532 ; theyas a rule approach the institutionalchurch in the second and third generations, 
534. 

SECULAR GOVERNMENT AND THE CHURCH, 
III, secular authority in the Church, according 
to THOMASIUS, 517. 

SECULARIZATION, I, of Nominalism by JOHNOF JANDUN, and MARSILIUS VAN PADUA, 188, 

190. 
SECULARIZATION OF POLITICAL CONVICTION, 
III, is furthered by ignoring the ultimatefundamental questions of belief; this factjustifies Christian party formation, 624. 

SEGMENTARY AND ORGANIC TYPES, III, of 
social forms, in DURKHEIM, 175. 

SEIGNORIAL RIGHTS, II, in the Netherlands,

236. 
SEIN UND SOLLEN, III, in modern politicaltheory, 385; this dualism of Neo-Kantianism 
is criticized by HERMANN HELLER, 388:
and accepted by SIEGFRIED MARCK, 401. 

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS, I, as absolutely free

ego in FICHTE, 414. 

—, II, cosmological self-consciousness,
473 ; unity of self-consciousness, andKANT'S synthesis, 494, 495; cosmic andcosmological self-consciousness, logicized 
in KANT, 498; KANT'S definition,
500; he excludes sensibility, 501; itsunity; the cogito in KANT, 519; andthe self, according tot HEIDEGGER, 523;
HEIDEGGER'S interpretation of KANT on the 
finite ego in the transcendental unity ofself-consciousness, 528; KANT did not conceive 
the transcendental unity of self-consciousness 
to be sensible, 535; not a singleaspect transcends self-consciousness, 539;
cosmic and cosmological self-consciousness, 
540, 541; pre-theoretical and theoretical 
experience rooted in self-consciousness, 
560; cosmic self-consciousness and 
the selfhood, 562; and the knowledge ofGod, 562; this self-knowledge and theknowledge of God restores the subjectiveperspective of human experience, 563; itstranscendent freedom, 574; man's self



 

SELFHOOD 206 

consciousness becomes more and more 
individual; his individuality has a sociotal 
structure, 594. 

SELFHOOD, I, is supposed to be reducibleto an immanent subjective pole ofthought, 6; as pure actuality in SCHELER,

111. 
—, II; in HEIDEGGER: finite; its essence is 
historical time, 524, 525; only in theoretical 
abstraction HEIDEGGER holds realityto be accessible to the selfhood, 527 ; hisself is the origin and identical with time;
our self and time, 531; his "existential" 
time is not "cosmic time", 531; the transcendence 
of the religious selfhood abovetime, 535; sensory phenomena and theselfhood, and cosmic time, 539; the transcendental 
phenomenological subject orego, 543; the subjective a-priori of theintentional content of the acts, 544;
intersubjectivity of egos as mentalmonads, 545, cf. 549 ; the absolute transcendental 
subject is an absolutization,
546; the religious root of human existence, 
549; our selfhood is under the law,
552; intermodal synthesis and selfhood,
554 ; the transcendent horizon of the selfhood, 
560; the individual ego has beenintegrated into the religious selfhood andself-consciousness, 562; man in his fullselfhood transcends the temporal earthlycosmos in all its aspects and partakes oftranscendent root of this cosmos, 593.
—, III, is the individual religious centre ofhuman existence and experience; this

existence is a "stare extra se", 6. 

SELF-KNOWLEDGE, I, we do not possessreal self-knowledge in the transcendental-
logical concept of the thinking ego, ac


cording to KANT, 54 ; depends on knowledge 
of God, 55. 

SELF-REFLECTION, I, philosophy cannotdo without critical self-reflection; rvarOii 
aeatirdv , know thyself; how is selfreflection 
possible, if it does not transcendthe concept, and we cannot think in atheoretical sense 'without conceptual determination, 
5; self-reflection pre-supposes 
that our ego directs its reflectingact of thought toward itself; in this actphilosophical thought finally transcendsits own limits, 7; the way of self-reflection 
is the only way leading to thediscovery of the true starting-point oftheoretical thought, 51; the concentric direction 
of this thought, necessary for critical 
self-reflection, must spring from theego as the individual centre of humanexistence, 55 ; the selfhood gives this central 
direction to theoretical thought byconcentrating on the true, or on a pretended 
absolute Origin of all meaning; self-
knowledge is in the last analysis dependent 
on the knowledge of God ; a real account 
of the fact is only given in the Biblical 
Revelation of man as the image ofGod, 55; critical self-reflection started by 

LOCICE concerning the root of the science-
ideal, 271; it went no further than theidea of the sovereign personality, 500.
—, II, intuitive self-reflection on the modalities 
and theoretical synthesis; the modal 
aspects are our own and do not transcend 
the self; they refer to the selfhood;
in the foundational direction there is no 
free synthesis; analysis remains at restin the synthesis of the given; enstatic Erleben 
of individuality structures; Hineinleben, 
474 ; Erleben lacks theoretical insight 
into modalities; conscious Erleben,
or intuition, 475; our experience of identity, 
500; in phenomenology, 544; FICHTEand HUSSERL, 549; radical religious self-
reflection, 550; and the access to the intermodal 
synthesis, 554 ; HUSSERL followsDESCARTES' solipsist selfreflection, 584. 

SELF-FEELING, II, is psychological phe


nomenon which manifests itself in a con


centric direction to the ego; but the ego

escapes every attempt to grasp it in a

psychological view, 115. 

SELF-SUFFICIENCY, I, of philosophicalthought, 12, 14 ; is an absolutization ofmeaning, 20; of philosophic thought,
within its own field, 20, 22, 23. 
—, II, this postulate cannot be epistemo


logically accounted for; it forces its

religious a-priori on us in the disguise

of a "pure theory", 492. 
SELF-SURRENDER, I, absolute self-surrender

is religion, 58. 

SEMEN RELIGIONIS, II, has been preservedin the human heart thanks to God's gratiacommunis; and in many apostate religions 
important remnants of the originalWord-Revelation have been retained, 311. 

SEMI-MANUFACTURES, III, e.g. planks, 131,

132. 
SEMON, III, "mnemism", 733. 
SENECA, I, shows a theological preference
for theoretical philosophy of nature, 539.


II, 

Epist., 102 (Lib. XVIII, 2), -- 392;
De Benef., 3, 20 ff, — 411.
—, II, on slavery, 411, 412.


—, III, 
Epist. 102 (bib. XVII,2), 227.
—, III, developed the idea of an uncorrupted 
natural state as a society under


the leadership of the best and not as an
aggregate of a-social individuals, 229, 230


(note). 


SENENSIUS, PETRUCCIUS, III, On "universitas", 
233. 
SENSATIONS, II, are distinguished from


feelings in psychology, 116. 


of movement, 112; feeling, 347; sensory
SENSIBILITY, II, in the sensory experience 



 

20 7SIB (OR CLAN) 

imagination, and objectivity, 425; pure"sensibility" in KANT, 495. 

SENSORIUM DEI, II, in NEWTON'S thought,

96. 
SENSORY IMAGES, II, of movement, 168.

, III, there is no logical identity in

sensory impressions as such; they do

not furnish a logical foundation for the

application of the fundamental logical

norms to a judgment, 450; are not pre


ponderant in naive experience, but anti


cipate the symbolical aspect; their de


grees of clarity, 38; qualitative and mo


dal differences between sensations, in

HELMHOLZ, 43 ; MULLER'S law, 44 ; sensa


tions are signs, according to RIEHL, 45;

symbols, 46; RIEHL rehabilitates the

sensory aspect of experience, 47, 48. 

SENSORY PICTURE, II, of the destruction of 
a cultural area by some natural catastrophe 
is perceived as a disaster, a cala


mity, 379. 
SENSUALISM, I, Nominalistic sensualism 


in MARIUS NIZOLIUS, 244. 


SERTILLANGES, A. D., O.P., III,


S. Thomas d'Aquin, 12. 
SERVET, M., III, CALVIN'S struggle against
SERVET'S pantheism, 72. 

SERVITUTES, II, praediorum rusticorumcompared with servitutes praediorum ur


banorum, 426. 
SET-THEORY, II, CANTOR'S set-theory, cri


ticized by SKOLEM, 340. 


SEVERIJN, Dr., III, 
Ernst Troeltsch over de betekenis van het 


Calvinisme voor de Cultuurgeschiedenis,


531. 
SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, I,
Pyrrhonic Hypotyposes, 275;

Adv. Math. 7, 16; 275, 536.
—, I, "being is appearance"; this Pyrrhonic 
scepticism had the ultimate intentionof denying every criterion of truth; itwas adopted by HUME and BERKELEY; in1718 SEXTUS EMPIRICUS' work was published 
in a Latin translation, in 1725 in aFrench version, ascribed to 'HUART, 275;
he states that the first explicit division ofphilosophy into ethica, physica, and logica, 
was made by a pupil of PLATO'S,

XENOCRATES, 536. 

SEXUAL INTERCOURSE, III, was at first ,promiscuous, 
according to BACHOVEN, 331;
sexual communism instead of individual 
marriage is nowhere to tie found, accor


ding to LOWIE, 332. 

SEXUAL PROPAGATION, II, an original typeof biotic modal individuality of meaning,

its substrata Aisplay anticipatory types ofmeaning individuality, 424. 

SHAFTESBURY, I, sought the ethical facul


ty in the moral sentiment, 338; ethics is 

psychologically and aesthetically grounded 
in the "feeling of beauty", 339; heconverted the Humanistic personality-
ideal irrationalistically into that of theaesthetic morality of genius and turnedagainst every supra-individual norm andlaw; true morality consists in a harmonious, 
aesthetic self-realization of thetotal individuality; this was his transformation 
of the Greek ideal of kalokagathon; 
virtuosity is the highest disclosureof the sovereign personality in SHAFTESBURY'S 
thought; not a single power andinstinctve tendency is allowed to languish; 
they are all brought into harmonyby means of a perfect life, and therebythe welfare of the individual as well as 
of society is realized; the source of moralknowledge is in the subjective dephts ofindividual feeling, 462; morality isbrought under a subjective and aestheticbasic denominator; the morally good isthe beautiful in the world of practicalvolition and action; the good, like thebeautiful, is harmonious unity in the manifold; 
it is the object of an original approbation 
rooted in the deepest of man'sbeing: taste is the basic faculty for both

ethics and aesthetics, 463.


—, II, his aestheticism, 276. 
SHAPERS OF HISTORY, II, CAESAR, GALILEO,
REMBRANDT, LUTHER, CALVIN, 243, 244;
and historical economy, 286. 


SHELL-LIME, III, as an enkaptic structuraltotality; it possesses a typical embracing 

form totality, 702. 
SIB (OR CLAN), III, organized communitybut with an undifferentiated qualifica


tion; kinship in it is usually unilateral;
maternal or paternal.; it is not patriarchalor matriarchal; patrilinear sibs are calledgentes among the Romans, 353 ; LowIE'serror, 354 [cf. s.v. LowiE] common descent 
is a fiction; the sib or clan is notfound at the lowest level of primitive cultures, 
but the conjugal family and kinship 
community are found, 354; sibs areoften very large; they cannot exist without 
comprising a considerable part of thenatural kinship; members must be bornin the sib; there is sometimes adoption;
the sib is dominated by the family mind;
once a sibmate always a sibmate; the ruleof clan-exogamy : sibmates must not marry 
with each other; such a marriage isincest, 355; the sib is a peace relationshipbetween sibmates; it executes the vendetta; 
this testifies to the presence of apolitical structure interwoven in the sib;
the sib-chieftain leads ritual and is a magician; 
the sib encloses a business, orpnization 
in agriculture or in hunting;
totemistic clans are centres of mana be1ief, 
etc., '356; the leading-structure in thesib is the family bond; what structuresare combined in it depends on societalconditions; clans are extremely changeable 
units; common descent is a fiction, 


 

SIDGWICK, N. V.208 

357; sibs have a leading structural principle, 
not a leading function; its collective 
responsibility in case of a blood-
guilt; the leading structural principle isthe unilateral family bond, 358; this is aparallel to the relation between fosterparents and their foster child; adoptionof a child incorporates it into either thefather's or the mother's clan; the fiction 
of common descent proves the supra-arbitrary 
nature of the clan's structuralprinciple; its foundation is a power organization, 
359; sibs are not economically 
founded; their foundation is a powerorganization uniting the power of thesword, that of faith, economic power, etc.
in an undifferentiated total structure, 360. 

SIDGWICK, N. V., III, 

The Electronic Theory of Valence, 700. 

SIEVERS, E., II, modern phonology, 224. 

SIGER OF BRABANT, I, an Averroist ; disrupted 
Christian faith and Aristotelian metaphysics, 
260. 

SIGNIFYING, II, HUSSERL considers it as a 
psychical act which can only intend thelinguistic meaning but belongs as such topsychology; but the intending and signifying 
function is not identical with anact; the change in the intentional meanings 
of symbols is adapted to the culturaldevelopment by virtue of the inner structural 
moment of lingual formation; thereference of the symbol to what is signified 
is made only via the meaning inten


tion and subjective signifying, 226. 
SIGNS, I, have universality in BERKELEY,

273. 
—, III, like OCCAM, RIEHL distinguishes
arbitrary and natural signs, 45. 
SIGWART, II, 
Logik, 442, 444. 

SILICO SKELETONS, III, 774. 

SILICO LATTICES, III, 773. 

SIMILARITY, III, in the culture of different 
peoples are not due to derivation, 332,


333. 
SIMMEL, GEORG, I, 
Hauptprobleme der Philosophie, 127.
---, I, philosophy is "a temperament seen
through the picture of the world", 127.
—, II, 
Soziologie, 210;
Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie,


211, 212; 
Der Fragmentcharakter des Lebens, 212;
Logos, Band V, 212.
—, II, his form-matter scheme in sociology; 
geometrical form used to distinguish 
formal sociology from material social 
sciences, 210; social forms are a 
priori conditions in the historicalpsychical life of social individuals, aselements of socety. Society is theirsynthesis; psychical interaction is the 

fundamental social category; was 
SIMMEL'S material historical?, 210; forni 
and content scheme; his Neo-Kantian 
scheme for the epistemology of history;
the individualizing view of reality as "objective 
mind", 211; theoretical cognitiveand non-theoretical cognitive forms; hecannot differentiate between sociology,
history; cultural sciences, 212; on history, 
252.
—, III, 
tuber soziale Differenzierung, 242;
Soziologie, 242. 
—, III, his concept "social form", 172; onthe unity of societal communities, 241;
he is the "father" of the formalistic school 
of sociology; the true realities in societyare the separate individuals; the conceptof society vanishes; an organism is aunity because of the interaction betweenenergies of its organs being more intensethan that with any exterior being, 242. 

SIMON, SAINT, I, tried to combine Restoration 
historical thought with the naturalistic 
scientific view of the Enlightenment, 
transforming into the rationalisticIdea of progress the irrationalistic ideaof development of Romanticism and theHistorical School; his school started a 
positivistic sociology, 209.
—, II, his positivistic view of culture, 200;
his view of worldhistory, 269.
—, III, 
Oeuvres de St. Simon et d'Enfantin, 455. 
—, III, society is an organism, 163; theconstitution of the state is of secondaryimportance, 452; economical factors in"civil society" gave rise to authority andsubordination; property is the origin ofclass-distinctions; authority belongs tothe ruling classes; the natural scientificmethod in sociology, 453 ; politics willturn into economics; government into theadministration of common interests; theState will vanish, 455. 

SIMPLICITY, II, Classicist aesthetics was 
guided by the science ideal and by analysis 
penetrated to the functional character 
of aesthetic meaning. It discovered
modal analogies in the aesthetic sphere:
unity in multiplicity, economy, simplicity
and clarity, frugality, 347. 


SIMPLICIUS, III, 
In Categorias Arist., 68 E, 227. 


SIN, I, wiped out the image of God, 4; the
possibility of sin ; sin as privatio; the law
of sin; a dynamis; there is no contradiction 
between creation and fall, 63; DESCARTES' 
explanation, 236; in LEIBNIZ' sin
is due to metaphysical imperfection, 237.
—, II, the curse of sin, 32 ; sin is not 
mere privatio; is sinful reality still meaning?, 
33; sin is both privation, and, positive, 
i.e. apostasy, a power; but not independent 
of the meaning character of
creation, 33 ; Common Grace, 33 ; world, 
flesh, and sin, 34 ; sin aid legal order, 



209 SOCIAL CATEGORIES (TRANSCENDENTAL) 

134; sin is not a counter power to creation, 
302; it is a disconcerting resistance,
35; sin and law in the opening-process,
335; 336; the fall into sin and our horizon 
of experience, 549. 

SIN AND MEANING, II, Sin is not merelyprivatio; it is also a positive guilty apostasy 
insofar as it reveals its power, derived 
from creation itself. Sinful realityremains apostate meaning under the lawand under the curse of God's 'wrath, 33. 

SIN AND THE STATE, III, the sword powerof the State is because of sin, 423. 

SINZHEIMER, HUGO, III, 

De Taak der Rechtssociologie, 577.

III, wants to prove that empirical sociology 
can study societal human relationships 
apart from any normative legalviewpoint; he adduces the figure of acriminal organization, 577. 

SI 02 FORMATIONS, III, of radiolaria, 108. 

SKOLEM, II, criticizes CANTOR'S set-theory,

340. 
SLAVERY, II, a human being can never bea juridical object; LACTANTIUS and SENECA
against slavery; the Christian Church opposed 
slavery indirectly, 411. 
SMEND, RUDOLPH, III, 

Der Staat als Integration, 259, 387;
Verfassung and Verfassungsrecht, 389,


400. 
--, III, applied LITT'S theory to the state,
considering the latter as a universal integrational 
system unified by subjectiveand objective factors; later he appealedto the state's functional territorial organization 
of power according to the historicist 
view, 259; he founded the Berlin 
School, and introduced the dialectical 
cultural scientific method in his Integrationslehre, 
387 ; the State is in a perpetualprocess of renewal, 389; State and laware two independent and different aspects 
of communal life, 399; State andlaw cohere but are self-contained provinces 
of spiritual life, 400. 

SNAIL. HOUSES, III, as objective structures,

774. 
SNOWDEN INCIDENT, PHILIP, III, and internal 
relations, 486. 

SOCIAL ASPECT, II, in STAMMLER, 16, 67; 
control, command, power, a modus ofsociality, 68; social individuality structures, 
69; convential and ceremonial economy; 
lingual expression and social contact, 
113; empathy, 113; social refers to 
human intercourse, 140, 141; sociality 
and history; forms of intercourse differ 
with time and place; social norms require 
positivizing formation, which is a 
historical retricipation ; forms of intercourse 
have meaning, a lingual retrocipation, 
227; in its closed structure history 
need not be signified to continue its 
course; closed social intercourse is in


evitably significant; social behaviour varies 
with time and place: there is a history 
a social intercourse; therefore intercourse 
is not history, 228. 

SOCIAL CATEGORIES (TRANSCENDENTAL), III,
are the conditions of systematic investigations; 
further distinctions should not be 
imposed on social structures in a subjective 
and a priori way, but as a result ofstructural investigation, 565; transcendental 
social categories do not pertain tothe ultimate genera embracing differentradical types, but refer to the transcendental 
societal categories in the plastichorizon : thing, event, enkaptic intertwinement, 
internal structural causality, etc.,
566; these categories are the links between 
the modal and the plastic dimension 
of the temporal order; they are notrelated to the metaphysical idea of being,
nor to the constitutive formative function 
of a transcendental subject of experience(Kantian or Husserlian) ; but to the modal 
and the plastic structures; the mostfundamental category is the correlationbetween communal and inter-communal 
or inter-individual relationships, whichare founded in the modal aspect of socialintercourse; the contrast between differentiated 
and undifferentiated social relationships 
is founded in the historicalaspect; the categories of natural and organized 
communities, institutional andnon-institutional relatonships impart a 

typical direction to primary categories 
towards individuality-structures; natural 
and institutional communities are sharply 
to be distinguished from free associations, 
567; differentiated and undifferentiated 
communities of an historical foundation 
are not essential to every society; 
there are non-institutional natural communities 
e.g., those founded in a neighbourhood 
in a vital spatial sense; in the 
genetical order historically founded communities 
are always preceded by naturalones; and institutional natural communities 
precede those of a non-institutionalcharacter; a differentiated society cannotexist without the stable foundation of institutional 
organized communities; theprimary condition of a society is its relative 
stability, 568 ; the categories of societal 
form and social interlacement are 
also transcendental, apart from their typical 
variable realization; the latter requires 
a genetic and an existential form;
these forms are the nodal points of enkaptical 
interlacement between societalrelationships of a different radical or adfferent geno-type; the category of voluntary 
associations is-not a genus proximum, 
569; the term "voluntary association" 
implies a close connection withhuman purposes; this category pertainsto the genetic form of organized communities 
which only originate in the freeindividualized and differentiated inter



 

SOCIAL CATEGORIES (TRANSCENDENTAL) 210 

personal relations, 570; the category ofsocietal form assumes a typical transcendental 
relation to a well defined categoryof societal individuality structures; TONNIES' 
category of "Gesellschaft" is theproduct of an individualizing and rationalizing process in the inter-individuaand inter-communal relations of societythe purposes pursued in these organizations are to be freely chosen and extremely varied, according to the variationof human needs in the process of cultura1 
disclosure, 571; the genetic forms constituting voluntary associations have an abstract character; purpose and means anust 
be indicated to relate them typically tothe organized community to be formedjuridically they imply a social compactwhich functions in the sphere of common 
private law; institutional organizedcommunities have priority over differentiated voluntary associations; voluntaryorganizations may be associatory orauthoritarian in form; the latter requirea labour contract or a contract of enrol 
ment to grant membership; such contracts are genetic forms constitutinga 
communal relation ; here voluntary associations may assume an indirectly compulsory character in their existentialforms; the contractual character of theirgenetic forms is a transcendental condition of differentiated voluntary associations, 572; a contract of association is acollective interindividual act of consen 
sus constituting a unified will of a wholebound to a common purpose; agreementsnot directed to the formation of volun 
tary organized communities do not constitute a unified will of a whole bound to 
a common purpose; TONNIES .holds all as 
sociatory bonds, in the "Gesellschaft" tobe based on the do ut des principle; BINDING 
and TRIEPEL called the genetic formof an association a Vereinbarung, i.e., aunifying act of the will; two parties haveopposite interests and aims; such a contract 
they held to be based on the principle 
of do ut des; these opinions are 
wrong; BINDER and TRIEPEL extend their 
concept "Vereinbarung" even to the parties 
in a law suit; but only voluntary associations 
are strictly bound to the genetic 
form of a "Vereinbarung", 573 ; theHumanist natural law doctrine was too 
one-sided; it assumed that institutional 
communities, too, could only arise fromindividualized inter-individual relations;
in modern society the genetic form ofmarriage is an agreement; this agreementis not sufficient in most countries to constitute 
a marriage; the natural law doctrine 
of the contractual genesis of a State

•

has been generally reliquished; the leading 
function of a voluntary association isnot identical with the purpose that itsfounders had in view; such a purposegives form to the internal structural principle 
and means the free choice of the 

type of association ; a modern mining industry 
has a supra arbitrary structure:
an historical (subjective-objective) organization 
of power comprising capital,
management, division and coordinationof labour; its genetic and existentialforms shape its internal relations as wellas its external relations in an enkapticinterlacement, 574; its internal structureis realized in a necessary correlation ofcommunal and inter-individual relationships; 
the example of a modern depart-
ment-store; the limits within which thesubjective purposive plan of the foundersplays an individual formative role; thepurpose of a voluntary association is notrestricted to the internal life of the organized 
community to which it refers; itis necessarily directed to the correlationof internal communal and external inter-
individual relationships, 575; the geneticform of a closed club is constituted chiefly 
by the aim and means of the foundersand is a nodal point of inter-structural intertwinements; 
the internal leading function 
of a trade-union is the moral bond of 
solidarity between the labourers typicallyfounded in their organized historical vocational 
power to elevate labour to anessential and equivalent partner in theprocess of production, 576; purposes likethe promotion of the intellectual and bodily 
development of the members, etc.,
do not qualify the internal community;
only the chief aim has a typical relationto the leading function without coalescingwith it; the typical relation between purpose 
and internal structure of a criminalorganization; SINZHEIMER'S sociologicaland HAURIOU'S institutional view of a criminal 
association; it is not possible toestablish the factual existence of a criminal 
organization without the aid of normsfunctioning in the social order; a positivist 
might consider norms as factualrules of behaviour in a society that hasaccepted them, 577 ; but this does not explain 
the "code of honour" and the internal 
authoritative order in a criminal 
organization; this code has a supra arbitrary 
foundation in the structuralprinciple of their internal communal 
sphere independent of criminal purposes 
and not different from that of a"lawful" industrial organization; it isgiven an illegitimate positive form; HAURIOU 
distinguishes between purposes andinternal "institutional idea"; this idea isneo-Platonic and becomes an "idee 
d'oeuvre" in an organized community;
but this metaphysics cannot explain acriminal organization, 578 ; TONNIES' contractual 
view of "KOrperschaften"; the relative 
truth in this view. Voluntary assosiations 
formed for a subjective purposepre-suppose a process of individualizationin the inter-personal societal relationsguaranteeing the individuals a sphere ofprivate liberty outside of all institutional 


211 SOCIAL CATEGORIES (TRANSCENDENTAL) 


communities; an historically closed society 
embraces almost the whole temporal 
existence of its members in communal 
relationships; in the individualizing process 
a real emancipation takes place, 580;
primitive societal forms shut people offin a kind of exclusive symbiosis; thebreaking up of the undifferentiated institutional 
communities is connected 
with the rise of associatory organizations; 
man's emancipation is in line withthe opening process of history and withhis vocation ; this process is much moreaccellerated in a city than in a town ; apatriarchal family of agriculturists, anda metropolitan family; a medieval townand a modern city, 581; the dissolutionof the guilds; the complicated picture ofmodern city life and society; the politicalinstitutional bond is a really integratingbond in such a city; a rural village community; 
metropolitan relations are largely 
impersonal ; the process of expansion 
and emancipation is not necessarilyun-Christian; it breaks through narrow-
minded nationalism, opposes the defiication 
of temporal societal relationships,
582; temporal societal relations shouldexpress the religious supra-temporal unity 
of the human race; the Corpus Christi; 
JESUS' parable of the Good Samaritan;
the opening process of society increasesthe individual man's needs, and his dependence 
on others; division of labourHEGEL'S dialectical idea of the "burgerliche 
Gesellschaft"; the "strategem ofreason" (List der Vernunft) ; he tries toreconcile HOBBES' naturalistic individualistic 
construction with the Humanistic 
idea of law and morality in KANT'S conception, 
583 ; the "biirgerliche Gesellschaft" 
drives the individual out of family 
life and raises hilti to a higher spiritual 
level pointing to the "Vernunftstaat";
in this state the antithesis between the 
subject and the norm has been cancelledin the substantial (and no longer formal)
moral freedom of everybody as a part ofthe whole; HEGEL'S State conception asthe organized administration of justiceand "Polizei", 584; the three main structures 
of civil society in HEGEL; societyand the absolute State, division of labour;
social classes; a logical triad, 585; Korporationen; 
society and family are partsof a whole; vocational class honour; a 
single unorganized person; individualand universal interests reconciled by civil 
law, 586; criticism of HEGEL'S view;
his masterly interpretation of the modernindividualized inter-individual societal 
relations; his evaluation of the influenceof the .Christian idea of free interpersonal 
relations on the individualizing process; 
his universalistic deification of anational State, his logicistic speculativescheme of three social classes; over-emphasis 
on economic motives is orientedto the idea of the homo econornicus, he 

forces voluntary organizations into histhree classes, 587 ; HEGEL discovered astructural law of modern society : viz. thegeneralizing and integrating tendency inthe free societal purposes which formsthe necessary counterpart of the increasing 
individualizing tendency; the normative 
law of correlative differentiation 
and integration; individuality structuresin the differentiated inter-individual and 
inter-communal relationships (free market 
relations, publicity, fashions, sports,
competition, the press, traffic, musicaland theatrical performances, private philanthropy, 
diplomacy, etc.), 588; theseindividuality structures possess• two radical 
functions; fashion and sports arcqualified by a typical function of socialintercourse; free market relations, publicity, 
etc., are qualified by the economicfunction ; social philanthropy by the moral 
aspect; missionary activity is an activity 
of faith; all these structures are ofa typical historical foundation; individual 
acts display different individualitystructures : saluting a friend is qualifiedas a typical act of social intercourse; apurchase agreement, a lease contract, areeconomically qualified; a public performance 
of music is aesthetically qualified, 
an alms in public is morally qualified, 
etc.; these structures are not basedon organization; the acting individualsact in essential coordination in a cooperative 
or in an antagonistic sense; theyfollow the same direction (in fashion,
e.g.) ; supplement each other (division oflabour), or are at strife (competition),
589; primitive inter-individual relationsare undifferentiated and interwoven with 
the undifferentiated order of the narrow 
tribal or folk community and share itsisolating and limiting character; theyvary from tribe to tribe; those of onecommunity are experienced as alien orhostile by another; each tribal relationship 
has its vertically individualized, miniature 
"society" ; modern Western societytends to expand their sphere of validityhorizontally; they have an internationaltendency; leading groups set the paceand are generally followed, 590; the leading 
houses in Paris, London, Vienna, etc.,
lay down the norms of fashion; they cannot 
create norms in a perfectly arbitraryway, but are bound by dynamic principles 
of taste, social distinction, efficiency, 
etc., and by the various societal individuality 
structures; extravagances neverhave a normative function ; they have apatent expansive, international character; 
there are no national fashions; butthere are folk dresses, 591; fashion. is anintegrating factor in inter-individual social 
relations; v. JHERING treats fashion 
as a social excrescence in contrast to folk 
dress, and as originating from impuremotives of class pride and vanity; butfashion is not a sign of decadence, nor a 


SOCIAL CATEGORIES (TRANSCENDENTAL) 212 

symptom of the "mass man"; fascist and dualization and integration should benational socialist salutes were a foolish counterbalanced by the unfolding of orset-
back caused by the setting up of na- ganized institutional communities andtional barriers; fashion is only radically voluntary associations; otherwise theyqualified as a structure of social inter- will result in an individualistic processcourse;) it is geno-typically and pheno- of disintegration; hence the extremely in-
typically differentiated in particular sub- dividualistic and merciless capitalisticject-object-relations and in its interwea- form of the industrial sector of Westernvings with other structural types of inter- society, 595; the class struggle; labourindividual relations, e.g., a fashion in became impersonal market ware; the la-
sporting dress, evening dress, travelling- hour community was affected by the in-
costumes, lounge suits, etc.; such diffe- dividualistic contractual view; unlimitedrentiation bears an expansive cosmopoli- competition created the Hobbesian "homotan character; this is the result of the in- homini lupus"; family, kinship, and thetegrating process manifest in modern so- State were also affected by this social di.
ciety, the differentiating factors in the sease; the "sacred" egoism of the separateintegrating process are the individuality States; all these abuses revealed the Civistructures 
of the inter-individual rela- tas terrena; modern society is formingtions (592) especially in those of social voluntary associations to counter-act thisintercourse; national and local forms not destructive individualism, 596; employersfounded in climatic or other natural fac- and labourers are organizing; trusts,
tors are experienced as obsolescent pecu- world concerns, are international; carliarities; 
in the typically economic rela- tels exercise restraint on competition,
tionships the correlation between inte- but may become a menace to healthygration and differentiation is very mar- market relations; collective bargainingked owing to modern technique, modern between employers and the employed;
traffic, trade, industry; the integrating this was stimulated by the Christian ideatendencies in these structures are founded of solidarity in opposition to Marxism;
in the economic power of the leading but there was some misconception of an

entrepreneurial groups; customary stipu- entire branch of industry being a "naturallations, standard contracts, general con- community", and "organical part of theditions in individual economically quali- national whole", which error was an affied 
agreements; little scope is left to the ter effect of the universalist-Romanticprivate autonomy of the contracting par- view of human society current in theties; contrats d'adhesion, 593; the organ- Christian historical trend of thought duized 
industrial groups bring about a ho-ring the times of the 19th century Restaurizontal 
integration in the contents of the ration, 597; a public legal organization ofindividual agreements; this integration is industrial life is not a "natural commun,
differentiated according to the horizontal ity"; it has no public legal competencebranches of industry or trade; DUGUIT on its own account; the Romantic viewsupposes that such integration is an in- cannot be interpreted in terms of thetrinsical transformation of civil law into principle of sphere-sovereignty, a misan 
economically qualified social law; but conception on the part of the Protestantin this case there is only question of an League of Trade Unions in the Netherenkaptic 
interlacement of industrial and lands; medieval political autonomy as acommercial law with civil law; outside subjective right of the guilds only suitedof the internal sphere of civil law there an undifferentiated society; public legalis no equality of the coordinated subjects authority can never be derived from thein the inter-individual societal relations; inner nature of a private organization ofscience is a necessary integrating factor industrial life; the Dutch Public Indus-
presenting itself as a concrete social phe- trial Organization Act of 1950, 598; thenomenon in the correlation of interindi- organs of such an organization have de-
vidual and organized communal relation- legated autonomy; the State combines aships; science is theoretically-logically horizontal public legal integration with aqualified and materially differentiated, compulsory vertical organization of naand 
is the foundation of the individuality tional production processes; the Statestructure of modern technical progress; can only bind the industrial (and agrithe 
opening and individualizing process cultural) relationships as far as they areis a rationalizing process, 594 ; it is des-enkaptically interwoven with the State's 
tined to disclose and realize the poten- structure; the political integration distialities 
and dispositions inherent in so- plays international tendencies; since thecial relations according to the divine second world war individual States areworld-order; as far as the formation of more interdependent than formerly, 599;
law is concerned the Historical School international political relations are in-
pointed out the necessary part played by creasingly being integrated; the secondscientific jurists; their inference that article of the Charter of the United Natheoretical 
jurisprudence is a formal tions; international security and the posource 
of positive law was erroneous; sition of the leading powers; the inte-
PUCHTA; VON JHERING; modern indivi- grating function of the U.N.O. in the non



213 SOCIAL CATEGORIES (TRANSCENDENTAL) 

political spheres; the Uno is not an all- structure; this structure is bound to thatinclusive society, but a voluntary organi- of the State as a res publica; the rise ofzation of individual States; it is qualified parties manifests the interest and theby an international public legal function sense of responsibility of the foundersand founded in an historical internatio- and members with respect to State afnal 
organization of power; but it is not fairs, 606; JAMES BRYCE argues the indisan 
institution; nor has it any monopolis- pensibility of parties in a free country;
tic organization of armed force or a ter- parties awaken the public spirit in theritory, 600; it is not endowed with real people; their discipline is a remedygovernmental authority over the separate against political egoism and corruption;
States; it is not a civitas maxima; its -- the debate between parties promotesinner nature is determined by the juri- mutual correction and the finding of adical principle of international public in- common basis for practical cooperation;
terest; its integrating function displays a KELSEN attributes this situation to a unipromoting 
and supporting character, not versal axiological relativism inherent ina compulsory trait of State regulation; democracy; he says that autocracy ismodern society shows continuous tension founded in the belief in an absolute veri-
between differentiation and integration ty; why this view is wrong, 607; KELSEN'Sprocesses, between individual and orga- appeal to the principle of proportionalitynizational bonds; individualism and uni- is unwarranted by his relativistic view ofversalism; more than a third part of man- democracy; without belief in an absolutekind is delivered to totalitarian power, supra-theoretical Truth and supra-arbi601; 
Western democracy tries to inte- trary norms the political struggle wouldgrate its military forces; communism is a be meaningless, 608; the factual groupingsecularized eschatological faith; dialect- of the population into political partiesical Western humanism has been swayed may or may not coincide with the diffebetween 
universalism and individualism; rentiation into "religious groups"; oppoits ideas of freedom and authority have site parties may have the same religiousbeen undermined by Historicist relati- basis, and the same party may embracevism, 602; the doctrine of unassailable Christians and atheists; but the radical 
human rights cannot check the absoluti- antithesis between the Biblical and thezation of temporal communal relation- apostate religious motive is decisive; theships; the Biblical view excludes indivi- dualistic motive of nature and grace maydualism as much as universalism; such a blur the line of division; it is not alwaysvoluntary association as a club touches necessary to form separate Christian par-

man's temporal existence only superfi- ties; a political party has an historical 
cially; accupational organizations( trade foundation; its unity is dependent on theunions, e.g.), are very important, and power of a political conviction concern-
animated, at least partly, by a spirit of ing the policy of the State, 609; it doescommunity and solidarity; the typical not rely on military power; a militaryfoundation of a restricted club is an his- organization is not a political party; thetorical form of organized social power, possibility of an anarchistic political par603; 
its leading function is that of social ty, 610; a farmer party, a labour party, aintercourse within a closed communal middle class party are only variabilitycircle; the club's authority is vested in types which are enkaptic interweavingsthe board and the general assembly; the between a political party and occupation-
exclusion of a member from any perso- ally differentiated interests; the meaningsnal social intercourse deprives him of his of the adjective "political", 611; the par-
internal societal rights; the requirements ty bond is never of a theoretical politicalfor membership and the grounds of ex- character; because the party takes sidespulsion have a typical internal juridical in practical politics; the Anti-Corn-Lawcharacter; 
the ballot in connection with League of 1838 was not a political partythe social position of an applicant, for but an organization ad hoc for the realiadmission; 
this internal social law has zation of certain transitory political aim;
its reverse side in civil legal inter-indivi- so was the Eastern Question Associationdual relations, 604; a political party of 1878; a genuine party requires someshows an enkaptic interlacement with the total view of the State and its policy toState guaranteed by its primary aim of guarantee the party's relative stability; 
influencing the State's policy; also in the inner divergences regarding practical poparty's 
genetic and existential societal litics, between conservative and progresforms; 
undifferentiated unions are no po- sive opinions, etc., cannot affect the inlitical parties; SoRoKIN's view criticized, ner unity so long a compromise remains605; a party is not a faction; there are possible, 612; opposing parties may makefactions in a Church, in a school, in a a mutual, inter-communal compromise adtrade union, etc. OSTROGORSKI'S definition hoc, solong as the latter does not concernmentions as a party aim "the attainment fundamental principles; the leading funcof 
a political goal", but "political" re- tion is not that of faith; i.e., politicalmains an undefined general concept in faith; political organization is not reallyits ignoring the typical trait in a party's pisteutically qualified; a common politi



SOCIAL CONTRACT 214 

cal belief is not the leading function, 613political divergence is possible between 
members of the same Church; the party'qualifying function is the moral aspectthe typical moral bond of a political conviction is indispensable, 614; SOROKINoverestimates legal rules; the moral bond 
of political conviction is a non-originalretrocipatory individuality type of the 
moral aspect; referring to the nuclear 
type of formative power in a typical politico-structural sense; the party cornmunity implies an historical vocationthe moral political bond produces a mind 
of politic-ethical solidarity; a totalitarian party discipline contradicts the moral guiding function, 615; organizationa1 
stratification 'should not muzzle independent thought and creative criticism; overstrained 
party discipline changes the individual 
member into a negligible quantity; 
and the leaders are mediocrities andhypocrites, says SOROKIN; this seems tobe an unwarranted assertion, 616; verybig parties are apt to affect the integrityof the moral bond by the formation of adictatorial elite; the Russian Communistparty has acquired a monopoly, grants itsmembers certain privileges and advantages, 
but exercises an extremely rigorous 
party control over its members, 617;
exclusively personal interests cannot explain 
the loyalty of American citizens totheir parties; notwithstanding the "spoil"
system; pressure groups and deceitfulslogans and promises endanger the party's 
moral bond; a party is a voluntaryassociation and therefore not a part ofthe State, 618 ; the prohibition of a partyhas a dubious effect; there may comeunderground activity; in elections andthe formation of a new cabinet politicalparties have a typical enkaptic functionwithin the constitutional sphere of theState; the parliamentary system of government 
is insolubly bound to the parties; 
this side of party life does not belong 
to the inner sphere sovereignty of aparty, for its public legal functions arederived from the State and depend onthe public function of the electorate; historically 
the parties arose from local election 
committees; these were their geneticforms; a monopolistic party in a totalitarian 
State is an extremely close enkaptic 
interlacement similar to that of a 
Church-State, 619; the monopolistic partyis the chief organ of the totalitarianState, and it rules the whole :,machineryof the body politic; but in its innersphere , it remains a closed community 
qualified by a moral bond of common 
political conviction, which conviction 
it cannot impose on all the citizensof the State; the term "ecclesiastical parties" 
is confusing; since it has variousmeanings; the task of the Church withrespect to politics, 620; why a politicalparty cannot be bound to a Church con


fession; the Catholic national party isclosely bound to the Roman CatholicChurch, 621; the Anti-revolutionary Partyis independent of ecclesiastical authority;
a party's political belief is conditionedby the life- and world-view of its members 
which is rooted in a basic motive,
622; the appeal to a common belief deepens 
and strengthens the moral bond,
checking an 'overstrained party disciplin;
in Anglo-Saxon countries there is littleinterest in the deeper fundamentals ofparty principles; public opinion there ispartly Christian and partly Humanistic,
but generally anti-totalitarian; BRYCE observes 
that the party system of the U.S.A.
has contributed to the unification and 
homogeneity of the population; but thereis no real political education of the members; 
parties are oligarchically ruled andrequire blind obedience to their discipline; 
the French Revolution and Marxism 
have stimulated Europeans to reflecton the spiritual fundamentals of partyformation; the antithesis between liberalism 
and conservatism in the English dualparty system is 'too superficial now thatWestern society is faced with the threatof totalitarian ideologies, 623 ; the secularization 
of political conviction is furthered 
by political parties ignoring the ultimate 
questions of belief; this is the justification 
of a Christian party formation,

624. 
SOCIAL CONTRACT, I, this theory has to reconcile 
the mathematical science ideal 
with the personality ideal; criticized inHUME, 311; in HUGO GROTIUS, 311, 319; inLOCKE, 318 ; in HOBBES, in PUFENDORFF,

319; in ROUSSEAU, 320. 
—, III, in HOBBES, 182, 232; RoussgAu,


236. 
SOCIAL DYNAMICS, III, the historical development 
of ,human society is the sub


ject of Social Dynamics, 187. 

SOCIAL FORMS, II, SIMMEL assumes that 
social forms are a priori conditions included 
in the historical-psychical life ofthe social individuals themselves, 210.

—, III, VON WIESE'S concept; SIMMEL'S172; social forms are positivizations ofstructural principles, 173-175; segmentary 
and organic social forms in DURKHEIM, 
175-178; they are nodal points ofenkaptic interlacements, 405. 

SquAL GROUP, III, this concept and thevarious criteria of a general classificationlack any transcendental foundation, 176. 

SOCIAL IMPULSE, III, in ARISTOTLE; was 
denatured in Stoicism to the "appetitus

socialis", 224, *226, 232. 

SOCIAL MADIATION, III, by means of symbols, 
243, 250-253; in a "closed sphere";
in a Gemeinschaft; is conductive to itsinterwoven structural unity, 253, 254 ; this

mediation criticized, 260, 272. 


215 SOCIOLOGY, GENERAL 


SOCIAL PREJUDICE, I, in philosophy and ina life and world view, 165. 

SOCIAL PROCESS, III, according to FR. OP


PENHEIMER, 166. 

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, II, psychology dealswith its logical, historical, lingual, social,
economical, aesthetical, juridical, moral,
and faith anticipations, 115. 

SOCIAL RESTRICTION, III, this idea Of LITT'S 
is crypto-normative, 272. 

SOCIAL WHOLE, III, a communal whole isnever an object; it is realized in the social 
coherence of typical human acts andmodes of behaviour, and bound to objective 
social vehicles or conductors; especially 
to the lingual subject-object relation, 
198; the polis embraced all othercommunities and individual men as partsof a whole, in ARISTOTLE, 201; the State 
determined the nature of the household;
the conjugal relations and those betweenparents and children are equalized withthe relation of master and slave, 202;
homogeneous and heterogeneous wholesdistinguished by ANAXAGORAS, ARISTOTLE,

638. 
SOCIALISM, II, conservative liberalism evoked 
the reaction of socialism and com


munism, 362. 

SOCIALIST REVOLUTION, III, in it privateand public law will vanish, according toST. SIMON, and in Marxism, 455. 

SOCIAL TYPES, III, WEBER'S "ideal type",

82. 
SOCIETAL RELATIONSHIPS, III, and sociology, 
157; interlacements and the irreducibility 
of their radical and geno-types,
164 ; sphere-sovereignty and inter-structural 
coherence; enkapsis; mankind;
realization, 170; difference from animaltypes of symbiosis; soc. relationships require 
human formation and are omnifunctional, 
172; positivization, 173; constitutive 
and existential forms; geno-types, 
174; communal, inter-individual, andintercommunal relationships, 176; community, 
177; intercommunal relationshipsand inter-individual relations, and en


kapsis, 181. 


SOCIETAL STRUCTURE OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE, 
II, the individuality of human experience 
within the temporal horizon has
a societal structure excluding any possibility 
of a hermetically closed "micro


cosm", 594. 


SOCIETY, I, a universalist conception of
society in FICHTE, as a whole in relation


to its parts, 489.
—, III, is the system of free market re


lations according to LOCKE, 452. 


SOCIETY, MODERN, III, its generalizing and
integrating tendency is a structural law,


588. 
SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD, III, intertwinements 
of individuality structures cannotbe posited a priori, but must be disco


vered in a continual confrontation with 
empirical reality, 264. 

SOCIOLOGY, GENERAL, II, form-matter 
scheme applied by GEORG SIMMEL, 210;
VON WIESE, Formal Sociology, 212.
—, III, sociology investigates societalrelationships as such; in their totalityand as a specific view; the positivist"factual" view and that of a normative 
ideal socio-cultural phenomenon, 157 ; themodern pseudo-natural scientific conceptof structure in sociology; ideal types;
structure is then "constellation" of ele


ments; theoretical sociology and biology,
158; sociology as a total science of society; 
causality; structural causality presupposes 
a total view, and can only behandled as a transcendental Idea; SOROKIN 
takes the societal components in acultural-social sense; the structural constellation 
of interacting subjects (:= persons), 
meanings, values, norms, social vehicles 
or conductors and "causal interaction"; 
his notion of socio-cultural causality 
is multivocal, 159 ; SOROKIN over-estimates 
the role of legal norms in organizedgroups; only a particular secondary radical 
type has the legal aspect for its central 
leading function, 160; the typical sociological 
problem of totality; SOROKINminimizes the divergence between thevarious sociological schools and their-isms; these -isms are not specific viewpoints 
of a pure societal nature, arisingfrom the variety of the sciences concerned 
with sociology (psychology, history,
etc.), but they originate from the absolutization 
of specific modal aspects appliedto a totality view, 161; SOROKIN followsRICKERT : his sociology tries to deal withthe super-organic or mental vital phenomena; 
his socio-cultural universe; meanings, 
values, and norms are super-imposedon biotical properties; human subjectsand material vehicles; sociology is a generalizing 
science, history is an individualizing 
science; this is neo-Kantianism;
SoRoltrN loses sight of 'the totality problem, 
162; S. SIMON and AUG. COMTE proclaimed 
society to be an organic whole;
their irrationalistic freedom-Idealism and 
rationalistic science ideal; is there a cultural 
community?, 163; COMTE'S positivism 
intended to re-integrate Western culture 
by assuring it a mental solidarity;
a cultural community cannot be all-embracing; 
the universal interlacements ofall temporal societal relationships cannotdetract from the irreducibility of theirradical and geno types, 164 ; GURVITCH;
particular and all-inclusive groups;
groups and societies, 164; an all-inclusivesociety is a definite historical culturalcommunity; fascist and capitalist "societies", 
165; FR. OPPENHEIMER: all natural 


SOCIOLOGY, GENERAL 216 

sciences are related to biology; in the that the typical structural principles as-
same way all the activities of the human sume in the process of their positivizamasses 
constitute the "social process"; tion; they are the necessary link betweenlife is unique and has many forms in the structural principles and the factualplants, animals and men; a society is a transitory relationships subjected tospecies of human mass living socially, i.e. them, 173; genetic (or constitutive) formsunited by psychical interactions; his me- and existential forms, and phenotypes;
taphysical substance concept "Life", 166; civil and ecclesiastic marriage; industrialhuman society is a secondary immortal and farmer -families; pastoral family,
substance; the errors committed by OP-etc., 174; the Dutch East- and West-In-
PENHEIMER'S view; his metaphysical vita- dian Companies; the medieval church;
lism; Universalistic sociology may con-DURKHEIM'S segmentary and organic tysider 
humanity as an all-inclusive tem- pes of social forms; MAX WEBER'S "ideal 
poral community (ComTE) ; it may be type" and antique and medieval forms offounded in ontological universalism; and "political life", 175; communal and inter-
it may be accompanied by axiological individual or inter-communal relation-
universalism, 167; PLATO'S consistent on- ships; their correlativity; the termtological universalism, an inconsistent "group", 176; Gemeinschaft, Gesellschaft;
universalist in sociology; his Phaedo re- community, society; a new definition ofsects the axiological universalism of the the term "community", viz., a more orpolis; mankind is not the all-inclusive less durable societal relationship joiningtemporal whole of human society; the its members into a social unity, irrespec-
Biblical "from one blood" is not intended tive of the degree of intensity of the coin-
in a universalistic sense; the three trans- munal bond; inter-individual and inter-. 
cendental problems of a theoretical view communal relationships function in coorof 
human society: of the basic denomi- dination, 177; antagonistic behaviournator for a comparison of the types of within the marriage bond is somethingsocietal relationships; their mutual rela- quite different from such behaviour out


tion and coherence; their radical unity side of marriage between a man and aand meaning-totality, 168; the central re- woman; the factual behaviour of peopleligious community of mankind in its occurs within the cadre of an intricatecreation, fall and redemption; the Stoic network of typical structures of correlaconception 
in conflict with the Christian ted communal, inter-communal, or interview; 
Christian revolution and the Stoic personal relationships; superficial andidea of mankind; the Greeks absolutized untenable generalizations; SUMNER MAIpolis; 
the basic denominator is the tem-NE's theory of the evolution from statusporal world order rooted in the Divine to contract; DURKHEIM'S view; TONNIES' 
order of creation, 169; the mutual rela- Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft; organizedtion between the social individuality- and unorganized communities; "Ver-
structures: sphere sovereignty and inter- hand", 178; natural (unorganized) coin-
structural coherence; enkapsis; radical munities are of all times; marriage, cog-
unity and meaning-totality in the central nate family, kinship family; neighbourreligious 
community of mankind; sphere hood community of colonists; vicinage;
sovereignty and undifferentiated socie- guild; the concept "natural community"
ties; the inner natures of the typical so-in ARISTOTLE'S view; friendship is not a 
cietal relationships may not all of them natural community, 179; public legal or-
have been factually and fully realized; ganization of industry or agriculture;
but at any stage of their realization they comparison of a natural community anddepend on their internal structural prin- the public legal organization of a branchciples, 170; marriage displays its own of industry or agriculture; cognatic fa-
structure even in its defects and deterio- mily, extended family bond; organizationration; the internal structures of a mar- makes a community independent of theriage, a church, a state, etc., cannot be lease of life of its individual members;
identified with their variable and often authority and subordination in organizedsinful factual realizations; structural prin- communities; and in marriage and famiciples 
are not "ideal types", 171; animal ly, 180; authority of the magistrate, of atypes of symbiosis differ from the norm- factory manager; natural law of freedomatively qualified societal relationships; and equality; communal and inter-indithe 
latter require human formation (a vidual relationships and their enkapsis;
historical foundation) and function in all non-integrated inequality and diversity inthe aspects of our social experience; Sim- social position; inter-personal and inter-
MEL, VON WIESE, etc., and the concept communal relations have their counter"
social form"; interpreted as "social ele- part in a communal bond, 181; humanments", 172; transcendental structural society cannot exist as an unintegratedprinciples and subjective socio-political diversity;unity and diversity form aprinciples; the latter may contradict the transcendental correlation and condistructural 
principles founded in the Di- tion of any possible human society;
vine World-order; positive norms con- the relation of a societal whole and itsstitute social relations; societal forms parts; sociological universalism over



217 SOCIOLOGY, GENERAL 

estimates the communal relationships; munity of family life against the back-

sociological individualism absolutizes the ground of inter-individual intercourse,

inter-individual relationships; the indi- 194; all temporal societal relations are

vidualistic concept of "elements"; the concentrically related to the radical

denial of the reality of communities; on- spiritual solidarity of mankind in crea


tological individualism in LEIBNIZ' mona- tion, fall, and redemption by Christ in

dology combined with axiological indivi- the religious communion of the Holy

dualism of personality; HOBBES' sociolo- Spirit; more extensive communities show

gical individualism, axiological primacy a lower level of morality than those of a

of his State as a fictitious super-person more intense character, 195; universalism.

Construed by a compact between indivi- absolutizes the temporal communal rela


duals, 182; sociological individualism, or tionships and replaces the radical unity

universalism and nominalism or realism; of mankind by a theoretically devised

community is not a natural fact but a temporal one; the totalitarian ideology

normative task; MAX WEBER wants to eli- implied in universalism is often camou


minate the idea of community, 183; TON-flaged as an "organic" view; the human

NIES' Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft; cf. I-ness is never an "organ"; the biological

S.V. FERDINAND TONNIES, 184 ; social Dy- analogy fails at the critical point of thenamics, 187; institutional and non-insti- transcendental Idea of totality in univertutional 
communities; an institution en- salism; the membership of the "Corpuscompasses its members intensively, con- Christi" is independent of all temporaltinuously and for a large part of their communal relationships, 196; comparisonlives independently of their will; e.g. the of organized societal units with a thingfamilistic community; the State; the in- structure; inter-communal* and inter-perstitutional 
Church; the conjugal commu- sonal relationships do not resemble thingnity, 187; undifferentiated organized structures; things lack subject functionscommunities are a secondary type of in- in the post psychical aspects; they arestitution, 188; among the organized corn- only "objects" in the typical human somunities 
only the State and the Church cietal relationships; perhaps a thing lacksare institutions; all other organizations any subject function in the post physicalare voluntary associations; based on the ,spheres; for the term may be restrictedprinciple of freedom to join and leave, to "dead" objects, 197; the human body189; compulsory organizations; enkapsis is qualified by the act-structure, and notwith the State; indirect compulsion; as- a "thing"; temporal communal human resociatory 
and authoritarian non-institu- lationships function in the mental and intional organizations; employer, manager, the pre-logical spheres; a communallabourers in a factory; an organized corn- whole is never an "object"; it is realizedmunity with its essential structural sub- in the social coherence of typical humanject-object relation to buildings and ma- acts and modes of behaviour; it is boundchines (e.g. a factory), 190; is most often to the objective social "vehicles" or "conan 
authoritarian organization; the free- ductors" mentioned by SOROKIN ; espedom 
to join or to leave is frustrated by cially to the lingual subject-object relathe 
situation of the "labour-market"; this tion, 198; the conception of the Greekfrustration is not caused by the structural polis; PROTAGORAS depreciates the gentiprinciples 
but by factual positive situa- litial organization; form-matter motive,
tions; indirectly compulsory organiza- 199; PLATO'S ideal universalistic state,
tions; the State; associatory and authori- 200; ARISTOTLE'S view of the polis is unitarian 
voluntary or indirectly compulsory versalistic, 201; his conception of theorganizations may be enkaptically inter- household ( oixia), 202; ARISTOTLE'S state 
woven with each other in the genetic is the perfect community directed to theform of a free association, 191; naive ex- good life, his conception of the marriageperience of organized communities, as and family bonds, 203; friendship;
continuous units, not as pluralities; and authority and obedience; property, 204;
their subject-object relations; a church his "organic" theory and Scholasticism;
and its building; household; these subj.- division of labour and corporative occuobject relations are actualization rela- pational classes, 205; the sociological
tions, 192; naive experiences cannot ex- fictitious person-theory, cf. s.v. fictionplain the internal continuous unity of a theory, 233--236; societas inaequalis etsocietal whole; the naïve conception of societatis aequales, LOCKE, WOLFF, 237;
organized communities as the totality of problems about the unity of an organizedtheir united members; this resembles the community; universalism and individual-
naive view of a man's inheritance as in- ism; OTHMAR SPANN'S views, 240; modern 
cluding all the separate objects belonging individualistic nominalism, its concepto 
it, 193; in primitive tribes the indivi- tion of reality; unity of an organized corn-
dual man is only known as an outcast, an munity is explained in terms of psycho-
outlaw; sociological universalism elimi- logical interaction as a category of con-
nates the correlativity between communal sciousness; or in a functional juridicaland inter-communal or inter-personal re- sense, 241; as the functional logical unitylationships; we experience the close coin- of a system of legal norms derived from 


SOCIOLOGY OF THOUGHT 218 

an original norm; SIMMEL'S conception: egos, the "thou"; these perspectives areunity is merely interaction between ele- not similar or comparable, but corresments, 
242; VoN WIESE says: these social pondent, 250; these reciprocating persinterhuman 
formations exist only in the pectives are realized in the symbolicallyminds of men, 243; Greek universalism expressive movement in which I and thouviewed an organized social whole as a unite spiritually and understand eachcomposite "corpus", organic in structure, other in the world of timeless meaning;
rooted in a metaphysical form (eidos) ; the social interwovenness of the ego inits unity was in its controlling part; mo- the Gemeinschaft (community) of thedern universalism qualifies an organized closed sphere, 251 (cf. s.v. Gemeinschaft,
community as a "Gesammtperson"; an 251 ff.) ; a summary of the various theo"
Uberperson" is the State; HEGEL'S view; ries of a communal whole; individualismthis is an hypostasis, 244; the German ad- versus universalism; rejection of the reherents 
of the Historical school viewed ligious transcendence of the human I-nessthe state only as the political form of a in immanence philosophy, 260; LITT'snational community; and gave the trans- theory of social interwoveness is valuapersonalistic 
conception of an organized ble; a comparison of the present situacommunity 
a pluralistic elaboration, re- tion in sociology with that of PLATO andcognizing the autonomy of non-political ARISTOTLE, 261; the relation between so-
and lower political associations; whose cial philosophy and positive sociology;
substance is found in a common or gene- attempts to delimit sociology from "so-.
ral will; the concept "spiritual organism" cial-cultural" sciences have failed; elimias 
a corporative personality originates in nation of the normative viewpointSCHELLING'S philosophy; GIERKE'S theory, blocked theoretical approach to social245; on a radical Christian standpoint the reality; SnvatEL's formalistic view alsodilemma between universalism and indivi- failed; philosophy of human society hasdualism is meaningless; man's personal- to give "empirical" (or rather: positive)
ity transcends the temporal horizon of sociology a solution to its transcendentalreality; tranpersonalism rests on an irra- basic problems, 263; structures of indivitionalistic 
hypostatization of temporal duality and types of intertwinement arecommunal relationships; modern indivi- philosophical subjects and the necessarydualism reduces man to an atomistic self- pre-suppositions of positive sociologycontained thing, or to a system of func- both for descriptive and explanatorytional interactions or to an autarchical science; individuality structures and in-
metaphysical combination of matter mo- tertwinements cannot be discovered in 
nads and a central soul monad; or to a an a-priori way; but in continuous conself-
sufficient moral individuum, or to frontation with empirical social reality;
such a moral ego; these views deny the theory makes them explicit, 264 ; the in-
inner communal structures of temporal stitutional natural communities of mar-

society; OTHMAR SPANN'S criticism of riage, family, kinship are to be distin


such individualism, 246; there is no polar guished from the undifferentiated organ-

tension in the Christian view; no anti- ized communities, 265.

thesis between universalism and indivi- SOCIOLOGY OF THOUGHT, III 

, KARL MANN-

dualism, 247; the faithful are members 

HEIM's views, 289.

of reborn humanity, elected in Christ;
WEBER arranges the term individuality SOCRATES, I, he gave a new introspectiveunder the meanings of individualism, meaning to the Delphic maxim, 51, 52;
which is greatly confusing, 248; TH. LITT with him the primacy passed over to thecalls sociology the foundation of the"Geis- form-motive, 67; in the culture religionteswissenschaften" (socio-cultural scien- the concept of law was that of "order",
ces), 248; sociology must examine the and assumed a teleological sense withspiritual world in which the I-hood lives respect to "natural subjects", 112, 113;
and in which subject and object are iden- SOCRATES' ethics has no affinity withtical; it must start with the totality, the KANT'S, 123; he inquired whether his egocoherence of spiritual reality, necessary was related to the wild Typhon or tofor the understanding of the relative self- Apollo; his interests were directed to culsufficiency 
of its moments; scientific ture, ethics, and politics; he wished tothought in here the self-transillumination regain fixed norms, in the philosophical

of the human mind; the "moments" are theoria, as to the good, the true, and the 

interlaced in dialectical tensions, 249; the beautiful; and to elevate philosophy toegos' psychical experiences are united episteme, a science; virtue must be di-
with the timeless social meaning signified rected to the divine Idea of the good; thein the sensory symbolism of social forms true, the beautiful, 534 ; SOCR. did notof expression; the latter possess a trans- distinguish between theoretical and pracpersonal 
character; the ego is a monad tical philosophy, 535.

living solely in its psychical acts, inter- —, II, the kalokagathon, 10; on the De-
weaving past experiences with those of miurge or form-giving nous, 56.
the present; intertwined in a real reci- III, his idea of a teleological worldprocity 
of perspectives with the other order is handed down to us both by 


 21 9 SOUVENIRS 

XENOPHON'S Memorabilia and PLATO'S Philebus; 
it was probably influenced byANAXAGORAS and DIOGENES, 633. 

SoHAI, III, 
Kirchenrecht, 515, 521, 545, 551, 552. 
--, III, holds that CALVIN seeks the sovereignty 
over the Church in the collectivewill of the Church-members; and that in 
in the presbyterial organization of thechurch the elders are the'representativesof the congregation in the modern senseof the political, representative system inthe State, 521; he summarizes the misconceptions 
of CALVIN'S thoughts onchurch government, 545; legal order andthe church are mutually exclusive; lawGospel are antithetically opposed likespiritual and secular, 551; his historicalinvestigations concerning ecclesiasticalorganization beg the question ; he identifies 
the temporal Church institutionwith the Kingdom of Heaven, 552, 

SOKOLOWSKI, P., III, 
Sachsbegriff und Ktirper in der klassischen 
Jurisprudenz und der modefnen
Gesetzgebung, 226, 229. 


SOLGER, I, contests the dualism of the universal 
and the particular, 471. 


SOLIDARITY, III, the radical spiritual solidarity 
of mankind, 195; solidarity is a
Christian idea, in opposition to Marxism,


597. 
SOMBART, W., II, 
Der moderne Kapitalismus, 293. 


SOMLO, FELIX, II, 
Juristische Grundlehre, 240.
—, II, broke with ROUSSEAU'S and KANT'S 
natural law view of statute law, 142; follows 
WINDELBAND; difference between legal 
rules and social conventions and logical, 
moral and aesthetical standards:
empirical and absolute, 239; arbitrary
accidental and universally valid; but a
norm cannot be arbitrary and accidental;
absolute norms is a contradictory designation, 
all norms depend on the others;
aesthetic norms vary with time and place:
Renaissance, Middle Ages, Antiquity;
ARISTOTLE on the Drama, 240. 


SOMLO, FELIX, III, 


Juristische Grundlehre, 370. 
—, III, the primitive primary norm ; this


norm can only be explained by the individuality 
structures of undifferentiatedsocietal relations; Sommi considers the 
primitive primary norm as "law", not as"Sitte"; law to these primitive people isan undifferentiated complex of norms,
371; these norms originate from a su


preme power; legal rules are the sumtotal of such norms; then norms are juridical; 
and laid down by an arbitrary supreme 
human authority; this view is refuted 
by the facts, 372. 

SOPHISTS, I, inferred from PARMENIDES 

logicism that the proclamation of logica

meaning as the origin of the cosmic di

versity is tentamount to the elimination 

of the modal diversity and consequently

to the abandoning of theoretical though

itself, 19; their sceptical relativism denied

any norm of truth; they were irrational

ists in the epistemological field; this po

sition leads to antinomy, 145.

—, III, POLOS, TRASYMACHOS, and KALLI 

KLES were radical individualists; they

gave primacy to nature as an orderlesS 

vital process in which the stronger indi

viduals have a natural right to oppress 

the weaker; the matter motive is un 

checked by the form-motive; PROTAGORAS

199; they repudiated societal life, 223

the contract theory of the State was

started by the Sophists according to 

PLATO, 232. 

SORBONNE CHAPEL, THE, built by LEMERCIER, 
142. 


SORGE (CARE) , II, in HEIDEGGER'S philosophy, 
24. 
—, III, (Care or concern) in the struggle
for possession, 5. 


SOROKIN, P. A., III, 
Society, Culture and Personality, 158, 160,
305, 608; 
Theories Sociologiques Contemporaines,


495. 
—, III, his sociology, 159-162; vehicles 
or conductors, 198; on kinship groups,
305; his criticism of modern biologistic
political racial theories, 495; his conception 
of a political party, 608. 
SORORATE, III, a form of marriage, 339,

340. 
SOUL, I, and body, in DESCARTES, 218; thehuman soul has three original faculties,
the cognitive faculty, the feeling of pleasure 
and pain, the desiring faculty, in

KANT, 388. 
—, II, ARISTOTLE'S view, 11,. 12; in theBible it is the religious centre of humanexistence; it is not the Gegenstand ofpsychology; it has nothing to do with themetaphysical Greek "psyche", 111; the"rational" soul and the virtues, and happiness, 
in ARISTOTLE, 145; THOMAS AQUINAS' 
conception of individuality contradicts 
his Scholastic Christian view of individual 
immortality of the rational soulas form and substance, 419; HUSSERI, 
calls "material thing" and "soul" different 
regions of being, 454. 

SOURCES OF LAW, III, and genetic formsof interlacement, 664 ; agreements forcooperation are formal sources of law,
665; different theories, 666, 667. 

SOUVENIRS, III, function in the subject-
object relation; pretium affectionis, 294. 


 

SOVEREIGNTY220 

SOVEREIGNTY, I, BODIN'S concept, 311.
—, III, BODIN'S absolutist theory, 396, 398 

SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CHURCH, III, KAMP 
SCHULTE'S erroneous interpretation o fCALVIN'S views, 520, 521, 546. 

SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE, I, in RoUs-
SEAU, 320. 

SPATIAL ASPECT, I, the spatial was absolutized by PARMENIDES ; the eternal beinghas no coming into being nor passingaway and is enclosed in the ideal staticspatial form of the sphere; but the spatial 
is not supra temporal, it implies simultaneity in the mode of continuous dimensional extension; spatial relationshave subjective-objective duration of timein temporal reality; even in abstract geometry, where spatial relations are viewedapart from transitory things and events31; i.e. according to their modal structurealone, they express the spatial temporalorder of greater or less in simultaneity,
32; space and time, in EINSTEIN, 85; anarrangement of coexistence in LEIBNIZ,
231; HUME : the copy of sensory impressions 
of coloured points, 284; minimasensibilia, 287; an a-priori order, in LEIB',
az, 342; space and time are a prioriforms of thought, 343; space is a synthetical 
forms of the "outer sense", time of 
the inner sense, in KANT, 347; space isfilled with things; an a priori form of

intuition, 348.
—, II, spatial figures display a modalcoherence, 7; its different meanings, 55 ff.;
"formal space", 63; original and analogical 
meanings of the word space, 64 ; sensory 
space; spatial analogies; the physical"world space" exceeds sensibility, theterm "territory"; historical and legalspace cannot be perceived and must besignified; the national flag on a vessel, 65;
spatial analogies, 76 (note) ; mathematicalspace in KANT is an a priori intuitionalform of sensibility, 77; a priori synthetical 
Euclidian axioms in KANT ; non-Euclidean 
geometries in the 19th century;
CARP'S view; RUSSELL'S; MAX BLACK; 
BROUWER; intuitionist arithmetizing ofgeometry; logification of arithmetic andgeometric, 78; the general notion "empirical 
space" is scientifically useless, 79;
in Aristotelian Scholasticism number implies 
spatial extension, 83; original spaceis mathematical; its nucleus is continuous 
extension; its time is simultaneity;
formal mathematics has eliminated space,
85; original space is not sensorily perceptible; 
dimensional extension; dimension 
is an order; not a figure; it is alaw, 86; spatial magnitude, spatial point,
subject-object relation; magnitude is anumeral retrocipation, 87; space andnumber, 89; NATORP logifies number andspace, 91; NEWTON'S "absolute space"; 

NATORP holds that matter fills space, 95(note) ; KANT'S view of space; topologicalspace, space is not an a priori receptacle(HUME), 96; directions of movement areretrocipations to space and number, 98;
physical space and relativity, relativitytheory; GAUSSIAN coordinates are physicalanticipations in geometry; incongruitybetween the theory of physical continuousspace and that of relativity, 101; spacemay be discontinuous; discrete positionsin space; points are numerical; spatialtime; numerical time, 102; anticipation,
of spatial time to kinematical time; geometry 
of measure and that of position,
103; biotic space, 109; movement ofthought implies logical space; analyticaldimensions; numerical analogy,120; kinematic 
space is a retrocipation, 165; spaceand irrational numbers, 170; space andmotion, 185; space perception, 371, 373;
a point in space; magnitude; arithmeticmay approach the meaning of space, 384;
no objective retrocipatory analogy ofmovement in space; the movement ofthought, 384 ; spatial magnitude as "variable" 
in the anticipatory function, 386.
—, III, in classical physics the substancefills space, 19. 

SPANN, OTTMAR, III, 


Gesellschaftslehre, 222, 238, 239, 240, 241,
243, 246; 
Fundament der Volkswirtschaftslehre,
480, 481. 
—, III, on the opposition of individualism


to universalism; his twofold error, 222; 
individualism is the autarchy of individual 
man, 238; in universalism the individual 
person retains his inalienable inner 
value, his own life, his moral freedom, 
239; this observation on moral freedom 
concerns the axiological not the sociological 
view; SPANN says that universalism 
does not necessarily deify thestate; such deification is an individualistic 
remnent in inconsistent universalism; 
Medieval universalism identified the 
church with the kingdom of God in theidea of the "Corpus Christianum"; SPANNsees in the state a partial whole and themanifestation of the unity of all organizations, 
the remaing partial 'whole of society 
is unorganized; the State is an organic 
part of the total society includinguniversalistically conceived natural communities 
with inter-individual and intercommunal 
societal relationships, 240,241; he does not distinggish betweenfunctionalistic individualism and the older 
substantial individualism; 243 ; his 
criticism of individualism, 246; in economic 
life the State is merely a capital of ahigher order, and therefore itself "economy"; 
economy is the devotion of meansto ends according to a scale of needs ordered 
in conformity to a balancing andsparing mode of estimation, when thereis a scarcety of means, 480, 481. 


 

221STABILITY 

SPECIAL SCIENCE, I, its task; and philosophy, 
85.

—, II, seemingly handles its own criterion 
of truth, 576. 

SPECIES-CONCEPT, THE, III, in biology; 
diagnostic : taxon ; phylogeny : phylon;
„oenetics: isogenon; JOHANNSSEN'S "reineLinie", 80; cf. s.v. Type-concept, and.:
Individuality structure. 

SPECIFIC ENERGY, III, of the sense organs, 
in MULLER'S theory; and LOCKE'Sdoctrine of the secondary qualities, 39;
the theory is criticized by A. RIEHI„ 42,

43. 
SPECULATION, is to be rejected, 42. 
SPEMANN, III, experiments with the transplantation 
of cells from the so-called
blastopore, 723, 735, 752; his hypothesis
that the blastopore must contain the organizing 
centre, 753. 


SPENCER, HERBERT, II, founder of the biologistic 
school of sociology, 260; introduced 
Darwinism into the conception of
history, elevating British liberalist economic 
industrialism to the final purpose of
history, 269; and WELLS, 270 (note).
--, III, on "Social Dynamics", 187. 


SPENER, III, opposed the Humanistic Idea
of tolerance, 517. 


SPENGLER, OSWALD, I, 
Untergang des Abendlandes, 103.


—, I, his historicism only accepts different 
realms of historical development, 103;
his historicist relativism, 118; western 
culture is doomed to decline, 214.
—, II, 
Der Untergang des Abendlandes, 24, 175,
195, 218, 219, 220, 221, 585.
—, II, historic explanation of logic, 175;
history is a stream of life, 195; historic-.
izing of science; cognitive activity depends 
on and is determined by a particular 
culture; history of physics; systems
of numbers vary with civilizations, 218;
there are no a priori forms of cognition;
systematical and ethical periods of philosophy 
followed by the historical relativistic 
age, 219; there are only truths with
respect to a particular type of mankind;
this view excludes the concept of history; 
his absolutization contradicts his concept 
formation, 220; destroys history; he
speaks of a diversity of cultures and the
science of history; he keeps theoretical 
distance from historical phenomena to
understand them; his historicism is self-
refuting, 221; his parallels of culture; no
causality; only fate; his view of simultaneity; 
of time, 283. 


SPERM-CELLS, III, 772. 


SPIDER'S WEB, A, II, a spider spins its web
with faultless certitude, 198. 
—, III, as objective structures, 107. 


SPHERE-SOVEREIGNTY, I, is the expressionof the relation between the aspects, 101;
of the modal aspects, 102; as a basicproblem, 104; it makes no sense in thefulness and radical unity of meaning,

106. 
—, III, and coherence, radical unity andmeaning totality; and enkapsis, 170; andautonomy, 221, 222; the principle ofsphere sovereignty was formulated by ALTHUSIUS, 
663 ; the original spheres ofcompetence cannot be isolated from eachother hermetically; sphere sovereigntyonly functions in the cosmic coherence,
692, 693. 
SPHERE UNIVERSALITY, II, of feeling, 115; 
of sensory perception, 377. 

SPINOZA, B. DE, I, had a geometrical conception 
of the root of the cosmos; allthings must be understood as modi withinthe two attributes (250) thought and extension 
of the sole substance (the deity),
and as such they are an eternal mathematical 
consequence derived from theessence of the deity; empirical investigation 
does not increase our knowledge ofeternal and unchangeable geometricaltruths, so that SPINOZA excludes the empirical 
changes of things from his mathematic 
ideal of science; LEIBNIZ opposedthis view, 251; idealists called SPINOZA 
an atheist; HUME refutes such an assertion, 
295. 
—, II, his thesis : "truth is its own crite


rion and that of falsehood", 597 (note). 

SPIRIT, 1, FICHTE'S metaphysics of the 
Spirit, 472. 

SPIRIT OF THE EARTH, THE, III, in FECHNER'S 
speculative thought, 631. 

SPIRITUAL, I, the sense of freedom and 
the feeling of moral power prove the spiritual 
character of the human soul, inROUSSEAU, 314. 
—, II, the spiritual community of mankind, 
200; the "objective Spirit" in history, 
245. 

SPIRITUALISM, I, in LUTHER'S view of Law 
and Gospel, 511; of MAINE DE BIRAN ;
French Spir. gave rise to the thought ofMAURICE BLONDEL, 525. 

SPIRITUAL ORGANISM, III, this concept ofthe Historical School derives from SCHEL


LING, 245. 

SPOIL SYSTEM, AMERICAN, III, cannot explain 
the loyalty of American citizens to 
their parties, 618. 

SPONGES, III, 774. 

STABILITY, II, the cosmological a prioricharacter of the modal aspects, in con-
tra-distinction to all modal individualityof meaning is manifest in its structuralstability in contrast with all that is variable 
in temporal reality, 553. 


STAHL, FR. VON 

STAHL, FR. VON, II, on God's guidance inhistory, 233; as an unconscious processin man, 249. 

STAHL, FRIEDRICH JULIUS, I, his philosophy

of history borfowed the Fichtian concep


tion of the hidden conformity to a law of

historical development, unknowable from

rational concepts, as a hidden telos ma


king the transcendent values visible in the

individual temporal formations of culture;

this is a Humanistic perversion of the

Christian faith in Divine Providence; it

makes the law a simple reflection of the

individual free subjectivity disclosed in the

"irrational process'", STAHL adopted this

view under the influence of SCHELLING'S 

Romanticism; "God's guidance in histo


ry" is thus an irrationalistically conceived

unconscious operation of God's "secret

counsel" and yet it is accepted as a com


plementary norm for human action; this

theory influenced the "Christian-histori


cal" trend in political theory in Germany

and the Netherlands, 488, 489.

—, III, 

Philosophie des Rechts nach geschicht


licher Ansicht, 429;

Die Kirchenverfassung nach Lehre und

Recht der Protestanten, 516, 517.

— III, defines the law State, 429; publicadm
inistrative law is merely formal andopposed to material law; the Decaloguecontains the principles of material law,
430; he is in favour of the episcopal system 
of church government, 516 (note) ; he 
says that in CALVIN the general priesthood 
of the believers is the constitutive 

element of the church ordinance, 521. 


STALIN, III, the Marxian communistic
community is incompatible with the
State institution and in itself Utopia, 464. 


STAMMLER, RUDOLPH, II, 
Wirtschaft und Recht nach der materia


listischen Geschichtsauffassung, 209;
Lehrbuch der Rechtsphilosophie, 210.
—, II, his concept of law; legal aspect reduced 
to volition as the teleological form
of thought, opposed to the causal form of
physics; social, moral, religious and juridical 
categories, 16, 17; positive law is
a historical economic material in the 
legal form, 208; of thought, 209; he applied 
the form-matter scheme to law, 209;


on slavery, 411. 


STAUDINGER, H. J., III, considers a virus 
is a micro organism that has degenerated,


84. 
STANLEY, III, and WYCKOFF'S discovery ofthe virus, 84. 

STARKE, C. N., III, criticized L. MORGAN'Sconstructive theory of the rise of thehuman family, 331. 

STATE, THE, I, composed of individualsby means of a social contract, in HOBBES, 

222 

217; in ROUSSEAU, • HOBBES, 315, 316; itsbasic law according to CHR. WOLFF, 320. 
—, II, the State is auniversal competencein HEGEL, 396.
—, III, and the polis in PLATO, 164 ; theGreek polis, 169; its internal structurehas various realizations, 171, 173, 175; in 
HOBBES' view, 183; as an institution, 189,

191 ; PROTAGORAS and PLATO on the State,
199, 200, 201 ; ARISTOTLE'S view of the 
State, 201 ff.; PLATO'S three ranks: philosophers, 
soldiers and labourers; the unityof the polis, 207; ARISTOTLE'S concept oftaxis 208-212; forms of government,
209-212; Humanistic natural law resulted 
in State absolutism; from the individualistic 
state of nature the social contract 
led to the civil state, excluding thevery notion of societal relationships independent 
of the state, and even thechurch; HOBBES' Leviathan; Rous SEAU ;
MARSILIUS OF PADUA ; JOHN OF JANDUN,
236; societas inaequalis and societatesaequales; the state's aim is the organizedprotection of the innate rights of man tolife, freedom and property; LOCKE ; salus 
publica as the highest law of the state; inthe utilitarian sense of the "Staatsrfisim";
WOLFF'S police and welfare state abolished 
individual freedom, 237; OTHMARSPANN'S view of the state, 240; the modern 
universalist view of the state as an 
überperson; a hypostasis; HEGEL saysthat the state becomes a person only inthe monarch; the state is the highest realization 
of the "objective spirit' the present 
divine will; breaking (244)9, throughthe boundaries of family and civil society, 
the real "communal" will, its universal 
validity independent of the changingsubjectivity of its individual members,
245; the State is a typical historicallyfounded community of a differentiatedcharacter exhibiting an institutional nature; 
patriarchal joint families, sibs, andprimitive domestic communities have institutional 
traits; also tribal organizationsand medieval guilds; but all these are undifferentiated 
organized communities;
the State is a differentiated organization,
379; Platonic and Aristotelian views 
consider the State as the totality ofhuman society; ARISTOTLE'S polis isthe societas perfecta, autarchic, aimingat the "good life"; but lacks any internal 
structural limitation ; the State 
is a non-natural institution; this lastfact is not realized in ARISTOTLE'S view;
in PLATO'S and ARISTOTLE'S view of the 
State there is a supra temporal metaphysical 
idea as the normative essence of the 
State, 380 ; PLATO is aware of the structural 
principle of the State when he mentions 
the idea of justice and the monopoly 
of the sword power, which are radicaltypical for the State; the first theoreticalcrisis in the Greek view of the State 'was 
started by the left, wing sophists; the decay 
of Athenian democracy; MACCHIA



 

223STATE, THE 

VELLI'S naturalistic theory of the absolutist 
power State, 381; it was the outcomeof another crisis, prepared by medievalindividualistic nominalism; the decay ofthe Holy Roman Empire and the rise ofthe modern bureaucratic State; the name 
"Stato"; the recent crisis in the Humanistic 
theory of the State; the decline ofthe civic law state; relativism and historicism; 
natural and rational law dependon history; post-Kantian freedom idealism 
proved to be historically conditioned;
there was no room for an invariable normative 
structural principle of the State,
382; CARL SCHMITT on the relativisticdestruction of the ideology of the Stateof the Humanistic faith in reason, 383;
the modern shibboleth of scientific political 
theory is the elimination of all normative 
evaluations; all individual historical 
phenomena are manifested in socialindividuality structures which as suchare not modal historical; e.g. the Battleof Waterloo; variable social forms realizing 
the State institution are not to beconfounded with the State's structural 
principle; modern Roman Catholic institutional 
theory; M. HAURIOU was first influenced 
by Comtian positivism, then bythe philosophy of life, and finally founded 
his conception of the State in a semi-
Platonic metaphysical State-idea; G. RENARD'S 
"La thêorie de l'institution" accommodates 
HAURIOU'S theory to traditional 
Thomism, 384 ; the structural principle 
of the State makes possible our experience 
of its transient formations; modern 
political theorists separated "Sein"
from "Sollen", i.e., an empirical and anormative sociology of the State; GEORGJELLINEK could not indicate the startingpoint for a synthesis of these two; theState was either conceived as a subjectivesynthesis of social psychical relations into 
a teleological unity; or as a logical system 
of legal norms, 384, 385; LUDWIGWALDECKER'S nominalistic functionalistic 
theory; he levels the State with "allother organizations", and even calls theChurch a State; MAX WEBER calls a modern 
state a large scale business; KELSENagrees with this, 386; LASKI : the State is 
like a Miners' Federation KELSEN : the 
State is a logical system of legal norms;
HELLER: "a plebiscite de tous les jours";
a structural not a historical phenomenon,
387, 388; SMEND : the State is in a perpetual 
process of renewal; HELLER: thestructure of the State is a cross section of 
the stream of history, 389; its functionsand structure are changeable, 390; anopen configuration, 391; its moral juridical 
principles are not supra-historical,
392; also HELLER speaks of the decisionof the moment being superior to any principle; 
his scholastic classification, 393;
he adheres to the absolutist theory of Bo-
DIN, 394, 395, 396; the crisis in the theoryof the State was connected with the poli


tical crisis and the economical crisis between 
the two world wars, 396; Fascismand National socialism meant a barbarian 
subversion of all values in the Christian 
and Humanist traditions; their background 
was modern irrationalism 'with itspolitical myths and technical mass psychology; 
the totalitarian state; sacrificing 
individual man, and appealing to thespiritually uprooted mass-man ; the basicproblem of political theory is the relationbetween might and right; the contrast between 
law State and absolutist powerState, 397 ; KALLIKLES' super-man ; PLATO'Sjustice-ruled State; PLATO and ARISTOTLEdid not overcome the totalitarian idea of 
the State; the Greek form-matter schemeimplied a religious absolutization of thecultural aspect whose nuclear meaning ispower; the polis had unlimited competence; 
which gave rise to a dialecticaltension with the idea of justice; the contrast 
between might and right in Humanism; 
the naturalist "Staatsrdson"; Bo-
DIN'S absolutist notion of sovereignty; thealternate supremacy of the personalityand of the science ideal, 398; the personality 
idealists opposed "inalienable human 
rights" to the absolutist sovereigntyof the State without denying such sovereignty; 
MACCHIAVELLI'S "raison d'etat";
Fascism and National Socialism tried to 
adapt their totalitarianism to the idea ofthe law state; different conceptions ofthe law State; and of the power State;
GIERKE'S view; he would not sacrifice theidea of the law State to "historical reality"; 
but he opposed the actual State tothe legal order, 399; the State is the historical 
political aspect of a national community; 
the internally contradictory dualism 
of might and right in the "empirical" 
and normative juridical theory (LABAND, 
GERBER, BUYS, JELLINEK) , 400; thefierce controversy between the juridicaland the naturalistic schools; KELSEN; 
MARCK, 401; Christian theories of the 
State were vitiated by synthesis philosophy; 
the error of the "dialectical theology"; 
constraining power is not per se demonical; 
EMIL BRUNNER'S view; he denies 
the possibility of a Protestant philosophy 
of law and of the State; RomanCatholic theory of the State starts fromAristotelian "natural law"; in the StateReformed thought finds three factors:
communion (due to creation) ; legal constraint 
(related to sin) ; and a semi demonic 
craving for power; (the State's essential 
nature is here power), 402; Elvin,
BRUNNER relapses into the theory of the 
State which synthesizes his Christian viewwith the immanence standpoint; he projects 
his own dialectical view into Christianity; 
he is infected by the contrastbetween nature and grace; his commandment 
of loVe of the moment and law • as 
such; the structure of the State, however,

cannot be internally anti-nomic; BRUN



 

STATE, THE224 

NER confuses structure and its positivization, 
403; he derives the power of theState from the divine will and at the 
same time he calls the State secular, not 
sacred; power he calls an irrational product 
of history; his law concept is neo-
Kantian positivism; his idea of community 
is irrationalistic phenomenological;
organization is the typical foundation ofthe State, 404 ; social forms are realizations 
of the societal structural principlesand have a phenotypical character; suchforms are nodal points of enkaptic interlacements; 
the structural aspect of theState's radical type has no factual duration; 
but is a structural condition of anybody politic; its organization is the historical 
foundation of the State; organization 
is not founded in nature, but the result 
of the historical formgiving activityof man; in HELLER'S and PLENGE'S theory"organization" lacks any structural meaning, 
405; organization versus organism inRomantic philosophy; FICHTE replacedSCHELLING'S term "organism" by "organization"; 
MARx "mechanized" the term "organization"; 
GIERKE considered all organized 
communities as "personal spiritual 
organisms"; under the influence ofSCHELLING he wrote that "originallyStates arise and grow, without any cooperation 
of a conscious creative will, asthe natural product of the unconscioussocial impulse", 406; positivism identifies 
"organization" with "social ordering", 
406; psychical conventions or normsbring about a certain regularity in socialbehaviour, which is the social "organism"; 
jurists understand the social organism 
in a functional juridical sense;
the unity of the organization is then fictitious; 
HELLER denies the identity of organization 
and ordering; organization isa collective unity of action, 407; its "organs" 
and its "unity of action"; TONNIES'
"association" and its arbitrary volition,
opposed to "social organism" with its"natural volition ;"; SIEGFRIED MARCK'S 
antithesis between organization and organism; 
FR. DARMSTAEDTER'S interpretation 
of this contrast is related to the Kantian 
opposition between autonomy andheteronomy, 408; the law State partakesof the nature of an "organism"; thepower State is an organization ; the Stateis self-contained; DARMSTAEDTER relates 
State and law as natural reality tovalues, viz. those of regulation andgovernmental power; its natural realityis: a multitude of people; law is a valuecommanding or prohibiting certain waysof behaviour; the value attached to the 
State is the power of the magistrate;
thus there arises an internal antinomybetween might and right, 409; the valuelaw and the value State are mutually exclusive; 
the State must be an instrumental 
value with regard to law as a value in itself; 
criticism of this view, 410; Church 

and State differ radically; they do notdiffer only specifically; the term "organized 
communities" denotes a transcendental 
difference from "natural" communities; 
there is no ultimate genus of organized 
communities; radical types are theultimate genera of the individuality structures, 
411; a rising State structure destroys 
tribal and gentilitial powers, etc.
the State is a res publica; political authority 
is a public office, not a private property; 
ancient Asiatic empires; Merovingian 
and medieval kingdoms; they wereno real States; res regia versus res publica, 
412; radical and geno-types; theState is a genotype of societal relationship, 
the State is a typical historical pOwer 
organization; other power organizations, 
413; sword power over a culturalarea within a territory; this power implies 
a task, a vocation; German myth ofblood relationship as the foundation ofthe State was not meant in a mere biotical 
sense; the racial Nazi ideology wasnot naturalistic, but irrational-historicistic, 
414; the myth of Italian fascism fellback on the old idea of the eternal Roman 
empire; both wanted to elevate "the cultural 
race" (or in the Italian version the"national State") to a "spiritual" power;
WALTER HAMEL conceives State and 
people as dialectically connected, 415;
though political power is all-sided, itscomponents are different: the State hascontrol over economical, moral, faith-
and other forms of power; variabilitytypes of the State, 416; but non-politicalorganizations have types of power thatare no internal constituents of the powerof the State; they may be hostile to theState; a rich State may be weak; the mythof the totalitarian State, 417; the monopolistic 
organization of military powerwithin a particular cultural area cohereswith the leading function of the State,

-

i.e. the foundational power function isopened and anticipatory; the differentiation 
in social structures can only occur 
in the anticipatory direction, 418; theseeming antinomy in this state of affairs;
the opening process deepens and doesnot abolish the original foundation of theState; the leading function lacks a nuclear 
type of individuality; the parallelism 
between the State and natural communities, 
419; the basic function of the 
State cannot be ignored; military organizations 
within the State's territoryweaken the State's power; revolutionarychaos, 420; preparation for a revolutionby propaganda and by systematic influence 
on the national conviction; revolution 
can only succeed when the revolutionary 
leaders collar the militarypower, 421; subjective military bearersof power actualize the objective militaryapparatus, but they require the supportof a law abiding army, members recognizing 
their authority as legitimate; organ

 

225STATE, THE 

ized military power is not mere armedcontrol, but has an anticipatory structure;
armed power and the State's territory,
422; the State's military power is relatedto man's fall; the Divine Covenant with 
Noah; the meaning of the phrase "becauseof sin"; Christian synthesis philosophyand the Aristotelian idea of the State, 423; 
the coercive power of the State belongedto relative natural law i.e. natural law 
modified by sin ; the metaphysical schemaof the whole and its parts; an indeterminate 
idea of totality; the fourfold useof a fruitful idea of totality; a. the meaning 
totality; b. the structural moments 
of a meaning aspect; c. the idea of the 
whole of a thing, occurrence, or an individuality 
structure of social life; d. of 
the integration of human societal relations, 
424 ; the qualifying function is notthe end human beings try to reach inthe State; the theory of the purpose ofthe State; the a-priori and axiologicalcharacter of this theory on the immanence 
standpoint; Scholasticism assigneda higher rank to the Church than to theState, 425; Humanistic natural law theorists 
made the Church an instrument in 
the hands of an individual or a community; 
the Classical liberal idea of the lawState; the welfare State; the cultureState; in the Classical natural law stageof the "law State" the purpose of theState construed in the social contract was 
to be limited by the "innate humanrights"; the old liberal non-interferencein society outside the political sphere;
the development of this theory is tracedby J. P. A. MEKKES' standard work, 426;
law was viewed as a purpose outside ofthe State; LOCKE'S law State; KANT'S viewidentifies public and civil law; THOMAsius' 
criterion of law; KANT'S pronouncement 
on the contents of public law, 427;
in MONTESQUIEU'S trias politica the executive 
authority is an alien element; onlythe legal coercion in this view remindsus of the internal structure of the State;
legal coercion is the negation of a negation 
of freedom (injustice) ; KANT'S view:
in external relations to other States the 
body politic is only a power state; KANTdefinies the State as a "union of a multitude 
of a people under legal rules", ignoring 
its foundational function, 428; theidea of the formal legal State; the legalorder limits the activity of the magistrature; 
FRIEDRICH JULIUS STAHL On the law-
State, 429; OTTO BAHR and RUDOLPHGNEIST; legal and utility questions in thetheory of administrative judicature andthe theory of the law-State, 430; State andlaw are identified in the last phase ofthe theory of the law-State; logicist formalism 
of KELSEN'S school; a dictatorialState is here also called a law State, 431;
the Italian fascist and the German National 
Socialist State pretended to realize amaterial, universalistic conception of 

law; the old liberal theory could not stemthe rising tide of the totalitarian idea ofthe State; criticism of KELSEN'S theory,
432; a State can only serve any purposeif its exists as such; rejection of the objective 
metaphysical ideology of the Stateand of the State as an absolute end in itself; 
HEGEL'S conception is objectionable;
so is the organological theory of Romanticism, 
433; the State as a res publica hasto guarantee the stability of its publiclegal order so that its armed force mustbe subordinate to the civil government;
its military power cannot be its leadingfunction; its stable legal order is also theultimate criterion of its existence in international 
law; KELSEN showed that thelegal viewpoint is indispensable; theState's leading function is the juridicalfunction; difference from an organizedgang of armed robbers; this difference isradical, not specific; coherence of leading 
function with foundational functionis expressed in the structure of its authority, 
434 ; governmental authority oversubjects by the strong arm; GIERKE'S discussion 
of the "Obrikeitsstaat" in contrast 
with the "Volksstaat" is misleadingterminologically and historically; theState idea shows a tendency to incorporate 
itself in the whole of the people;
GIERKE is thinking of the Roman autocratic 
imperium idea in opposition to thedemocratic form of government, 435; theState displays a typical juridical character; 
the will of the State is an organizedunity of volitional direction in the organized 
action of a social whole; in a Statethere is no government apart from apeople, and vice versa; the people forma political unity only in the territorial 
organization of government and subjects, 
436; the basis of the unique universality 
and totality of the internal legalcommunity of the State; and the spheresovereignty of non political societalstructures, 437; the State's people are allthe citizens irrespective of family relations, 
church membership, philosophicalconvictions, trades, professions, class distinctions, 
social standing; the State constitutes 
a typical integrating politicalunity; this integration is bound to structural 
typical principle; i.e. to the publicjuridical function and in the "public interest", 
438; the structure of the internal 
public law; public interest gives a typical 
material legal meaning to the internalpublic law of the State; it embraces legalorganizational and behaviour norms regulating 
the organization and competences 
of the State's organs; different branches 
of the State's task; KELSEN'S formalistic 
view of public law; KRABBE'S and VANIDsrNGA's historicistic psychological view;
the appeal to medieval legal conditions;
the petitio principii in the supposed "objectiVe!' 
historical demonstration; VONBELOW'S studies of "medieval German 


 

STATE; THE226 

State"; the modern British legal system,
439; British "common law"; what doesit mean? DICEY'S erroneous praise of thissystem ; the French Conseil d'Etat's application 
of typical public legal principles 
to the State's responsibility; VONBELOW'S error; yet he insists on the necessity 
of some structural theoretical insight 
into the nature of the State and onsome juridical training of historians,440;
different periods and conditions in theMiddle Ages; the real meaning of the absolitist 
idea of the State and the true idea 
of the law-State, 441; public interest andits limits; salus publica and reasons ofState; WOLFF'S natural law theory of thepolice State; HOBBES' and ROUSSEAU'S Leviathan 
State; LOCKE'S AND KANT'S liberalconstitutional State; modern totalitariantheories; PLATO and FICHTE defendedState-education ; PLATO abolished marriagein the public interest; just like ARISTOTLE; 
ROUSSEAU wanted to destroy all private 
associations; WOLFF wanted the government 
to control everything human;
even to fix the church-confessions, HUGOGROTIUS and the salus publica, 442; S.
PUFENDORFF; the antinomy in WOLFF'Sdoctrine; ARISTOTLE'S autarchical "perfect 
community" for the "good life"; thisview knows no freedom outside of the 
State; ROUSSEAU'S idea of "salus publica",
equality, the exclusion of private individual 
privileges; the general will; absolutepower of the State; CHR. WOLFF : eudaemonist 
theory of natural law; his mention 
of a collisio legum; necessity breakslaw, 443; salus publica is: a sufficient,
quiet and safe life; KANT wished to givethe idea of public interest a non-eudaemonistic 
and anti-absolutist meaning; theconstitutional principle should containthe a-priori juridical norms realizable asa duty prescribed by the categorical imperative; 
his law-State with the idea ofthe trias politica, 444 ; salus publica anddistributive justice; the proportional distribution 
of public communal chargesand benefits; PAUL DUEZ' on this publiclegal standard; it is an integrating principle; 
externally the State's task cannotbe delimited; but governmental interference 
with the life of the nation is subject 
to the inner vital law of the bodypolitic, 445; State activity must be guided 
by the idea of public social justice;
and recognise the sphere sovereignty ofthe various societal relationships; publichealth matters; public law is correlatedwith private common law, 446; the Carolingian 
State; the Roman republic; thelaw of the twelve tables; CL0vIS' lex Salica; 
jus gentium developed the idea ofcommon private law; then a world lawgranting legal equality to free men; thisworld law is connected with ius naturale; 
a Stoic conception, 447; the innernature of the Roman ius gentuim, 448;
public and private law in Rome; private 

law 'bound to the res publica; outside of

the res publica there was no room for an

-

inter-individual common legal spherebased on the natural law principle ofequality and freedom of all free individuals 
as such; jus gentium superseded thejus civile; JUSTINIAN'S code; classical private 
common law was the work of the 
Roman lawyers, 449; the task of the praetor 
in private common law; Roman lawinfluenced continental legislation; in England 
Roman law had only little influence;
here feudal law was transformed into 
common private law also by the formative 
activity of judicial organs of theState; another example is given by theScandinavian States; there is a differencebetween popular tribal law and commonprivate law, 450; common private law isby its nature bound to the State; it bindsany specific (non-juridically qualified)
private law enkaptically to the principlesof inter-individual justice, legal security,
and equity; but the internal spheres ofspecific kinds of private law remainexempt from the State's competence; theState as an instrument of oppression; depreciation 
of the principles of public in-.
trest, civil freedom and equality in positivistic 
sociology; the Humanist naturallaw doctrine of the 18th century absolutized 
the State's private common law;
BODIN'S idea of sovereignty, 451; BODINand MONTESQUIEU continued to identifythe res publica with the whole of human-
society in the classical Roman way;
LOCKE broke with this tradition; theState was marked off from non-politicalcivil society, which latter was an economic system of free market relations; ST.
SIMON and AUGUSTE COMTE, 452 ; ST. SIMON 
held that political changes dependon economic factors in "civil" society;
COMTE added: and on a change in ideas;
the State is a secondary product of "civil"
society; civil property creates differentsocial classes; the ruling class assumespolitical authority; GALILEO and NEWTON'S 
natural scientific method should be 
applied in sociology without assumingany norms; then they combined the newsociology with historical thought (of theRestoration) ; COMTE'S view of sociology,
453; the three stages; law of continuousprogress; a military, theological stage; ametaphysical phase; an industrial type ofsociety; polytheism produces many military 
States; Christian monotheism separated 
priestly and secular power, ' restricted 
war by feudalism, abolished slavery; 
towns arose; then came industrialism; 
the intermediate period is inorganic, 
metaphysical, 454 ; ST. SIMON predicted 
the disappearance of the State andits substitution by an economic planningorganization; COMTE said that a new morality 
will arise; social duties will takeprecedence of private rights; COMTE rejects 
communism; private property is a 


 

227STATE, THE 

social function; there will be a universal 
European political community; there willnot be a civil law order; Marxism; after 
socialism has destroyed the capitalistclass, society will be communistic; publicand private law will vanish, 455; the united 
world proletariat; Marxian Hegelianism; 
his historic materialism; the State is 
an escape from civil society torn by classstruggle, 456; ENGELS describes the origin 
of the State in primitive society; theState serves the interests of the rulingclass; Marxism holds the State to be a 
mere ideology; ENGELS predicted that theState will die out; also its civil legalorder will disappear; Marxism agreedwith JOHN LOCKE, 457; LOCKE thoughtthat the highest duty of the State was theprotection of property; ROUSSEAU soughtits origin in the sanctioning of the crimeof forceful seizure; PROUDHON said "property 
is theft"; Bolshevist view of theState, penal and private common law;
PASJOEKANIS bound law to commodityexchange; its determining principle isequivalency; the origin of the State is theextension of a market community embraced 
by the class-organization of power; 
market relations between the State 
industries necessitate civil and publiclaw; the Soviet Community demands rulescalled "economical law" as long as theyare maintained with coercion; STALIN'S 
policy inspired the work: "The Law ofthe Soviet State" written under the 
guidance of WYSJINKIJ ; in it the division 
into civil and economic law is 
condemned; the Soviet Civil Code of 
1923 influenced by DUGUIT, 459; civilrights serviceable to Soviet social economic 
aims are protected by the State;
EMILE DURKHEIM'S views; DUGUIT denies 
the human rights of the natural law doctrine, 
viz. freedom and equality, as metaphysics; 
there is only "objective" laworiginating in the laws of solidarity; inprimitive society there is solidarity bysimilitude; in differentiated societies 
there is solidarity by division of labour;
the former has penal law; the latter contractual 
order, 460; DUGUIT thinks the State 
is the factual relation of force between 
stronger and weaker individuals; coercionand obedience; objective law is sociallaw; composed of socio-economic rulesand customs of propriety in industrialand occupational life; these rules are feltto be just; they become legal rules;
DUGUIT'S concept of sovereignty of thelaw from a naturalistic sociologicalviewpoint; KRABBE from an ethical 
psychological, and KELSEN from a normological 
viewpoint; law needs no humanformation, for it is a spontaneous reflexof social relations; the Romantic doctrine 
of the Historical School, 461 ; BESELERand GIERKE ; in Ducures "Traitê de droit 
constitutionel" the formative factor in 
law is again recognized; normative and 

constructive legal rules; • he describesthe transformation of civil private lawand public law; jus naturae et gentiumand the State proved to be no mere metaphysical 
ideas; his "sovereignty of law"
is only the sovereignty of the typical industrial 
legal sphere, 462; his transformation 
of the State is its abolition; subjective 
civil rights cannot be abandoned;
LOUIS JOSSERAND On subjective civil 
rights; they should be in accordance withthe social-economic function ; JOSSERAND 
on the abuse of rights; his view had itsprototype in the first article of the Russian 
civil law Code of 1923; it is rejectedby the Dutch Supreme Court, 463; theRussian State has not become a communist 
society nor a syndicalistic organization 
in the sense of DUGUIT; the Russian 
State industries are real industrial or-
z-5oanizations enkaptically bound by thebody politic, the State being proprietorand entrepreneur; a socialist State canonly exist according to its structure asan authoritative public legal communityfounded in a monopolistic organizationof military power; it cannot exist without 
a public legal order; LENIN and STAIAN 
realized this fact; the Marxian community 
is Utopia; although consistentlyconceived; political pluralism, 464; pluralism 
wants to eliminate the State's 
structure from the projected syndicalistfederation; this means "economic monism"; 
E. BERTH : "the State is dead";
LASKI calls political pluralism "guild socialism"; 
he, too, overstrains the economic 
aspect; DUGUIT also believes in political 
pluralism, 465; we cannot understand 
the structure of the State apart fromits enkaptic interlacements; the body politic 
is always liable to the influence ofclass interests; but it cannot exist at allif it is not a res publica; LORENZ VONSTEIN realized that the State will alwaystry to elevate itself above class interests;
the theory of constitutional law introduced 
the formal juridical method; problemsthat require insight into the structuralprinciple of the State: sovereignty, theparliamentary system; basic rights; etc.;
sociological political theory eliminatesthe structure of the State; "organic suffrage"; 
and medieval craft-guilds, 466;
the State structure expresses itself in 
the moral sphere: love of country; reawakening 
of patriotism; a struggle forfreedom; J. F. HERDER'S discovery of national 
individuality, 467; he consideredthe nation as a "natural organism" withan entelechy of its own; the HistoricalSchool considered the "national spirit"
as the source of culture; this was irrationalism, 
in direct opposition to Rous-
SEAU, etc.; difference between a primitivefolk and a nation; folklore and ethnology; 
GURVITCH supra functional view of anational community; influenced by theHistorical School, 468; what is a national 


 

STATE, THE 228 

science, art, industry, Church? the genotypical 
structure of a nation and its enkaptic 
interlacements with other societalindividuality structures; the meanings ofthe terns "national"; a nation is not a natural 
community but the result of political 
form-giving; its individuality revealsitself in its enkaptic intertwinements withother societal relationships, 469; the irrationalistic 
universalistic view of a nation; 
R. VON JHERING described his conception 
of the Roman national character;
his error; the geno-typical characteristicsof a nation ; of the Dutch nation ; Stateand nation have the same radical type; ina democratic constitution only the nationhas original political competence; theHumanistic sovereignty of the people,
470; the former Danube monarchy was apluri-national State; love of country depends 
on the political structure; nationalstruggle for freedom; true patriotism; itsway may lead through blood and tears;
the State is "on account of sin"; the demonic 
joy in the "strong State" is anti-
Christian, 471; love of country is not objective, 
but subjective in the State'speople; principium exclusiae collisionisofficiorum; limits to love of country;
ARISTOTLE'S view, 472; love betweenChurch members; between the membersof a family; there cannot be a collisio officiorum 
; because of the principium exclusiae 
antinomiae; but there may arisepainful tensions; conflicts lie on the subject-
side of social life; international relations, 
473; states have external intercommunal 
relations; difference betweeninternal and foreign policy; KANT'S individualistic 
project of a league of nations; 
we must distinguish between international 
private relations and public interests; 
the danger in "reasons of State",
474; obligatory arbitration in disputes, inthe Acte generale of 1928 of the formerLeague of nations; the San FranciscoCharter and the position of the small nations; 
the United Nations, 475; the oldindividualist dogma of sovereignty; the"sacred egotism" of the States; the internal 
vital law of the State is not a 
law of nature, but bears a normative character; 
KAIN'S policy is no fate; love ofcountry has its counterweight in international 
love of one's neighbour amongthe nations; absolutized patriotism becomes 
blind chauvinism; the commandment 
of temporal love is valid also internationally, 
476; the norm of love doesnot require submission to a usurper; constitutional 
forms; the organization of political 
power; enkapsis with other formsof power (e.g. economic power) ; v. HALLER'S 
patrimonical theory of the State,
477; GROEN'S view, and its later change;
the notion of "the medieval town"; thepolitical power of the guilds, 478; ARISTOTLE, 
called democracy the rule of thepoor; the relation between the State and 

economically qualified classes; franchiseand property; economical types may beinterwoven with types of political power;
the modern view of social democracy;
the aesthetic aspect of the State; PLATo's

-

aesthetical idea of social classes; ARISTOTLE'S 
Politica requires politics to be a"symphony"; the Romantic exaggerationof the aesthetic motif, 479 ; CALVIN pointed 
to the aesthetic aspect as a "well-ordered 
condition", opposed to anarchy;
political "symmetria", "proportia"; political 
economy; OTTMAR SPANN'S view ofthe State and economy, 480, 481; HERMANN 
HELLER also holds the State and 
economy to be autonomous; free economic 
market relations and the State are 
only enkaptically bound; the State's structure 
necessarily expresses itself internally 
in the economic aspect; internalpolitical economy is a territorial compulsory 
economy opened in the typical direction 
to the x public juridical leadingfunction of the State: taxation ; income 
and capital, 481; the modal economicalprinciple of a frugal administration ofscanty means, in the alternative choiceof their destination, according to a well-
balanced scale of needs; the economicalvalue of the military apparatus, the police, roads, etc., for the economy of theState; deviation from the prices in thefree market may be justifiable; "theState's economy wants to attain non-economic 
purposes" is a destructive view;
for it excludes the question as to what(not how) is economic; the integrationof the State in political economy; the absolutist 
economical-State-autarchy, 482;
modern large scale ordering of nationaleconomy; the danger of totalitarianism;
ordering should be led by the juridicalidea of public interest; complete economical 
autarchy is impossible; autarchyimplies the subservience of economicproduction to the power policy; FICHTE'Sclosed commercial State; its disastrouseffect on States poor in raw materials,
483; its counterpart is an imperialisticforeign policy; RUDOLF KJELLEN defendsthe autarchical principle as concernedwith the individuality of the State; • buthe warns against making autarchy intothe worship of a fetish, 484; WOLDEMARKocH's description of Fascist economicprogramme; it depends on the power ofthe nation and complete autarchy is impossible 
to Italy, 484, 485 ; German Naziautarchy; HEINRICH STOLL'S book; theState's function in the aspect of socialintercourse : public ceremonies, honoursto national symbols, national festivals;
national honour; an offence to thenational honour concerns the entire 
structure of the State, and ultimatelyaffects the honour of God as the 
Sovereign, 485; national honour in international 
relations; discourtesy to ambassadors 
created a casus belli in ancient 


 

229STATE, THE 

Rome; David's punitive war against theAmmonites; in the individuality structures 
of human society all the modalnorms are indissolubly interwoven; armyrules, of discipline and" the State's qualifying 
function; the State is a typical integrating 
whole uniting a plurality intoa unity also in its internal aspect of social 
intercourse, 486; the State cannotabolish class-distinctions; but only integrate 
them in the structure of politicalintercourse; a compulsory manner of saluting 
imposed on non-political intercourse 
rouses aversion and ridicule; theState's lingual function : objective symbols; 
SMEND called them symbolical summaries 
of "material integrating factors";
titles, badges; the State's integration ofverbal languages within its territoryshould be bound to juridical public justice, 
487; the Belgian revolution againstHolland is an example of political failurein linguistic matters; political culturalunity of the nation; national musea; monuments; 
national festivities, anniversaries; 
national history taught in schools;
science and art are promoted; the publicinterest and public justice should guidethese activities of the State, 488; the cultural 
task of the State should respect thesphere sovereignty of non-political organized 
communities; the political functionof communal thought; disintegrating effects 
of party strife, economic class-warfare, 
etc., 489; "public opinion" influences the political will of the nation; mo-dern 
formers of public opinion; press,
radio, television; in autocracy and in democracy 
public opinion is important; especially 
in dictator ridden nations; politicians 
and parties mould public opinion,
490; public opinion is not composed of anumber of opposing "public opinions"
formed by classes or parties; it is not aparty-cry; it is the communal opinion ofthe leading groups; it transcends difference 
of parties and of interests; it has anintegrating function under the guidanceof public societal justice; HEGEL'S view,
491; public opinion may be led astray;
the thought of the day is not public opinion; 
the government's .formative task 
with regard to publ. opin.; it cannot govern 
in opposition to a truly national conviction; 
but public opinion does not govern 
although it has an integrating function 
: it is a strongly emotionally boundthought founded in the political emotional 
structure; the naturalistic sociologicaltheories conceive of the State as a systemof intensive psychological interactions,
492; or as the chance of a unifiedphysic°psychical process of humancooperation; or as a biotic organism;
as the product of racial strugglesor class warfare; KELSEN'S criticism ofthis view is irrefutable; the natural aspects 
of the State cannot be understoodfunctionally; only in a normative jimidi


cally qualified individuality structure;
they are the result of formative politicalactivity; the naturalistic conception iscrypto-ethical political, says KELSEN;
psychical interactions do not stop at theState's frontiers; the feeling of nationalsolidarity binds government, country,
and nation, 493; this feeling only revealsitself in the modal historical and juridical 
anticipatory spheres of the psychicalaspect; and is related to the State's sensory 
objectivity, — in the subject-objectrelation ; — this feeling is enkapticallyinterwoven with international relations; 
its biotic aspect: the State also functionsas a vital community of government,
country, and nation; as such it is not anatural datum but a structural aspect ofpolitical formation; the State's territoryis the objective vital space of the nation,
494 ; as a politically opened and organized 
space; a political form of life; theracial problem; three original main races;
primary or natural races; grounded inblood relationship; "racial" soul; "racialmind"; anatomical criteria, 495; ALFR.
ROSENBERG'S racial theory used to justifyHITLER'S anti-semitic cruelties; CHAMBERLAIN'S 
pan Germanism and anti-semitism;
PEARSON'S theory of the right to exterminate 
"inferior" races; the baseless hypotheses 
of the polygenetic origin of thehuman races; fallacious assumption ofNordic or Aryan race was based on linguistic 
theories concerning Sanskrit;
GUNTHER'S and WOLFF'S political theorieson races; H. ST. CHAMBERLAIN'S feelingsabout "race" in his "own heart", 496;
differences between the races; inferiority 
of the negro, although education candisclose capabilities; the racial problemin South Africa; is an obstacle to national 
political unity; natural law ideas cannot 
be realized there; a white minorityis in a precarious condition; the formation 
of a national biotical type; assimilation 
of foreign elements; the State andthe nation create "the blood", 497; biopolitics; 
negro and kaffir problems inSth. Africa and the U.S.A.; integration depends 
on the normative leading functionof the State; tyranny, 498; the doctrineof the State's territory; 1. the object theory; 
2. the subject theory; 3. the competence 
theory, 499; the territory of theState has an objective public juridicalqualification; its political geometricalstructure : boundaries, extent, politicalcentre, peripheral parts; in faith thestructural principle of the State pointsto the religious root of the State institution, 
500; because it is a societal structure 
of man's own temporal existence;
this structure enables the State to function 
as such in faith; must the State bea Christian community? — the State andthe Church, 501; the Christian charactermust not be imparted to the State fromoutside; not even from the Church; the 


 

STATE EDUCATION

structure of the State can express itselfin a Christian faith community; the possibility 
of truly Christian politics; pseudo 
arguments against the idea of a Christian 
State, as well as in favour of an 
ecclesiastical State, 502; the State's faith 
is not always Christian, it may be pagan;
but the State always functions in somefaith; it is never neutral; its modal revelational 
principle assumes a politicaltype of individuality; God is the Originof all authority, the Holy Avenger of iniquity; 
might and right find their unity 
in the Divine Sovereign as well as theirself-sufficient fulness of being; this Revelational 
principle is the politico-pisteuticnorm; it is revealed in the Divine Word; 
the State is "on account of sin"; outside 
the Written Revelation the political revelational 
principle turns into a law of sin,
the idolatry of Mars or of Dike, etc.; theState's structure can only reveal itself ata disclosed level of culture, 503; God's 
sovereignty over the State can only beaccepted by us in its true sense if we recognize 
the "regnum Christi"; a merely"natural" belief is apostasy; Christ is the"Prince of the Kings of the earth", 504;
the State cannot have a church confession; 
in a truly Christian life the spheresovereignty of the various societal structures 
is respected; a Church should havea binding confession; the Christian Stateunites the whole nation into a Christian 
political faith community in the confession 
of God's sovereignty in Jesus Christas the Sovereign of all earthly sovereigns,
505; Christ is the King of common grace;
common grace and special grace; not tworealms; the State belongs to the generaltemporal life of the world, like the familyand other non-ecclesiastical societal 
structures; the State has a general soteriological 
vocation ; a pagan State remains 
a State; the Church can only beChristian ; common grace embraces "thegood and the evil together" and is restricted 
to temporal life; special grace concerns 
the renewal of the religious root ofthe creation in Christ Jesus, 506; particular 
grace is the real root and founda


tion of common grace; a State divorced 
from the new root of life owes its 
apostatic manifestation to the civitas terrena; 
its structural office is maintained; 
hence our duty to struggle for a ChristianState; the religious antithesis in the political 
struggle; the Christian conceptionmust secure historical power in the national 
conscience as the basis of Christian 
politics, 507; official prayer shouldnot ignore Christ's kingship; the life offaith is not merely individual, but alsocommunal; this holds for a Christian 
Church community as much as for aChristian State, 508. 

STATE EDUCATION, III, defended byFICHTE, 442. 

230 

STATE OF NATURE, I, bellum omnium Contra 
omnes, — in HOBBES -, 317. 

STATUTE-LAW, I, in ROUSSEAU, 322. 

STEIN, HEINRICH VON, II, 
Die Entstehung der neueren Aesthetik,


346. 
STENZEL, J., II, on phonemes, 224. 
STEPHANI, JOACHIM, III, 
Institutiones juris canonici, 515. 
STEPHANI, MATTHAEUS, III, 
Tractatus de jurisdictione, 515. 


STEPHANI BROTHERS, III, Church government, 
ad interim since the Peace of Augsburg, 
had devolved upon the Protestant
sovereigns as an extension of the jus advocatiae; 
the sovereign has secular authority 
jure proprio, and ecclesiastical
authority concessione imperatoris lodged
with him instar depositi; this is the episcopal 
system, justified by an appeal to the
nature of the matter and to Holy Scripture, 
516. 


STERN, W., III, 
Die differentielle Psychologie in ihren
methodischen Grundlagen, 81. 


STIMULUS AND SENSATION, III, adequate
and inadequate stimuli of the sense organs, 
41; the necessary relation between
stimulus and sensation according to
RIEHL, 44. 


STOECHIOMETRICAL LAWS, III, of LAVOISIER, 
PROUST, DALTON; and the conclusion 
that atoms do not change essentially, 704. 


STOICISM, I, Stoic motives in Renaissance 
thought, 198; its idea of the "GoldenAge" in ROUSSEAU, 317.
—, II, the rights of man as such andthe rationalistic Idea of Humanity hadbeen derived from the Stoical Idea of 
world-citizenship and from a secularizedChristian view of freedom and personality, 
358.
—, III, the Stoics idea of mankind, 
169; ARISTOTLE'S "social impulse" wasdenatured in the Stoic theory of the"appetitus socialis"; ARISTOTLE'S nous,
eidê, orexis, became : immanent world 
logos (with its pneuma) ; the Stoic logoispermatikoi; orexis became syndesmosor material coherence, 224 ; cosmic pneuma 
with its tension permeates matter (hypokeimenon 
as the principle of paschein,
the passive undergoing) internally, and 
limits it externally; inorganic naturewith pneuma as cohesion (hexis) ; inplants physis or growth; in living feelingbeings psyche (or soul) ; in man logos orreason; logos in man is the product ofevolution from perceptions and representations; 
Middle and Late Roman Stoi 
cism classifies things into corpora unita, . 
corpora composita, and corpora ex dis



231 STRATAGEM OF REASON 

tantibus [this classification is a transformation 
of ARISTOTLE'S taxis doctrine;]
world soul, inorganic things, plants, animals, 
men ; — inorganic things made byman; — composites whose unity has beengiven to them by the craftsman; — lastlythe universitates rerum aut personarum,
things without mutual sensory points ofcontact, e.g., communal relationships ofhuman society; and of animals; theirnames express the tenor binding them into 
a unity; the functional-juridical bondholds the individuals together, 226; inStoic psychology reason is given hegemony; 
the theory of the inner tonos originated 
in pantheistic universalism in keeping 
with a naturalistic monism, permitsthe essences of individual things to fusetogether, 227; it is cosmopolitan; the autarchical 
sage does not require any externalmeans for his happiness; his inclinationto live up to the lex naturalis enableshim to be independent of positive humansocial relationships; also of the State,
228; the Stoics taught the substantial unity 
of all things; the appetitus socialis isnot the foundation of social relationshipsin their particular inner structure, but interms of an external functional point ofview, 228; they valued the influence ofpositive law in the State, 228 ; their cosmopolitan 
ideal of society; viz. a worldkingdom in which men live like a grazingherd under the common law, without 
marriage, family, temple or judicature;
they equallized veritable organized communities 
with coordinate inter-individual 
societal relations; their theory of naturallaw, original freedom and equality of allmen in the "golden age of innocence",
229; the late Stoic theory of the State andof organized communities shows no special 
relation to their psychology, 231; the

relation of authority and subordinationis based on the legal order restraininghuman dissoluteness; natural law does 
not permit subordination; Stoicism tended 
towards the theory of the social contract, 
231; Roman stoicism was influenced 
by the republican theory of Romanjurists basing the authority of the Statein the consensus populi, 232. 

STOKER, Dr H. G., I, 
The New Philosophy at the Free University, 
94;
The Philosophy of the Idea of Creation,


94. 
—, I, he thinks the Idea of creation all-
embracing and the cosmonomic Idea a
narrower basic Idea, 94; his questionabout the refraction of the meaning totality 
into coherent modal aspects by cosmic 
time, 106. 

--, II, on the substance concept, 32. 
—, III, 
Die Wijsbegeerte van die Skeppingsidee,
66, 67.
—, III, his concept of substance, 62; time 


is not the cause of the continuous unityof a thing; time is not empty; STOKER 
thinks that time is added to the modal 
structure ; this is an error, 64 ; his Ideaof Creation conceives of the unity of athing in a new concept of substance,
apart from the modal horizon of our experience; 
does created reality only possess 
meaning? substance is conceived asan other conic section of the cosmos according 
to STOKER; his substantial causality 
in a thing structure, 66; his substanceis not metaphysical ousia; he calls thesubstantial unity of a thing "force", "dynamic 
reality", "will", "love"; presumable 
influence of SCHELER; of neo-Scholasticism; 
STOKER cannot agree with ourrejection of the dichotomy of body andsoul, 67; he assumes a hidden energy,
etc., in the substantial core of created 
things behind "meaning" and behind theessential meaning coherence determiningthe existence of all things; he therebytries to transcend the meaning horizonby means of the absolutization of analogies; 
energy, force, and love, and willcannot be the same within the temporalmeaning horizon, if these terms have ageneral sense, we can build a whole speculative 
theory on them, 68; the imagoDei; criticism of STOKER'S "will" concept,
69; the attempt to find a substantial kernelof things created beyond the meaning horizon 
is meaningless; STOKER denies the 
metaphysical character of his substanceconcept, 69; his terminology is influencedby irrationalism, e.g. his conception offorce as the substantial kernel of things,
70; he identifies volitional force with 
love; this view is a speculation borrowed 
from a romantic turn in the Humanist 
freedom motive; he speaks of the"autonomous being and value of the cosmos 
with respect to God", 71; RomanCatholic writers raise the same objectionto the cancellation of the substance concept 
as STOKER does, 72 ; summary of theobjections against STOKER'S substance 
concept, 74; STOKER rejects the centralposition of mankind in our earthly cosmos; 
he wants to view everything "in itsimmediate relation to God" without the 
intermediary of Christ; his two "conicsections of the cosmos", 75; STOKER'S 
view runs the risk of landing in theism,

76. 
STOLL, Dr HEINRICH, III, 

Deutsches Bauernrecht, 485.
—, III, German national socialistic ideaof autarchy was to be accomplished bymeans of a compulsory organization ofthe farmers in a "Reichsnahrstand" and 
by the "Erbhofrecht", 485. 

STRATAGEM OF REASON, III, in HEGEL; the 

correlation between the individualizingprocess and the increasing interweavingof the interests of individual persons, 583. 


 

STRUCTURAL PRINCIPLES232 

STRUCTURAL PRINCIPLES, II, and norms, 
and principia, 237; eternal principia, 238;
absolute and empirical norms, 240. 

STRUCTURAL PRINCIPLE AND SUBJECTIVE 
PURPOSE, III, are distinguished by HAURIOU, 
578. 

STRUCTURE, III, as the correlation of elements 
is a modern pseudo-natural scientific 
concept in sociology, 158; and factual 
reality, 171. 

STRUYCKEN, A. A. H., II, 
Het Rechtsbegrip, 400. 

STUFENTHEORIE, III, or EMERGENT evolutionism, 
of WOLTERECK, 733; a geneticmonism accepting irreducible levels ofbecoming; life is then a new level ofreality, and also an emergence of physico-
chemical constellations; this rise of 
different autonomous levels of reality isruled by "structural constants" called.
"autonomous powers", determinants, imagoids, 
"ideas"; this view is antinomic, 

762. 
STUMPF, II, on space perception, 373. 

STURM UND DRANG, I, its typical representatives 
: LAVATER, HAMANN, JACOBI, influenced 
FICHTE; they glorified the activity 
of "genius"; their titanic activitymotive and strong voluntaristic tendency; 
their activistic ideal of personality;
GOETHE'S Faust ; their "ego drama"; activity 
and selfhood are the two poles inthis world of thought; the ide"al "ego". isabsolutized in a limitless subjectivismand elevated to "genius" having in itselfa perfectly individual moral measure ofaction bound to no general norm; SCHILLER'S 
"Rduber says: the law has not yetformed a single great man, but freedomhatchess colossuses and extremities";
HAMANN'S "Socratic Memorabilia"; enthusiasm 
of the deed; its optimism, 452; thismovement still bound to ROUSSEAU by thenaturalistic view of the personality idealexpressed in the watchword "naturalforming of life"; the subjective individuality 
in nature is absolutized; thedepths of this subjective reality can begrasped by feeling only; GOETHE'S Faust:
"Gefiihl ist alles", subjective ethical freedom 
is demanded, unconditional freedom 
of feeling from all dependence; its Humanistic 
personality ideal is irrationalistic 
and oriented to the aesthetic view 
of nature, in polarity with (453) therationalistic science ideal; but this personality 
ideal is not definitively liberatedfrom its counterpole; antinomy is accepted; 
FAUST and PROMETHEUS become the 
favourite problems; KLOPSTOCK'S formulation; 
their irrationalist idea of humanityis derived from feeling; their boundlessreverence for all that man is; the Idea of 
nation (Volk) and State; the individualis part of the totality of an individualcommunity; empathy as a method of the 

historian HERDER; his humanity ideal,
454 ; his impulse toward a sympatheticunderstanding of every individuality inthe cultural process, 455; JACOBI's emotional 
faith and philosophy of feeling, 458,459, 460; KANT'S Critique of AestheticJudgment offered a point of contact tothe feeling philosophy of the Sturm andDrang; SCHILLER'S aesthetic Idealismelevated the aesthetic Aspect to the rootof reality; here SHAFTESBURY'S aestheticethics asserted its influence on KANT, 462. 
—, II, in Germany, and the irrationalizing 
of the personality ideal, 272. 

STYLE, III, in art; a typical historicalanalogy in aesthetic structures, 121; styleLouis XIV, 141, 142. 

SUAREZ, FRANCISCO, I, 
Disputationes Metaphysicae, 203. 

SUAREZ, KARL GOTTLIEB, II, projected the"Preussisches Landrecht", 358. 

SUBJECT, I, is a term used to denote the 
subjection of everything created to theDivine law; in Immanence phil., 108,109; is epistemological in KANT's Kritik

d. r. Vernunft; it is the homo noumenon 
in his Kritik d. pr. Vernunft, 109; thisconcept is turned into that of the law ina special modality in Rationalism, 466.
--, II, the cognitive subject is Reflektionspunkt 
of being in itself, in HARTMANN, 21;
a radical antithesis in the subject-side of 
the root of the earthly cosmos, 32; MALAN 
mixes up subject and law, 84, 85; dimensionality 
in space is not a subject, but alaw-order, 87; spatial magnitude of a figure 
belongs to the modal subject-side ofthe spatial aspect, 87 ; biotic phenomenaare subjects, 108; behaviour is subjectivity; 
Behaviourism, 113; a legal subjectis no real person, 124; subjective feelingof extension, 168; the Subject as the transcendental 
pole of thought in KANT, 368;
a modal subject cannot become an objectin the same law-sphere, 370. 
SUBJECTIVE INDIVIDUALITY, I, in Irrationalistic 
positivism is not bound to laws,
and mocks at all "concepts of thought",

110. 
SUBJECT-OBJECT RELATION, I, is the presupposition 
of the integral character ofnaïve experience, 42; identified with theantithetic Gegenstand relation in dogmatic 
theories of knowledge, 43.
—, II, in space, 87; in sensory space, 168;
semasiological subj.-obj. rel., 227; subj.obj. 
rel. and the historical meaning ofnatural events, 251; subj.-obj. rel. occurboth on the subject and on the law side:
visual objects and subjective sight; sensory 
space is an objective analogy connected 
with subjective spatial feeling;
subjective symbolizing and objective sign;
cultural activity and its object, 366; theHumanistic schema of subject and objectserves as a first orientation; it is im



233 SUBJECT-OBJECT RELATION 


posed on reality; DESCARTES, 367; aschema of theoretical and of practicalreason; in modern thought an object isthat to which our mental activity inthought or volition is directed; in Scholasticism 
the intentional object of cognition 
is distinguished from the subjectivereality of things (esse intentionale, essesubjective, in re) ; in DESCARTES; FRANZBRENTANO, 367; before KANT the subjectwas hypokeimenon (substance) ; sinceKANT the object has been identified withGegenstand; things are gegenstandlichbecause products of the formative process 
applied to sensory intuitions, 368;
objectivity becomes universal validity,
opposed to individual subjectivity;
FICHTE: the object is the non-I; the material 
of our duty; thing in itself, 368; or"substance", either a thing (res), or the"bearer of accidentia"; a real extramental 
Gegenstand of thought or will; thisview was chiefly grammatical; the predicate 
only refers to accidentia; KANTturned the relation into an epistemological 
direction; subject is the transcendental 
pole of thought, its object is thecounter pole, 368; Humanist phil. distinguishes 
cognitive from volitional objects, 
and adapts this distinction to thescheme of science and personality toconstruct the cosmos; there is no cosmological 
analysis of modality structures;
object becomes a general notion ; thebasis of objectivity: substance, transcendental 
logical synthesis, tension betweennature and freedom, transcendental consciousness, 
or being, 369; a modal subject 
cannot become object in the samelaw sphere, 370; and vice versa; objectis not "Gegenstand"; objectivity is notuniversally valid law-conformity; in concrete 
reality subject and object are individual, 
370; the individuality of an object 
is indifferent to that of the subject inthe same sphere; the relation as suchmay become individual; the subj.-obj. relation 
in the psychological sphere of sensory 
perception, 371; perception, representation, 
remembrance are acts, notmodalities, 372; our sensory picture ofspace; psychical objectification is boundto the retrocipatory structure of the feeling-
aspect, 373; numerical, spatial, kinematic, 
physical, organic object functionsimplied in the spatial picture, 373; theorganic function cannot be objectified inany other way than in a modal spatialpicture; also the pre-biotic functions;
pre-psychical subj.-obj. relation : amother-bird feeds its young ones; objectified 
in the sensory image; it is relatedto asubject's sensory perception, 374;
the biotic subj.-obi. relation cannot be reduced 
to sensory impressions (psychological 
empirism), 374 ; hallucination : noidentity sense on the part of the psychol.
subject; dreams; imagination; the representational 
relation; the objective per


ceptible image does not represent theactual pre-psychical subject- and object-
functions; a sensory representation is theoptic copy of an individual image within 
another individual objective perceptual 
image; the inversed copy on the retina 
is another image than the originalobjective image, 375; a sensory copy isan implicit dependent psychical object-
structure; can post-psychical functionsbe objectified in feeling?, 376; not inthe same way as the pre-psychical,
376; modal sphere universality; pre-psychical 
objectifications are given in a natural 
way; naïve concept formation isbound to the sensory image; this imagehas anticipatory objective expressions oflogical characteristics; this expression isgiven as a possibility; subj. log.-feelingmust actualize it; there are axiologicalmoments in perception; the human faceshows logical thought in a concrete actof thinking, 377; human laughing andweeping are rational in the expressionof the face; sensory exterior of thingsshows axiological traits: culture; cultural 
traits in things find an anticipatory 
epxression in their sensory picture,
378; the sensory image of a destroyedcultural area is perceived as a calamity,
379; objectification of symbolical andpost-lingual anticipations in a sensoryimage; a courtesy and its implied symbolism; 
a conventional explicit symbol;
explicit; nonconventional symbolism in

-

music; implicit musical symbolism; andits aesthetical anticipations; abstractsymbols, 380; the modal structure ofa symbolical subj.-obj. relation; a symbol 
has cultural and logical analogies;
the objective beauty of a landscape;
abstract symbols belong to a system; itsfoundation; abstract symbols are qualified 
by their symbolic function, 381;
post-lingual functions; symbols in a disclosed 
society; objectified aesthetic functions; 
forms of social intercourse; faith; 
cult; prayer; their anticipatory expression 
in the sensory image; objectifications 
in various spheres, 382; in space;
this relation occurs in those aspectswhich have retrocipations in earlierspheres; a point is a spatial object, i.e.,
an objectification of number in space,
383; a point's objective spatial functioncannot be isolated from a subjective spatial 
figure, 384 ; spatial magnitude; continuum 
of points is antinomic; a point hasdependent objective existence, 385; subj.obj. 
relation in logical aspect; Realismversus Nominalism, 386, 387; Subj. Obj.
rel. in personal rights in Roman law,
393; v. JHERING eradicates the subj.-obj.
rel. 401; the meaning of slavery; LACTANTIUS 
and SENECA'S statement; STAMMLER'Sview, 411; modern personality and property 
rights; their peculiar subj.-obj. relation; 
KOHLER'S view; copy-right andright to a patent, 412; the impossible 


SUBJECT-OBJECT-RELATION, ENKAPTIC 234 

right to personality; GIERKE'S defini- of function in the new scientific method,
tion; REINHARDT'S view, 413; Subj. Obj. and it serves as a common denominatorrel. and the gnoseological Gegenstand re- for the different modal aspects; LEIBNIZlation, 460; VOLKELT ignores the Subj. calls this "substance" the "abiding lawObj. relation, 476, 478. for a series of changes"; up to KANT the 
—, III, the subject-object relation of "substance" remained conceived of asnaïve experience must not be identi- "Ding an sich"; this was due to the lackfied with the Gegenstand relation, nor of self-reflection of Humanistic thought;
with an ontological theory of naïve DESCARTES' definition of a substance as arealism, 22, 27, 32; copy theory, 34, 35, "res" that exists in itself and is not in36, 38; 44, 46, 47; modal object functions need of anything else to exist; this re-
of a tree, 56, 57 ; the tree has a sensory sembles JOHANNES DAMASCENUS' view, butaspect in an objective macroscopic per- must be taken in an entirely differentceptional image in relation to human sen- sense, 202; SUAREZ' definition has rathersory perception, 98; the structure of a the same formulation in ARISTOTLE; butthing has subject functions that are ob- again of a fundamentally different mean-.
jectified with a plastic structure in its ing; the substance-concept is not essenobjective 
sensory image, so that the bio- tial to the Humanistic science ideal, 203;
tic function becomes its qualifying as- the sole substance with its two attributes,
pect, 105; objectively qualified things, viz., thought and extension, in B. DE SPI-

e.g. beaver dams, ant hills, etc., 107 ; the NOZA, 250, 251; in HUME substance isobjective thing-structure of a sculpture, called a false concept, 291; the concept109-129; that of useful objects, utensils, substance is antinomous, 301.
furniture, etc., 129-145; a chair; its ob- II, a metaphysical concept; foundedjective sensory function is not given in in the absolutization of the Gegenstandnature; its anticipates the two typical ra- relation; excluded from the naïve subj.dical 
functions of the chair, 134, 135; the obj.-relation; ARISTOTLE'S "soul" concept,
objective empirical reality of a thing and 11; subst. is not the "genus proximum"
the subjective actualization of its objec- of its "accidents", 14; STOKER'S substancetive qualification, 146; intentional repre- concept, 32; substance and accidents, 58;
sentation, unfolding, and actualization, matter in classical physics is the sub148, 
149, 150; the actualization of a book's stance of occurrence; NATORP on this, 95 
destination happens when we open the (note) ; the metaphysical concept of sub-
book, turn the pages, and read, 152, 192. stance caused great confusion in the dis-
T cussion of life phenomena, 109; DRIESCH

SUBJECT-OB.TECT-RELATION ENKAPTIC, , 

conceives phenomena of life as a sub-

between animals and plan ts and their ob-

stance with entelechy, 110; epistemol.

jective formations e.g.: the shells of mol-

criticism inferred that the substance is

luscs, 650; the subject-object-relation 

cognizable or not, 430; Subst, and acci


does not detract from the enkaptic form


dentia in ARISTOTLE; was adopted by

totality, 776. 

KANT in a modified form, 445; the sub-
SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE JURIDICAL stance is independent of human expe-

FACTS, II, this distinction is required by rience in pre-Kantian metaphysics, 467; 
the modal subject-object relation, 415. substance or ousia in ARISTOTLE; thoughtSUBJECT-SIDE, I, of meaning and the cos- is related to substance; Ding an sich is ainonomic side, 101. substance in KANT, 496, 506. 

, III, the origin of the metaphysicalSUBMISSIVE INSTINCT, II, power over men concept; ousia; the search for true being,

has a social psychical substratum in the 4; in Neo-Scholasticism, substance is thefeeling drive of submission to the leader- human personality in its concrete unity 

ship of superior figures, 247., and identity, 5; BOETHIUS' definition;

—, III, MCDOUGALL'S theory; VIERKANDT S that 
atat 

of THOMAS AQUINAS; AUGUST BRUN-view, 294. NER, 6; the term "substance" first appea-
SUBSTANCE, I, ousia or substance in ARIS- red in Quintilianus Inst., 7; primary sub-
TOTLE, 44; substance or noumenon, 109; stance in ARISTOTLE; eidos; secondaryin ARISTOTLE'S Metaphysics the subject is substance, 9; this primary substance isidentified with "substance"; composed of foreign to naive experience; ousia is theform and matter, 113 ; every natural sub- primary category of being; its accidentastance 
strives after its own perfection lia; thing in itself; its sensibility is puenclosed 
in its essential form in ARISTO-rely epistemological; its accidents areTLE; his idea of a hierarchy in which the independent of possible perception; qua-
lower form is the matter of a higher litates occultae; difference between sub-
form, 181; in Thomism substance is the stance as "thing in itself" and the naïvecentral category of being, 182; the Aris- thing experience; substance is the firsttotelian-Thomistic concept of substance temporal Gegenstand of theoretical logiwas 
rooted in the Greek form-matter mo- cal thought; ousia synthetos or compotive, 
201; the Modern Humanistic concept site substance, 10; THOMAS AQUINAS holds 
of substance as super-natural "essence" the substance to be unknowable; thein LEIBNIZ' Monadology; it is the concept whole and its components; substance in 


235 SWORDS, THE Two 

ARISTOTLE, is antinomous, 12; forms is the 
cause of matter, is ousia, 13-15; MARLET'S 
interpretation of substance, 16; matter 
is the principium individuationis, also 
in THOMAS; materia quantitate signata;
the subst. concept is a fundamental depreciation 
of individuality, 17; thing andsubstance; function; RUSSELL, 18, 19; the 
concept "energy" has replaced that of"matter" in modern physics; RUSSELL'Sview; he holds the distinction between 
physical and mental to be unreal, 20; hisconcept "event"; matter and mind arelogical structures of relations betweenevents; WHITEHEAD distinguishes eventsfrom objects, 21; a thing with aspects isas useless a concept to RUSSELL as a substance, 
22; NEWTON'S "material units"; 
substance in modern biology, 23; themodern mathematical concept of function 
serves to obliterate the idea of the 
modal and the plastic horizons of experience; 
ARISTOTLE'S ousia was meant to 
account for individuality structures, 26;
DESCARTES' conception of substance; Humanistic 
soul substance before KANT; 
metaphysical concept criticized by HUME,
who influenced RUSSELL; HUME'S relations 
of resemblance and contiguity between 
impressions; KANT'S category ofsubstance, 27 ; RITTER on thing and substance, 
28; substance in STOKER'S view, 
68; ALBERS; MARLET, 72; BAVINK ; KANT, 
100 ; individuality structures are not substances, 
108; FR. OPPENHEIMER calls human 
society a secondary "immortal substance", 
167; KJELLEN applies the substance 
concept to the State, 197 ; the Stateis founded in the substantial form of human 
nature, in ARISTOTLE, 201; the generic 
relation of ruler and subject joins aplurality to the unity of a community ofmen whose material bodies are ruled bya soul as substantial form; the relation 
between ruler and subject is called taxis,
it is a kind of law, in ARISTOTLE, 208; the 
State is not a natural substance; the taxis 
is the constitution, 209; taxis has to explain 
the unity of a composite substance,
211 ; ARISTOTLE considers an organizedcommunity as an analogy of a naturalsubstance, 212; in THOMAS the theory ofthe organic character of human societyacquires its foundation .in the "substantial 
form" of human nature, 218; the 
authoritative structure of an organizedcommunity has its metaphysical foundation 
in ARISTOTLE'S substantial form, 223,230, 239, 244; LITT rejects this metaphysical 
hypostatization of the human egointo a substance, 250; a substance can 
only possess one single substantial form,
in THOMAS, 707 ; substance precludes insight 
into enkapsis, 710; substance in

DRIESCH, 736-741. 

SUBSTANTIAL FORMS, I, attacked by Oc-
CAM, 184 ; in THOMISM, based on a lex 
aeterna, 202. 

SUBSTANTIAL MATRIX, III, in WOLTERECK'S 
theory, 24. 

SUBSTRATUM AND SUPERSTRATUM SPHERES, 
II, the earlier modal spheres are thefoundation of all the later modal aspectsin an irreversible coherence of meaning,

51. 
SUFFRAGE, ORGANIC, III, and medieval 
Craft guilds, 466, 467. 

SUPER-MAN, I, in NIETSCHE, 211, 466. 
—, III, in KALLIKLES, 398. 

SUPER-NATURAL, I, faith in the super natural 
is given up in the Renaissance, 191. 

SUPER-PERSONAL LIFE, III, is the only entelechy, 
according to DRIESCH, 740. 

SUPPLY AND DEMAND, II, an economic law 
was positivized as a basic norm of theeconomic determination of prices, 361. 

SUPPOSITIONAL LOGIC, I, Of PETRUS HISPA-
nus, 184. 

SUPRA-TEMPORAL, THE, I, in the religioussphere of our consciousness we transcend 
time; the "pre-functional" can onlybe experienced in the religious concentration 
of the radix of our existence uponthe absolute Origin; even the idolatrousabsolutizations of the temporal cannot beexplained from the temporal horizon;
eternity is set in the human heart andthat is why he directs himself to thingseternal; the religious centre is not rigid


ly static; PARMENIDES' conception of theeternal divine form of being is immobile,
like PLATO'S world of the eidê and the 
immortal soul (cf. PHAEDO) ; this view is 
antinomic, as PLATO pointed out; PARMENIDES 
absolutized the modal spatial aspect, 
31; the term: "central trans-cosmictime" is not serviceable, 32, 33 ; supratemporal 
unity of the aspects, 101. 

SUPRA-TEMPORAL NORMS, II, according to 
WINDELBAND the logical, aesthetic andethical norms have an absolute character, 
because elevated above time, and therefore 
not subject to change, 239. 

SUPRA-THEORETICAL, I, judgments, 70. 

SUSPENSION THEORY, III, and entelechy,

745. 
SWANTON, R. J., III, 
The Social Organisation of American Tribes 
(American Anthropologist; N.S. VII;
663-673), 332.
—, III, refuted the constructive evolutionist 
theory of the rise of the human family, 
331; the matriarchy and promiscuity 
theory is untenable as regardsNorth-America, 332; he is a follower ofBOAS, 333. 

SWEDENBORG, I, was humorously criticized 
by KANT; he was a "visionary", 334. 

SWORDS, THE Two, III, of the CorpusChristianum, in the Middle Ages; a Scho



 

SYMBIOSIS236 

lastic problem, 218; in the Bull "UnamSanctum", 512. 

SYMBIOSIS, III, Parasitical symbiosis; anexample of a natural and an unnaturalkind of interlacement, 93; animal typesof symbiosis are not normatively qualified 
societal relationships, 172; symbiosis 
is interwoven with correlative enkapsis 
between a living being and its environment, 
648; ALTHUSIUS' theory ofhuman symbiosis, and sphere-sovereignty, 
662, 663. 

SYMBOLICAL ANTICIPATIONS, II, in history,

284. 
SYMBOLIC ASPECT, III, of the structure of 
the State; "material integrating factors",
according to SMEND; verbal languageswithin its territory, 487; Belgian Revolution, 
488. 

SYMBOLIC LOGIC, II, why useful; restrictedII, in logicism, 339. 

SYMBOLIC LOGIC, II, why useful, restrictedto the logical form of propositions, etc.,
59, 452-455; [cf. s.v. WHITEHEAD andRUSSELL, HUSSERL ,] is not purely analytical, 
452; on the whole and its parts, 451 ff. 

SYMBOLIC SUBSTRATUM, II, of the beautyof nature, 139. 

SYMBOLISM, II, juridical relations areonly possible when signified; the smashing 
of a window pane, the getting into apublic means of conveyance, have a ju


ridical signification as a delict, and asthe indirect expression of the intentionto make an agreement of conveyance respectively. 
These significations arefounded in language, 137; cultural symbolism, 
285. 

SYMBOLS, I, in positivism formulas andconcepts are mere symbols in naturalscience, 213; in LEIBNIZ, 240; are representative 
and make knowledge possible,

273. 
—, II, incomplete symbol, MALAN, 84 ; objective 
sensory phenomena are symbolsof physical states of affairs, 100; the numerical 
symbol -i-, 173, 174; sensory symbols 
in primitive law, 183; historical memorial 
symbols, 223; cultural and lingualsymbols, 285; symbols in art, 348; conventional, 
unconventional, explicit, implicit, 
abstract symbols, 381; social symbols, 
382; symbols of reality are the universalia 
post rem in THOMISM, 387.
—, III, objective sensory phenomena (e.g.
colours) are symbols of the pre-sensoryaspect of energy (i.e. physics), 37; symbolical 
anticipations in sensory impressions 
evoke a name, 38; OCCAM'S division 
of signs, 45, 46; from a natural-scientificviewpoint, objective sensory phenomenaare only symbols referring to imperceptible 
physical relations, 46; naive experience 
is not destitute of names for thingsbut implied the symbolically signifying 

aspect as well, 51; a tree has a symbolical 
object-function because it can benamed, 57; in the genetic process ofhuman life the cultural function precedesthe lingual modus, 78; books, scores, etc.,
are symbolically qualified, they signifythe aesthetic structure of a work of art 
in an objective way and cannot actualizeit, 110, 111; literary works of art showa typical cultural foundation and formation 
of lingual means of expression whichis modally different from the formativemoment inherent in symbolic signification 
as such, 123; the relation between 
intuitive and symbolic knowledge; theroutine view of modern daily life mustnot be confused with actual naive experience; 
this fact implies a loss in entensity 
with respect to naive experience;
but it does not affect our experience ofthings essentially familiar to us, 144, 145;
the relation between the internal structural 
principle and the modal .foundational 
system in the subject-object relationof symbolically qualified things, e.g., abook, 150-153; as means of social mediation, 
243, 250-253, 272; realize reciprocity 
of perspectives, 250; in a "closedsphere" a symbol becomes objective,
transpersonal, constant, enabling thesphere to expand, 252. 

SYMPATHY, II, according to BERGSON intuition 
is an immediate subjective psychical 
"empathy" penetrating with "intellectual 
sympathy" into the "duree",

i.e. he creative qualitative vital stream oftime, 481. 
SYNODS, III, German Synods and congregational 
representation in the 19th century; 
"Synodal Konsistorial System" inthe modern Lutheran Church, 548. 

SYNOLON, II, in ARISTOTLE : the substantial 
form of a natural being, as such, lacksindividuality and must be combined withmatter into a synolon (t6de ti), 419. 

SYMPHONOPHORA, III, and animal colonies, 
649. 

SYNTHESIS, I, requires self-reflection, 51;
attempts to accomplish a synthesis ofantithetic motives, 65; between natural 
necessity and freedom accepted in Kantian 
epistemology — rejected in hisethics, 90; of pagan and Christian motives 
began to lose ground in the Renaissance, 
189; KANT did not really solve the

problem of the epistemological synthesis,
423; between Kantianism and Existentialism 
and Christian doctrine, in EMILBRUNNER, 520. 
—, II, a-priori synthesis, in KANT, 13;
analytical and inter-modal synthesis, 434;
synthesis precedes analysis in KANT, 443;
synthesis is the combination of a plurality 
and transcendental logical unity; thepre-requisite of analysis; logical synthesis 
and the imagination (in KANT), 497; 


 

237THEORETICAL ACTIVITY 

logical synth. and intermodal synth. arenot distinguished by KANT, 498; synthesis 
speciosa and synthesis intellectualis,
514 ; the primary meaning-synthesis between 
"pure" sensibility and "pure"
thought; they are modi of the transcendental 
imagination which is essentiallytime and selfhood, 528; intermodal synthesis 
and selfhood, 559. 

SYNTHESIS PHILOSOPHY, III, on the State, 
402-406. 

SYNTHETICAL JUDGMENTS, I, in KANT, and 
analytic judgments, 73.

-, II, in KANT; MAIMON denies that theyare a priori applicable to sensory experience, 
449; they play a constitutive rolewith respect to objective experience, 568. 

SYSTASIS OF MEANING, II, logical systasis,
390; is intermodal, 429; is prior to synthesis, 
431; of meaning, 433 ; the logicalobjective systasis of a rose, 450; systasisand distasis, 471, 472. 

SYSTATIC CONSCIOUSNESS, III, in the naive 
attitude, 36. 

T 

TABOO, II, is the negative counterpart of 
mana, 317. 

TAINE, HYPPOLITE, II, on the spirit of 
classicism, 345. 

TALION, II, is a primitive principle implying 
juridical economy, 67. 

TAO, II, is the identification of retributive 
justice (in the order of nature) and inescapable 
necessity, found, a.o., in theold Chinese idea of TAO, 133. 

TARWAD, III, the tarwad house and tar-
wad property; and polyandry, 341. 

TASK OF THE STATE, III, and the structure 
of the body politic, are confounded by 
JELLINEK, 432. 

TASTE, I, is the basic faculty for ethicsand aesthetics, in SHAFTESBURY, 463. 

TAXIS, III, is an ordering principle concerning 
the distribution of authority andbenefits, 208; ARISTOTLE'S concept is ageneral metaphysical idea, applied in hisdiscussion of body and soul, 209, 211;
its sociological sense is an analogy, 212;
accepted by THOMAS AQUINAS, 219. 

TAxoN, III, in biology, 80, 81. 

TECHNE, II, is not purely objective; itsnorms; its communal character; progressand reaction; authorities, 258; is only aformative factor if discovery or invention 
is generally accepted in society, 259. 

TECHNICAL ECONOMY, II, the intermodal 
coherence between economy and technique 
is only developed at a higher stage 
of culture, 67. 

TECHNIQUE, II, technical economy, 67;
technical authorities, industry; tools,
norms, 258; inventions, 259; technicizing
of economic life, 361; technique, its excessive 
power, 362. 


TECHNIQUE, MODERN, III, and the correlation 
between differentiation and integration, 
593. 


TELEOLOGY, I, "the formal teleology of nature"; 
dictates the law of specification, 
in KANT, 389.
-, II, is opposed to causality in STAMMLER, 
16, 17.


III, versus destination, 60; teleological 
world-plan in DIOGENES OF APOLONIA;
he applies ANAXAGORAS' idea to the interpretation 
of particular natural phenomena, 
633. 

TENDERNESS, HI, in the family tone, 285;
family feeling is opened by the moralfunction into tenderness, 293. 

TERMINISM, II, OCCAM ascribed an exclusively 
intentional existence to the universalia 
as symbolical signs (i.e. termini) by 
which only empirical things are signified; 
he is inclined to identify the intentional 
concept with the actus intelligendi, 

388. 
TERMITES, II, the remarkable works built 
by beavers and termites in social cooperation 
do not have a cultural character, 

198. 
TERRITORIAL SYSTEM, III, Of Lutheran 

church government, ousted the Episcopalsystem, and was inspired by the wish toguarantee tolerance to the Pietists, 517. 

TESTAMENT, THE OLD AND THE NEW, I, 
form an unbreakable unity, 177. 
TETENS, II, faculty psychology, 111. 
THEISM, I, of DESCARTES and LEIBNIZ, 122. 

THEODICY, I, of LEIBNIZ, 252, 259, 260,261. 
THEOLOGIA NATURALIS, I, in OCCAM, 67; in 
THOMAS AQUINAS, 180. 

THEOLOGY, I, in ARISTOTLE, 72; and philosophy, 
in AUGUSTINUS, 178; the queenof sciences, 510. 
-, II, is a theory based on the synthesisof the logical function of thought and thetemporal function of faith, 562.
-, III, a philosophical difference cannotbe reduced to a theological difference;
MARLET and ROBBERS try to do so, 73. 

THEORIA, I, in Greek thought claims autonomy 
with respect to popular faith;
versus pistis, in PARMENIDES, 35; in Greekthought was dominated by the form-
matter motive since ARISTOTLE, 36; enables 
man to attain the union of human 
thought with the Divine pure Form, 72. 

THEORETICAL ACTIVITY, I, is hypostatizedas an immortal ousia or substance, 44. 


 

THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 238 

THEORETICAL ANALYSIS, I, in theor. ana 
lysis reality appears to split up into various 
modal aspects, 3. 

THEORETICAL ANTINOMIES, I, their source, 
45, 46; in KANT; mathematical and dynamical 
antinomies, 368. 

THEORETICAL ATTITUDE, I, of thought, 35. 

THEORETICAL CONCEPT, I, what it defines, 

30. 
THEORETICAL INTUITION, II, plays no partin KANT'S functionalistic critique of 
knowledge, 501. 

THEORETICAL KNOWLEDGE, I, is only"image" in FICHTE, 457. 

THEORETICAL REASON, I, is not an unproblematic 
datum, 40; it was KANT'S basis 
of theoretical synthesis, 49. 

THEORETICAL SYNTHESIS, I, its startingpoint in immanence phil., 45, 46. 

THEORETICAL THOUGHT, I, reality appears 
to split up into various modal aspects intheor. thought, 3; this thought is impossible 
without conceptual determination, 5;
concept formation rests upon a sharp distinction 
among the aspects and a synthesisof the logical with the non-logical aspects; 
the process of theor. thought is anti-thetical 
; the non-logical aspects are made intoa Gegenstand, 18; in the philosophical-
theoretical attitude we approximate time 

— and temporal reality — only in an analytical 
setting asunder of its modal aspects, 
which nevertheless continue to expresstheir coherence in their intrinsic structure, 
34 ; the first transcendental problemof theoretical thought, 38; the anti-thetical 
attitude of such thought : Gegenstandis that which resists our analytical function 
and is opposed to it; the theoreticalantithesis can only present itself withinthe temporal total structure of the act ofthinking; the anti-thetical structure is intentional, 
not ontical; in logical analysisthe aspect which is opposed to the logical 
function is distinguished theoretically 
from the remaining aspects, 39; x 
opposite to y, and both to the logicalfunction; the resistant, i.e. the Gegenstand, 
continues to express its coherencewith the other non-logical aspects thathave not been chosen as the field of enquiry, 
40; the first transcendental problem 
as to the theoretical attitude is the 
"Gegenstand relation", (cf. sub voce) what 
do we abstract from empirical realityand how is such abstraction possible;
confrontation with the naïve attitude; 
(cf. sub voce), 41; dogmatic theory ofknowledge considered the theoreticalattitude as an unproblematic datum, eradicated 
the difference between theoretical 
and naïve attitudes and identified the 
subject-object relation with the antitheticGegenstand relation, 43; to this fact it is 
to be ascribed that philosophical andtheological anthropology had a dichotomistic 
conception of human nature as acomposition of a material body and animmortal rational soul; PLATO and ARISTOTLE 
(cf. sub voce) hypostatized thetheoretical activity of thought in its logical 
aspect as an immortal ousia orsubstance; THOMAS AQUINAS held that the 
entire rational soul, characterized as it 
was by the theoretical activity of thought,
must be an immortal and purely spiritualsubstance; this conclusion was directed 
by the dualistic form-matter motive, 44;
the antithetical attitude offers resolute 
resistance against every attempt to reduce 
one of the aspects to another; itavenges absolutizations by involving theoretical 
thought in internal antinomies;
theoretical synthesis is a union, but nota deeper unity of the logical and non-logical; 
it pre-supposes a supra-theoreticalstartingpoint; absolutization points tosuch a starting-point, 46; theoretical distinction 
of the non-logical aspects presupposes 
an insight into their mutual relationships 
and coherence, i.e., a basicdenominator for comparing them; theycannot be distinguished unless they havesomething in common; this denominatoris the cosmic time-order; on the immanence 
standpoint another denominator issought, e.g., by absolutizing one of theaspects; in Greek metaphysics by accepting 
the metaphysical concept of being asa so-called "analogical unity"; the theoretical 
vision of reality is the vision ofthe abstracted modal aspects in the totality 
of their coherence, 47 ; the theoreticalvision in pure mathematics; differentschools : logicism, symbolistic formalism,
empiricism, intuitionism; "isms" in logic;
in ethics, aesthetics, and theology, 48;
KANT started from theoretical reason as 
the basis of every theoretical synthesis,
49; the central problem of theoreticalthought is concerned with the relationbetween the thinking ego and its theoretical-
logical function; the antitheticstructure of theoretical thought obligedKANT to oppose the logical function tothe other aspects of thinking, but heidentified the act with a purely psychicaltemporal event which could become aGegenstand of the transcendental logical"cogito"; the real act can never be a"Gegenstand" of its logical function, 50;
as long as theoretical thought is directedto its "Gegenstand" only, it remains dispersed 
in a theoretical diversity; it mustacquire the concentric direction to anultimate unity of consciousness lying atthe root of all modal diversity, i.e., tothe thinking ego; human I-ness is a central 
and radical unity, as such transcending 
all temporal aspects; the way ofcritical self-reflection only can lead tothe discovery of the true starting-pointof theoretical thought, 51; the concentric 


 

239THINGHOOD 

direction of theoretical thought cannothave a theoretical origin ; it springs fromthe ego as the individual centre of humanexistence, 54 ; the selfhood can only givethis central direction to its theoretical 
thought by concentrating upon the absolute 
Origin of all meaning; self-knowledge 
depends on the knowledge of God;
both exceed the limits of theoretical 
thought and are rooted in the "heart",
i.e., the religious centre of our existence;
this central supra-theoretical knowledgepenetrates the temporal sphere of ourconsciousness, 55; the alleged viciouscircle in our transcendental criticism; wehave only proved that the concentric direction 
of thought in self-reflection cannot 
originate from the theoretical attitude 
of thought itself; it can only issuefrom the ego as a supra-theoretic individual 
centre of human existence; only thecontents of the supra-theoretical pre-suppositions 
can be questionable, but nottheir necessity, 56; the thesis that thestartingpoint of theoretical thought isonly to be found in the central religioussphere of consciousness is no longer tobe proved theoretically, because this insight 
belongs to self-knowledge and transcends 
the theoretical attitude; withoutsuch knowledge the true character ofthe chosen starting-point remains hiddenfrom us, 57 ; the concentric direction in 
theoretical thought must be of religious 
origin, although it is always bound tothe anti-thetical Gegenstand-relation; critical 
selfreflection in the concentric direction 
of theoretical thought to the egonecessarily appeals to self-knowledge;
here lies the point of contact betweenphilosophic thought and religion; thesupra-individual character of the starting-
point; the selfhood has an intrinsically 
ex-sistent character; so the starting-
point of philos. thinking is not in theindividual ego alone; the I-ness sharesin the Archimedean point in which thewhole cosmos centres, 59; philosophycan be cultivated only in a community;
the starting-point is supra-individual;
our I-ness is rooted in the spiritual community 
of mankind, first in Adam, inwhom the whole of the human race has 
fallen, then in Jesus Christ, in Whom thenew humanity is rooted as the membersof one body; our I-ness lives in the -We-
directed to the divine -Thou-, 60; (cf. subvoce "Gegenstand") ; the I-ness penetrateswith scientific thought deeper into itsGegenstand and reveals its own deficiency 
in comparison with naïve experience,
84 ; theoretical thought should not dominate 
a life and world view, says LITT,
155; theoretical thought was believed tobe impartial and infallible, in the En


lightenment, 170.
—, II, is religiously determined, and not


selfsufficient, 41; is bound within thelimits of the temporal coherence of 

meaning, 41; speculation rejected by STPAUL in Romans 9, 42; cannot be emancipated 
from the cosmic temporal order,

47. 
THEORETICAL TRUTH, I, identified with 
theoretical correctness in LITT, 139. 

THEORETICAL VISION, I, of reality, 46-48. 

THEORY OF LAW, PURE, II, is antinomous 
in H. KELSEN, 17; is a logification of thejural aspect, 46. 

THIEME, HANS, III, 
Naturliches Privatrecht and Spat. scholastik, 
314. 


THING, II, corporeal and incorporealthings in Roman Law, 394. 

THINGHOOD, I, is only due to impressionsseparated in time but united by associ


ational relations, in HUME, 293. 
—, III, is theoretically explained awayas a category of relation; or as ametaphysical concept of substance; afictitious union of associated impressions;

a constant system of functional relations;
thinghood is experienced in the naïveattitude in its integral individualitystructure, 28; HUSSERL'S misinterpretation 
of the thing structure; naïve experience 
of a linden tree; focussing ourtheoretical attention on it, implies theoretical 
abstraction, for the tree is not experienced 
as a separate independent entity; 
the "simple" only occurs in the fullcomplexity of a universal interlacementof structures, 54 ; the different subjectand object functions of the tree do nottogether constitute it as a thing; not evenits modal individuality in the aspects;
the functional coherence seemingly absorbs 
the tree's individual functions, 55;
a tree's last subject function, 56; its object 
functions; its logical object functioncannot be eliminated, 57, 58; the internalmodal typical opening process and themodal anticipations, the structural coherence; 
our implicit inarticulate awareness 
of this structure, 59; a thing's integral 
unity; the leading, qualifying function 
indicates the intrinsic destination of 
a thing in the temporal world-order; noteleology or entelechy; external teleological 
relations lie outside a thing's internalintegral actual unity although they playan essential part in our naïve experience;
we do not confound the inner nature of 
a tree with the needs of other beingswhich it may satisfy because of the subject-
object relations of naïve experience,
ARISTOTLE'S entelechy of a living thing,
60; but the structure of individuality of aliving thing is incompatible with ARISTOTLE'S 
conception of the "inner telos ofa natural ousia"; metabolism in a livingorganism does not eradicate the boundaries 
between its modal functions; sphere-
sovereignty, 61; there is not a hidden entelechy 
or vital force which can explainmetabolism in its physical chemical 


 

THOMAS AQUINAS 240 

structure; there is no encroachment of 
vital energy on this physical chemica1 
structure; STOKER'S concept of substanceindividuality structures belong to another 
dimension of our experience than the 
modal structures, 62; modal irreducibilit yis founded in the same temporal order as 
the plastic horizon of human experiencethe seeming contradiction between modal 
sphere sovereignty and the internalunity of a thing is only due to the Geg2nstand-
relation; the theoretical epochê ofcosmic continuity; every modality of anindividual whole has a bottom-layer inthe continuous inter-modal coherence of 
cosmic time; the internal thing-causalityis not parallelism nor modal interactionof functions, 63 ; the problem of bodyand soul arose from the absolutization of 
the Gegenstand relation; STOKER'S objections; 
time is not an external cause inthe structures of individuality; but thevarious functions are intrinsically temporal; 
the continuity of cosmic time isintermodal but not empty, 64; reality hasits intermodal bottom-layer in the continuity 
of cosmic time; the individual identity 
of a thing receives its determinationfrom its internal structural principle and 
is intuitively experienced in the naiveattitude; the transcendental Idea of the 
individual whole is the cosmological apriori of the theoretical analysis of itsmodal functions; we are unable to isolatethe cosmic temporal bottom layer of a 
thing structure, nor can we theoreticallyisolate our intuitive faculty, 65; the possibility 
of the internal unfolding processin a tree is an unsolvable problem; tograsp a thing's temporal unity within thefunctional diversity of our cosmos, wemust appeal to the naive experience oftime; philosophy cannot replace naïveexperience, 66; the individuality structure 
of a tree embraces all the modal aspects 
in subject-object relations of naiveexperience; it individualizes the modalfunctions and groups them together in atypical way within the cadre of an individual 
whole, 76; this individuality horizon 
is the ground of a thing's temporalunity in the diversity of its functions;
modern vitalistic holism rejected; thestructural unity of a thing has a law- anda subject-side; its modal functions canonly become its internal structural functions 
insofar as they express the struc


tural unity as an individual whole, 77;

see further sub voce: Individuality-struc


ture. 

THOMAS AQUINAS, I, 
De Instantibus, 26. 
—, I, time as the numerical measure ofmotion can have real existence only inthe soul, although it has a fundamentumin re in the motion of matter, 26; follo


wing his teacher ALBERTUS MAGNUS, THOMAS 
AQUINAS sought to adapt to Christian 

doctrine the speculative Aristotelian philosophy 
in interrelation with neo-Platonic, 
Augustinian and other motives forming 
the common property of Christianthought in the patristic period : the lexaeterna with the lex naturalis, Christian 
and pagan ideas were seemingly made toconverge, 173; compare sub voce Christian 
Philosophy, pp. 179-181; the lexnaturalis, immanent to natural substances, 
relates to a transcendent lex aeterna(the plan of creation in the Divine Mind) ;
this lex aeterna is Divine reason; the obligating 
force of the lex naturalis is derived 
from the will of the Creator; providence 
is the teleological natural orderand hierarchy of substantial forms; theDivine Origin of this order is the firstcause and final goal of the whole temporal 
movement in nature from matter toform, 182; in the sphere of supra-naturalgrace the Divine Origin is conceived inthe light of Revelation, the lex naturalishas its complement in the lex charitatiset gratiae, 183; he accepted ARISTOTLE'Saxiological view of theory and practice,

538. 
II, 
Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, 21,

566, 567;

Summa Theologiae, 21, 85, 386, 419;

Expositio in Metaphysica, 21;

In Sent. II, dis. III, q. 2., a. 2., 386, 419;

Quaestiones sup. Metaph., 389.

II, on "being"; metaphysical unity,
etc. as grounds of being, 21; on objectand subject; esse intentionale et esse sub


jective, 367; principium individuationis;

formae separatae, 419 ; and the human 

soul, 419. 

III, 

Summa Theologiae, 6, 12, 321, 707, 714;


De ente et essentia, 12, 16;


Summa c. gent., 12, 221;
De Regimine principum, 219, 221;


Comm. Aristot. Politica, 219, 221;


cf. 323. 
—, III, accepted BOETHIUS' definition of
personality, 6; held substance to be unknowable, 
12; form is the cause of the
being of matter; matter is the principle
of individuality, 16; but then "substance"
is not possibly: individuality structure;
THOMAS accepts ARISTOTLE'S principium
individuationis; and also the creative
Ideas in the Divine Logos of Augustinian
Scholastics; the result was insoluble an


tinomies in the view of the soul's immortality; 
dialectical dualism in the explanation 
of the Aristotelian Thomistic categories, 
17; he accommodated ARISTOTLE'S
theory of organized communities to the
Christian conception of the human race 
as the "body of Christ"; nature and supra-
natural grace, 214 ; Thomism combined 
the universalistic view of the Church 
institution with ARISTOTLE'S conception
of the State; ARISTOTLE'S "substantial essential 
form" of human nature; the 



 

241 TrdomI sm 

household is the germ of the State; guildsare called organic components of theState; the city-state and the Holy RomanEmpire were both perfect autarchicalcommunities (societas perfecta) in the"natural" sphere; Church and faithare the sphere of "grace"; the Stateis an organic "unitas ordinis", evenman is "unitas ordinis", 218; ARISTOTLE'Sconcept "taxis" is accepted by THOMAS;
the controlling part makes the components 
to cohere and to form a unity forthe purpose of the communal good; analogy 
to the unitas ordinis in the humanbody; reason produces the State as theperfect and supreme natural community;
the State is higher than all other communities 
and includes them all as its organic 
constituents, 219; the Thomistictheory of organized communities onlyknows about autonomy of the lower communities, 
not-about sphere-sovereignty;
its universalistic "natural society" idea;
the supplying of temporal goods as abasis for striving after eternal salvation;
one single limitation of the State's task;
the Church is the perfect society in thesupra-natural sphere of grace; and canelevate natural life to supernatural perfection; 
it decides which affairs are natural 
and which are supernatural, 220; theChurch is the infallible interpreter of natural 
law and the limits of the State's 
competence; the Greek absolutization ofthe State is broken through; THOMAS recognizes 
subjective natural rights of individual 
man; positive law is bound tonatural law; but there is no natural sphereof the lower communities exempt from theState's authority; the autonomy of medieval 
corporations; its difference fromsphere sovereignty, 221; his definition ofres publica, 227 ; universalia only exist inabstracto, 233; ARISTOTLE'S view of the family 
and of education was supplementedby its supra-natural completion of educating 
children to be good sons and daughters 
of the church as the institution of 
grace; a teleological view, 267; RomanCatholic moral philosophers conceived oflove as an effect of pleasure in a corresponding 
good originating iii a sensoryknowledge of such good which rousessensual appetite; spiritual love derivesfrom spiritual knowledge through reason(nous) affecting the appetitive faculty,
321; he holds that the essential structureof marriage can be deduced from the cosmic 
principle of propagation; this vieweradicates the difference between marriage 
and family; he calls posterity essential 
to the marriage bond; but allowssexual intercourse in a barren marriage,
323 ; he calls woman "mas occasionatus",
only "aliquid viri"; not "civis simpliciter", 
329; a substance can only possessone single substantial form, 707; a plurality 
of "substantial forms" is incompatable 
with the "unity of substance", 714. 

THOMASIUS, II, law regulates external behaviour, 
151; on subjective rights, 395. 
—, III, his criterion of law as a coercive 
regulation; adopted by KANT, 427; his Humanistic 
idea of tolerance, 517; the secular 
government authority in church matters 
has to maintain the external peace inthe Church; it has to abstain from anymaintenance of doctrinal discipline except 
for the purpose of safeguardingthe external peace in the interest of theState; this task was entrusted to the secular 
governors "sine concursu necessarioTheologorum"; this is the territorial system, 
517. 

THOMISM, I, in the proper use of naturalreason philosophy can never come intocontradiction with supernatural truths ofgrace in the Church-doctrine; Aristotelianmetaphysics is accommodated to the ecclesiastical 
dogma, 36; Thomistic metaphysics 
will deny the religious foundationof the transcendental Idea of totality andorigin of the modal diversity of meaningin its internal coherence; it will arguethat our thought has an immanent andautonomous transcendental concept of awhole that is more than the sum of its 
parts; but this concept hides the relationbetween modal diversity and totality andunity of meaning; Thomism considers thetranscendental concept to be implied inthe analogical concept of being; this argument 
criticized; the Aristotelian metaphysical 
concept of being, 71; is ruledby the form-matter motive, which is religious; 
pure matter and pure form; purematter is the principle of potentiality andimperfection, pure form is identified with 
God as pure actuality, the unmoved Mover 
of material nature; the proofs of theexistence of God as the unmoved Mover;
they leap from the relative to the absolute 
and pre-suppose the conception ofGod which should be proved; HERACLITUSdeified matter but could never ask for an 
unmoved Mover as prime cause of empirical 
movement; ARISTOTLE'S Metaphysicsspeaks about the mystical moments ofunion of human thought with the divinepure Form through theological theoria;
THOMAS' view of the autonomy of naturalreason implied a meaning of autonomyquite different from the Aristotelian conception; 
the analogical concept of beingdoes not explain in what way the theoretic 
meaning diversity can be concentratedon a deeper unity; it cannot even explainthe modal coherence which is the presupposition 
of a true analogy, 72, 73 ; Medieval 
Thomism and Greek thought, 173;
compare sub voce : Christian Philosophy,
pp. 179-181; the intrinsic dialectic ofthe Scholastic basic motive of nature and 
grace created polar tendencies but theywere effectively checked by ecclesiasticalexcommunication ; in the late MiddleAges the medieval ecclesiastically unified 


 

THOMPSON, R. E.242 

culture began to collapse; 14th centuryNominalism turned against realistic Scholasticism 
with its doctrine of the realityof the universalia (i.e. the universalforms) ; PETRUS AUREOLI and DURANDUS OfSt Porcain took up the Nominalist tradition; 
WILLIAM OF OCCAM became the 
leader; Nominalism became a cultural 
factor of worldwide significance, 183;
OCCAM attacked the metaphysical conception 
of the Aristotelian "substantialforms" on which the Thomistic Idea of 
the understructure of the order of gracewas based; OCCAM'S views, 184 ff; Thomism 
held to the primacy of the intellect;
OCCAM defended the primacy of the will;
this antithesis was originally unrelated tothe conflict between realism and nominalism; 
DUNS SCOTUS, a more consistent realist 
than THOMAS, contended the primacyof the will, like the Augustinian School;
OCCAM and the Nominalists criticized 
Thomism so that the motives of nature 
and grace were separated; Humanism thendeveloped the line of "autonomous naturalthought", 187 ; the Aristotelian-Thomistic"substantial forms" were based in a lex 
aeterna, and differed fundamentally fromthe super-temporal "substance" in Modern 
Humanistic Philosophy, 202; in theAristotelian Thomistic doctrine of natural 
law the body politic is founded on thesubstantial form of human nature; the 
doctrine of the appetitus socialis, 311. 

THOMPSON, R. E., III,


A History of the Presbyterian Churches
in the United States, 521. 
--, III, asserts that the church elders are 
representatives of the church in the same
sense as a nation has its representatives
in Parliament, 521. 


THON, II, 
Rechtsnorm und subjektives Recht, 400,


403. 
--, II, on subjective rights, 397; subjective 
rights in the claim granted by thelawgiver to the individual by permittingother norms to be enforced in case the 
primary norms protecting him are infringed, 
400; showed that the power ofdisposal may occur apart from a subj.
right; e.g. the conveyance of fraudulentlyconverted personal property to a bonafide third party; he carried to absurditythe doctrine that the power of enjoymentis essential to a subj. right, 403; his positivistic 
psychologistic theory of subj.
right cancelled the power of enjoyment,
contained in the concept of subjectiveright, 403; HOBBES' view shared by THON,
403. 
THORBECKE, III, 
Aanteekening op de Grondwet, 679, 690.
—, III, the "visible" church is an ordinary 
civil society, a "corporation" in thesense of the Civil Code; its internal regu.lations 
have a civil legal character; pri


vate law is identical with civil law, 690. 


THROWNNESS, I, of man, according to
Existentialism, 215. 


THURSTON, III, 
Castes and Tribes of Southern India, 340. 
—, III, the practice of polyandry was to
prevent the splitting up of the family
property, 340. 


TILLICH, III, 


Kirche und Kultur, 539. 


Tam, I, is the medium through which the
meaning totality is broken up into a modal 
diversity of aspects, 16; in ARISTOTLE
time cannot exist outside the soul, 25; in 
THOMAS AQUINAS, 26; as a fourth dimension; 
in BERGSON it is the psychical duration 
of feeling; in Humanistic thought; in
KANT it is a transcendental form of intuition, 
27; as order and as duration in organic 
life; the temporal order of birth,
maturing, adulthood, aging, and (lying, 28;
in the logical aspect, 30; as an existential
of the "authentic" ego, 58; in EINSTEIN'S
theory, 85; AUGUSTINUS broke with the
Greek vision of time and paved the way
for an Idea of historical development,179;
in HUME, is an "Idea" formed out of the 
sequence of changing sensory "impressions" 
and "ideas", 286; a synthetical
form of the inner sense, in KANT, 347. 
--, II, the continuity of cosmic time, 4;
mathematical time is simultaneity, 85;
kinematical time, 100; time in the nume


rical and in the spatial sphere, 102, 103;
indications of time in language, 127; historical 
time, 193; time according to Os-
WALD SPENGLER, 283; historical time is 
the essence of the selfhood in HEIDEGGER, 
525; time and our selfhood, 531; our 
selfhood transcends time, 535. 
—, III, in RUSSELL; he identifies psychological 
with physical time, 24 ; time is
not an external cause in the individuality
structures and it is not empty, 64; cosmic
time is the intermodal bottom layer of
reality, 65. 


TISSUE CELLS, III, 772. 


TISZA INCIDENT, III, and international relations, 
486. 


TOLERANCE, III, the Humanistic idea of 
tolerance in THOMASIUS ; SPENER was opposed 
to this Humanism, 517. 


TONNIES, FERDINAND, Hi, 
Einfiihrung in die Soziologie, 245, 571,


573, 579; 
Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, 346, 408,


409; 
Handworterbuch des Soziologie, hrg. v.


A. VIERKANDT, TONNIES' Treatise : Gemeinschaft 
und Gesellschaft, 346; 
Kritik der Offentlichen Meinung, 490. 
--, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft,
178; his concept of "community", 183;
Gemeinschaft is an essential "social organism" 
in which the individual is in

243 TRANSCENDENCE OF THE SELFHOOD 

grown; Gesellschaft is the mechanicalaggregate of transitory social ties and relations 
that are the products of humanarbitrariness; Wesenswille and Kiirwille, 
184; examples of Gemeinschaften: marriage, 
family, domestic relationship,
mark-community, sib, village, ancientand medieval cities, guilds, religiouscommunity, church. Gesellschaft is destructive 
to culture; two periods of cultural 
development; examples: moderncity with trade and industry; politics;
cosmopolitan life; TONNIES' view passesinto a philosophy of history; he extolsmedieval corporations and depreciatesthe process of differentiation, 185; hisMarxian pessimism of the developmentof the "capitalist" society; Gemeinschaftas "organism" is SCHELLING'S idea; differentiated 
and undifferentiated societal 
relationships, 186; social Dynamics, 187;
corporate persons like organized authoritative 
communities have a unity capableof volition and action, at least to the 
minds of their members they are personssimilar to individual men; TONNIES means 
this equalization only in a fictitioussense, 245; his irrationalist romantic conception 
of "Gemeinschaft" is normativeand opposed to "Gesellschaft"; the formercompletely realized in medieval society,
271; family life is a standard example ofa "Gemeinschaft" but may show such defects 
that its real community is destroyed,
which fact is unaccountable in TONNIES' 
view, 272; Gemeinschaft rests on an instinctive 
basis and is ruled by a "naturalwill"; prototypes are the immediate family 
and the extended kinship; he includes 
the domestic community, themark-community, the medieval town withits guilds; but his concept of communityhas no typical structural character, 346;
[cf. sub voce: Undifferentiated OrganizedCommunities], his distinction betweencommunity and association (Gemeinschaft 
and Gesellschaft) is given a peculiar 
turn by DARMSTAEDTER, 408-410;
TONNIES cannot appreciate "public opinion" 
because of his rationalistic individualistic 
view of the "Gesellschaft", 490; 

he adopts WEBER'S ideal-typical methodand does not sufficiently distinguish freeorganizations from institutional communities, 
571 ; TONNIES says that a "Gesellschaft" 
is based on the principle of dout des, 573; he considers the contract 
containing the external rational purposethe exhaustive explanation of the "Kikperschaften" 
without a "communalmind"; he calls their internal unity a"construction of thought", 579. 

TooL, II, wherever tools are found to control 
nature, be it in ever so primitive aform, we are on historical ground, in acultural area, 258. 

TOTALITY AND CHANCE, III, their dualism 
in DRIESCH, 747. 

TOTALITY IDEA, I, the coherence of all the 
aspects refers to a totality, 4; the self isa subjective totality lying at the basis ofall the functions, 5; philosophical thoughtis theoretical thought of the totality, 7;
thought must be directed to the idea oftotality; I must choose my standpoint inthe meaning totality of our temporal cosmos; 
I must participate in this totality;
but I must not lose myself in the modalspeciality, which I must transcend; thisstandpoint is the Archimedean point ofphilosophy; the totality view is not possible 
without a view of the origin or cleicliof totality and speciality of meaning, 8;
the metaphysical concept of totality, 71;
is logically formalized in HUSSERL ; the 
philosophical idea of totality, 73.
—, III, its fourfold use, 424. 

TOTALITARIAN STATES, III, in ARISTOTLE, 
398; rule more than a third part of mankind, 
601. 

TOTEMISM, II, in totemism the members 
of a clan identify themselves with thetotem-animal or the totem-plant. Theyare storks, kangoroos, coconut palms, etc.
They have a diffuse personality awareness, 
318; according to DURKHEIM, 318;
in totemistic communities, CASSIRER supposes 
that all individuality of the members 
is absorbed by the group, 320. 

TOTEMISTIC CLANS, III, arose from economic 
causes according to KOPPERS, 359;
they may be divided into matriarchal 
phratries; age-groups; secret men's societies, 
363, 364. 

TOURTUAL, III, distinguishes two kinds ofsense impressions, 43. 

TOYNBEE, II, his concept of the challenge,
252; and mission, 253. 

TRADE UNIONS, III, are qualified by themoral bond of solidarity between labourers, 
576. 

TRADITION, II, is what is handed down 
from generation to generation, 202, andprogress; vital and dead elements, 232;
tradition is not a norm, 242; its strugglewith progress, 243, 250, 256; traditionand manners and morals, in VOLTAIRE, 

352. 
TRANSACTIONS OF THE UNITY OF SCIENCE, 
II, start from the idea that there is a

logical unity of scientific language, 59. 

TRANSCENDENCE OF THE SELFHOOD, I, overlooked 
by RICKERT ; is not appreciated onthe immanence standpoint, 23.
—, II, of the selfhood, in Mc HARTMANN 
has been lost, 20; of the selfhood, inHEIDEGGER, 531. 
—, III, God's transcendence is supposedto have been overemphasized by CALVIN,
according to MARLET, 72. 


TRANSCENDENT VERSUS TRANSCENDENTAL 244 

TRANSCENDENT VERSUS TRANSCENDENTAL, 1, 

with reference to criticism, 37, 88. 

TRANSCENDENT SUPER-TEMPORAL I-NESS, II, 

is the pre-supposition of the intermodalmeaning synthesis as an actus, 472. 

TRANSCENDENT, II, the ideal form worldin PLATO has transcendent being in theEleatic sense, and includes the numbersthemselves (eidetic numbers) togetherwith the exact geometrical figures, 9. 

TRANSCENDENT HORIZON, II, of experience,
552; encompasses the cosmic temporal,
the modal and the plastic horizon, 560. 

TRANSCENDENT AND TRANSCENDENTAL Ho 

RIZON,. II, both identified in irrationalism,
in SCHELER, e.g., 591. 

TRANSCENDENT ROOT, I, Of human exi 
stence is the rational moral function of 
sovereign personality, in KANT, 356. 
-, THE, II, and the fulness of individuality 
has been saved in CHRIST, .418. 

TRANSCENDENTALIA, II, in Scholasticism,
in OCCAM, 388, 389; in THOMAS AQUINAS 
and in ARISTOTLE, 566. 

TRANSCENDENTAL BASIC IDEA, THE, I, reli


gious basic motives control the immanentcourse of philosophic thought, 68;
through the medium of a triad of transcendental 
Ideas: the coherence, the totality 
and the Origin of all meaning; these 
are related to the three stages of critical 
self-reflection in theoretical thought, 69;
analogia entis, 71; the abstract characterof the transcendental basic Idea, 82; thetransc. basic Idea implies a relation tothe cosmonomic side as well as to the 
factual subject side of temporal reality,
the subject side is by nature individual;
the transc. basic Idea is also a basic Idea 

of type and individuality, 83.
—, II, and the continuity of cosmictime, is the hypothesis of philosophicalthought, 4; of the meaning totality, 8;
the transcendental Idea of Christian 
philosophy, 25; refers to the totalityand to the arche and is concentrated 
to the transcendent reality; transc.
Id. of the meaning coherence, 42; andthe concept of Gegenstand, 44; the transc.

Idea of the Origin implies that of thehuman ego as the centre of the empiricalworld; the Idea of creation guides ourphilosophy; man is the lord of the creation, 
53; transc. id. of the totality turnsthought in a transcendental direction, 54;
transc. id. of time is the Idea of the cosmic 
order of succession of the aspects,
54; the transc. idea of a modal function,

486. 
TRANSCENDENTAL BASIC MOTIVE, I, the in


fluence of dialectical basic motives on 
the philosophical conceptions of time:
the Greek form-matter motive, 25; in AL


BERT THE GREAT, THOMAS AQUINAS, AUGUS 

TINUS, 26; the Humanistic basic motiveof nature and freedom; KANT'S Kritik der 
reinen Vernunft; BERGSON'S vitalistic view 
of time; DILTHEY, HEIDEpGER, 27 ; theform-matter motive and Thomistic anthropology, 
its dichotomy of body andrational soul, 44 ; the motive of form andmatter in Greek thought and culture; theChristian motive of the Divine Word Revelation 
: creation, fall and redemption,
61 ; the modern Humanistic life-and-worldview 
with its motive of nature and freedom; 
the Humanistic basic motive; theRomanCatholic motive of nature and 
grace; the Christian motive of creation,
fall, redemption, 63; the origin of the religious 
dialectic in idolatrous basic motives 
(cf. s.v. Religion, 64) ; the R.-C.
Scholastic motive of nature and grace;
why this motive fails to realize the central 
place that the Biblical revelation assigns 
to the human heart; the dichotomistic 
conception of the relation of bodyand soul, 65; the antithesis between Thomism 
and Occamism; and that betweenK. BARTH and E. BRUNNER; the ascriptionof the primacy to one of the antitheticcomponents of the dialectical ground-
motive entails the depreciation of theother; Ionian philosophy held to the primacy 
of the matter-motive, 66; Dionysianand Orphic movements; Ionian philosophy 
deprived the form-principle of itsdivine character; the true god is formless, 
the eternally flowing stream of life(water, air, fire) or in ANAXIMANDER an 
invisible "apeiron" flowing in the streamof time and avenging the injustice of thetransitory individual forms; in SOCRATES, 
PLATO and ARISTOTLE the form has primacy; 
the deity is "pure Form"; matterloses its divinity; Occamism depreciates"natural reason", he rejects metaphysicsand natural theology, although the autonomy 
of natural reason is maintained tothe utmost; the grace-motive retains theprimacy, but not in a synthetic hierarchical 
sense as in Thomism; in modern 
Humanistic thought the antithesis between 
autonomous science and autonomous 
personal freedom is at first hardlyrealized; ROUSSEAU depreciated scienceand ascribed primacy to the freedom-
motive, the main spring of his religionof feeling; KANT follows ROUSSEAU, depriving 
all nature from any divine characterand denying its divine origin; God is apostulate of the practical reason, 67 ; thefreedom motive has the absolute religiousprimacy in modern phil. of life, and in

existentialism; the meaning of each ofthe antithetic components of a basic motive 
depends on that of the other, 68. 

TRANSCENDENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS, II, is the 

origin of "form" in Kantian sense, atranscendental condition of universallyvalid sensory experience, a constructive 


245 TRANSCENDENTAL LIMITING CONCEPT 

a-priori, 12; constitutes the "Gegenstand", a better mutual understanding of the vaaccording 
to HUSSERL, 467 ; is hypostati- rious schools of thought, 526.
zed to the super-individual subject proper 
of theoretical knowledge, 583; indivi- TRANKENDENTAL DEDUCTION, I, in KANT, 


dualized and personalized by SCHELER, was intended to explain why the catego


ries are necessarily related to the "Ge


587. 
genstand", 353. 
TRANSCENDENTAL CRITIQUE, I, the first way TRANSCENDENTAL DETERMINATIONS, II, in

of a transcendental critique of philoso- ARISTOTLE'S metaphysics, e.g., the being 

phic thought, 3-22;no philosophical true, and the being good; AUGUSTINUS'
thought is possible without a transcen- Veritas est id quod est, identifies "truth"
dent starting point, 22; the first way and "being", 20; there are three of them


started from the position that philosophy in KANT, 58.
is necessarily directed to the meaning
totality, to the selfhood and to the Arche, TRANSCENDENTAL DIRECTION, II, of time,


34 ; the second way starts with an exami- 186.
nation of the structure of the theoretical 


T

attitude of thought as such, 35; the dogma TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS, I, a transcendental

concerning the autonomy of theoretical Idea is a limiting Concept, 24; the transc.

thought, 35-37; difference between Idea of religion, 57; transc. Id. in KANT;
the three-unity of the transcendental

transcendent and transcendental critic-

Ideas; their content depends on supra-

ism; the necessity of transcendental cri


ticism of the theoretical attitude, 37; the theoretical pre-suppositions, 89; in Co-

HEN the transc. idea is the self-conscious


Gegenstand-relation, 38; it is intentional, 

ness of the logical concept, 91; the abso


39 the first transcendental basic prob


;

lutized logical category, 363.

km; naïve and theoretical attitude compared, 
41; subject-object relation in TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS OF POSSIBILITY ANDnaive experience, 42, 43 ; the second basic NECESSITY, II, are conceived in the cos-
problem, concerning the starting-point of monomic Idea; they become speculativetheoretical synthesis, 45; the source of metaphysical as soon as they absolutizetheoretical antinomies, and various the horizon of human experience into an

"isms", 46; the basic denominator, 47; internal rational order, 551.

KANT'S starting-point, 49, 50; starting-
point and critical self-reflection, 51; the TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM, I, assumesthird basic problem about the possibility that since KANT and FICHTE the fundaand 
nature of critical self-reflection, 52, mental antinomy between the science and53, 54, 55; the alleged vicious circle in the personality-ideal has been solved,
our transcendental criticism, 56; the su- 205; transcendental freedom-idealism

pra-individual starting-point, 59; the re- was inaugurated by KANT, 325; it was theligious basic motive, 61; the form-matter first trend to penetrate to the foundation

motive; the Humanistic motive of nature of the science-ideal, 499. 
and freedom; the Christian motive; the —, II, is guilty of identifying a modalScholastic motive, 62, 63 ; the dialectical Idea with the meaning totality of the

character of apostate basic motives; reli- cosmos, 187; stands and falls with the

gious and theoretical dialectic; attempts to acceptance of a transcendental-theoreticalachieve a synthesis; the motive of nature consciousness which "constitutes" theand grace,65; the shift in the primacy,66, world as its "Gegenstand" and eventually67; the three transcendental Ideas of theo- constitutes itself, 549; on universallyretical thought are the medium for the valid, transcendental truth, 573.
control of this thought by the, religious 

TRANSCENDENTAL IMAGINATION, II, the

motive, 68; they form a tri-unity; they ans- problem of the intermodal synthesis in 
wer the three fundamental problems as KANT'S doctrine of the "transcendental

three directions of one and the same trans- imagination", 513 ff.; the transcendentalcendental basic Idea; this Idea also lies at imagination is the original essential unithe 
basis of the various special sciences, ty of the stems of knowledge in KANT,

69; the sciences are dependent on philo- according to HEIDEGGER'S explanation, 525.

sophy in their theoretic conception of

reality and of the method of forming TRANSCENDENTALISM AND MORALISM, II, inconcepts and positing problems; the KANT, 278.
transcendental critique can pave the way TRANSCENDENTAL LEVEL OF TRUTH, II, we 

for a real contact among the various phi- cannot say that transcendental verity conlosophical 
trends of thought; it unmasks sists in an adequatio intellectus et rei;

dogmatic prejudices of a supra-theoreti- the Christian cosmonomic Idea requires 
cal character; it sharply distinguishes us to to formulate another definition of

between theoretical judgments and sUpra- transcendental truth, 573.

theoretical, ones, 70; transcendental critique 
of the metaphysical concept of the TRANSCENDENTAL LIMITING CONCEPT, I, is

analogia entis, 71-73; opens the way to an Idea, 8. 


 

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC 246 

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC, II, in KANT, 503. 

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC OF HISTORY, I, developed 
by FICHTE, 492. 

TRANSCENDENTAL-LOGICAL CATEGORIES, II, 
of Kantian philosophy, 459. 

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGICAL EGO, I, is the 
logical unity of the thinking subject, 16. 

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGICAL SUBJECT, I, is a 
reduction of the thinking ego, and isnothing but the bare concept of the subjective 
logical unity of thought pre-supposing 
the thinking ego; a pseudo-concept, 
since it is incapable of analysis; itis a meaningless abstraction involved ininternal contradictions, 7; transcendental 
logical ego in immanence philosophy, 16;
transcendental cogito neglects the basictranscendental problem concerning therelation of the ego and its logical function 
of thought; this does not transcendthe modal diversity of meaning, 17; alsothe transcendental logical function is alogical unity of philosophical thought towhich we must ascribe theoretical logical 
meaning; there is an immanent logical 
diversity in the logical meaning ofthought; but it cannot exist apart froma cosmic meaning diversity, 18; logicaland cosmic diversity must not be identified; 
such identification leads to antinomy; 
the proclamation of logical meaningas the origin of the cosmic diversity istantamount to the elimination of the modal 
diversity and consequently to theabandoning of theoretical thought itself;
the intermodal synthesis pre-supposes themodal diversity and cannot be introduced 
into the logical aspect; transcendental 
logicism can only be maintained bya shift of meaning, 19; Archê and Archimedean 
point coalesce in transcendentallogicism, 20; the logical function cannotbe a Gegenstand of theoretical thought;
only the abstracted, purely intentional,
modal structure of the logical function;
we never arrive at a "transcendental logical 
subject", detached from all modalstructures of time and sovereign and absolute, 
40; KANT'S transcendental logicalsubject of thought, 53, 54; and in LITT, 78. 

TRANSCENDENTAL-LOGICAL UNITY OF APPERCEPTION, 
I, is the logical unity of thethinking consciousness, 16; (in KANT),
is a subjective pole of thought in the logical 
function of thinking, of the understanding, 
53, 358. 

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGICISM, I, absolutizes 
the logical function of theoreticalthought, 19; Archê and Archimedeanpoint coincide, 20. 

TRANSCENDENTAL MOTIVE, II, KANT was 
led by a transcendental motive in hisdoctrine of the Theoretical Ideas, 432. 

TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEMS, I, the first 
transcendental problem is concerned with 
the Gegenstand relation; what do we ab


stract in the theoretic antithesis from the 
structures of reality and how is this abstraction 
possible?; the naive attitudeconfronted with the theoretical, 38, 41; 
the subject-object relation in the naiveattitude, 42, 43; the consequences of ignoring 
the first transcendental basicproblem in the traditional conception asto the relation of body and soul in humannature, 44 ; the second transcendental 
problem : from what standpoint can were-unite synthetically the logical and thenon-logical aspects of experience opposedto each other in the theoretical antithesis; 
this question touches the kernel ofthe inquiry; the true starting-point shouldtranscend the two terms of the theoretical 
antithesis; it cannot be cosmic time, 
nor the cosmic coherence, 45; the third 
transcendental problem: the possibility 
of critical self-reflection, and the true 
character of such self-reflection ; KANT 
ignored the third basic problem togetherwith the first, and as a result he was unable 
to bring the second problem to acritical solution, 52-54. 
--, III, three transcendental problems ofsociology, 168. 

TRANSCENDENTAL SCHEMA, II, in KANT, 
517, 519. 

TRANSCENDENT SUBJECT OF AUTONOMOUS 
MORAL FREEDOM, I, in KANT, is law-giver 
to human action, 359. 

TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECT OF THOUGHT, I,
does not satisfy the requirements of anArchimedean point, 16; is merely an abstract 
concept, 20; in KANT'S philosophy,

109. 
—, II, is the absolutization of the theoretic-
phenomenological attitude of thought,
546. 
TRANSCENDENTAL SYNTHESIS, II, in I(ANT'S
precedes analysis, 443. 


TRANSCENDENTAL THOUGHT, I, in RICKERT, 
it is the Archimedean point and the Arch6 
of the theoretical cosmos, 14 ; puretranscendental thought is always meantin a logical sense; the logical function ofthe act of thought does not transcend themodal diversity of meaning and so itlacks the unity above all multiplicitywhich characterizes the central ego, 17;
the transcendental logical subject ofthought is conceived as a "Transzendenzin der Immanenz", 18; 

TRANSCENDENTAL (-THEORETICAL) TRUTH, 
II, its accordance with the principiumexclusiae antinomiae, 579-582. 

TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS, 
II, is identified with the cogito, 
by KANT, 499; is not sensible, 535. 

TRANSFINITE NUMBERS, II, CANTOR'S conception; 
and in that of VERONESE, 87; in

H. WEYCS theory, 340. 

247 TROLL, WILHELM 

TRANSPERSONALISM, III, is universalistic, TRIEB, I, a self-producing striving inand absolutizes temporal society, 240; FICHTE, 441.
it rests on an irrationalistic hypostatiza- rr,1RIEPEL, III, cf. BINDING; associations are 

tion of temporal communal relationships, based on the principle of do ut des, 573.

246. 
„ TRI-UNITY, II, in theology, is an analogi-
TRANSZENDENZ IN DER IMMANENZ, I, all

cal term, 63.

modal diversity of meaning is irreversi


bly dependent on the "transcendental TROELTSCH, ERNST, II,

subject of thought", 17 ; and in respect to Der Historismus and seine Probleme,

this subject we can speak of a "Trans- 206, 270;

zendenz in der Immanenz", 18. Hauptprcbleme der Ethik, 206;

Die Aufkldrung, 352, 355.

TRASYMACHOS, III, Sophistic radical indi- 

, II, merges all values and norms intovidualist, 199. the creative development of culture; his 
TREE, I, is a typical individuality strut- unprovable faith in the coherence with

ture, 554. the Absolute, 205, 206; in primitive cul—, 
III, a tree has a central biological tures the biotic retrocipations of historifunction, 
56; its object functions, 57; and cal development come to the fore, 270;

his absolutely autonomous Idea of cul


the opening relation, 58 ; its sensory as


pect, 98, 104, 105; its wood in a piece of ture, 282.

—, III,

furniture; sawn wood has a secondary 

Die Soziallehren der Christli

Christlichen Kirchen

natural structure, 129-132. 

und Gruppen, 228, 247, 315, 513, 515, 527,

TREMENDUM, I, the experience of the 529.

"Tremendum" is identified with religion —, III, on early Christian sociology, 217;

by R. OTTO, 58. his view that radical individualism and 

universalism is as such without articula-

TRIANGLE, II, and ontological analytical tion, 228; individualism and universalism

judgments, according to PFANDER'S inter- lie hidden in an inner tension in the basic

pretation of KANT, 441; the concept idea of Christianity; Calvinism is indivi


triangle is a generic concept whose dualistic, 247; his exposition of LUTHER'S

meaning is limited by the original spatial standpoint is obsolete, 513 (note) ; his 

modality, 458, 459. views on Church and sects are oriented to 

TRIAS POLITICA, III, Of MONTESQUIEU, 428. SIMMEL's "formal tendency", 527; there is 

a radical tension in Christianity between

TRIBAL(ORGANIZED) COMMUNITY, III, the individualism and universalism; the 

folk unit embraces a small number of in- Church is an institution of saving grace;

clividual families; the leading role falls membership usually starts at birth, which

to the natural family bond or the kin- necessitates a compromise between the

ship bond; exogamy is only local; tribal Evangelical standards and Stoic or Aris


chiefs or elders are merely mediators in totelian conceptions of the lex naturalis;

a conflict; the vendetta punishes a killer, the Church type embraces all other socie361; 
division of labour is adapted to the tal relationships as lower stages of the 
difference between man and woman; in Christian community of grace, 528; themost cases the whole people are owners Church type is called universalistic; theof the soil; the cult community with its sect is individualistic; a sect relies on the

initiation rites is guided by the structure personal conversion and dignity of theof the natural family; so that the political members; the infinite value of an indivistructure 
is extremely weak; in the pa- dual person as a child of God renderstriarchal totemistic clans the political all social differences negligible;
structure has taken the lead, 362; there TROELTSCH borrows his ideal type of ais an amount of antagonism to the natu- Church from medieval Roman Catholic 

ral family and to the kinship family; conceptions; according to his historicistictotem clans may be subdivided into ma- "Religionssoziologie", 529, 530; he genetriarchal 
phratries; the introduction of ralizes the typical Roman Catholic socialage-groups emancipates boys from the form of a Church and is thereby disquafamily 
community; young men's houses; lified to explain the Church formationsyouths live as bachelors up to the age of issued from the Reformation; he hasthirty; sometimes at initiation they are wrenched the Gospel from its context in

forbidden to obey their mothers; secret the whole of the Divine Word revelationmen's societies have broken every tie with and posits a dilemma which is alien to 
the structure of the immediate family Christianity; his interpretation of CALVIN

and the wider kinship community, 363, is erroneous, 531.364 ; they are organized resistance clubs TROLL, WILHELM, II,
to matriarchy and have an aristocratic

Allgemeine Biologie, 108.

form; H. SCHURTZ on their origin, 365. 

—, II, biotic phenomena belong to aTRICHOTOMY, III, of physis, psyche and sphere which transcends physics andspirit, in THEODOR HAERING, 635. chemistry, 108. 


TROXLER 248 

TROXLER, I, explicitly appeals to JACOBI, his own absolutization of theoretical truth,
sets the arch-consciousness or immediate 570; the Christian Idea of verity, directedknowledge in opposition to reflecting and to the fulness of the meaning of Truth;
discursive thought, 471. truth has the same perspective characteras our horizon of experience; then the

TRUBETZKOY, II, 

transcendental horizon must be made

Phonology, 224. 

transparent by Divine Revelation; the re-

TRUTH, I, the principle of truth in COHEN 	ligious fulness of truth liberates the ho-
implies a continuous coherence between 	rizon of human experience and is con-
logos and ethos, 75; identified with theo- 	cerned with our full selfhood; in Holyretical correctness, in RICKERT; as an "ab- Scripture truth means steadfastness, cersolute" 
value, truth in RICKERT, is time- 	tainty, reliability, 571; Divine Revelationlessly valid and rests in itself, 134 ; in enters our temporal horizon only throughARISTOTLE, HOBBES, KANT, HUME, DESCAR- faith; God is the Origin; Christ the per-
TES, HEGEL, LITT; and the transcendental 	fect Revelation and the fulness of truth;
basic Idea, 150; as integral consistency, 2 X 2 4 becomes an untruth if it is ab154; 
DESCARTES' mathematical concept of 	solutized into a truth in itself; Christiantruth, 191; truths of facts and truths of science, 572; the traditional definitionreason, in LEIBNIZ, 250; necessary and implies that truth in its transcendental acontingent truth, according to LEIBNIZ priori structure transcends reality; an-
and to WOLFF, 251; two kinds of truth in other definition of the transcendental a 
PETER RAYLE'S thought, 260. 	priori structural level of truth, 573; de-, 
II, theoretical truth depends on super- 	pends on a normative relation of ourtemporal truth; hypostatized "truth" is a subjective cognition to its structurallie; there is no selfsufficient partial truth; laws; it requires the transcendent lightreligious fulness of meaning is bound up of Divine Revelation, 573; the transcenwith 
temporal reality; the Divine Word- 	dent freedom of human self-conscious-
Revelation in the garb of human language; 	ness; our insight is fallible; the investithe 
Incarnation; our experience is limi- 	gator's Archimedean point; the transcented 
by, but not restricted to the temporal, 	dental horizon must be opened by Christ,
561; human cognition is directed to the 574 ; truth and theoretical truth; KANT'Sabsolute truth, or, in apostasy, to the Principles of Pure Understanding arespirit of falsehood, 562; Christ is the functionalistic, 575; the a priori criterionTruth; standing in the truth is the pre- of theoretical truth, 576; special sciencesrequisite for the insight into the horizon handle different criteria of truth, butof experience, 564; the logical criterion only seemingly so; they lack a transcenof 
truth owes its meaning to the structure 	dental criterion ; they use an a priori sub-
of the experiential horizon; the error of 	jective theoretical synthesis: 576; theopposing super-natural truth to natural, accordance between the subjective syn565; 
accommodations to the Biblical Re- 	thesis and the modal structure of the Gevelation; 
Christian religion should pene- 	genstand within the temporal horizontrate philosophy; THOMAS AQUINAS' defi- and in relation to the religious fulness ofnition of truth as the agreement between Truth; theoretical judgments and spherethought and being; based on the confu- sovereignty; there is no truth in itself;

sion of Gegenstand and substance, 566; the perpective structure of truth and sub-
ARISTOTLE'S view: the adequacy between 	jectivism, 577; the hypostatization of thethe conceptual form and the essential Idea of Verity, 578; absolutely individualform of the ousia; the homoioosis of the truth in SCHELER, 585.
intellect to , 

 real being; knowledge is TURGOT, I, had in passing formulated the

noeta, 566 Scholastic adequation; vis 

law of the three stages elaborated by

cognitive and vis appetitiva; THOMAS 

uOMTE, 209.

calls the true and the good transcendent


—, II, followed VOLTAIRE'S view of his-

alia; convenientia entis ad animam, 566; 

tort', 269.

the basis of ARISTOTLE'S and THOMAS' con


ception; KANT'S rejection of this view; TYLOR, E. B., II,
the problem posited by KANT, 567; he evolutionist history, 270.
restricts truth to the a priori theoretical
horizon and to the sensory phenomena; TYPE CONCEPT, III, interlacement of typi


a priori synthetical judgments on objec- cal individuality structures, 55; the typitive 
experience guarantee the correspon- cal leading function of a tree in the opedence 
between knowledge and Gegen- ning process, 59; the earth as a typically
stdnde ; these judgments are true a priori, qualified physical-chemical energy coni.
e., universally valid and necessary; the stellation, 78; the internal structural prinsource 
of all truth; empirical truths are ciple and the typical groupage of the as-
relative; the experiential process is direc- pects into a unity, 80; the typology of
ted towards an absolute ideal, viz. the human personalities in psychology and
perfect correspondence between the re- psychiatry; W. Stern; type and class; a
presentations in the object, 568; HUSSERL'S logistical foundation of the type concept
rejection of KANT'S views of truth, 569; as an "Ordnungsbegriff" in HEMPEL and 



249 UNDIFF. ORG. COMMUNITIES 


OPPENHEIM'S Der Typusbegriff im Lichteder neuen Logik, 81; the ideal typicalmethod in sociology introduced by MAXWEBER; social types; WEBER'S are arbitrary; 
generic and specific type conceptsin jurisprudence and theory of law; VONJHERING'S view of them; different typesof legal spheres; modern theories and theunscientific concept of sovereignty; sociology 
of law, 82 ; the ultimate irreducible 
genera and their criterion foundedin the plastic dimension of the temporalorder is only to be found in the typicalstructural groupage of the modal aspectswithin the structural whole; radical types 
are determined by their typical leading 
function; they encompass the structural 
orbits of things or other individualtotalities as kingdoms: inorganic, biotic,
psychical kingdoms (mineral, vegetableand animal kingdoms) ; border cases present 
themselves in the micro world outside 
of the naïve attitude, 83; the virus 
causing the mosaic disease in tobacco-
plants; STANLEY and WYCKOFF'S discovery; 
B. BAVINK's view, 84 ; the threekingdoms and their criteria; these criteria 
concern only the sensorily perceptible 
characteristics, they are not validwithout exception but related to the radical 
types of our plastic experientialhorizon; no pan-psychism; animal behaviour 
is distinguished from vegetativereactions in the naïve attitude; materialistic 
behaviorism, 85; the basic denomi


nator of radical types, 87; there is no
radical type "man", 87-89; secondary
radical types are related to man's social
life, 89; nucleus, retrocipations, anticipations 
and the qualifying function of an
individual whole, 90; the anticipatory
structure of the foundational function 
does not affect its nuclear type of individuality, 
91; radical type of individuality, 
91; radical type, primary or genotype, 
variability type; natural and unnatural 
variability types, 93; radical type
"animal" and geno-types; sub-types, 94;
two meanings of "genotype" in biology;
pheno-type; DIEMER'S use of the distinction 
between geno- en pheno-types and
radical types, and subtypes, 96. 


UEBERWEG, 
Hist. of Philosophy, 241. 


UTRA VIRES, II, retribution and ultra vires 
in HERACLITUS and PARMENIDES ; and PETRACZICKY'S 
attributive imperative func


tion, 134. 

UMBGROVE, Dr J. H. F., III, 
Leven en Materie, 736. 

UNA SANCTA ECCLESIA, III, the Church asthe Body of Christ, 510. 

UNAM SANCTAM, III, BONIFACE VIII'S bull, 
and the theory of the two swords, 512. 

UNDERSTANDING, II, is free, active, spontaneous 
in KANT, 496. 

UNDERSTANDING AND INTUITION, II, according 
tO PAUL HOFFMANN, 29. 

UNDIFFERENTIATED ORGANIZED COMMUNI 
TIES, III, TONNIES distinguishes Gemeinschaft from Gesellschaft, but not in a 
normative sense; his concepts "standardtypes", or "normal concepts"; immediatefamily and extended kinship are his prototypes; 
they are no structural typicalconcepts; they also include "household,
mark community, village- and city-guilds,
etc. [cf. sub voce TONNIEs], 346; themembers of an undifferentiated organized 
community consider one another asgenuine blood relatives though there isno real kinship .among them; there is anatural communal mind; yet their societal 
relationship has only an historicalfoundation and is morally qualified; suchsocieties perform structural functions thatat a higher stage of cultural developmentbelong to more than one organized community 
of different structures; they are"
supra-functional", but not "all-inclusive";
they are interlacements of social structures,
347; their difference from differentiated 
communities is not merely modal, but itis structural, and above all typical structural; 
a differentiated organized community 
may adopt typical structural functions 
of other societal relationships; e.g.
a state owned public school, or industry,
an established Church, etc. These are 
pheno-types; their foundational and leading 
functions are genotypically differentiated, 
348; undifferentiated communities 
combine the most heterogeneous structutes 
in one and the same organization;
these structures are interlaced in an intra 
communal sense, not in an intercommunal 
way; they are founded in some power-
formation, closely bound to bioticconditions; the patriarchal "joint fami1y", 
the sib, etc. The predominance of apolitical structure in secret men's societies; 
problems concerning these communities, 
349 [cf. sub voce W. SCHMIDT ;
and also: Kulturkreislehre] ; the joint family 
displays a more complicated structure 
than the kinship; the patriarch'sauthority; the right of primogeniture;
authority is connected with economicfactors, 350; the aul among the Kirghiz . 
has an indivisible common property be1onging 
to from six to ten families joint1y; 
yet the aul is not economically qualified, 
351; it implies a political structurewith armed power in the case of the Kirghiz 
`aul'; but the whole of it is permeated 
by the family mind; FUSTEL DE COULANGE 
describes the ancestor worship ofan Undiffer. Organ. Comm. among the 


 

UNGERER, E.250 

(reeks and Romans; all the generations Science; professes a logical unity of

of one and the same gens form an 'eter- scientific language; 0. VON NEURATH, 59;

nal' whole, 352; the agnatic kinship com- Scientific Empiricism; Logistic; the un


munity is its leading and central struc- critical name of "physicalism"; metaphors,

lure, 353; sibs or clans are posterior to etc., 60; this movement criticized, 60; why

family and kinship, 354 ; sibmates by "physicalism" is the wrong term the Un.

birth or through adoption; sibs are do- Sc. Movement; its various schools, 60.

minated by the family mind; clan exo-

UNITED NATIONS, III, the Charter; inter-

gamy, 355; vendetta; a political structure

is included in the sib; the sib chief: ri- national security; Uno; not a civitas

tual; business organization; totem clans; maxima, 600, 601. 

mana belief, 356; the family bond takes UNITY, I, arithmetical unity is the copy

the lead, 357, 358; a structural principle of a single impression, in HUME, 287.

is not a complex of subjective motives; —, II, of mankind, 262.

the sib's foundational structure is a power

organization, 359; different kinds of UNITY OF THE ROMAN CHURCH, III, and

power are united, 360; sibs are peace- its hierarchy, 234, 235.

organizations, 361; their division of la- UNIVERSAL, I, and particular were con-

hour, 362; secret men's societies (Manner- nected through the teleological Idea of

biinde), are under the leading of a poli- the Intellectus, Archêtypus in KANT, 405.

tical structure; skull-cult; ancestor wor


ship; Vehmgerichte; cruel initiation, 363, UNIVERSAL AND INDIVIDUAL, II, according

364 ; they are antagonistic to matriarchy, to ARISTOTLE, 11.

365; they deprive the sib chief and his UNIVERSALIA, I, are denied a "fundamen


council of any real power, 366; the me-+

tum in re; PETRUS HISPANUS ; they are

dieval guilds, primitive vi cinages, pre- mere signs in OCCAM; they are conceptus

feudal and feudal manorial communities or intentiones animae; copies of traits in

(villae, domaines) and seignories, etc. things, 184; do not have a model in naare 
also undifferentiated organized com- tural reality, 242; are symbols of relarnunities,
367; ARISTOTLE'S theory of socie- tions in LEIBNIZ, 247.
ty refers to the undifferentiated relation- —, II, in Nominalism, OCCAM, 387, 388;
ship of the Greek household, 368; the phy- realism pre-supposes a final hypostasislae and phratries; the polis; dissolution in which the nous, as the noêsis floe-
of the phylae; the ancient Roman curiae seoos and as the divine origin, is se-
with their gentes, 369; quirites; the pri- parated from the temporal coherence of 
mitive Urnorm (primary norm) ; SomLO's reality in an absolute choorismos, 387.

view, 370, 371 ; MALINOWSKI'S criticism, 
371 ; SomLO influenced by AUSTIN'S con- UNIVERSALISM, III, Of ST SIMON and AUG. 
ception of sovereignty; FRITZ MUNCH'S COMTE, 163; G. GURVITCH'S opinion, 165;
view, 372, 373; primary primitive norms OPPENHEIMER'S universalism based onare not structural norms; the structural the substance "Life", 166, 167; mankind 
unity of the internal norms of the natural as an all-inclusive temporal community;
family, 374 ; primitive primary norms COMTE; sociological, ontological andare interweavings of various structural axiological universalism, 167 ; PLATO'Snorms; in a sib there are fraternal norms, universalism, 168; absolutization of the 
internal industrial, political, cult, club Greek polis and the three transcendentalnorms, etc.; they are realized in the con- basic problems, 169; sociological univercrete 
structure of one and the same pri- salism cannot account for our pre-theoremitive 
community, 375; this structure tical experience of a communal relation-
covers up the modal aspects in the corn- ship, 182, 194 ; the dangerous implicationsmunal consciousness; comparison with of such universalism, 195, 196; PLATO'Snorm "complexes" of different structural universalistic State, 200; and ARISTOTLE'Srules destined for various differentiated universalistic view of the polis, 201—
communities, e.g., an Established Church 203; of the conjugal and the family bond,
in which the government of the State may 203, 204 and 205; the influence of theenact certain ecclesiastical norms, 376. universalistic view on ARISTOTLE'S theory

of the forms of government, 210; the uni-

UNGERER, E., III, 

versalistic view of the "Holy Roman Em-

Die Erkenntnisgrundlagen 

der Biologie. pire", 217; THOMAS, 218; Stoic universal-

Ihre Geschichte, and gegenwartiger

ism, 224 ; individualism versus universal-

Stand, 733, 735. 
—, III, uses an "empirical" criterion of ism in the modern view of human so-


organic vital phenomena as "autonomous ciety, 222-238; OTHMAR SPANN, 239, 240; 
totality phenomena", 733; the theory of a the concept of substance was revived in

modern universalistic views of so-
specific vital force was not meant in a ciety; its basis, 243; Gesammtperson andmetaphysical-vitalistic sense, 735. Ueberperson; the higher self-sufficientUNIFIED SCIENCE, II, Encyclopedia of Uni- whole and its "organic" constituent bofied 
Science; Foundations of the Unity of dies, 244; HEGEL, 244, 245; GIERKE'S "Col-
Science; Erkenntnis; Journal of Unified lective Person", 245; OTHMAR SPANN'S 


251 VALIDITY, ABSOLUTE UNIVERSAL 

criticism of individualism, 246; LITT'S 
theory is a kind of universalism, 254, 255;
his final or highest social unity, 258; hisfunctionalistic universalism, 259, 262. 

UNIVERSALISTIC VIEW OF THE CHURCH, III, 
in TROELTSCH ; it embodies the medieval 
synthesis with the Greek "perfect society", 
532. 

UNIVERSALITY, II, the universality of history 
because a merely extensive, geographical 
matter in the Enlightenment, e.g.,
in VOLTAIRE, 354. 

UNIVERSE (THE IDEA OF A), III, the inter-
structural coherence and the idea of a 
universe, 627 ; does it embrace all temporal 
things, occurrences, actions, and societal 
relations? or is it a diversity whichis not enclosed in a temporal individualtotality? this is the dilemma "universalism" 
versus "individualism"; PLATO'S 
idea of the world as a macrocosm and 
man as a microcosm; the world soul and 
the human soul; the idea of an autozooion; 
in his Politeia the State is the 
connecting link between macro- andmicrocosm; this "mesocosm" embraces 
all societal relations as its componentparts, arranging them according to theIdea of justice in its concentric relationto the Idea of goodness; the world reasonis the leading part of the world soul; 
PLATO attempted, 628, to embrace the 
temporal world in a totality; his viewwas universalistic; to KANT the universe 
evaporates into a theoretical limiting•concept 
of reason only pointing to the totality 
of transcendental conditions of theexperience of the "outer world"; thisidea is related to the classical natural 
scientific concept of function; it is of anindividualistic character as a cognitiveideal, 629; the individualistic conceptionof the universe evaporates the totality ofthe cosmos to a subjective limiting concept; 
at least insofar as any rationalisticmetaphysics of the mathematical scienceideal is rejected (DESCARTES, LEIBNIZ) ; 
within the temporal order individualityis bound to a structural diversity lackingany integration into an all-inclusivewhole; the earth and all other celestial 
bodies have been created in systems ofphysico-chemically qualified individuality 
structures; they cannot be construedfrom a functionalistic hypothesis of theirorigin (KANT, LAPLACE), nor as somatospiritual 
super beings, 630; with man asa "part of the earth" (G. TH. FECHNER) ; 

FECHNER'S universalistic conception ispantheistic, 631 the universal order ofinterlacing coherence of all the temporalindividuality structures that we call cosmos 
(ordered universe) cannot itself becontained in an all-embracing individuality 
structure, for the latter bears a typecharacter presupposing a diversity oftypes; the temporal cosmos is the condi


tion of the possibility of the order of

coherence embracing all structural typi


cality; the transcendental idea of possi


bility is entirely determined by the cos


mic world order; the idea of meaning

totality points above itself to the tempo


ral coherence of all the modal spheres

and to the fulness of meaning in the

transcendent religious root and to the

Origin of creation ; in a similar way the

idea of individuality structure points to

that which embraces all such structures 

and to the root and the Origin of all in


dividuality, 632. 

SOCIO-CULTURAL UNIVERSE, III, SOROKIN'S 
erroneous idea, 161. 

UNIVERSITAS, II, the Stoic view, 392. 
—, III, in Stoicism : collectivities of thingswithout mutual sensory points of contact; 
the functional juridical bond holdsthe individual members together, 226;
the Canonistic view; it is considered as 
a juridical name, not a person; its unityin JOHANNES ANDREAE, 233. 

UPANISHADS, II, the speculation of the

Indian Upanishads about the selfhood;

the Iltman (I-ness) is an absolutely ab


stract supra-temporal, actual centre of

the contemplative intuition of essences,

participating in the Brahman, the spirit

of world, 324. 

UOMO UNIVERSALE, I, in LEONARDO DA 
VINCI, 192. 

URBILD UND ABBILD, III, of a sculpture,

114. 
URNORM, III, according to SomLO, 370,374--376. 

USEFUL OBJECT, III, is historically foun
ded and socially qualified, 143. 


UTILITARIANISM, II, in the disharmony ofthe disclosure of the economic sphere theEnlightenment only recognized inter-individual 
relations; the principle of supply 
and demand and that of the freemarket became an "unalterable law"; 
morality became utilitarian and autono


mous, 361. 

UXKULL-GYLLENBAND, W. GRAF, II, 
Griechische Kulturentstehungslehren, 263. 

V 

VAIHINGER, II, his emendation of a text
of IMMANUEL KANT, 499. 


VACUOLES, ,ETC., III, vacuoles nucleoles,
and other para-plasmatic material parti


cles, 724. 


VALIDITY, I, and being, 76.
—, II, legal validity and its retrocipa


tions, 166. 


VALIDITY, ABSOLUTE UNIVERSAL, I, of MO



 

VALIDITY, UNIVERSAL 252 

dal laws even for God, is mere speculatial 
metaphysics, 92. 

VALIDITY, UNIVERSAL, I, cannot be claimedfor a life and world view, according toLITT, 126; in KANT, is independent of allempirical subjectivity, 158; in the phil.
of the Cosmonomic Idea, 160. 

VALLA, LORENZO, I, 
De Voluptate, 198.

—, I, deified nature as the sphere of expansion 
of the personality ideal; he borrowed 
heavily from Epicurean ethics,

198. 
VALUATION, II, emotional acts of valuation 
in SCHELER, 545. 
VALUE, I, and reality" in Neo-Kantianism,


76; according to LITT, 125; in RICKERT,

136. 
—, III, value and reality according toRICKERT, 50. 

VALUES, II, the disintegration of values atthe end of the 19th century; J. BURCKHARDT'S 
insight, and MASUS tS observation, 

282. 
VALUE, ABSOLUTE TRUTH, I, according to 
RICKERT, 135. 

VARIABILITY TYPE, III, points to enkapsis,

127. 
VASSALAGE, II, the Carolingians conquered 
two dangers (the invasions of theArabs, and the rising power of the Frankish 
lords) by the introduction of the

compulsory incorporation of the privatevassals into the Frankish army, 252. 

VEDA, II, its conception of the gods Varouna 
and Mitra as the guardians of rita,
the astronomical world-order, 324. 

VEHMGERICHTE, III, in the Middle Ages,
364-366. 

VELZEN, CORNELIS VAN, III,
Institutiones theologiae practicae, 315. 

VENDETTA, III, in the Clan (or Sib);
proves the presence of a political structure 
in the clan, 356; among primitivetribes, 361. 

VERBAND, III, is an organized community,
178; (cf. s.v. community; and: organizations), 
179. 

VERDE, GIUSEPPE Lo, III,

Die Lehre vom Staat im neuen Italien,

43L 

VEREINBARUNG, III, BINDING and TRIEPEL'S 
concept; it is a unifying volitional act,

573. 
VERNUNFT (REASON), II, in Neo-Hegelianism, 
213. 

VERONESE, H, extended CANTOR'S theoryof transfinite numbers; this theory is. 
antinomic, 87; the convergent infinite 

series is considered as an arithmetical 
concept, 91. 

"VERSTAND" (Cf. S.V. UNDERSTANDING), I, is 
the logical function of thinking in KANT,
53; its usus logicus, and its usus realis, inKANT, 348; it brings unity to the phenomena 
by means of rules of understandingunder principles, 363. 

VERWORFENHEIT (THE STATE OF REJECTION), 
II, in HEIDEGGER'S philosophy, 22. 

VERWORN, III, he calls the hypothetical"protomeries" by the name of "bio-molecules", 
643, 722. 

VICINAGE, III, an undifferentiated organized 
community, 367. 

VICIOUS CIRCLE, I, ascribed to our transcendental 
critique, 56. 

Vico, II, and the idea of historical development, 
and historical individuality,

276. 
VITORIA, FRANCISCUS DE, III, 
Reflectiones Theologicae, 314. 

VIERKANDT, ALFRED„ II, 
Die Anfange der Religion and Zauberei,


314. 
—, III, 
Gesellschaftslehre, 243, 290, 353, 357, 358,
—, III, opposes VON WIESE'S view, 243;
calls LITT's standpoint an "immanent universalism", 
255 (note) ; is influenced bythe naturalistic utilitarian viewpoint inhis Gesellschaftslehre; his theory of reciprocity 
as a biological necessity; his evolutionism 
: personal groups had their precursor 
in the animal herd from which 
we can imagine the human horde to havedescended as the primal form of humansocietal life, 290, 291; VIERKANDT'S reasoning 
approaches that of HOBBES' instinct 
of self-preservation; but in thistheory it is taken for granted that thevital conditions for a member of the 
group are not guaranteed by natural, prelogical 
factors; in animal groups reciprocity 
is absolutely maintained by pre-logical 
factors; not so in a human group;
biotic and psychic aspects of humanshave an entirely different structure fromthat of animals; VIERKANDT'S evolutionism 
is thereby refuted; he denies theblood tie in the family as a foundation;
and refers to the unmarried father's indifference; 
and to the love of foster parents, 
291; his unfounded attack on naïveexperience, 292; parental love is calledforth by continual interaction favouredby sexuality and reproduction; criticismof this view; his concept "foundation"
has a natural causal sense, 293; Unterordnungstrieb 
(submissive instinct), 294;
ancestor cult implies that the communitycontinues that of the family beyond thegrave, 353; the sib chieftain embodies the 


253 WATERLOO, BATTLE OF 

magic power of the clan, 357; on the collective 
responsibility in a clan, 358;
VIERKANDT confounds subjective motiveswith foundational relationships to thecommunal structural principle, 360. 

VINCI, LEONARDO DA, I, and the Idea of 
the "uomo universale", 192; he considered 
nature as a teleological whole animated 
with life, and anticipated GALILEI'S 
mathematical mechanical analysisof empirical phenomena, 198. 

VIRTUE AND BEATITUDE, I, are united in 
the concept of the highest good, in KANT,

382. 
VIRTUES, II, in ARISTOTLE virtues consist 
in the permanent control of the lowersensory functions (the passions) by thewill in conformity to the rules of practical 
reason ; dianoetical or logical virtues,
144, 145. 

VIRTUOSITY, I, is the highest disclosure ofthe sovereign personality, in SHAFTESBURY, 
462. 

VIRUS, III, in BERNARD BAVINK ; is a degenerated 
micro organism; causes mosaicdisease in tobaccoplants, 84; and plantsor animals, 649. 

VISIBLE CHURCH, III, in LUTHER'S views, 
512 ; is not limited to the Church institution, 
534; according to A. KUYPER, 539;
as a "corporation", according to THORBECKE, 
with a civil legal character; thevisible Church is an institution with an 
internal legal sphere apart from civil law,
according to SAVORNIN LOHMAN, 690. 

VISIO OMNIUM RERUM IN DEO, I, of MALE


BRANCHE, 525. 

VITAL MATTER, III, the problem of vitalmatter; KOLZOFF ; DRIESCH ; WOLTERECK,

732. 
VITALISM, II, in DRIESCH ; is antinomous,
110. 
-, III, misinterpreted by DRIESCH, 733(note) ; older and Neo-vitalism, 734, 735;
WOLTERECK'S vitalism includes in life every 
possible phenomenon : spiritual-psychical 
phenomena; shell-formations; protozoa 
movements; temple; book; sonata; astrategic plan, etc., 764. 
VITALISTIC HOLISM, III, is to be rejected, 
77. 

VITULES, III, MEYER'S concept, 722. 

Vivo, II, replaces the cogito in DILTHEY'S

Historism, 19. 


VLEESCHAUWER, H. J. DE, I, 
L'evolution de la pensee Kantienne, 341. 


VLOTEN, J. VAN, I, a 19th century Spinozist
who interpreted SPINOZA in a rationalistic 
way, 250. 


VOETIUS, G., III, 
Politica Ecclesiastica, 315. 


VOGEL, PAUL, III, 
Hegel's Gesellschaftsbegriff, 585. 


VOLKELT, J., II, 
Erfahrung und Denken, 303;
Die Quellen der menschlichen Gewissheit, 
303; 
Gewissheit und Wahrheit, 303, 431, 475, 


476. 
-, II, identifies faith with cognitive intuition, 
303; "reine Selbstgewissheit" isabsolutely free of thought and a-logical,
431 (note) ; he contrasts logical necessitywith intuitive certainty, 475, '476; hisview of intuition, 477. 
VOLKSGEIST, I, in SCHELLING'S philosophy, 
208, 469.
-, II, in the Historical School of jurisprudence, 
397.
VOLLENDUNG, I, and RICKERT'S philosophy, 
131. 


VOLLENHOVEN, D. H. TH., II, 
De Noodzakelijkheid eener Christelijke
Logica, 464. 


VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA, I, the general
will is every citizen's own will and cannot 
do injustice to any one, in ROUSSEAU,
and KANT; in MARSILIUS OF PADUA, 323. 


VOLTAIRE, II, 
Essai sur les moeurs et sur l'esprit des
nations, 352; 
Traite de Metaphysique, 351. 


H; his Idea of worldhistory, 268; howhe found his factual material, 269; hisIdea of historical development, 350; ontradition and manners, morals; invariable 
principles in culture, 352; his zealfor accuracy in the description of morals

and manners; extensive universality ofhistory, 354 ; the original defect in hisdevelopmental idea, 354. 

VORHANDENE, DAS (THAT WHAT IS GIVEN),
II, in HEIDEGGER, 22; human life is at the 
mercy of this datum, 524. 

w 

WAGNER, RICHARD, I, influenced NIETSCHE'S 
first romantic-aesthetic period,

465. 
WALDECKER, LUDWIG, III, 
Allgemeine Staatslehre, 386, 406. 

WATER, I, is experienced as a means of1ife in the subject-object-relation of the

naïve attitude, 42. 
-, III, in water there is an irreversible 
enkaptic foundational relation : H 2O is 
the minimum form-totality, 699; the H-
atoms and the 0-atom remain intact; and 
the structural principle remains unaltered, 
701; a water-molecule is a typical 
spatial ordering of atoms accordingta valency; the formula H2O, 703. 

WATERLOO, BATTLE OF, II, its historical 
dentity, 230, 231. 


 

WAVE MECHANICS 254 

—, III, is not to be grasped in an exclu
sively modal-historical sense; it is a his
torical phenomenon manifested in social
individuality structures, 384. 


WAVE MECHANICS, III, Wellenpakete, 100 


WEBER, E., I, 
Die philosophische Scholastik des deutschen 
Protestantismus im Zeitalter der 
Orthodoxie, 513. 


WEBER, E. H., III, on MULLER'S theory of
the specific energy of the sense organs,


41. 
WEBER, MARIANNE, III, 
Ehefrau und Mutter in der Rechtsentwicklung, 
314, 315, 316.
—, III, Puritanism did not stop at a utilitarian 
view of marriage; in Puritan cir-
. 
cles the Biblical conception of the love
union came strongly to the fore, 316. 


WEBER, MAX, I, a follower of RICKERT ; 
under their influence historicism beganto turn away from naturalistic evolutionism; 
the latter made room for reflection 
on the difference between natural science 
and cultural science, 212. 
—, II, 
Stammler's "Ueberwindung" der materialistischen 
Geschichtsauffassung, 209;
Die protestantische Ethik und der Geistdes Kapitalismus, 293.
—, II, in his Religionssoziologie in Dieprotestantische Ethik und der Geist desKapitalismus there is a shift in the po


siting of the problem, 293 (note).

— III, 
Die Prot. Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus, 
247, 248; 
Parlement und Regierung im neu geordneten 
Deutschland, 386; 
Kirchen und Sekten in Nord Amerika,


527. 
—, III, his "ideal types" of social organizations, 
171, 176; his concept of an a-
normative empirical sociology and the
elimination of the concept of community,
183; his observations-on the inner loneliness 
of the individual person in Calvinism, 
247; the conflict between the "individual" 
and "ethics" (in the sense of
S. KIERKEGAARD) did not exist in Calvinism, 
though in religious matters it placed
the individual completely on his own;
he classes the term individuality with
that of individualism, 248; his "ideal 
types" are useless in ethnology, 330; the
sib chieftain possesses "charismatic" 
authority, 357; a modern state is a large
scale economic business, 386; his idea of
"Zweckenrationalithr (rational aims),
408. 
WEBSTER, III, 
Primitive Secret Societies, 365. 
—, III, secret societies developed from
initiation rites and age groups; they were
intended to establish an aristocracy via
a democracy and a plutocracy, 365. 


,

WEIERSTRASZ, IIon functions in arith


metic; intuition, 484. 

WEINMANN, III, has pointed out the rareness 
of the occurrence of really inadequate 
stimuli of the sense-organs, 41. 


WEISMANN, AUGUST, III, his theory concerning 
he continuity of germplasm,
739; the introduced the term "germplasm"; 
the "Keimbahn" theory; body
cells or soma are split off from the germ-
cells, 757; his theory of the predisposition 
of full grown organic forms, 771. 


WELLS, H. G., II, 
The Outline of History, 270.
—, II, wrote a history of the world, based
on SPENGLER'S evolutionistic ideas, and 
socialism ; ascribed a great role to human
initiative, 270. 


WELTANSCIIAUUNGSLEHRE, I, a theory of
life and world views, 120. 


WENTSCHER, 


Geschichte des Kausalproblems, 300. 


WERNER, HEINZ, II, 
Einfiihrung in die Entwicklungspsychologie, 
178. 


WESENSCHAU, I, or "theoretic intuition of 
the essence" is the ultimate ground of
philosophical certainty in some trends of
modern philosophy, 12; HUSSERL'S eidetic
logic was to be based on the direct intuition 
of the essences on the part of an
"uninterested observer"; in the theoretical 
epochê he can give an adequate essential 
description of the entire act-life
of man in its intentional relation to the 
world, 213. 


WESTERMARCK, EDWARD, II, 
Early Beliefs and their Social Influence,


312. 
—, II, on Religion and magic, 312.
—, III, criticized the constructive evolutionist 
theory of the natural family's development, 
331. 
WESTERN SOCIETY, III, is threatened by
totalitarian ideologies which render the
English dual party system inadequate
and too superficial, 623. 


WEYL, H., II, 
Ueber die neue Grundlagenkrise in der
Mathematik, 88; 
Die Stufen des Unendlichen, 340. 


, II, MATHS depends on natural numbers, 
88 ; criticizes CANTOR'S "set-theory",

340.
. 

WHITEHEAD, A. N., II, 
Whitehead and. Russell: Principia Mathematica, 
78, 82, 83, 436, 452. 
—, II, number and the class concept, 83;
in WHITEHEAD and RUSSELL : Principia
Mathematica; LEIBNIZ; idea of the logical
calculus seems to have been realized, 452.


,III, 
Principia Mathematica, 21, 24; 


255_ WOLFF, CHRISTIAN 


Process and Reality, 21.

— III, distinguishes between "events"
and "objects"; these events are not logically 
self-subsistent, but aspects, 21; he is
an adherent of "emergent evolutionism",
762. 
WIEGAND, HEINRICH, III, 
Die Staatslehre des Thomas von Aquin,


227. 
WI ESE, LEOPOLD VON, II, his formal sociology, 
212.
—, III, 
Allgemeine Soziologie, 242, 243,
—, III, his concept "social form", 172;
the unity of an organized community isexplained as a formal category of consciousness, 
241; social interhuman formations 
exist only in the minds of men; butthey presuppose a plurality of men; hismisinterpretation of naïve experience ofcommunal formations, 243. 

WIJK, N. VAN, II, on Aktionsarten, 126. 

WILDA, III, thesis on the medieval craft 
guilds, 673. 

WILL, I, primacy of the will, in OCCAM,
187; in DESCARTES, 220; is a modus of 
thought; there is no freedom of the willin LEIBNIZ', 238 ; the concept of the willas a mode of mathematical thought, wasrejected by LOCKE, 271; in HUME, the willis an impression felt in a corporeal motion 
or in the production of new Idea inour mind; LocKE's theory of the will,

305; general will in ROUSSEAU'S view,
315; in his first metaphysical treatiseKANT rejects the freedom of the will, 337;
later on our pure autonomous will iscalled an example of an idea of freedom,
an intelligible substance by KANT, 349;
pure will is the moral law, 373; the willis directed by the knowledge of thenatural laws and not by its own moralinclinations, if happiness is the result ofthe moral action; this is the antinomy ofthe practical reason, 383 ; the pure ethicalwill, in FICHTE, 441. 

—, II, in modern psychology, 111; is theconcrete direction of human act life, 145; 
KANT views will as the essence of man, 
150; formative will, 243; psychical function 
of the will, 244 ; juridical will, 537. 

WILL OF THE STATE, THE, III, iS an organized 
unity of volitional direction in theorganized actions of a societal whole,

436. 
WILL TO POWER, THE, I, Of NIETSCHE, 211. 

WINDELBAND, I, 
Einleitung in die Philosophie, 121;
Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, 194,
281, 349, 437, 449, 450, 464, 465; 
Einleitung in die Philosophic, 531;
Geschichte der alten Philosophic, 539.
—, I, philosophy is the science of the
life-and-world-view, 121; comparison of 


Leibnizian metaphysics with PLATO, ARISTOTLE 
and Neo-Platonism, 194; speaks ofPlatonic idealism in LEIBNIZ' doctrine of 
the "eternal verities", 224 ; W. holds that 
HUME, like all his predecessors sinceDESCARTES, had unwavering faith inmathematics as prototype and foundationof scientific thought; W. overlooks HUME'Sdistinction between natural and philosophical 
relations, 280; W. misunderstandsHUME'S conception of the certainty ofmathematical knowledge, 281. he consi


'

dered the influence ROUSSEAU had on IM. 
KANT to be the decisive turning-point inKANT'S philosophic thought, 332 ; W.
thinks that KANT'S idea of "mundus intelligibilis 
is a relapse into Leibnizianmetaphysics, 349; his interpretation ofthe second German Renaissance in its attempts 
at a solution of all antinomies between 
the ideals of science and personality, 
464 ; but his error is that he does notrecognize the moralistic conceptions ofthis Humanism as an apostasy from theChristian Idea of freedom, a secularization, 
465; his division of philosophy, 531. 

-9 

II, 
Präludien, 239; 
Geschichte der neueren Phil., 503. 

— II, on culture, 201; logical, aesthetical,
and ethical norms are supra temporal;
they claim their realization with immediate 
evidence, 239; W.'s short-sighted
praise of KANT'S epistemology, 503.
—, III, 
Einleitung in die Philosophic, 35;
Geschichte der neueren Philosophic, 35.
—, III, naïve empirical thought pre-supposes 
a relation between representations
and reality similar to that between a
thing and its copy; reality is the Gegenstand 
of the copy in the naïve picture of
the world, 35. 
WINDSCHEID, II, 
Pandekten, 403. 
—, II, on subjective rights, 397; he did
not cancel the power of enjoyment contained 
in the concept of subjective right,


403. 
WIRTZ, P., II, 
Die Marind-anim von Hollandisch-SiidNeu-
Guinea, 316. 


WITGENSTEIN, LUDWIG, II, 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 60.
—, II, on the method of philosophy, 60. 


WITTE, J. L., S.J., III,
Het problem individu-gemeenschap in
Calvijn's geloofsnorm, 73. 


WOHLER, III, his synthesis of urine matter, 
716. 


WOLFF, CHRISTIAN, I, he did not understand 
the inventive or "creative" character 
of Cartesian and Leibnizian mathematical 
logic; and reduced the principle ofsufficient reason to the logical principleof contradiction, thereby abolishing the 


 

WOLFF 256 

distinction between "necessary" and

"contingent" truths; but this consequence

lay hidden in LEIBNIZ' theology, 251; hisbasic law for the State, 320; "salus publica 
suprema lex esto"; he openlyacknowledged the insoluble antinomybetween this law and LOCKE'S doctrine 
of the inalienable human rights, 321;
KANT dealt a blow to LEIBNIZ and WOLFF'S 
metaphysics, 334 ; he attacked the Wolffian 
conception which derived causalityfrom the logical principle of contradiction, 
335; his logicistic mathematicalmethod; by mere conceptual analysis hethought he could obtain a priori knowledge 
of reality and its causal relations,
339; his division of philosophy, 530.
-, II, philosopher of the Enlightenment,
influenced codifications, 358; his humanistic 
theory of innate rights and naturallaw, 413. 
-9 III, 
Jus naturae, 282, 444. 
-9 III, his theory of the police- and welfare 
state was based on the Lockian "innate 
rights" and devoted much attentionto non-political associations; but individual 
freedom was sacrificed to the salus 

publica, 237; his theory of natural law,
282; of salus publica, 442, 443; his Aristotelian 
view, 444. 


WOLFF, III, 
Angewandte Rassenkunde, 496. 


WOLLF, J., II,


Complexe Getallenstelsels, 173. 


WOLFF, H. J., III, 
Organschaft and Juristische Person, 407. 


WHOLE AND ITS PARTS, THE, I, in metaphysics, 
is a pseudo-concept, 72; in Hus-


SERL, 73, 74. 


WOLTERECK, R., I, 
Grundzfige einer allgemeinen Biologie,


565. 
-, I, he conceives of organic life as amaterial living "substance" (matrix) withan outer material constellation and an 
inner side of life-experience, 556; discussion 
of the philosophical conflict concerning 
the foundations of biology, 565.
-, III, 
Grundziige einer allgemeinen Biologie,
102, 108, 643, 698, 701, 702, 719, 720, 823, 
724, 725, 728, 729, 731, 770, 771, 777, 778;
Philosophic des Lebendigen, 733, 749,


750, 751, 755, 756, 757, 759, 760, 761;


Ontologie des Lebendigen, 762, 763, 764,


765. 
-, III, substantial "matrix" of "living
matter", 24; exoplasmic and endoplasmic 
constituents of an organism, 102;
he opposes the older view of an organism
as a cellular system; he calls the hypothetical 
"protomeries" bio-molecules, 643;
plants and their "Umwelt" form an internal 
structural unity and totality, 698;
the concept "ordered spatial figure", 701, 
702 (note) ; on exoplasms, 718, 719, 720;
paraplasmatic material particles, 724 ; histerm "biomolecule" has played him a badtrick in his conception of the "matrix"
of "living matter", 725; his programmeof bio synthesis, 728; active change withmaintenance of the total system is a newbiotic phenomenon, 728; the differencebetween enzymes and hormones operating 
as bio-impulses in a living organismand the catalysts of non-biotically qualified 
chemical processes, 731; matrix; hiscriticism of DRIESCH'S entelechy, 732;
his bio-substance concept is connectedwith "immaterial and conditional structural 
constants"; physico-chemical biophenomena 
are the temporal-spatial outside, 
the immaterial essence is the insideof a living being; a vital process is the"inner experience" of such a being; itwill be impossible to synthesize "livingmatter", i.e. the "bio-substance", 750; its"primary bio-chemical moment"; and iscapable of stimulation and has geneticcontinuity; it is to be compared 'withradio active elements and aromatic combinations; 
there are producing and produced 
components of a living cell; the"producing" component only is "living-
substance"; assimilation and dissimilation; 
inductive material units (genes,
hormones, enzymes, organizers) ; "matrix" 
(germplasm, idioplasm, reserve-
plasm), 751; the matrix produces itselfand sometimes the inductive material 
components; enzymes and metabolism;
protein combinations; hormones; the influence 
of "organizers on the embryo",
752; his hypothesis, 755; the "seat" of theorganizers and regulators, 756; he speaksof the "matrix" as something whose existence 
has been established; he identifiesit with germplasm, idioplasm or hereditary 
material, 757; and emphatically distinguishes 
between living and non-livingcomponents of a cell; his view was influenced 
by the metaphysical substanceconcept; a molecular theory of mattereliminates the typical totality structure ofa living being, 759; it does not makesense to speak of a specific material "bio-
substance", 760: WOLTERECK is involved 
in antinomies; Roux's criticism of a matter 
"that assimilates itself", 761; his"emergent evolutionism"; different levelsof reality arise according to the rule ofstructural constants, 762 ; antinomy between 
their constancy and the continuityand unity of the genetic process; valueand the genesis of value are mutually exclusive; 
W.'s evolutionism is irrationalistic; 
it proceeds from the Humanisticmotive of nature and freedom; freedomis called the completion of nature, 763;
W.'s all-embracing "life" concept is anabsolutization and shows his lack of insight 
into the different modal and individuality 
structures, 764 ; in the protozoaand protophytes the total form is an ex



257 ZWINGLIAN CHURCH GOVERNMENT 


pression of the total system of the cell, 
770; he demonstrated that also the separate 
cell-form is an elementary total formexpressing a typical structural whole, 
771; his investigations into the biotic elementary 
forms, 772, 773; his three maingroups of morphological types and their 
milieu, 777. 

WOOD-CELLS, III, of a tree, 129, 131. 

WORK OF ART, I, reconciles the tension 
between necessity and freedom (SCHELLING), 
208. 

—, III, a secondary radical type, 110; itis a sensory perceptual thing related toaesthetic value, according to RICKERT, 

113. 
WORLD CITIZENSHIP, II, in the Enlightenment 
and in the Stoa, 358. 

WORLD-KINGDOM, III, ZENO'S politeia; theStoic cosmopolitan ideal, 228, 229. 

WORLD PLAN, I, and creation, 174; according 
to FICHTE, 480, 481.
—, III, ANAXAGORAS' idea, 633. 

WORLD SUBSTANCE, III, in EDDINGTON'S 
psycho-monism; mathematical forms arecalled "spiritual"; but the "Wirkungsquantum" 
-h- has no modal mathematicalmeaning, 101. 

WUNDT, II, heterogenesis of aims inhistory, 244. 

WYSJINSKY, III,

The Law of the Soviet State, 459. 

X 

XENOCRATES, I, directed the Academy afterSPEUSIPPOS; his division of philosophyinto: ethica, physica, and logica, 536. 

XENOPHON, I, 
Memor., 3, 9, 4; ... 535.
—, III, in his Memorabilia he mentions 
SOCRATES' idea of a teleological world-
order, 633. 


X-RAYS, III, the light spectra of combined 
atoms do not pass over into the x-
ray spectrum of the elements; this spectrum 
originates from the more centralshells of electrons round the nuclei of 
heavier atoms, 704. 

z 

ZAHLSTRECKE, II, number is supposed tobe continuous, in PASCH, 91. 

ZENO, III, valued the state, and its positive 
law, 228; favoured a world kingdomunder a common law; without marriage,
family, temple or judicature, 229. 

ZWANGGENOSSENSCHAFTEN, III, in German 
Law, 681. 

ZWINGLIAN CHURCH GOVERNMENT, III, opposed 
the Calvinistic conception ofChurch discipline, 519. 


viv 

Aitiqoatat

fauku